Quality, legitimacy and global governance : a comparative analysis of four forest institutions by Cadman, T
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality, Legitimacy and Global 
Governance: A Comparative Analysis 
of Four Forest Institutions 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Timothy Mark Cadman MA 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Tasmania September 2009
  ii 
Thesis Statement 
This thesis contains no material that has been accepted for degree or diploma by 
the University or any other institution, except by way of background information 
and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of the candidate’s knowledge 
and belief no material previously published or written by another person except 
where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does the thesis 
contain any material that infringes copyright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
 
 
Tim Cadman 
September 2009 
  iii 
Statement on Authority of Access 
This thesis may be made available for loan and copying in accordance with the 
Copyright Act 1968. 
 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
 
Tim Cadman 
September 2009 
 
Faculty of Arts 
School of Government 
University of Tasmania 
Newnham Campus 
Launceston  
Tasmania 7250 
Australia 
 
  iv 
Abstract 
This dissertation is a theoretical and evaluative study of the quality of global 
governance, explored through case studies of four global institutions in the 
environmental policy domain addressing forest management: the Forest 
Stewardship Council, the ISO 14000 Series (Environmental Management 
Systems), the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification, and the 
United Nations Forum on Forests. It examines the international 
relations/international politics and comparative politics/public administration 
literature concerning the institutional theory and practice of contemporary 
governance, particularly the nature of democracy beyond the nation-state. Given 
the ongoing evolution of global governance, it is important to determine whether 
the institutions in which actors operate are sufficiently effective to address the 
problems of the contemporary era. Previous methods of evaluating governance 
quality have been based largely upon input/output legitimacy. Using a theoretical 
framework based around ‘new’ governance, the thesis argues that contemporary 
global governance is best understood as being built around ‘participation as 
structure’ and ‘deliberation as process’, and that the more deliberative the 
interactions within a given institution, the higher the quality of governance. The 
method of analysis is built upon a new arrangement of the accepted attributes of 
‘good’ governance, using a set of qualitative principles, criteria and indicators, 
and applied to the structures and processes of governance. Recognising that 
contemporary global institutions are manifold, the analytical framework also 
locates the institutions typologically, determined by their source of authority 
(state/non-state), democratic mode (aggregative/deliberative) and degree of 
governance innovation (old/new). The research findings confirm that the more 
deliberative the model of democratic interaction, the better the systems’ quality of 
governance and by extension, the more legitimate the institution. 
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Introduction  
Background 
The emergence of international intergovernmental institutions in the immediate 
post Second-World War period, particularly those associated with the United 
Nations and the Bretton Woods system, represent an important step in the 
development of world economic, social and political relations. Previously, 
decision making powers had rested almost exclusively within the nation-state and 
when these decisions resulted in conflict between nations, disputes were resolved 
principally under the Westphalian model of international diplomacy, in which 
state-centred sovereign authority remained unchallenged. Today, this sovereignty 
still remains intact, but is now increasingly the subject of an international system, 
in which national governments are rendered at least partially accountable to each 
other through such bodies as the United Nations (UN). These developments have 
resulted in a more global approach to international relations as can be seen in the 
growth of a range of intergovernmental institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO).  
On a national level, governments still act as the chief political facilitators, 
making decisions that subordinate the needs of the certain societal sectors in 
favour of others. Citizens may be disadvantaged in favour of the market for 
example, or conversely, corporate interests curbed to protect the disadvantaged 
from the excesses of the market. International agreements, including the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenants on 
Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and 
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subsequent treaties and declarations between contracting states have attempted to 
include previously marginalised groups in political decision making. These 
include women and ethnic and cultural minorities, although such initiatives have 
met with varying success. Nevertheless, these agreements should still be 
interpreted as redefining the traditional understanding of the social contract as one 
between the individual and the state towards one in which an emergent world 
polity has become the location for an often heated dialogue between national 
governments and civil society over universal social, economic and political rights, 
and particular local conditions. 
But despite these changes, democratic participation in decision making, if it 
occurs at all, still takes place largely within the nation-state, and political 
participation on a global level also remains largely in the state’s hands. The 
adequacy of this traditional, intergovernmental, approach to problem solving is 
being called into question from a number of crosscutting directions. Firstly, 
although national sovereignty remains formally intact, it is coming under 
increasing pressure due to the supranational nature of many of the UN’s initiatives 
as well from those countries that subscribe actively to its agenda, and from 
regional integration initiatives, such as the European Union. Secondly, citizens 
themselves are also questioning the political sovereignty of the nation-state in this 
new era of debate around universal rights. Thirdly, both states and citizens are 
either supportive or critical of these new and emerging global arrangements, 
depending on whether they are the beneficiaries or victims of the social, political 
and economic change that has occurred. Change has also been accelerated by the 
integration of global financial activities, information and communication 
technologies and increasing scientific knowledge, which in part contribute to the 
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contemporary phenomenon referred to as globalisation. These factors make for a 
complex debate regarding the role, rights and obligations of both the individual 
and the state in this, the post-modern era, which is characterised by its 
complexity, uncertainty and risk. 
At the same time however, and historically commensurate with the rise of 
globalisation, it is possible to discern an increasing ‘enviromentalisation’ of 
global institutions. An important first step, sponsored by the United Nations 
Educational Cultural and Scientific Organisation (UNESCO), was the 
establishment of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources (IUCN, now the World Conservation Union) in 1948.1 In 1949, 
the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) followed by convening the 
Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources. This 
event was confined to information sharing regarding resource use and 
conservation, and it was not until the United Nations Commission on the Human 
Environment (UNCHE) in 1968 that non-state interests began to play a more 
active role in the development of institutional arrangements and action plans. The 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Stockholm Declaration 
of 1972, both of which arose out of the UNCHE, placed the imperative for 
environmental action on the global level, and set the future for discussions about 
the environment within a normative context. For the next few years UNEP set 
about fulfilling its mandate on a variety of international issues through close 
collaboration and coordinated action with governments, intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN bodies, and a 
range of private interests.2 Global action on the environment reached a high point 
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with the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. 
These types of institution are constituted from of an ever-increasingly diverse 
range of both state and non-state actors. This has created a premium on 
institutional ‘buy-in’, meaning that governments in particular have had to become 
more collaborative -- that is more participatory and deliberative -- in their 
dealings with other interested parties. This collaboration has encouraged the 
proliferation of conferences, roundtables, dialogues and other forums, many of 
which recognise the importance of ‘multi-stakeholders’. The substantive outcome 
of Rio, Agenda 21, embedded non-state participation in the normative framework 
of international environmental policy and the role of non-state interests in 
environmental decision making at all levels was formally acknowledged.3 The 
expectation for increased citizen participation in decision making that these 
developments have brought about therefore raise some dynamic tensions between 
state and non-state actors in the creation of global environmental policy. 
The changing social, environmental and economic conditions that have arisen 
as a consequence of globalisation consequently present some major challenges to 
contemporary democracy, both in terms of how to structure institutional responses 
in ways that effectively deal with global problems, and how to include newly-
enfranchised actors in decision making processes. With no one single nation state 
acting as the global political facilitator -- at least officially -- there has been an 
evolution in the delegation of authority away from traditional government towards 
the more abstract concept of governance. The business of decision making is no 
longer exclusively the domain of the nation-state, and new global processes have 
generated alternative forms of global public-domain institution, characterised by 
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the interplay between traditional government, the global corporate sector and civil 
society.  
This transition from government to governance is neither straightforward nor 
uncontested, and there are tensions between the universal aspirations embedded in 
the new world order and their expression on a local level. Alternative institutional 
arrangements have not replaced the sovereignty of the nation-state, but they can 
both complement, or compete with, conventional national and international 
institutions. These arrangements are exemplified by the growing number of 
social-environmental, market-based initiatives built around the concept of 
sustainable development. A fundamental shift is occurring in the national and 
international public/private sector balance, which is delivering opportunities for a 
global form of governance, in which both civil society and corporations are 
playing a key role. The practice of democracy in this globalised context questions 
the relevance of traditional modes of democratic governance, and its ability to 
effectively address global problems, or even to represent the interests of state and 
society in a globalised world, particularly when the boundaries between public 
and private authority -- and national and supranational responsibilities -- are 
becoming increasingly blurred. This reconfiguration away from power located 
geographically within the nation-state to one within a global landscape is already 
happening, both in terms of theory and practice, and there is clearly a need to 
understand this process in order to determine how democracy can be rendered 
adequate in an era of globalisation.4 
Research Focus, Central Question and Argument  
This ongoing reconfiguration of power challenges the validity of hitherto 
territorially based systems of democracy, in which the individual’s political 
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participation is limited almost exclusively to electing representatives to make 
decisions on their behalf. Consequently, the question arises as to whether the 
traditional democratic approach is adequate for a world in which interaction 
occurs in a non-spatial system where multiple interests seek to make decisions 
whose social, environmental and economic importance transcends borders. The 
reconfiguration of power outlined above questions whether participation within 
current institutions of global governance is either sufficiently comprehensive, or 
‘deep’ enough to represent those interests required for decision making processes 
to solve universally significant problems.  
Deforestation serves as a case in point. Deforestation has been attributed to a 
wide range of causes including international development and debt policies, 
population growth, poverty, drug cultivation, wars and the role of the military, 
land tenure inequities and natural causes.5 Whilst almost everyone is prepared to 
accept there is a problem of over-extraction, governments face considerable 
political difficulties in determining how to best manage forests when they are 
used by many individuals in common, and there is conflict over what action to 
take.6 Forest management also exists within a global market system where the 
cornucopian or Promethean discourse denies the existence of environmental 
limits; it compels ever-increasing production in a world that is limited.7 As a 
consequence, global deforestation continues to escalate. Government 
representatives meet to make decisions regarding management in global forums 
that exist beyond the electoral mandate of the national citizen. But contemporary 
issues, which are universal in significance, such as the management of the world’s 
forest ecosystems, are not always contained within the territorial space of any 
single country.  
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The non-territorial and contradictory nature of the forest problematic in 
particular raises some fundamental questions regarding the practice of global 
governance generally. Although there is a growing inclusion of non-state interests 
in decision making, effective corrective mechanisms to address problems remain 
limited due largely to the rather powerless nature of many of the existing, 
conventional, international regulatory institutions. This should cause those with 
interest in contemporary global governance to want to understand what it is about 
its current practice that renders certain institutions ineffective.     
The central research question of this thesis therefore asks, “How can 
governance systems be distinguished one from another and how can they be 
evaluated in terms of their effectiveness?” This question is especially relevant in 
the current era, as the demarcation between public and private is becoming 
blurred, and the rights and responsibilities of the state, corporations, and civil 
society one to another within the new paradigm of globalisation have become 
increasingly complex. The question also contains an implied challenge to the 
adequacy of traditional approaches to decision making and the interests they 
serve. Given this analysis, the effectiveness of global governance turns to a 
considerable degree on the arrangements for democratic participation within 
contemporary global institutions.  
In terms of forest governance in particular, the subject under consideration in 
this dissertation, this question relates to the standards and regulations developed, 
and the extent to which they are relevant on the universal level, applicable within 
regional or national contexts, and capable of solving what is both a global and 
local social, environmental and economic problem. The central thesis of this study 
is that, Global institutions that utilise deliberative modes of interaction are better 
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suited to the needs of the contemporary era than those using more traditional 
aggregative approaches. Of the existing global institutions with responsibility for 
forest management, the largely civil society initiative called the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) proves to be most effective in response to the 
challenge of managing forests in an era of globalisation and environmental 
awareness. This thesis argues that FSC performs so well because it is markedly 
different from existing institutions that use aggregative models of democracy, 
whereby competition between divergent interests invariably results in social, 
economic or environmental conflict. Grounded as they are within the territorial 
confines of the nation state, such institutional approaches are no longer adequate 
in an era of globalisation, in which the need for collaboration to tackle global 
problems has become a pressing necessity. 
Key Conceptual Elements of Contemporary Governance 
To prove this thesis, it is necessary to understand why current methods of 
participation and deliberation in some existing forest-related institutions are not 
sufficient, and what it is about FSC’s governance that makes it a more effective 
model. This study has explored these two concepts in some detail, and views them 
as functioning interdependently in contemporary governance. Participation has 
been described as the: “cornerstone of democracy [and] a categorical term for 
citizen power”; it represents a significant mechanism for social reform, as it 
redistributes power between the affluent and the disadvantaged, enabling them to 
share in the same benefits of society, and without which “the redistribution of 
power is an empty and frustrating process.”8 Deliberation is a specific method of 
interaction, markedly different from the traditional practice of aggregative 
democracy. It occurs when problems are discussed with a view to developing 
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solutions through cooperation and joint agreement and in which rational discourse 
contributes to problem solving.9 The designation of democracy as aggregative or 
deliberative is a critical theoretical method of interpreting the particular 
expression of a given democratic model, and is characterised as consisting of 
competitive versus cooperative political interaction.10 
It is important to understand the conceptual evolution in thinking about 
governance in the wake of globalisation, particularly the emphasis on deliberative 
approaches to decision making and how these new approaches are reflected in the 
environmental arena. The conceptual framework of this study is consequently 
informed by what can be termed ‘new governance’ literature.11 The centrality of 
participation and deliberation to the new modes of what is referred to as social-
political interaction form the basis of the institutional analysis in this study. Here, 
contemporary governance is conceived of in terms of participation as structure 
and deliberation as process. This is an extension of the existing idea that 
governance is now to be understood in terms of both structure and process.12 In 
such a context participation and deliberation have a functional significance 
beyond their particular expression in a given institution; it is not the institution per 
se, but rather how participation and deliberation occurs within it that determines 
the effectiveness of its governance.  
A further and more complex result of the evolution of contemporary 
governance is its diversity, and how it is categorised in the literature. Most 
authorities are able to see a difference from earlier conceptions, generally 
described as being ‘top down’ in nature; contemporary governance by contrast is 
portrayed as being less command-and-control oriented.13 Beyond this, theorists 
dispute the number and types of contemporary governance. Classifications tend to 
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be grouped together around an understanding of governance as an essentially 
state-based phenomenon, or an aspect of globalisation, or a mixture of the two. 
These differences are explored in more detail in a subsequent chapter, but the 
point that needs to be made here, is that these disputes over the phenomenon of 
governance can make comparisons between theories difficult. Consequently, this 
study has chosen to understand the many types of contemporary global 
governance as being delineated by three broad parameters. These relate to the 
degree of innovation in governance (simply put, between ‘new’ and ‘old’ styles of 
governance), modes of democratic practice (between aggregative and deliberative 
approaches), and source of authority (state-centric or non-state). This approach is 
less of a ‘theory of governance’ and more of conceptual method for discussing 
and comparing individual institutions within the ‘universe’ of contemporary 
governance. Knowing where an institution is located will provide useful 
information for determining the general contribution of these parameters to the 
overall performance of an institution, most notably the democratic mode 
employed.  
In order to explore this discussion within its global context, this study has 
chosen to examine global institutions of forest governance, and forest 
management certification in particular. Forest governance provides an ideal focus 
for this study, since its multi-sectoral, participatory nature most closely reflects 
the evolving relations brought about by globalisation between socially, 
economically or environmentally-oriented actors, who have an interest in solving 
both a universal environmental problem (unsustainable forest management, 
resulting in deforestation), and its particular local manifestations.14 In totality, the 
interactions within a given institution represent the major components of what can 
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be termed governance systems, and what structures and processes these systems 
utilise yields important information about the efficacy of a specific global 
institution under investigation to the task of managing forests in the contemporary 
era.  
Reflecting the complexity of contemporary governance generally, forest 
governance is also expressed in a number of different models.15 This situation is 
reinforced by the market-driven emphasis inherent in sustainable development, 
and exemplified by the rivalry -- explored in detail in this study -- between forest 
management certification schemes. Forest certification has become the subject of 
numerous studies.16  
Some core concepts require definition at this point, as they are relevant to, or 
impinge upon, all the forest governance systems investigated. Certification should 
be understood as “a process, which results in a written quality statement (a 
certificate) attesting to the origin of raw wood material and its status and/or 
qualifications following validation by an independent third party.”17 A key 
objective of certification is to promote sustainable forest management (SFM), 
which is the process of managing a forest to ensure ongoing production whilst 
maintaining its environmental and social function.18 Standards are a set of 
principles, criteria and indictors (PC&I) that serve as a tool to promote SFM, as a 
basis for monitoring and reporting or as a reference for assessment of actual forest 
management. A principle is a fundamental rule or aspect of forest management. 
Criteria are to be understood as states or aspects of forest management requiring 
adherence to a principle of forest certification. Indicators are qualitative or 
quantitative parameters, which are assessed in relation to a criterion, and 
contribute to the overall determination of the quality of forest management.19 
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These are introduced at this point since the use of PC&I as a means of 
determining the impacts of management within the forest certification literature is 
adopted by the author as part of the study’s conceptual framework and as an 
evaluative tool in its methodology. The use of PC&I is not unique to forest 
science, but the importance of the hierarchical relationship between PC&I, has 
been overlooked in some quarters of political science.20  
Legitimacy and the Determination of Governance Quality 
With the increasing privatisation of forest governance and with so many 
alternative approaches, choice in itself has become a problem for both consumers 
and policy makers alike. This is problematic from a governance perspective, as it 
is becoming ever more difficult to distinguish ‘good’ schemes from ‘bad’. Some 
forest governance systems appear to understand SFM as a means of substantially 
improving forest management beyond the existing status quo; others may simply 
be free-riding on the back of previously-developed programmes by adopting 
easily achievable elements, whilst ignoring others, or even worse, setting 
themselves up as ‘decoy’ institutions.21 In the absence of such standards -- 
ironically, such an important feature in many of the governance systems 
themselves -- there is confusion over what constitutes ‘good’ governance, and 
establishing its presence in a given scheme is at present a somewhat arbitrary 
process. 
Much of the assessment debate revolves around the question of legitimacy, and 
from whence it is derived, reflecting a common pre-occupation in the broader 
governance literature. Legitimacy in the context of this study is understood as 
being derived from the sum total of both the inputs, outputs and outcomes of a 
governance system. Inputs are understood as participatory structures and 
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deliberative processes; outputs as substantive products such as standards and 
policies; and outcomes in terms of the way in which the substantive products of a 
system exercise a longer-term influence over actors’ behaviour, and the status of 
the problem itself. In this formulation legitimacy is synonymous with the 
effectiveness, or quality, of a governance system: the ends do not justify the 
means; indeed, it is the means, which largely determine the ends. One of the main 
purposes of this study is therefore to develop and test an evaluative framework for 
determining governance quality, capable of incorporating the many different 
systems of governance, whilst providing a common template for assessment. This 
has required moving beyond particular definitions of ‘good’ governance and 
approaching the problem of assessment by comparing multiple systems in terms 
of the structures and procedures of governance underlying them.22 ‘Good’ 
governance in this context could therefore be defined as the effective interaction 
between the inputs, outputs and outcomes of a given institution.  
The quality of contemporary environmental governance is consequently 
evaluated in this study by examining the participatory structures, deliberative 
processes, substantive products, and longer-term outcomes of a given institution, 
as it is these, which ultimately determine its effectiveness. Effectiveness here 
continues to be defined as a measure of the performance of a given institution in 
relation to a set of objectives, but in this study it is ultimately evaluated at the 
principle, rather than indicator level.23 In the hierarchical framework of 
assessment developed in this study, ‘good’ governance is therefore not to be 
attributed to any single institutional arrangement, such as accountability, or 
transparency, and so forth. These are critically important, but function at a lower 
level of assessment, and represent specific indicators of performance, which 
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together make up the criteria, against which the structures and processes of 
governance are judged. In turn, these criteria contribute to the overall 
determination of performance at the principle level. Rather than evaluating the 
performance of an institution on the basis of a few individual attributes, this 
approach consequently looks at a governance system as a whole. In addition, by 
locating each institution within the ‘universe’ of contemporary governance, the 
overall performance of an institution can also be compared to its degree of 
innovation, democratic practice and source of authority. This provides important 
information concerning some of the broader parameters affecting quality of 
governance, most notably democratic practice. 
Method 
The broad objective of the research method adopted in this study is to determine 
whether a governance system that more closely adheres to a deliberative model, 
performs better than one that utilises more conventional democratic approaches. 
Four global institutions of forest governance were selected for an exploration of 
this objective by means of qualitative analysis.24 The case studies are the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC), the International Standardisation Organisation (ISO) 
14000 Series (Environmental Management Systems - EMS), the Program for the 
Endorsement of Forest Certification Schemes (PEFC), and the United Nations 
Forum on Forests (UNFF). UNFF provides an example of an existing forest-
related intergovernmental model, whilst PEFC and FSC are both market-based 
certification programmes that address forest management, but are sufficiently 
different in their structures, processes and governance types to provide interesting 
comparisons. ISO 14000 has been included on account of its value as another 
global environmental governance system with an emphasis on environmental 
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management, and an associated certification programme.25 The ISO 14000 Series 
does not deal specifically with forest management, although its standards can be 
applied to both forestry and forest products. It did initially commence discussions 
for the development of a forest-management specific standard, but this 
subsequently became a lower-level, technical, publication TR 14061. The specific 
institutional type of each case study is discussed in more detail in subsequent 
chapters.  
Each of the four schemes have been selected on the basis of their different 
arrangements for interaction between social, economic and environmental 
interests on the global, national and local levels (both public and private, or state 
and non-state), the model of governance they employ, and democratic mode. Each 
of the institutions has been subjected to a review of primary documentation from 
the institution itself, secondary materials from scholarly commentators, and ‘grey’ 
literature generated by critics such as NGO commentators and consultants.  
Interviews were also conducted with representatives from the main interests -- 
economic, environmental social and governmental -- that participate in forest 
governance, as well as with staff, from each of the institutions. The interviewees 
were selected based on their appearance in materials generated by each of the 
schemes and in the secondary literature, as noted by previous researchers, and on 
the recommendation of other interviewees. All were subjected to a similar set of 
questions, one for the institutional subjects, and one for sectoral informants. The 
questions were oriented around identifying the interviewees’ perspectives on the 
structural and procedural aspects of the governance system in question, including 
its establishment, rules and procedures, and outputs. The interviewees’ views 
were also sought on the strengths and weaknesses of the relevant systems, and the 
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general significance they attributed to participation. Interview subjects were 
placed into three groups for the purposes of commenting on their perspectives: 
business (consisting of forest-related enterprises, forest owners -- large and small 
-- and business professionals); non-governmental organisations (NGOs -- both 
social and environmental); and others (institutional, research, government, and 
special agencies, such as FAO). All subjects have been identified in the case 
studies by the date of their interview and the group into which they were placed, 
but not by name. The intention behind designating subjects in this way is to both 
preserve confidentiality, whilst still providing some indication, where relevant, of 
the views of business and NGO interests from a whole-of-sector perspective. 
Confidentially was assured in order to solicit an open and frank assessment of 
each institution. A full list of interview participants is included in the Appendices. 
Given the number of interviewees (thirty seven overall, nine from business, 
fifteen from NGOs, thirteen from ‘other’) it has not been possible to divide the 
governmental, institutional, research and special agency informants into separate 
groups without risking revealing the identity of subjects. These interviews are 
used to complement and corroborate the literature examined, and to determine the 
views of interviewees regarding the governance arrangements of each of the case 
studies.  
The data thus collected have been used to evaluate the performance of each 
institution against a set of PC&I of governance quality. The results are then 
correlated to the three broad parameters of contemporary governance, referred to 
above -- most notably the democratic mode employed. The intention behind this 
second analytical method is to determine whether those institutions that are more 
deliberative in their democratic form performed better than those that used more 
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traditional aggregative modes. This is to address the contention presented in this 
study, that global institutions that use deliberative modes of interaction, are better 
suited to the conditions of the contemporary era. 
Thesis Structure 
This introduction has outlined the background, central research question and 
argument, key conceptual framework elements, methodology and structure 
underpinning the study’s central thesis. Following this, Chapter Two sets the 
scene for a more focussed discussion of contemporary governance. A brief review 
of the literature on globalisation establishes the context for changing perspectives 
on governance. It highlights the shift in focus away from state-based approaches 
founded on intergovernmentalism to hybrid public-private and civil-society based 
approaches. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the evolution 
of contemporary governance theory and practice, and describe some of the 
recognised components of ‘good’ governance. Chapter Three focuses on forest 
governance, which is identified as a policy arena where the shift from ‘old’ 
governance institutions, exemplified by the International Tropical Timber 
Organisation (ITTO) and the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP) to ‘new’ 
governance institutions (such as forest certification schemes) is especially evident. 
The chapter argues that beyond merely noting the existence of this shift, there is a 
need for a more elaborate framework for assessing the quality of governance 
occurring within these ‘new’ institutions. It presents a typology of contemporary 
global governance, addresses the ‘problem’ of legitimacy by means of a 
conceptual model, introduces a set of PC&I for the analysis of institutional 
performance, and situates these within an evaluative framework, against which 
the case studies in subsequent chapters are assessed.  
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The next four chapters systematically investigate the governance arrangements 
of each of the case studies, commencing with FSC, and following with ISO, 
PEFC and UNFF.26 After a history of the emergence, evolution and significant 
developments affecting each particular case study, a second section presents an 
overview of its governance system as a whole, including its typology. This is 
followed by an evaluation of the institution’s performance and, using the sources 
of information discussed above, each indicator is critically assessed and provided 
with a rating. Subsequent to a postcript bringing each case study as up to date as 
possible, each chapter concludes with a synthesis of the findings and offers some 
preliminary observations on the particular institution investigated. 
Chapter Eight provides a systematic comparison of the governance 
arrangements of all four case studies across the analytical framework of Chapter 
Three, highlighting similarities and differences. After a general discussion of the 
performance of all four case studies, a more detailed thematic investigation of 
each of the criteria and indicators follows. This section also explores some of the 
possible reasons underlying the differences and similarities between the 
performances of each institution and provides some concluding observations on 
each of the criteria. A final section summarises the performance of each case 
study and examines each institution in the light of the total quality of its 
governance system. The chapter concludes by commenting on the relationship 
between institutional type and performance.  
Chapter Nine, the conclusion, summarises the dissertation, highlights its 
findings, identifies its weaknesses, demonstrates its significance, and points to 
avenues for further research. The Appendices contain a list of interview subjects, 
and the background materials associated with each of the interviews. 
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Global Governance and the Environment:  
Theory and Practice 
Introduction 
In the Introduction a question was raised as to how to differentiate between the 
many institutional varieties of contemporary governance and how to determine 
their effectiveness in an era of globalisation. Two key elements were introduced 
as being central to evaluating the governance of the institutions investigated: 
firstly, the manner in which participation is structured within such institutions; 
and secondly, the extent to which the procedures of these institutions follow 
deliberative approaches. The following chapter begins this task by placing the 
discussion of contemporary governance in the context of globalisation and 
providing an overview of governance theory and practice. It continues with a 
broad outline of the central perspectives of two broad schools of thought (referred 
to here as international relations/international politics and comparative 
politics/public policy), and investigates how these schools look at contemporary 
governance in terms of its structures and processes. A further section looks at how 
these structures and processes are expressed institutionally, describing a situation 
in which non-state participation and deliberative -- or discursive -- methods of 
reaching agreement are taking place within increasingly private, civic or hybrid 
public/private-civic institutions. These discussions inform a subsequent, more 
focussed, exploration as to how governance quality and legitimacy are understood 
in these contexts. This is followed by a more systematic examination of the key 
concepts associated with governance quality and legitimacy most notably interest 
representation, accountability and transparency, decision making, and 
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implementation. A concluding section reflects on the materials examined, and 
points to the need to synthesise the discussions contained in this chapter into a 
more coherent analytical framework capable of classifying and evaluating 
contemporary governance. 
Background: Globalisation and its Relationship to 
Governance 
Globalisation has been described as a complex set of forces intimately linked to 
the transformations of the modern era and characterised by “the pervasive 
interaction between fragmenting and integrating dynamics unfolding at every 
level of community.”1 The dynamics of globalisation are subject to wide-ranging 
disputes. Three schools of thought, largely within the discipline of international 
relations, have been identified, which view the phenomenon with varying degrees 
of enthusiasm: hyperglobalisers (advocates), sceptics (critics) and 
transformationalists (generally positive).2 Various political ideologies are present 
in the three schools and while interpretations depend on perspective, all schools 
and perspectives examine it with respect to its historical trajectory, 
conceptualisation, causal dynamics, socio-economic consequences, implications 
for state power, and, most significantly for this study, governance.3  
Hyperglobalisers define the phenomenon as “the widening, deepening and 
speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary 
social life.”4 They argue that sovereignty, state power and territoriality stand 
today in a more complex relationship than in the epoch during which the modern 
nation state was being forged. Globalisation is associated not only with a new 
sovereignty regime but also with the emergence of powerful new non-territorial 
forms of economic and political organisation in the global domain, such as 
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multinational corporations, transnational social movements, international 
regulatory agencies, and so forth. In this sense, the world order can no longer be 
conceived as purely state-centric or even primarily state governed, as authority 
has become increasingly diffused among public and private agencies at the local, 
national, regional and global levels.5 In contrast, sceptics argue that nation-states 
have simply adjusted themselves and their institutions to fit changed economic 
circumstances and meet the new requirements of capital, and in order to 
implement these changes have created global mechanisms in response. At the 
same time they have voluntarily surrendered power by reducing expenditure on 
the public’s behalf and handing authority over monetary policy to central banks; 
although they continue to exercise influence, it is in a different way.6 Unlike the 
hyperglobalisers, transformationalists see globalisation as a process in transition 
rather than fully realised, and contrary to the sceptics have an essentially 
optimistic view of global economic forces. The nation-states have learnt that 
economic efficiency in the market is dependent on the values of society and the 
community in which it functions. Nevertheless, globalisation of financial markets 
and production chains has threatened to undermine the nation-based social 
contract, and has necessitated the development of globally embedded shared 
social values and institutions. 7 Whichever the view, the conclusion reached is that 
contemporary social processes transcend boundaries so completely that it has 
been necessary, from a governance perspective, to rethink current arrangements.8 
Furthermore, the environment features prominently as a locus for the 
contemporary interplay between globalisation and governance.9 
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Global Governance Perspectives10 
According to Kjaer, governance theory is similarly affected by the analytical 
approaches through which it is described and defined and is interpreted by a range 
of disciplines including international relations (IR - also referred to elsewhere as 
international politics - IP), and public policy (or public administration) as well as 
comparative politics.11 The first two are more global in their orientation, and now 
recognise the impact of the forces of globalisation on the ‘realist’ notion of the 
pre-eminence of the nation-state in international relations, as well as emphasising 
the growth of non-state organisations. The latter two have a more state-centric 
perspective, in so far as they are concerned with social-political interaction within 
the nation-state, or political groupings of nation-states. In public administration, 
governance has become a synonym in recent years for reform of the public sector, 
and experiments with alternative arrangements have resulted in the fragmentation 
of previously centralised, ‘top-down’ administrative systems. Comparative 
politics associates governance with an evaluation of different political systems 
and state-society relations, including processes of democratisation.12  
Despite analytical disagreements in the diverse disciplinary approaches there is 
nevertheless a common interest in the institutional manifestations of governance, 
particularly in terms of rulemaking and behaviour.13 Whatever their orientation, 
scholars also share an interest in determining from whence the legitimacy of a 
given governance system is derived. Two theories currently dominate.  
Legitimacy can be ‘input oriented’: that is, derived from the consent of those 
being asked to agree to the rules, and concerning such procedural issues as the 
democratic arrangements underpinning a given system. Legitimacy can also be 
‘output oriented’: derived from the efficiency of rules, or criteria for ‘good’ 
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governance, and demonstrated by substantive outcomes.14 Legitimacy can 
therefore be determined both according to the principles of democracy on the one 
hand and efficiency and effectiveness on the other.  
Understandings of democracy vary according to the institutional model 
adopted. The rational model assumes that the behaviour and preferences of actors 
involved in a given system are fixed and externally derived, with individual needs 
being aggregated into collective agreements through trade-offs and negotiation. 
An alternative sociological model of democracy views actors’ behaviour and 
preferences as being socially constructed and the product of integrating the 
expectations of those around them with the obligations of the office they hold.15  
These two models of actor behaviour can essentially be associated with 
representative and participatory democracy respectively. The model adopted by 
an institution can impact in important ways on its operation. It is argued, for 
example, that too much democracy reduces efficiency, whilst excluding particular 
interests distorts desired social and economic outcomes; both outcomes affect 
perceptions of institutional legitimacy. The problem of actor exclusion has been 
addressed within representative democracy via the practice of majority decision 
making. Governance scholars continue to see shortcomings, however, and call for 
additional measures to existing majority systems of representative democracy. 
Kjaer herself recommends more participation and a greater emphasis on processes 
of deliberation.16 Both the rationalist actor and constructivist schools establish a 
relationship between the effectiveness of a given institution and the range of 
commonly identified governance arrangements that underpin them; the emphasis 
on which is the most significant depends largely on the critical theory adopted.17  
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Given the globalising forces at play, and since international events can impact 
on state affairs and vice-versa, there has been an increase in the crossover 
between disciplines.18 There is a blurring of previously distinct scholarly 
boundaries, since ‘multi-level governance’ is being increasingly used as a term to 
replace the earlier ‘regime’ concept of rulemaking, particularly influential in IR 
theory.19 Governance should consequently now be understood in terms of its 
expression on both the national and international levels.20 Both broad disciplines 
are relevant to the study of contemporary governance, but on account of their 
different perspectives may be designated as being either ‘global’ or ‘state-centric’ 
in their orientation.  
Theories of Governance in the International Politics Literature  
It should be noted that IR in particular has taken some time to catch up with and 
analyse the impacts of globalisation on governance theory. The previously 
orthodox viewpoint, that global political cooperation occurs almost exclusively 
within the sphere of intergovernmental regimes comprised of intergovernmental 
agreements, which are pursued in the context of state-based authority, is now seen 
as being largely out of touch.21 For the emergent IR/IP ‘globalists’, there is an 
emphasis on the structures of governance.22 Traditionally, global governance was 
a matter for individual countries via balance of power politics, but modern global 
governance is no longer dominated by the nation-state, and extremely disparate 
interests that are not dependent on organisation along territorial lines have begun 
to outflank the state.23 Multilateral institutions in particular have become central, 
now differentiated between government (“control exercised by the nation-state, 
through formal (usually elected) parties”) and governance (“control exercised by 
a variety of public and private institutions that have been established at different 
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spatial scales”).24 The globalisation of politics has led to a commensurate growth 
of global governance, not solely represented within formal institutions and 
organisations for intergovernmental cooperation such as the UN and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). Multinational corporations, transnational social 
movements and a multitude of non-governmental organisations all pursue global 
objectives that bear upon systems of trans-national rules and authority, around 
which the relevant actors converge and through which they pursue international 
relations.25 These systems: 
[C]onstitute forms of global governance distinct from traditional notions 
of government conceived in terms of specific sites of sovereign political 
power. In the contemporary international system there is, of course, no 
single political authority above the state. But despite this, international 
regulatory regimes have developed rapidly, reflecting the patterns of 
global and regional enmeshment.26  
Although there is no formal global government, it is nevertheless true to say that 
there is still global governance, whereby actors enmeshed in regimes (or more 
appropriately, less formalised arrangements of norms, rules and procedures) 
engage in behaviour that is nevertheless regulated and predictable.27 As it is 
currently expressed in such intergovernmental institutions as the UN, however, 
global governance is simply not strong enough as a substitute for the mechanisms 
of government inherent in the nation-state.28 This failure of intergovernmental 
organisations to institutionalise strong supranational agreements is noted as being 
particularly evident in relation to the environment.29 Emergent contemporary 
social initiatives and movements around the environment are a response to this 
lack, and are triggering more inclusive forms of global governance to compensate, 
which are based on the “dynamic interplay between civil society, business and 
public sector over the issue of corporate social responsibility.”30 
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Several commentators note the increasing role of non-state actors in this 
emerging global polity, most notably international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs). Held et al. identify 176 international INGOs in 1909 
compared with 5,472 in 1996 to emphasise this point.31 Keck and Sikkink 
comment that environmental NGOs have grown the most dramatically of all the 
social change organisations, and in combination with human rights and womens’ 
rights movements represent over half the NGOs involved in social change.32 
Courville argues the shift in economic power away from the national, to 
international levels, and a commensurate erosion of the welfare society is 
associated with the rise of globalisation, trade liberalisation and privatisation. 
These developments have shifted power towards non-state actors, and explain the 
rise of the NGO sector, but she includes both corporations and civil society 
protagonists are included in her list of players.33  
As the power of non-state associations and organisations grows, state powers 
are being replaced, displaced or shared. Collective self-governance is emerging as 
part of the social-political landscape, a consequence of globalisation and the 
differentiation, complexity, pluralisation and reflexivity to which it is giving 
rise.34 Since NGOs in particular now wield significant power in their own right, 
concerns regarding their level of accountability and conflicts of interest have 
arisen.35 One suggestion has been to equate “the function of global civil society in 
global environmental governance…[to] that of civil society within states.”36  
However, the problem lies not just with NGOs, but rather from an inherent 
“democracy deficit caused by the dispersed nature of decision making across 
international borders.”37 Consequently, there is an active discussion in both theory 
and practice as to how globalisation itself can be democratised.38 Since 
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participatory democracy is seen as partly shifting away from the nation-state, 
problem solving is now occurring in global venues of collective action that are 
becoming increasingly pluralised, community-based, and less under the direct 
organisation of the state.39 A note of caution has been sounded that the devolution 
of power to decentralised structures in which representative organisations play an 
important role can reduce democracy; but it can also open spaces for participatory 
opportunities.40 Other commentators consider that problems for democracy are 
more about ensuring effective mechanisms of decision making.41 The argument is 
that democratising global institutions is no more of a problem than it is with large 
nation-states; it is effectively a question of design. Global democratic institutions 
need to be built around participation and deliberation, which would occur at both 
the global and local levels and in which non-state and state entities would engage 
in discursive self-regulation and be responsible for the implementation of any 
standards or regulations developed at the appropriate level. This approach can be 
contrasted with much of the current global interaction beyond the unitary state, 
such as the UN Security Council, or the European Union (EU), neither of which 
are seen as particularly democratic. 42 
Criticism of existing forms of democracy at the global level has led to various 
suggestions as to how global governance can be democratised.43 Three potential 
alternatives have been suggested: liberal internationalism, which simply seeks to 
place a weak form of domestic liberal democracy onto the democratic world 
order; radical republicanism, which seeks the creation of alternative approaches to 
managing social, economic and political interaction based on self-government; 
and cosmopolitan democracy, which conceives the idea of citizenship as being 
multiple, overlapping and ‘deep’, functioning within and beyond the nation-state. 
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These are to be understood as ongoing projects, not yet fully realised.44 A greater 
emphasis is placed on deliberative modes of democracy, along the lines of 
Habermas’ discourse theory.45 This approach is seen as important on a global 
level, since “deliberation, organized at diverse levels, represents the best hope of 
… sustainable global governance.”46 Deliberative democracy is particularly 
relevant given the lack of formal supranational authority and the preference for 
partnerships and multi-stakeholder processes. It also conveniently avoids the 
“conceptual trap of state-centric notions of democracy.”47 
Dryzek provides an interesting reframing, which sits almost between the global 
and state-centric approaches. He supports the concepts contained in deliberative 
democracy, but situates them within a global environmental discourse, which he 
refers to as ecological democracy.48 He portrays globally organised liberal 
capitalism as being mostly insensitive to environmental concerns, and a dominant 
fact of the current era. If they do not accept this reality, commentators are reduced 
to wishful thinking about how things might be. For him, only two discourses, 
those of the Prometheans and the ecological modernizers have a coherent analysis 
of this situation. He rejects the Promethean, since its basis in the infinite 
availability of resources for exploitation provides the perfect setting for what he 
sees as the current (negative) trajectory of liberal capitalism. Ecological 
modernisers on the other hand accept that liberal capitalism needs to be 
restructured in order to factor in its environmentally destructive capacity, whilst 
accepting the economic constraints it places on political action. Such an 
acceptance recognises the need to both facilitate and engage in social learning 
within an ecological context, and he sees such a perspective as providing 
opportunities for democratic capacity building.49 His solution to powerful state 
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bureaucrats and corporate dominance of global institutions is to open up such 
processes to a degree of democratic experimentalism and discursive design that go 
beyond the simply pragmatic approach and point towards “a more radical 
participatory democracy.”50  
Theories of Governance in the Comparative and Public Policy 
Literature 
Without overstating the point, scholars that focus more on governance at the 
national and supranational levels tend to show a greater interest in its processes 
than more globally oriented theorists. Despite their analytical orientation around 
the activities of governments within the nation-state they are nevertheless also 
interested in governance at the international level. This is partly on account of the 
growth of collectivities such as the European Union (EU), since comparative 
political studies have been inevitably drawn into discussions regarding multi-level 
governance.51  
Modern governance is portrayed as essentially social-political in nature, 
defined as “more or less continuous processes of interaction between social 
actors, groups and forces and public or semi-public organizations, institutions or 
authorities.”52 Interaction is key, and is identified as a series of  ‘co’-
arrangements, characterised by coordination and cooperation between actors, and 
where interest representation is less fixed than in previous political ideologies, 
being built upon the interdependence between groups of actors that enjoy more 
autonomy than in state-based arrangements.53 In this model the transmission of 
information and knowledge and its valuation by those involved plays a central 
role; dialogue should be not be interpreted naively as interest- and power free 
however, but as a method of dealing with complex issues (such as ambiguous 
political and social problems).54  
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The environment is one policy arena where divergent groups (both state and 
non-state) are drawn together in a kind of vigourous pluralism.55 The need to 
properly address environmental problems has resulted in the replacement of old 
state/society relations by new forms of public/private interaction.56 This shift is a 
consequence of the perception of the lack of effectiveness of purely public 
regulation in tackling the environmental crisis. Complexity has reduced the ability 
of governments to act unilaterally, requiring the coordination of inter-dependent 
players in a way that ensures cooperation instead of the exercise of the power of 
obstruction, where adversarial and non-cooperative behaviour obstructs economic 
and environmental outcomes.57 ‘New’ governance, by contrast to previous 
approaches, is envisaged as a positive process of learning, where all are involved 
in the management of structural change and the negotiation and exchange of 
information between parties results in them learning to trust -- as opposed to 
mistrust -- each other.58 The interactions between participants is occurring within 
democratically self-regulating systems, in which environmental policy is the 
product of processes of internal reflection. These systems are replacing existing, 
more legalistic, mechanisms.59 
Scholars have focussed on the concept of learning as a governing mechanism 
for organising social and political interaction within environmental decision 
making. Policy learning is used to describe governance mechanisms based upon 
the process of learning from experiences, thus altering behaviour, and which can 
be used more broadly to build feedback mechanisms into policy-making, 
strengthen existing networks, create conditions that would lead to more trust and 
more productive dialogue, and to build flexibility into the policy system 
generally.60 Policy learning has been categorised into four sub-types: technical 
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learning (looking for new policy instruments); conceptual learning (redefining 
policy goals); cognitive learning (based on scientific knowledge) and social 
learning (based on interaction and communication).61  
Looking specifically at the sub-category of social learning, and moving beyond 
the European perspective, Fiorino places it into a historical context by examining 
the shift in policy-making behaviour in the US during the 1990s. In that decade 
greater emphasis was placed on stakeholder interaction and communication, and 
on environmental justice for environmentally disadvantaged groups in society. 
Interests outside government called for deliberation and consultation in decision 
making, a call that was echoed in government and industry, who also began to 
recognise the need for dialogue and partnership. Fiorino links the growth of this 
trend at the national level to the concept of sustainable development contained in 
the 1987 report of the Brundtland Commission, Our Common Future, and the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. 
In particular, with respect to UNCED’s key product, Agenda 21, he identifies 
participation, inclusion, dialogue, partnership, and equity as recurring themes.62 
Others argue further, and perhaps somewhat idealistically, that under these 
conditions participation has changed, with government acting as a facilitator 
rather than regulator or controller, whilst industry participates for the collective 
good, not its own economic or political interests. There is a different approach to 
implementation, away from hierarchy and control to cooperation between actors, 
who share responsibility for outcomes, rather than adopting adversarial roles, and 
agreements reflect increasing degrees of flexibility. However social learning 
requires well-organised bureaucracies, as well as interest groups experienced in 
participation. 63 
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Social learning is also identified as having implications for new ways of 
practicing democracy.64 There is a much broader interest in democracy than 
merely its relationship to social learning, however. Inoguchi and Bacon argue that 
when used normatively, governance is often taken as a synonym for democracy.65 
Since the end of the Cold War, the term has usually been employed in this sense 
to refer to processes of governance by which democracy is promoted, established 
and consolidated. Iterating the widely accepted view that governance also occurs 
on multiple levels, they stress the need for clear rules of transparency and 
accountability in the light of the decline in state power.66 The concept of ‘good’ 
governance has therefore become critical, as has the need to ensure that people 
continue to have the power and participatory rights associated with the election, 
decision making and supervisory aspects of government. These are entitlements 
under democratic conditions, and it is here that good governance and democracy 
coincide. Whilst there can be good government under an authoritarian regime, 
good governance cannot exist without a functioning democratic mechanism.67 
Comparative politics/public policy theorists, like their IR/IP counterparts, also 
question the ability of the current modes of governance to provide for genuine 
democracy.68 Market-based mechanisms confine democratic decision making to 
policies for creating low-cost social conditions conducive to economic 
development. International institutions and regimes aimed at solving problems 
beyond the nation-state, such as the environment, are built upon highly 
technocratic and exclusive supranational agencies and agreements, with a very 
reduced role for the public. Corporate governance arrangements, despite some 
modest concessions to demonstrate a degree of accountability and transparency, 
still exclude major stakeholding interests directly affected by company policies, 
  37 
such as employees and local communities. New public management has arisen out 
of the privatisation of previously publicly owned assets, the management of which 
is no longer under the direct control of elected officials. New practices of 
coordination through networks, partnerships and deliberative forums have 
promoted greater legitimacy via grassroot, democratic inclusion, but can be short-
lived and impenetrable, hindering wider social learning and lesson drawing.69 
Furthermore, these emerging governance arrangements challenge the 
understanding of democratic representation inherent in the architecture of classic 
liberalism. The state is now but one of many large, hierarchical institutions, which 
are neither answerable nor accountable to citizens, and democratic representation 
and governance is no longer to be found in one single location, threatening the 
notion of public control. 70  
At the same time -- and contradicting these warnings -- ‘new’ governance 
processes in public administration and public management deliberative 
democracy have been inextricably linked with a growth in deliberative democracy 
at the state level.71 Democracy within new governance is both deliberative and 
collaborative, and is to be contrasted with aggregative democracy in which voting 
is the primary mechanism for selecting preferences and determining outcomes.72 
However, some commentators remain sceptical regarding the ability of 
deliberative democracy to be used beyond small decision making units. On a 
larger scale, they question whether the assumptions of deliberation, particularly 
consensus formation, can occur in the presence of representative institutions and 
adversarial politics.73 However, recent developments in deliberative democratic 
practice in a large-scale context may challenge these assumptions. Deliberative 
democracy has appeared on the European stage as part of the ‘new’ governance 
  38 
response to the perceived problems in the effectiveness of decision making and 
democratic legitimacy within the EU system.74 Eberlein and Kerwer see the range 
of decision making approaches adopted in the EU as constituting what they refer 
to as democratic experimentalism. This theory still builds on the general 
principles that deliberation is central effective democratic decision making, and 
that institutional frameworks affect deliberation. The consider policy networks to 
be of particular institutional significance.75 
Dorf and Sabel present an idealised institutional framework in which the basic 
democratic unit is the local forum, through which collectively binding decisions 
are reached via deliberation between diverse, affected parties.76 Such forums exist 
over time and have real decision making powers exercised through direct 
democratic processes, which, crucially, are coordinated through a central 
governance council.77 This council encourages mutual learning by converting the 
collective experiences of participants in the many simultaneous experiments into 
performance standards based on the best practices found. Such a council might 
exist at a town governance level, or as a regulatory agency at the national level.78 
Standards developed under such processes differ from conventional regulation in 
that they are focussed on performance and continual improvement of existing 
practices, rather than specifying, for example, certain levels of pollution or 
protection. This provides participating entities with a competitive advantage over 
others as rules change in more predictable manner (“best practice rolling rules”).79 
According to this theoretical view, democratic experimentalism is not in conflict 
with representative democracy, since it needs the support of institutions of 
representative democracy (such as parliament and bureaucracies) to maintain 
viability. In addition, judicial review and administrative procedures can also play 
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further and important roles by overcoming decision making deadlocks, which 
might otherwise block effective experimentation.80 
In contrast, those who are less optimisitic call for democratic reform in order to 
address the multiple locations of contemporary governance. With no single locus, 
focus or demos, the nation state now shares power on the subnational and 
supranational levels with increasing numbers of networks and partnerships of 
quasi-public and private organisations, such as NGOs. There is no longer one 
single political mechanism for all scales of governance, necessitating a conception 
of democracy that is effective within institutions of various kinds and at various 
levels. The solution is to change top-down bureaucracies to “constitutionally 
ordered democratically self-governing associations.”81 Such self-government 
would not replace, but rather supplement and extend, representative government 
at the global level.82 
Institutional Expressions of Governance 
Given the diffusion of power away from the old paradigm of top-down, command 
and control state-led approaches, there has been a proliferation of new forms of 
governance and associated policy instruments. Starting at the departure point in 
the IR/IP analysis of the shift in global environmental politics away from 
intergovernmental, state-based relations, it is now possible to discern a historical 
trajectory towards alternative forms of governance. This is a development most 
analysts no longer deny.83 These have been characterised by their “network-like 
arrangements of public and private actors” and include such arrangements as 
business-driven self-regulation, and public/private or civic/private partnerships.84 
This development has been interpreted as being closely related to economic 
globalisation and the concurrent restructuring of the functions of the state. 
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Although corporations, for example, continue to lobby governments through 
traditional processes based around multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs), they are also dealing with each other and other non-state actors as well 
as the state. Such efforts amongst private actors, civil society and the state have 
given rise to private and civic governance arrangements that resemble the public 
governing functions of states and intergovernmental institutions. Relations are of 
a permanent and institutionalised nature and should be distinguished from simple 
cooperation, which is ad hoc and short-lived.85  
Such private and civic initiatives are categorised in a number of ways. Haufler 
refers to them as instances of self-regulation, representing a new form of global 
governance, defined as “mechanisms to reach collective decisions about 
transnational problems with or without government participation.”86 Interestingly, 
the move to private sector governance has been given a boost as a result of the 
international institutions that have either arisen within the UN, such as the United 
Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), or via UN-sponsored initiatives, such as 
the voluntary Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations.87 Ironically, it is 
globalisation, and its hallmark reduction in state power that has contributed to this 
growth, as well as the weakness of global governance at intergovernmental 
levels.88 UNEP notwithstanding, such failings are particularly evident within the 
UN system itself, which has been criticised as being neither effective in the 
assessment, review and monitoring of the measures it prescribes, nor in ensuring 
compliance.89  
The move to self-regulation is interpreted as not simply due to industry 
opportunism seeking to undermine regulatory systems to the lowest common 
denominator. Many companies are in fact developing international standards that 
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exceed the requirements of national legislation.90 Instead, self-regulation is seen 
as further evidence of the changing nature of global governance, particularly, as 
noted before, in the increasing use of collective mechanisms addressing issues of 
policy.91 Three discrete self-regulatory models have been described, centred upon 
civil-society-based monitoring and advocacy initiatives, industry-driven standard 
setting, and traditional government-led regulation (albeit functioning at local, 
national and regional levels). All three models are in addition to the various 
international institutions created to deal with common problems among 
countries.92 Although self-regulation is seen as having the potential to encourage 
significant improvements, Haufler still sees the necessity of acting in cooperation 
with traditional political approaches. 93 
Another perspective attributes more importance to direct civil society pressure, 
forcing companies and business associations to take on responsibilities within 
their business domains and society at large, resulting in a further interpretation of 
private and civic governance as a voluntary initiative.94 Here, the three types of 
regulation discussed immediately above are seen rather as three phases of 
regulatory development. An initial wave consisted of largely unilateral company 
codes, designed to demonstrate good conduct and not generally for public 
disclosure but intended to address the concerns of consumers in industrialised 
countries (such as child labour) while ignoring more entrenched problems, such as 
freedom of association. This was followed by a further development comprising a 
combination of social and financial reporting to demonstrate a company’s 
commitment to social responsibility to its shareholders.95 The third, most 
ambitious, and, as demonstrated by its commitment to transparency, most socially 
responsible, was the creation of sector-wide arrangements, involving several 
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businesses and/or associations, and including civil society participants.96 All three 
waves in this analysis are collectively referred to as certification institutions.97 
While the resultant institutions that have arisen do not and cannot replace nation-
states, however; but they have introduced new elements and dynamics into the 
processes of global governance.98 Cashore, Meidinger and others have 
commented at length on forest certification, which is discussed along with the 
forestry literature in the following chapter.99  
There is recognition elsewhere of the important role of non-state actors in their 
own right, most particularly in the evolution of global environmental governance. 
New sub-political arrangements are emerging that are institutionalising non-state 
interests in the economic domain, especially when governments fail to act, or 
when intergovernmental agreements and institutions prove inadequate. Market-
based mechanisms are making an increasingly significant contribution to global 
reform. But other economic interests and political agendas can also threaten such 
emergent transformations. Constant effort is therefore required by interested 
parties to maintain the relevance and momentum of these new forms of 
environmental governance, and to extend their effectiveness.100  
Other commentators prefer to describe non-state global governance as one 
comprised of transnational collectivities interacting either in competition or 
cooperation with state interests in a globalised space.101 This transition of power 
and authority away from states should not be seen as occurring only in 
transnational processes, however, as there has been a growth of new governance 
institutions at all levels.102  
Comparative politics/public policy scholars identify an inter-play between 
governance and government, reflecting the nature of the changing roles of state 
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and societal actors, in a period termed as governance transition, and encompassing 
alternative policy instruments.103 There are a range of types and sub-types of 
policy instruments, including benchmarking, co-regulation, negotiated agreements 
and voluntary codes of conduct. In the literature covering environmental policy 
instruments particularly, a trend away from the traditional regulatory approach 
dating back to the late 1960s towards new environmental policy instruments 
(NEPIs) has been noted. In the environmental context four sub-types have been 
identified: market-based instruments, eco-labels, environmental management 
systems and voluntary agreements. Older policy instruments continue to compete 
with NEPIs, which are themselves competing with each other. Hybrid forms of 
regulation, with strong features of governance such as self-monitoring and 
societal organisation are also appearing. Some analysts consequently prefer to 
interpret governance and government not as fixed entities, but rather as 
representing a continuum of different governing types on two heuristic ‘poles’.  
On balance, though, jurisdictions have nevertheless shifted from a position of 
government to governance with regard to their use of newer instruments.104 
Legitimacy and the Quality of Global Governance 
With the shift in governance away from government-led top down models to 
network-like arrangements of multiple actors, difficult questions have arisen with 
regard to legitimacy. Previously, nation-states simply intervened to change the 
behaviour of actors, gaining their authority from the traditional checks and 
balances of democracy (such as the rule of law).105 Globalisation has introduced 
new players onto the scene, and has raised two questions relating to legitimacy at 
the global level. Firstly, how can one ensure the institutions in which these players 
operate are democratically accountable? Secondly, how can one assume the 
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institutions and the policies they develop are effective? Traditionally, IR theorists 
have been more concerned with the output side of legitimacy. These concerns 
generally related to the effectiveness of global governance in terms of rule making 
and procedures, but with the expansion of governance beyond nation-states, and 
new actors influencing the norms of global politics, there is a growing concern 
regarding the democratic inputs of global governance.106 Legitimacy problems 
arising from a lack of accountability according to this emerging theory can 
therefore be addressed by strengthening public access to standards setting and 
broadening inclusion of stakeholders.107 The discussions regarding input and 
output legitimacy are manifested within institutions at the global level by a 
concern as to how to demonstrate ‘good’ governance. This is typified within such 
organisations as the World Bank, which has adopted a criteria-based approach, 
insisting on the need for particular elements of ‘good’ governance as a basis for 
lending.108 This approach has led scholars to look further into input legitimacy, 
connecting it more specifically to interest representation and accountability and 
transparency, rather than simply equating it to democracy.109 Output legitimacy, 
whilst still being still linked to effectiveness, is also now being analysed in terms 
of problem solving capacity.110 
The comparative politics and public administration literature tends to look at 
legitimacy in terms of the quality -- often synonymous with both the efficiency 
and effectiveness -- of a given system.111 Whether governance quality is derived 
from the inputs of a given system (relating to its structures and processes) or 
outputs (its products) -- or both -- varies between scholars. An input-oriented 
perspective implies that the procedures and processes by which a system’s 
policies are developed result in legitimacy.112 Democracy, for example, has been 
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identified as an input-oriented, procedural aspect of legitimacy, derived from 
compliance with rules agreed to by the majority for taking collectively binding 
decisions.113 However, it is argued that increasing input legitimacy through 
expanding interest representation and deliberation, can increase costs, and 
therefore has an impact on efficiency (output-legitimacy).114  
An alternative formulation views governance quality as being derived from the 
substance, or outputs, of a given system, including the formulation of criteria, or 
setting standards. These products relate largely to how governance is formulated 
and applied, and it is the products themselves that deliver effectiveness and 
legitimacy.115 Good governance in this formulation is portrayed as an output-
related aspect of legitimacy, derived from substantive criteria relating to effective 
policies that serve the common good.116 In contrast to input legitimacy, the 
implication is that “a political system and specific policies are legitimated by their 
success.”117 Here, the decisions made gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public if 
they deliver the goods.118  
Oran Young challenges the value of output legitimacy, and argues that 
although “an environmental regime is successful when it solves the problem that 
led to its creation” such an approach is unduly simplistic.119 He questions the 
value of determining the success of environmental regimes by looking at outputs  
-- centred on the implementation of the requirements of the agreements -- as they 
do not guarantee that problems for which a regime has been created will 
disappear. He notes a shift in institutional thinking towards changing behaviour 
instead, which although it may still not solve a problem, nevertheless allows for 
the consideration of side effects as well as intentional results. This is essentially 
an analytical distinction between outputs (agreements) and outcomes (behaviour 
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change). He sees a link between the process of decision making and the behaviour 
of those subject to the agreements made. He believes such an approach clarifies 
the issue of effectiveness: if behaviour is the dependent variable it is possible to 
ascertain how regimes change the action of key players. He stresses the value of 
identifying the causal mechanisms, particularly the nature of participation, by 
which regimes affect the behaviour of both state and non-state actors.120 Others 
connect the relationship between both outputs and inputs to overall legitimacy and 
effectiveness, which they see in terms of the quality of decision making processes. 
The decisions made gain legitimacy in the eyes of the public either if they deliver 
the goods (output legitimacy), or if the decisions made occur in a setting that is 
accountable through the rule of law or other means (input legitimacy).121  
Other scholars prefer to overlook the input/output analysis of governance all 
together, and correlate effectiveness to institutional design. Nevertheless, they still 
note the importance of participation, decision making and verification, and 
compliance mechanisms.122 In this analysis, effectiveness is also measured by the 
impact on behaviour, and the solving of the problem itself.123 There is a direct 
relationship between participation and effectiveness. Although a regime with less 
broad-based participation and mostly like-minded interests may be successful 
over the short term, it is unlikely to be effective over the longer term, since it does 
not contain the main contributors to a given problem.124 Interestingly, it is also 
noted that: “regimes with a generally inclusive access and participation profile 
tend to be more effective than regimes with a more exclusive profile.”125 On a 
global level, this leads to the conclusion that, legitimacy challenges 
notwithstanding, the network-like nature of contemporary governance involves 
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multiple actors, “whose interactive effects in practice can yield more effective 
global coordination and performance” than traditional models.126 
Governance Arrangements 
The term ‘governance arrangement’ is used to refer to a range of specific 
mechanisms influencing “the interaction between various actors pursuing 
common goals.”127 These institutional arrangements, identified across the fields of 
governance theory, have a bearing on governance quality. They are explored 
below, from both global and state-centric perspectives. 
Interest Representation  
Interest representation has been identified as a fundamental problem in 
contemporary global governance.128 The inclusion, or inclusiveness, of 
stakeholders, is generally associated with interest representation, and is seen as a 
crucial dimension underlying institutional variation at a global level.129 
Interestingly, the inclusiveness of intra-agency cooperation within the nation-state 
has been contrasted to the practices of intergovernmentalism in particular. 
Although this contrast should not be overstated, international agencies exist and 
function in a series of silos. In the WTO for example, only trade ministers 
participate because of a belief that other participants would simply confuse the 
situation. That environmental or labour ministers have no place is considered 
unacceptable, as those being affected by such institutions are not included. A 
second objection is that the democratic principle of interest representation, 
expressed in the belief of one person, one vote, does not apply in a number of 
organisations, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
where votes are allocated on the basis of wealth. This distorts representation and 
thus distorts outcomes and is in need of reform. 130 
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As an attribute of global governance inclusiveness has been broken down into 
two constituent parts, access and weight.131 Access denotes the number of actors 
bounded, or affected, by a given policy, and the extent to which they actively 
participate in developing its content. Weight refers to the extent to which 
influence is equally distributed among the active participants. Inclusiveness 
therefore sits along a power continuum, depending on the degree of access and 
weight a potential participant might have.132 Measuring inclusiveness depends 
several factors, but significance has been placed on the identification of actors 
affected by a policy. Governance has been described as being inclusive as when:  
[A]ddressees of a regulation are involved in the decision making process 
behind it, and if the affected societal parties of a regulation, both the 
associative targets and all those affected by a rule, are heard both 
formally and informally.133 
Looking at global governance, democratic theorist Iris Young sees a 
relationship between inclusion and equality, and exclusion and inequality. For her, 
legitimacy is normatively expressed by equally including all those affected by any 
given decision within the decision making process. However, she does not 
envisage simply imposing a specific set of requirements for inclusion on 
previously constituted institutions; political inclusion requires a plurality of 
methods, since inclusive discussion recognises social differences, transforming 
the style and terms of debate.134 For her, part of the process of transformation is to 
see that inclusion bounded by the nation-state is an inherently exclusive political 
form, and the contemporary world “normatively requires a more open system of 
global regulation and local and regional interaction.”135 In addressing the problem 
of inclusion in mass societies, she argues that institutions of representation have 
been wrongly assumed as being incompatible with participatory democracy. She 
believes that systems of representation are most inclusive when they encourage a 
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wide range of previously marginalised groups and perspectives. Furthermore, 
varied institutional locations and institutional types can in fact increase 
representation.136  
Effective interest representation in global governance also requires significant 
resources generally only available to well-endowed organisations, with access to 
ample finances, like think tanks, business associations and faith-based groups. 
These have an inherent advantage, as they tend to reside in the more privileged 
parts of the world, such as the North, and speak English.137 Lack of resources can 
be offset when associations collaborate, and in this regard at least, networks have 
been identified as having the potential to play a beneficial role. If the problems 
surrounding how networks are themselves resourced can be overcome, such 
structures have the potential to impact positively on global governance.138 
Governance theorists with a more state-centric perspective accept that 
participation within new institutional modes of governance is basically 
representative and group-oriented in nature.139 This also leads to a recognition that 
the complexities of governance brought about by globalisation call for a 
reinvention of interest representation in post-modern public administration.140 The 
collective nature of governance brought about by globalisation raises issues 
regarding the relationship between interest representation, inclusion and equality. 
In such non-spatial and non-territorial venues, equality can be eroded, since the 
same forces that are increasing opportunities for involvement make it much more 
difficult to simply use previous nation-state oriented standards.141 In response, it 
should be accepted that individuals cannot participate everywhere, and that global 
governance is essentially representative in nature. Participatory equality may not 
involve access to all points in the system  -- but it should include the ability of one 
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organisation to force another to justify or limit the costs it imposes on others. 
There may even be circumstances allowing for “justified inequality”: a cautionary 
rule-of-thumb would be that “inequalities are suspect when the voices of those 
affected are absent.”142 There is consequently a need for some formulation of 
baseline equalities, which although they do not guarantee that a given individual 
will participate, enable them to participate when they choose to do so. In such 
venues participatory equality is achieved through the presence of multiple 
associations, whereby the individual can choose the one that best represents their 
interests and over which they can exercise some control through the possibility of 
exit.143  
In the EU literature, attention has been paid to the problems associated with 
greater participation and wider inclusion inherent in the governance concept, 
notably the prevalence of hidden places of influence and power.144 This problem 
has been referred to elsewhere as ‘fugitive’ power and can result in a number of 
legitimacy problems associated with European governance.145 The European 
Commission has gone so far as to develop a White Paper on European 
Governance, the goal of which is inclusiveness and accountability, both presented 
as principles of ‘good’ governance.146 
A further requirement for effective interest representation is that all 
participants receive equal capacities and opportunities to participate, using 
methods that work for all. 147 Scholars point to the need for economic-technical 
capacity (money and expertise) as a structural framework condition for 
developing environmental policy, which is capable of identifying and resolving 
ecological problems within decision making processes that include public and 
private actors.148 Simmons and Birchall equate capacity building to the provision 
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of resources to strengthen participation, which they consider to be important 
aspects of community development, and include training, and increasing 
participants’ skills and confidence.149 
Accountability and Transparency 
Accountability has become a central aspect of the quality of governance debate, 
since the rise of new actors and new institutions has necessitated a reconfiguration 
of existing democratic mechanisms.150 Traditional ‘vertical’ systems of national 
democratic accountability (elected representatives hold public officials 
accountable through centralised budgeting and parliamentary oversight) have 
been supplemented by ‘horizontal’ accountability. In this model, the external 
accountability of decision-makers is to the public at large, and is linked to what 
appears as a subsidiary attribute, transparency, expressed in terms of public access 
to information and decision making procedures.151 Transparency plays a role both 
in the participation of interests from the inception of a governance system or 
policy process (ex ante) and in the public scrutiny of decision making (ex post).152 
It is effectively a precondition for effective accountability, since it is impossible to 
hold an institution to account if its regulatory operations are not open to public 
view.153 In the absence of a global constitution and formal hierarchies, the 
strategic interactions that arise among entities within institutions of global 
governance are frequently not regarded as legitimate by those affected by the 
rules such institutions make.154 Civil society actors have played an essential role 
in opening up global governance, and have forced various institutions to increase 
their visibility by publishing information, and have also pushed for the 
development and implementation of mechanisms for monitoring and controlling 
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agency activities, which are essential in view of the fact that conventional 
methods are seen as insufficient for the contemporary situation.155  
Accountability is also seen as being both an internal and external requirement 
of good governance. Rosenau points to two accountability problems for groups 
operating in globalised space. Externally, whilst some international (i.e. 
intergovernmental) organisations are accountable to the states they represent (if 
not the general public directly), NGOs are not, even by minimal standards of 
democratic governance. Internally, the decision making processes of many NGOs 
are not exposed to members, procedures for electing their leaders are absent, or 
they may not even have members.156 This concern is echoed elsewhere. Whilst 
international (governmental) organisations are internally accountable to the states 
they represent, NGOs are not, nor are they always transparent.157 Legitimacy 
problems consequently arise, for example, regarding the accountability of 
northern NGOs towards their southern counterparts, as well as the real extent to 
which NGOs as a sector are accountable to their own members.158 Nevertheless, 
despite their shortcomings, NGOs should be acknowledged for their contribution 
to holding governments and intergovernmental institutions accountable to the 
public. The UN has gone so far as to claim they represent an approximation of 
direct popular participation, at least within intergovernmental machinery. An 
approximation is no substitute for the real thing, however, and NGOs should 
expand their activities towards genuine popular participation, rather than supplant 
it.159 Nor should NGOs be singled out for special criticism. Some scholars point to 
a fundamental accountability deficit arising within self-governing networks, due 
to the differences between participating institutions. Such a deficit is experienced 
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at two levels: within individual parts of the network, and on account of the self-
interested -- rather than public-spirited -- nature of their members.160 
As a result of these perceived limitations, there have been calls for properly 
adapted principles of accountability to satisfy normative democratic criteria, but 
world politics generally lack universally accepted values and institutions.161 
However, it is recognised by advocates of greater global governance, that national 
models, including a reliance on accountability via electorates is not feasible. 
There is a need for a better meshing together of internal and external 
accountability measures, posing a number of unresolved normative questions.162 
Others see the answer as straightforward, calling for increased openness of global 
institutions. The application of freedom of information laws and generally freer 
access to information would account for the remoteness of global processes from 
democratic accountability.163 Alternatively, the standards-based approach of some 
institutions of global governance is presented as a solution to demonstrating 
accountability.164 
Scholars of the EU in particular have associated an institution’s legitimacy 
with its accountability mechanisms. How an institution views these aspects of 
governance impacts on its quality; shortcomings in the EU system are partly 
attributable to the different considerations given within institutions to the role of 
such elements as accountability, a problem exacerbated by the variety of 
institutional types.165 Other scholars are also concerned with the accountability of 
contemporary governance. They identify a clear discrepancy between the tenets of 
accountability within representative government versus the nature of participation 
within governance networks, which may be open and transparent, but need not be 
formally accountable.166 Some see a tension between the new approaches of 
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steering and coordination inherent in modern governance and traditional 
approaches to delivering political accountability within democratic theory. Since 
accountability now also rests with non-accountable actors, and relationships 
between the public and private sectors have become complex, it is difficult for 
citizens to understand how accountability functions.167  
Rhodes presents the classic accountability dilemma arising from the ‘hollowed-
out state’ identified in ‘new’ governance theory. Firstly, institutional complexity 
obscures who is accountable, and for what. Secondly, while the state equates 
transparency and responsiveness with accountability, the public does not actually 
have a clear government agency to hold to account. Further, if it is not clear who 
should be held accountable from the beginning, the problem is likely to be 
exacerbated after the event, and will reinforce lack of responsibility 
beforehand.168 This makes democratic accountability within networks a serious 
challenge in an environment of governing without government.169 This is 
particularly relevant as non-elected stakeholders are not directly accountable to 
the voting public, and the extent of traditional accountability safeguards such as 
freedom of information, declarations of interest, and ethics of office generally are 
not clear. Whilst a broader range of interests may participate in decision making, 
they can easily absolve themselves of responsibility and increased numbers of 
stakeholders may dilute transparency and blur the lines of accountability, making 
identification of responsibility difficult.170 Responsibility can also be expressed 
institutionally by a lack of responsiveness to stakeholders’ concerns, and might 
explain increased calls for participative democracy as a consequence of the sense 
of estrangement that has arisen in the way people view political institutions.171 
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Some scholars see that defining what constitutes a robust accountability system 
is a major problem facing advocates of new governance, and have problems 
envisaging any serious contenders to the state as a source of democratic 
accountability.172 The differentiated polity implicit in global governance requires 
accountability to be made explicit and manifested in many forms and in many 
forums, proper discourse should be based on openness of, and access to, 
information to sustain proper discourse.173 Governance structures therefore need 
to be sufficiently sophisticated to address accountability at the multiple levels of 
contemporary governance.174 Formal structures and clearly defined rules are 
required for each level, otherwise transparency can be lost, and policy making 
predetermined.175 This may require procedural frameworks such as judicial 
processes, or ombudsmen, to ensure transparency and thus deliver 
accountability.176 In short, how the responsibility of participating actors should be 
addressed in non-state, non-elected structures continues to be the subject of some 
debate.177 
Decision Making 
With their emphasis on institutions and structures, IR/IP governance theorists 
comment only superficially on procedural aspects of governance. Nevertheless, 
there is general recognition that as governance continues to develop at a global 
level, procedural arrangements are likely to be based more upon commonly-
agreed rules and practices, even if the coercion and bargaining common in 
territorial systems continues.178 The reason for this is seen as being twofold. 
Firstly, governance itself is increasingly multi-level, undermining traditional 
concepts of community and representation. Secondly, because single national 
interests must collaborate and seek accommodation if they are to deliver 
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externally-derived public goods to their local populations. These forces are 
generating a form of decision making, which is occurring in forums that in 
addition to their democratic expression are also more deliberative in procedural 
style.179 Dryzek describes this approach as consisting of “discursive procedures” 
for dispute settlement through the solving of problems cooperatively.180 He 
identifies policy and societal dialogue and mediation and regulatory negotiation as 
important aspects of procedure. He points to the Canadian Berger Inquiry as one 
of several practical examples of such an approach.181 
More traditional IR scholars also pay some attention to the need to improve the 
procedures of global governance, leading to an observation that: “the processes 
we use to negotiate global agreements are as important as the … capabilities … 
that the negotiators bring to the negotiating table.”182 Current intergovernmental 
processes are seen as lacking the necessary vision -- and pragmatism -- to cope 
with greater degrees of non-state participation.183 This has led to the conclusion 
that without existing institutional arrangements being changed in favour of more 
productive interaction, built around consensus, global environmental negotiations 
will continue to produce inadequate results.184 Interaction should be less formal 
and more collaborative, whilst decision making when it occurs should be built 
around consensus rather than majority rule.185 
With their emphasis on process, comparative/public policy theorists look at the 
procedural aspects of governance in some detail. Whilst not universal in the 
literature, there is a fairly strong indication that addressing the need to deal with 
social-political dynamics (at least within modes of ‘new’ governance) requires 
“processes of discursive consensus formation”, again, like global governance 
theorists, along the lines of the theories of Habermas.186 Environmentally 
  57 
focussed scholars have argued that: “a tradition of consensus building strengthens 
both openness and the integration of politics and thereby reinforces the 
institutional conditions for relative success.”187 Another commentator critical of 
current policymaking has noted an almost obsessive trend to consensus within 
new modes of regulatory governance.188 The criticism levelled is that processes of 
consensus de-centre the state by making it a facilitator between dissenting groups, 
and simply another player, rather than sovereign decision-maker.189 A second is 
that the focus on consensus moves away from making policy that is based upon 
the public interest, towards policy that is agreeable to those interests represented 
within the policy process.190 A third criticism concerns the definitional 
inconsistencies of consensus, which can be defined as both constituting 
unanimity, or as a decision everybody can live with.191 Another problem is that 
imposition of consensus can constrain decision making. By making existing 
processes of policy-making participatory, all of the perceived benefits of 
consensus (such as reduced conflict) can be achieved, without needing such rigid 
adherence to consensus. Effectively, participation is more important than a 
specific mode of decision making. 192  
EU regime scholars have examined whether decision making operating on a 
consensual or majority basis is more effective.193  The more consensual, it is 
assumed, the more likely the prospect of implementation, and the more legitimate 
the decision. However, it carries the potential to be less effective, as it gives 
‘laggards’ the upper hand. Unanimity and consensus-based processes, it is argued, 
result in weaker decisions than majority voting. However, both these assumptions 
are moderated by the need to balance different considerations in the various stages 
of a process. One European study finds that both consensus and majority decision 
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making were used in the environmental agreements investigated. Initially, whilst 
parties were still generally mistrustful of each other, consensus was the only 
viable option, but over time as trust between parties built, tougher decision 
making practices emerged in several of the cases examined.194 Anecdotal case 
studies of environmental processes in the US indicate that agreement is often 
reached by consensus (understood as total agreement) during the working stages 
of negotiation, reverting to a majority vote at the end.195 
When conflict occurs within negotiations, or as a result of complaints over 
procedure, several sources identify the need for dispute-resolution mechanisms.196 
The breakdown of processes of engagement and negotiation and the inability to 
resolve conflicts have been identified as two key indicators of governance 
failure.197 Van Vliet calls for “integrative negotiations” which are in turn 
dependent on the extent to which all parties can gain something, and adds that in 
cases of environmental dispute resolution, the consensus developed through 
mediation can bring separate interests closer together.198 Conflict should therefore 
not be seen as a negative aspect of governance.199 As venues for developing the 
skills of bargaining and compromise, conflicts can provide governance systems 
with a degree of energy and drive. So long as they do not encompass 
irreconcilable issues such as matters of religion or ideology for example, they can 
be managed, even if they are ongoing. Indeed, the ongoing nature of a particular 
conflict may even set the stage for the next round of engagement and negotiation. 
This leads to the observation that “the cumulative experience of muddling through 
numerous such conflicts is at the heart of an effective governance system.”200  
Supporters of ‘new’ governance as a system of public administration, argue 
that public decision/policy-making, implementation and enforcement inevitably 
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involve conflict amongst interested parties. They point to the value of  governance 
processes in the area of public administration in this regard that make provisions 
for mediation, facilitation, dispute resolution and arbitration should conflicts arise. 
Interestingly, it is in the arena of environmental governance where some of the 
most extensive use of these processes is made. A number of authors argue that 
procedures of consensus building and dispute resolution enhance the democracy, 
quality and fairness of decision making, and consequently -- through active and 
informed citizen engagement via public dialogue, reasoned debate and consensus 
-- increase legitimacy.201 
Implementation 
With their greater emphasis on both output legitimacy and process, 
comparative/public policy theorists look in some detail at the issues surrounding 
implementation within governance institutions. Pierre and Peters argue that in 
order to determine whether a given policy objective has been implemented 
effectively, it is necessary to trace the final effects of a given policy and its related 
programmes on society.202 EU scholars stress the relationship between 
implementation and compliance.203 Compliance results from a process of 
substantive assessment of international rules insofar as such rules are compatible 
with existing norms and beliefs; essentially a rule is complied with if it is 
considered to be appropriate by stakeholders. A second view places normative 
influences at a higher level, whereby Member States feel obliged to follow EU 
law, depending on the general culture of compliance within a specific state.204 
Implementation deficits have been alternatively identified as arising from the 
tensions between on the ground learning (open and decentralised) and the need for 
administrative discipline (hierarchical and centralised).205  Zaelke et al define 
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compliance as “a state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behaviour and 
a specified rule.”206 They identify compliance as arising from two interrelated, but 
separate concepts, implementation and effectiveness.207 Implementation is “the 
process of putting…commitments into practice.”208 In this context, effectiveness 
is presented as a measure of the extent to which a policy has been successful in 
solving the problem it was created to address.209 Compliance is consequently 
portrayed “as a valuable proxy for effectiveness.” 210  
Skjærseth et al. examine the effective implementation of international 
environmental agreements.211 For them “an institution is effective if it contributes 
significantly to solving the problems that motivated its establishment, notably by 
shaping the behaviour of relevant target groups” (identified as problem solving 
effectiveness and behavioural effectiveness).212 A relationship between behaviour 
change and social learning within institutions has been linked to transforming the 
perceptions of participating organisations about how to solve problems.213 
Particularly, processes of learning develop an individual’s capacity to deal 
flexibly with new situations.214 The implications of cultivating such an 
institutional approach to problem solving is that governance systems, which 
incorporate degrees of flexibility, are more resilient in the face of external change 
and may even benefit from it. Non-resilient systems on the other hand are 
vulnerable to change.215   
Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the growth of new forms of social-political 
interaction between government and society -- or rather, state and non-state 
interests. In recent decades, a growing body of theory has arisen, tracing the 
evolution of the practice of government at all levels away from traditional top-
  61 
down, command-control models towards a broader understanding of state and 
non-state relations, articulated in the concept of governance, and manifested in a 
series of ‘co’-arrangements centred upon collaborative approaches to problem 
solving.  
This analytical perspective should be interpreted as a consequence of 
globalisation and the post-modern era, both of which have blurred traditional 
demarcations between state and society. Within the international system, the 
authority of the nation-state is being eroded, but not eradicated. Non-state 
interests are accorded a seat at the decision making table, and indeed at times, 
occupy the driving seat, but the delegation of authority to such players is 
inconsistent.  On a national level, the state remains in charge, but has yielded a 
significant amount of its power, the result of accepting the neo-liberal 
philosophies of small government, privatisation, welfare- and market reform. Its 
control is of a less direct nature, and it is more content to steer, or coordinate, 
collective action. Its electoral mandate to govern is outsourced to secondary 
agents within the nation-state, or on an intra-national level, to the various 
apparatuses of such collectivities as the EU. At all these levels non-state interests 
play a significant role. 
How to collaborate is one of the most significant issues in these evolving 
interactions. The increasing powers of the private sector, NGOs and other non-
state actors at all levels has necessitated the development of alternatives to the 
traditional methods utilised by nation-states. Although ‘governance without 
government’ remains some way off, there is nevertheless a wide array of 
mechanisms for social-political decision making, ranging from the centralised and 
hierarchical, to the decentralised and self-regulatory. Governance is now 
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conceived of as many different institutional arrangements occurring at multiple 
levels: inside the nation-state; between states (such as the EU), and across states 
(via international regimes such the UN); and in various private and civic 
initiatives. These arrangements are by their very nature ‘new’; the academic 
debate is around what such a designation actually means. Various governance 
‘experiments’ have been adopted in response to questions of legitimacy and 
perceived democratic deficits. A move away from the aggregation of interests 
within traditional democratic models, and a greater emphasis on deliberation has 
been identified in these contemporary institutional models. This has led to calls 
for researchers to think about institutional design more creatively in order to make 
governance more effective.216 There is some agreement however, that 
contemporary governance shows a preference for interaction between 
decentralised networks made up of multiple actors functioning at multi-levels, and 
environmental governance articulates this trend especially strongly.217 
Although the various perspectives presented in this chapter have advanced 
governance theory considerably, the relationship between legitimacy and quality 
of governance remains unresolved. Scholars with a more international 
relations/comparative politics perspective view legitimacy in terms of both 
outputs (equated to efficiency or effectiveness) and inputs (equated to democracy, 
or alternatively in more recent studies, interest representation, and accountability 
and transparency). Those studying public administration and public policy have 
tended to focus largely on output legitimacy, whilst those in the field of 
comparative politics have followed two schools of thought, depending on whether 
their focus is on democracy (in which case they favour input legitimacy) or 
efficiency, in which case they concentrate on output legitimacy.218 Consequently, 
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there is as yet no consensus over the precise institutional requirements for 
determining quality of governance. But there is agreement is that participation and 
deliberation are seen as primary normative functions of contemporary democratic 
institutions. There is also recognition that governance arrangements such as 
accountability and interest representation, as discussed above, are in some way 
related to legitimacy. This relationship, using forest governance as an exemplar by 
which these previously discrete theories can be synthesised, is the subject of the 
next chapter. 
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- 3 - 
Global Governance and Forest Management:  
An Analytical Framework 
Introduction  
This chapter is in two parts. Echoing the discussions in the previous chapter 
regarding the changing nature of global governance and its institutional 
expression, Part I looks specifically at the sphere of global environmental policy, 
targeting forest management as an issue area that makes one of the most useful 
contributions to understanding and advancing both theory and practice. This 
section surveys the evolution of forest governance tracing a move away from 
purely intergovernmental arenas towards alternative forums and new types of 
policy instrument, most notably forest certification. It revisits the concept of 
quality and legitimacy in this specific context, and provides some examples as to 
how forest governance, in its various forms, has tackled these issues. Here, the 
implied link between legitimacy and quality of governance already alluded to in 
the previous chapter is made by forest governance scholars and is expressed in the 
policy arena itself. In both contexts, the recognition of the need to develop 
assessment methods to determine the quality and legitimacy of governance is 
identified as a key -- but hitherto -- unresolved issue.  
Building on these materials and those already discussed Chapter Two, Part II 
provides an analytical method for determining governance quality and legitimacy. 
It begins with a synthesis of the theory and practice of global governance 
previously introduced and points out the current impediments to the development 
of such an analysis. It first discusses the lack of a consistent system of 
institutional classification, and presents an analytical solution, based upon 
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understanding contemporary governance in terms of three central and universally 
relevant parameters; authority, innovation and democracy. Having provided a 
means for comparative analysis of divergent institutional types, this section moves 
on to the next ‘problem’ of legitimacy, namely its relationship to quality of 
governance and how to determine, or evaluate, quality. There it is argued that 
legitimacy of global governance is to be understood largely in terms of structure 
and process and it is the degree of interaction between these elements that 
determines quality of governance. Each of the governance arrangements linked to 
legitimacy in the previous chapter (such as accountability and transparency) are 
subsequently located hierarchically within an assessment framework based upon 
principles, criteria and indicators (PC&I). The institutional relationship of these 
PC&I to the structures and processes of governance is explained 
diagrammatically. An evaluative matrix and rating system, based upon these 
PC&I is provided as a means of evaluating the performance of the case studies in 
the following chapters. A short concluding section reflects on the evolution of 
contemporary governance and prepares the reader for the following case study 
chapters.  
Part I 
Global Forest Governance: From the Old to the New 
Forest governance provides one of the best spaces available to study the 
emergence of new modes of governance that have arisen in response to 
globalisation.1 This is because it is in the forest sector specifically that some of the 
most extensive and innovative experiments in ‘new’ governance -- of which forest 
certification is one of the most interesting -- exist.2 What is occurring in this 
domain contains theoretically interesting reactions to some of the larger political 
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and economic trends associated with globalisation and governance outlined in 
Chapter 1. Forest governance consequently provides one of the most useful lenses 
through which to scrutinise “the increasing tendency for collaboration in many 
sectors where political and economic trade-offs also exist.”3 It is in the forestry 
arena that environmental governance, understood as “the coordination of 
interdependent social relations in the mitigation of environmental disruptions” 
mostly clearly reflects the involvement of civil society and private industry, in the 
development of regulatory regimes, as well as the state.4 
Historical Overview 
Public concern about global deforestation became pronounced in the 1980s.5 
Deforestation has been attributed to a wide range of causes including international 
development and debt policies, population growth, poverty, drug cultivation, wars 
and the role of the military, land tenure inequities and natural causes.6 
Transnational corporate financial investment associated with the exportation of 
timber from producer countries to consumer countries has also been identified as 
playing a significant role.7  
The literature has outlined a historical narrative in which NGOs became 
increasingly active in their attempts to influence global timber policies and 
processes. This was partly a response to calls from social and environmental 
groups in the South for assistance in helping them save their forests, and 
recognition of the failure of the international policy community to solve the 
problems of forest degradation and deforestation.8 NGOs in the North began to 
look at the tropical timber trade in particular, and ways to influence that trade. 
They began to place forest conservation campaigns within the context of trade, 
leading to the development of a range of trade related strategies. These ultimately 
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led to an expansion beyond tropical rainforests to include temperate and boreal 
forests and involved large numbers of NGOs carrying out many interrelated but 
separate campaigns: targeting particular kinds of businesses (such as retail stores 
selling timber, or transnational corporations associated with the international 
timber trade); trying to persuade local and state governments to refrain from using 
tropical timber in building projects; and pressurising national governments and 
supranational bodies, such as the EU, to ban tropical imports.9  
By 1988 NGO efforts in Europe had been successful enough to bring about a 
vote in the EU Parliament, which recommended an import ban be put in place by 
EU members until logging of tropical rainforest -- particularly in Malaysia -- 
became sustainable, although this was later overturned by the EU Commission. 
By 1989, the call for a boycott had spread beyond Europe to groups in countries 
such as Australia, who began blockading ships, and in the US and Europe to a 
full-scale boycott of companies, implicated in tropical rainforest logging. By 1990 
the impact of local government bans in Europe caused Malaysia and Indonesia to 
threaten trade retaliations. In 1992 the Austrian government imposed its own 
import ban but dropped it a year later after Switzerland, which looked like 
following suit, was threatened with a counter-ban against Nestlé by Malaysia. In 
1993 Dutch NGOs signed an agreement with the Dutch government and timber 
importers, which established a 1995 deadline on the importation of unsustainable 
timber. 10 
While some NGOs pursued export bans and timber boycotts, others looked to 
existing intergovernmental initiatives, such as the International Tropical Timber 
Organisation (ITTO), as potential levers for change. NGOs began to lobby ITTO 
members to impose sustainability requirements on the tropical timber trade.11 The 
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ITTO had been founded in 1983 by 64 countries, under the auspices of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and comprised 
producers and consumers of tropical timber who were given a mandate to 
consider global resource management issues.12 In 1985, the International Year of 
the Forest, a range of UN institutions continued to work on the development of a 
number of forest initiatives.13  In the same year, the International Tropical Forest 
Timber Agreement (ITTA), considered to be the first commodity agreement 
designed to include forest conservation, and one of the chief products of the 
ITTO, received enough signatories to become ratified, but with a slow take up 
from producer countries it did not gain legal recognition until 1994.14 Further 
initiatives included the finalisation of negotiations regarding a Tropical Forestry 
Action Plan (TFAP), which had commenced in the early ‘eighties and was 
concluded in 1986 with the Plan’s endorsement at the eighth session of the FAO’s 
Committee on Forestry (COFO).15 However, all these initiatives have been 
accused of failing “to deal successfully with the complex global dynamics that 
give rise to environmental problems such as deforestation.”16 The ITTO in 
particular, “hamstrung by political compromise, was unable to take decisive 
action.”17  
By 1988 increasing NGO disillusion over ITTO’s lack of action in combating 
deforestation led the international environmental NGO the World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF) to warn ITTO that if it failed to start working towards tropical 
forest conservation, NGOs would look at other means to achieve it.18 Part of the 
problem was that NGOs and trade-related interests placed different emphases on 
the conservation/development objectives implicit in the concept of SFM. These 
differences, which had first formally arisen in the deliberations within ITTO, were 
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ultimately to be expressed via competitive industry- and NGO-driven market-
based systems of forest certification.19 
The Earth Summit and the Failure of Intergovernmentalism  
UNCED, or the ‘Earth Summit’, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, played an 
important normative role in shaping the general response to the environmental 
crisis, including deforestation, through the promotion of standards-based 
approaches as a method of problem solving.20 It has been argued that the 
standards that emerged in the post-Rio environment demonstrated the failure of 
previous international efforts to govern the environmental and social activities of 
transnational corporations more aggressively. Rio has been seen as paving the 
way for voluntary and self-regulatory initiatives, often developed directly by 
corporate interests. 21 Several commentators attribute this outcome to the 
considerable level of corporate attendance at the Earth Summit.22 Rio, in effect, 
legitimised the idea of voluntary standards, which was reflected in the outcome 
document of the Rio negotiations, Agenda 21. Both private businesses and 
industry associations were encouraged to promote clean production and to reduce 
hazardous waste generated by industrial activity via such initiatives.23 Agenda 21 
resulted in the development of a number of environmental management 
programmes designed to create standards and certify compliance, including the 
ISO 14000 Series (Environmental Management Systems). Corporate activity in 
this context does not cut across the environmental legislative and regulatory 
arrangements of the nation state. Standards are restricted to providing a 
framework under which a company systematises its own internal environmental 
management priorities, and such standards do not specify absolute environmental 
performance requirements.24  
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UNCED and its successors have been particularly criticised by a number of 
scholars in the field of forest governance for failing to take effective action to 
combat deforestation.25 Despite the promises and optimism generated at Rio for a 
global approach to forest issues, none was reached, and subsequent forest-related 
agreements (such as the 1994 renegotiated ITTA), were much weaker than 
expected.26 Rio was ultimately unsuccessful in bringing to forests the same degree 
of cooperation as climate change, biological diversity and desertification, and the 
widely anticipated legally binding instrument on forests did not eventuate.27  
Various intergovernmental institutions within the UN system were involved 
with the forest-related policy decisions arising from the substantive Rio 
document, Agenda 21, and the related Statement of Forest Principles. Forests 
were one of the issues dealt with by Agenda 21 (Chapter 11, combating 
deforestation), and initially, post-Rio it was felt that there was a need for a 
specific body to tackle the forest issue; this was the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Forests (IPF), which functioned from 1995-97 to “provide a forum for forest 
policy decisions.”28 In 1997 the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests was 
established, running until 2000. In terms of substantive outcomes, the IPF/IFF 
deliberations generated 270 Proposals for Action (PFAs).29 In 2000 a third body, 
the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF), was created.30 All three of these 
processes have been dismissed as being based on lowest common denominator 
politics, producing sub-optimal outcomes.31 They have been interpreted as part of 
a long line of competing, and/or concurrent -- but ultimately failed -- attempts to 
tackle deforestation.32 
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Contemporary Forest Governance 
Discussions regarding forest governance are not confined to any analytical school, 
and consequently, like broader governance theory, it is subject to varying 
interpretations. International forest deliberations of the intergovernmental variety, 
although challenged regarding their effectiveness, have not been wholly replaced, 
and therefore sit alongside and complement a number of newer governance types, 
including national forest programmes, forest certification, and various other 
public, civic and private initiatives.33 This has resulted in some confusion in the 
literature as to whether these separate initiatives represent forest regimes in their 
own right, or whether they should be treated as discrete parts of an international 
forest regime. Humphreys notes the disputes within the literature questioning the 
existence of an international forest regime, since there is no international forest 
convention. He agrees with European forest policy scholars that such a regime has 
emerged since the mid 1990s and argues for a revised definition of a regime as 
encompassing three aspects: the more commonly-recognised ‘hard’ law 
arrangement of a single international legal convention backed up by subsequent 
protocols; ‘soft’ law, such as non-legally binding instruments increasingly 
preferred by states, including the resolutions adopted by UNFF; he also identifies 
what he refers to as private international law.34  
Such a three-fold analysis may unduly restrict the regime concept, and it may 
be too early to identify any normative regime consensus around which actor 
expectations are converging.  There is general agreement amongst scholars, 
however, that contemporary forest governance reflects the trend away from top-
down approaches towards new governance, notably forest governance by 
networks.35 In addition to the previous failings of the ITTO, the inability of Rio to 
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combat deforestation comprehensively has been identified as a catalyst for the 
growth of forest certification specifically, which has been categorised as an 
example of the network model of forest governance.36 There is also a link to 
governmental processes in the origins of certification, however. Various post-Rio 
intergovernmental forest deliberations, including Montréal and Helsinki, 
developed principles and criteria for SFM, which were subsequently expressed in 
the market through certification schemes developed by such organisations such as 
the Canadian Standards Association (CSA). FSC is characterised as an alternative, 
specifically non-governmental system, which has developed its own principles 
and criteria independently of governments.37 Certification, it has been argued, has 
had a powerful influence on forest owners and is more successful in terms of 
protecting areas than public approaches, such as nature conservation agreements. 
It has been identified as consisting of a form of “private governance with 
government”, having the potential to complement, but not replace, public 
instruments, particularly since governments remain a key actor in both systems.38 
Certification plays an important role in terms of government policy 
implementation because its affects not only the behaviour of certified forest 
owners but also influences large numbers of other forest owners.39 The 
willingness and capability of such groups to assimilate information and correct 
their behaviour are essential for successful policy implementation.40 
An alternative perspective argues that certification is to be understood as a new 
institutional form of sustainable development beyond existing governmental 
processes.41 Such private governance systems may improve environmental 
performance across the board in ways that traditional public, command and 
compliance models have not. The resulting voluntary-compliance market 
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mechanisms coincide with increased civil society demands at a time of reduced 
government spending, and has created a form of international ‘liberal 
environmentalism’ that seeks to avoid command-and-control responses and avoid 
traditional “business versus environment” approaches.42 However, the designation 
of all such types of governance as ‘private’ is over-simplistic, as it puts voluntary 
codes, public reporting and certification together when they are in fact very 
different governance mechanisms. The problem with such an approach, it is 
argued, is that it ignores the rapid development of systems of international 
authority, which are not driven by the state. The loss of state authority, including 
the granting of legitimacy to alternative venues of power -- particularly market-
based instruments -- is worthy of examination in its own right. These are referred 
to as non-state market driven (NSMD) and represent a new type of governance.43 
Nevertheless, forest certification still requires compliance with government 
regulation. Governments can also act as stakeholders, procurers and users of 
certification, and can provide resources to assist those seeking certification, as 
well as participate in standards development.44 However, the state does not 
exercise sovereign authority in requiring adherence to non-state market-driven 
governance systems. Rather, a whole range of organisations make decisions as to 
whether to support such schemes. Participants are generally the same as in public 
policy making (environmental NGOs, business groups, professional and trade 
associations), and they act as representatives for the broader public, who grant 
them their authority based on their shared values. Government simply becomes an 
interest group.45 This has impacted on traditional notions of authority, which now 
sit alongside non-state and shared private/public concepts  (see Table 3.1 
below).46  
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Table 3.1 Comparison of non-state market-driven governance sources of authority 
with other forms of governance  
Feature Non-state market-
driven governance 
Shared 
private/public 
governance 
Traditional 
government 
Location of 
authority 
Market transactions Government gives 
ultimate authority 
(explicit or implicit) 
Government 
Source of 
authority 
Evaluations by 
external audiences, 
including those it 
seeks to regulate 
Government’s 
monopoly on 
legitimate use of 
force, social contract 
Government’s 
monopoly on 
legitimate use of 
force, social contract 
Role of 
government 
Acts as one interest 
group, landowner 
(indirect potential 
facilitator or 
debilitator) 
Shares policy-
making authority 
Has policy making 
authority 
Source: Cashore, Auld and Newsom (2004, p. 28). 
Whilst it is not yet clear if non-state systems will complement or challenge the 
nation state, or if the nation-state will seek to simply absorb the phenomenon in 
some way, non-state systems mark a radical departure from the traditional 
Westphalian sovereign authority model of public policy.47 As a new governance 
phenomenon non-state market-driven systems:  
[R]epresent a grand new experiment in developing rules and procedures 
in ways quite foreign to traditional public policy approaches. The extent 
to which … certification programs… [have] raised new and innovative 
ideas about the ways collaborative solutions might be found appears to be 
an important contribution by itself.48 
The idea that forest certification has something to offer governance as a 
wholeis elaborated by other commentators. Meidinger considers forest 
certification to represent a new form of administrative law. Its procedures have an 
inherently high capacity for policy learning due to their dynamic nature; the rapid 
flows of information and multi-stakeholder dialogue and debate are valuable 
contributing mechanisms, but as it is still a new phenomenon, he is unsure if 
genuinely beneficial social learning versus opportunistic manoeuvring is 
occurring. 49  
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Conceptions of Legitimacy in Contemporary Forest Governance 
Forest governance theorists acknowledge that ‘new’ governance has resulted in 
changed conditions for demonstrating effectiveness, and that institutional 
performance is understood in terms of input and output legitimacy.50 
Effectiveness describes overall performance in relation to an institution’s 
objectives or programmes, and efficiency denotes the cost and rate by which 
inputs translate into outputs.51 Non-state forest governance systems in particular 
have been identified as drawing their legitimacy from their core audiences. 
Sources of legitimacy range from the purely pragmatic, which is narrow and self 
interested, to the moral, based on ethical values. Legitimacy can also be derived 
cognitively, meaning a given scheme is understandable, or simply taken for 
granted.52 Legitimacy in this latter context can occur if an institution has been in 
existence long enough to become a normative institution, or by mirroring existing 
institutional structures, such as the UN.53  
Meeting the needs of the diverse stakeholder groups inherent in such systems 
can create internal tensions and impact on notions of legitimacy amongst 
stakeholders.54 Different strategies have been undertaken to achieve legitimacy.55 
This has resulted in analysis of the rivalry between forest certification schemes in 
particular as being understood in terms of the different approaches adopted within 
each system to the common problem of gaining rule-making legitimacy between 
NGOs, forest owners and forest product purchasers.56 However, certification has 
been identified as indicating a wider trend in the administrative law associated 
with global governance as it questions traditional notions as to how political 
legitimacy is conceived within transnational regulation.57 
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Quality of Governance and Definitional Inconsistencies 
In forest certification, quality of governance and legitimacy have been directly 
linked to participation. Other forms of forest governance beyond certification 
have thrown up similar discussions on how to determine quality of governance. In 
the case of national forest policies, participation has been similarly identified as a 
key constituent.58 Interest representation, as a sub-set of participation, is seen as 
an important aspect of quality of governance, particularly in certification. The 
logic underlying this is that: 
[A] standard will be good, and presumably legitimate, if it reflects the 
priorities of interested parties. While this concept of the public interest is 
not free of theoretical problems, it is difficult to argue that interested 
parties should not be heard, and it is also difficult to argue that a standard, 
which receives the assent of all affected and concerned parties is bad.59 
It is worth digressing slightly at this point and exploring by way of illustrative 
example what the types of interests associated with this form of forest governance 
are. Broadly speaking, these have been broken down into those with a general 
interest, political interest and financial interest. Generalists are seen as existing 
externally to the particular system, laying claim to a high-level set of concerns 
regarding social, environmental and political correctness and aesthetics, and 
include such interests as the public and the media. Political interests are portrayed 
as those who gain benefit or advantage from the existence of the process rather 
than the process itself, and include government, forest agencies, knowledge-based 
institutions (research or educational), and NGOs. Those with a financial interest 
are more concerned with the impacts of environmental and social considerations 
on the economic aspects of the system, such as competitiveness, marketing and 
prosperity, and include such groups as forest owners, forest industry and forestry-
dependent communities.60  
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Given the diverse nature of participants in forest governance, how these 
interests are balanced has consequently been identified as being crucial for 
broader credibility and rulemaking legitimacy.61 There is a special need to balance 
interests effectively through inclusiveness, which is seen as being instrumental in 
regulatory credibility and authority.62 Inclusiveness provides for a mix of qualities 
and resources amongst participants, allowing for the combination and mutual 
adjustment of interests. Participation in standard setting by such diverse groups 
also appears to build trust and enhance common expectations and understandings, 
as well as allowing for a certain degree of consensus.63 A further need for power 
distribution to prevent any party from becoming dominant in the general 
regulatory space has also been identified. Returning to forest certification, there 
are examples of controversies between the FSC and its competitor PEFC where 
demands for inclusiveness have come into conflict with industrial interests over 
control of standards setting.64 Certification may have increased the breadth of 
participants in forest policy arena, but questions have been raised as to whether 
industry-based programmes, in contrast to NGO-driven programmes, have 
balanced participation; although they have accepted it in principle, participation in 
terms of interest representation is tightly controlled.65  
Consequently, certification systems make use of a use a range of criteria to 
demonstrate legitimacy. Aspects identified include credibility, 
comprehensiveness, objectivity and measurability, reliability, independence, 
voluntarism, equality, acceptability, adaptability, cost-effectiveness, transparency, 
practicality and applicability.66 There are also various methods for quantifying the 
legitimacy of governance between competing programmes.67 The World Bank 
serves as a case in point. It has developed its own principles for what it refers to 
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as “acceptable” forest certification, requiring “meaningful participation” in 
standards setting and fair, transparent, independent, and conflict-of-interest-free 
decision making procedures.68 Given this range of approaches, there has been 
some recognition within the sector of the competitive nature of these different 
systems of evaluation. There have been various attempts to reconcile the 
differences between schemes by developing frameworks and thresholds to assess 
the legitimacy of competing systems, but these have yet to gain universal 
acceptance.69 Forest governance scholars have also, probably inadvertently, 
contributed to the problem by also making use of various sets of criteria in their 
evaluations of quality of governance.70 So too have civil society organisations.71 
As a result, determining the quality of forest governance presents a problem for 
scholars, public interests and institutions alike. 
Part II 
Analytical Synthesis and Framework for Evaluating 
Governance Quality 
Governance has been identified as a particularly useful concept for travelling 
across a range of political systems and differentiating between them. But the 
observation has also been made that there are problems with developing 
normative theories.72 The first of these concerns the lack of a consistent 
typological approach to categorising contemporary global governance. Secondly, 
given the different understanding of quality of governance and whence legitimacy 
is derived, the arrangements that underpin it as well as the lack of a consistent 
approach to evaluating ‘good’ governance also present analytical problems.  
This section seeks to address these problems, and presents an analytical 
framework upon which the four case studies that follow can be evaluated and 
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compared. It describes a theoretical approach to solving the ‘problem’ of 
legitimacy, its relationship to quality of global governance, and how to determine, 
or evaluate, quality. Here, it is argued that legitimacy of global governance is 
understood institutionally in terms of structure, process, outputs and outcomes, 
and it is the degree of interaction between these elements, which determines 
quality of governance. Each of the governance arrangements linked to legitimacy 
(such as accountability and transparency) are located hierarchically within an 
assessment framework based upon PC&I. The relationship of these PC&I to the 
structure and process of governance is explained diagrammatically. An evaluative 
matrix for rating institutional performamnce based upon these PC&I, is also 
presented. 
Classifying Governance 
Beyond the recognition that there is something ‘new’ about contemporary 
governance, there has been little else to hold all the discrete definitions together. 
This has led to calls “to frame a typology that sorts out and juxtaposes the diverse 
horizontal and hierarchical actors and processes through which authority is 
exercised.”73 Various scholars have risen to this challenge over the past decade or 
so, but this has resulted in a number of conflicting governance typologies, 
depending on the discipline, and date, in which they were written. As time has 
passed and the impacts of the growth of governance have been absorbed by 
previously discrete fields, it is now possible to see an increasing degree of 
convergence, although differences remain.74 As a result ttempts have made to 
identify and place the major concepts of governance within a broader analytical 
framework as a means of organising the literature (see Table 3.2 below).75  
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Table 3.2 Three typologies of governance 1997-2006  
Public Policy  Form International 
Relations 
Form ‘Analytic’ 
(Arts) 
Form 
Centralised Government has 
control 
Top-down Traditional 
governmental 
& inter-
governmental 
relations 
(including 
business) 
Old  State-steered 
(top-down, 
command-
control) 
Minimal state Less 
government, 
more 
privatisation  
Bottom-up Informal civil 
society 
initiatives 
New  New modes 
(self-regulation, 
etc. - public-
private) 
Corporate Directed and 
controlled by 
companies 
Market Multiple 
players using 
formal & 
informal 
market-based 
mechanisms 
All New and old 
mechanisms for 
procuring public 
goods (public, 
private & mixed) 
New public 
management 
(NPM) 
Private sector 
practices in the 
public sector 
Network Formal state, 
civil society, 
business 
alliances 
Normative Programmes to 
renew 
management 
(good 
governance, 
new public 
management & 
corporate 
governance -- 
public & private) 
‘Good’  Practices of 
NPM and liberal 
democratic 
values 
Side-by-side Informal 
cooperative 
arrangements 
between state 
& non-state 
  
Socio-
cybernetic 
Social-political 
interaction 
Mobius-web Intricate, 
overlapping 
mixed 
arrangements 
(“end-state” of 
contemporary 
governance) 
  
Self-organising  
networks 
Inter-dependent 
actors/ agencies 
delivering 
services 
    
Sources: Rhodes (1997), Rosenau (2003), Arts (2006) 
Arts presents the most concise typology, since he provides way of looking at 
contemporary governance that more efficiently captures the essence of the 
differences between ‘old’ governance (purely state-centric) and the gradations 
associated with ‘new’ models (state and/or non-state, non-state and hybrid), as 
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well as recognising the increasing integration between previously discrete schools 
of thought.76 This is a useful contribution to distinguishing between different 
forms of governance, but it is essentially one-dimensional, and only reinforces the 
divide between governance types.77 
Given that each type confronts -- and is affected -- by similar globalising 
forces, it is worth looking at some of the common themes that impact upon all 
types of contemporary governance, to see whether these themes can be used as a 
basis for a more integrated approach. In the survey of the literature undertaken in 
Chapter Two and above, three major factors in particular stand out amongst the 
many issues affecting the practice of global governance, and the institutions in 
which it is expressed. The first of these is that in addition to a shift in locality 
away from the nation state to multiple sites, the nature of contemporary authority, 
or sovereignty, has also changed. Authority may be located within national 
governments, but, given the nature of global social and economic transactions, it 
may also be vested in non-state agents, from corporations (or alternatively 
formulated, the private sector) to NGOs (or civil society), and multilateral 
organisations such as the WTO and IMF and so forth; even traditional notions of 
public and private are no longer clear-cut.  Here, the old state-centric exercise of 
authority, and the new power of non-state organisations exist on two ends of a 
continuum. The second and related theme, given the erosion of the role of the 
nation-state as the sole sphere of authority, regardless of its continuing existence 
and contribution to global politics, is the discussion across the literature about the 
practice of democracy in a globalised world. In the old world, democracy is 
characterised by territorially located, political parties; in the new, non-territorial 
sectors, consisting of groups such as civil society and business, engage one with 
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another in a much more cooperative set of arrangements, where collaboration is 
central to rule-making. Here, deliberation is to be contrasted with the other 
democratic end of the continuum, where interests are aggregated and compete 
with each other.  Thirdly, within governance theory itself, the discussion is also 
about the ‘old’ and the ‘new’, which is made more complicated by the fact that it 
is easier to distinguish between ‘old’ than the many and varied ‘new’ governance 
types.78 In practice, divergent forms of governance also appear alongside each 
other in the global policy arena. This is demonstrated, for example, by the 
existence of intergovernmental multilateral environmental agreements, 
exemplified by UNFF, alongside non-state market driven instruments, such as the 
Forest Stewardship Council.79 Consequently, innovation provides a third 
benchmark against which contemporary environmental governance is to be 
understood. Rather than presenting global governance as existing only within 
rigid definitional sets, it would be better to conceive it as a dynamic interplay 
between the factors influencing institutional expression. These three factors are 
therefore interpreted here as influencing the type of governance expressed in a 
given institution. Each institution will also sit in different places along the 
continuum in relation to each of these factors. This interplay can be expressed 
conceptually by way of a three-dimensional attribute space. By allocating some 
form of simple rating system (for example, low, medium and high) on both ends 
of the continuum, it is also possible, on the basis of empirical data, to determine 
the extent to which these themes are expressed in existing institutions, and to plot 
those institutions in three dimensions (see Figure 3.1 below).80 
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Figure 3.1 Framework of analysis for four hypothetical governance institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: adapted from Koenig-Archibugi (2006), Reuben (2003).81 
This also has the advantage of being able to locate multiple institutions in the 
one attribute space model for the purposes of comparative analysis, as Chapter 
Eight demonstrates.  
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As the discussions above have indicated, there is a considerable variety in the 
governance systems utilised by environmental institutions at the global level. The 
approach to classification adopted here provides a means of locating various 
institutions in relation to one another, not by their specific institutional type, but 
rather by three of the most significant forces at play on all systems of governance 
at the global level. In terms of this study, four very different models of forest 
governance have been selected, ranging from the intergovernmental (UNFF) to 
varying sub-types of ‘private’ governance (FSC, ISO, PEFC). Each of them varies 
in terms of the degree of innovation in governance, source of authority and 
democratic modality. Understanding these variations -- most notably, given the 
emphasis of this study, democracy -- will assist in determining whether there is a 
link between these broad institutional factors and quality of governance. 
Quality of Governance 
Summary 
This section describes a theoretical approach to solving, the ‘problem’ of 
legitimacy, its relationship to quality of global (forest) governance, and how to 
determine, or evaluate, institutional performance. Here, it is argued that 
legitimacy of global governance is understood institutionally in terms of structure, 
process, ouputs and outcomes, and it is the degree of interaction between these 
elements that determines quality of governance. Each of the governance 
arrangements linked to legitimacy (such as accountability and transparency) are 
located hierarchically within an assessment framework of PC&I. The actual 
relationship of these PC&I to the structure and process of governance is explained 
diagrammatically. An evaluative matrix, based upon these PC&I and related also 
to their institutional expression, is also presented. 
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Discussion 
In the governance literature it is possible to discern an interest in coming to grips 
with the structures and processes that underpin contemporary environmental 
governance. This emerges relatively early in the material, with a clear distinction 
made between governing, understood as a process of coordination, steering, 
influencing or ‘balancing’ social-political interactions; and governance, 
interpreted as the structure that emerges in a social-political system as result of 
interaction.82 This idea re-emerges subsequently in terms of ‘governance as 
structure’, understood as the models utilised by various institutions (and repeating 
some of the debates surrounding typologies of governance), and ‘governance as 
process’, again referring to the idea of steering or coordinating.83  
Elaborating further on structure and process, it is also clear from the literature 
that the structures of contemporary governance are understood as being more 
participative in nature, in that they include more actors than the traditional state-
bureaucracy model. Secondly, the processes through which decisions are made --
recognising the broader participation of a range of actors -- are more discursive in 
nature, requiring more deliberation than models oriented around command and 
control. The interaction between structure and process as a whole could be 
interpreted as comprising the ‘co’ arrangements referred to in the previous 
chapter, and relates to participation within an institution’s structure and 
deliberation via its processes, which together describe the nature of collaboration 
in ‘new’ governance.  
It is this interaction that results in substantive outcomes, such as the 
formulation of criteria, or setting of standards.84 Structure, process and substantive 
outcomes are seen as interrelated components necessary for the solving of 
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problems within contemporary governance.85 Together, they have been identified 
as the key determinants of ‘governability’, defined as “the total quality of a social-
political system to govern itself within the context of broader systems of which it 
is a part.”86 But, even if quality of governance is conceived of in these terms, it is 
nevertheless still necessary to address the problem of legitimacy in contemporary 
theory, since there is disagreement between governance theorists as to whence 
legitimacy is derived. Scholars with a more international relations perspective 
have previously viewed legitimacy in terms of both outputs (equated to efficiency, 
or effectiveness) and inputs (equated to democracy, or alternatively in more recent 
studies, interest representation, and accountability and transparency). Those 
studying public administration and public policy have tended to focus largely on 
output legitimacy, whilst those in the field of comparative politics have followed 
two schools of thought, depending on whether their focus is on democracy (in 
which case they favour input legitimacy) or efficiency, in which case they 
concentrate on output legitimacy.87 Whatever the scholarly perspective, the 
interrelationship between structure, process, ouputs and outcomes is clear, and 
may be conveniently married to both input and output legitimacy, since input 
legitimacy concerns itself with the structures and processes of governance, whilst 
output legitimacy is more interested in outcomes.  
However, given the nature of contemporary governance emphasised in the 
literature, “a more sociological notion of legitimacy” is also required.88 Quality of 
governance in this context should therefore be understood as the interrelationship 
between structure, process and outcomes, expressed in the observation that “the 
more ‘balanced’ these elements, the more ‘governable’ is the system.”89 Bearing 
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this in mind, this interrelationship can be expressed figuratively (see Figure 3.2 
below). 
Figure 3.2 Conceptual model of contemporary global governance 
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as a consequence of the first two problems, there is at present no simple matrix for 
evaluating governance quality. This section offers three analytical tools to address 
these problems. 
Firstly, for the purposes of understanding the nature of the relationship 
between the various governance arrangements a consistent hierarchical 
framework of PC&I relating to governance quality is presented here.90 The 
intention behind the placement of these attributes within such a framework is to 
ensure that they are located at the right level, to allow for a top-down analysis of 
principles via criteria and subsequently to indicators. Consistency in this context 
relates to the correct location within the framework: it is important that 
parameters are placed at the appropriate level and do not overlap or duplicate 
those at another, and are linked back to the appropriate parameter at a higher 
level. Such PC&I provide the means for reporting on the actual performance of 
each of the case studies explored subsequently.  
At the principle level, given the understanding of governance within the 
literature in terms of structure and process, and the argument advanced here that 
the total quality of a governance system relates to the interaction between 
structure, process and outcomes, these elements constitute the basis for a set of 
related principles. In this context, a principle is defined as a fundamental rule, 
which serves as a basis for reasoning, the objective of which reasoning is to 
ascertain the function of the total system in respect to explicit elements of 
governance.  A principle can also express a certain perspective regarding a 
specific aspect of the system as it interacts, in this context, with the overall 
governance system.91 Figure 3.1 has identified ‘participation as structure’ and 
‘deliberation as process’, both of which contribute to the substantive outcomes, or 
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products, of the system. The analysis, which follows, consequently looks at the 
governance arrangements discussed above in terms of their relationship to either 
structure or process. Here the perspective, or attitude, adopted regarding 
participation as the fundamental structural aspect of governance is that it should 
be meaningful. This term is frequently associated with participation in much of 
the literature, and serves here as a normative, qualitative descriptor.92 The second 
principle, referring to the deliberative, procedural, aspects of governance, has 
been ascribed the term productive as its descriptor.93 In this context the principle 
is more than a statement about the democratic legitimacy of a process, as it refers 
both to the quality of deliberations, as they occur within the system, as well as the 
quality of the outcomes, or products, of those deliberations. This specific 
analytical approach is discussed further in the context of Figure 3.3 below.  
Criteria are parameters functioning at the next level below principles, and 
demonstrate compliance with them in relation to specific aspects or states of the 
system. They are intended to facilitate the assessment of principles that would 
otherwise be ideational and non-measurable.94 A criterion can also be described as 
“a category of conditions or processes” against which, a system can be assessed.95 
Criteria are themselves not usually capable of being measured directly, however, 
but are formulated to provide a determination on the degree of compliance.96 They 
are consequently linked to indicators, which are hierarchically lower, and which 
represent quantitative or qualitative parameters, and do describe conditions 
indicative of the state of the governance system as they relate to the relevant 
criterion.97  
Any discussion regarding the criteria associated with the principles of 
meaningful participation and productive deliberation therefore occurs 
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simultaneously with their associated indicators. In this study, the structural 
principle of meaningful participation is demonstrated through two criteria, interest 
representation and organisational responsibility. In the discussion of the 
governance literature presented above interest representation has been linked to 
three elements of governance, which function on the indicator level: 
inclusiveness, demonstrating who participates in a governance system; equality, 
indicating the nature of the relationship between participants; and resources, 
referring to the economic, technical or institutional capacity of a participant to 
represent their interests within the system. The second criterion, organisational 
responsibility is comprised of two indicators, accountability and transparency, 
which are usually treated together in the literature, and refer to the extent to which 
the behaviour of participating organisations can be both called to account both 
inside the institution and externally by the public at large, as well as being visible, 
or open, to scruntiny by other actors within the institution, and beyond.  
The procedural principle of productive deliberation is demonstrated through 
two criteria, decision making and implementation. Three indicators are linked to 
decision making: democracy, not referring to a specific mode of democracy, but 
rather the extent to which a system can be deemed to be functioning 
democratically; agreement, referring to the method in which decisions are 
reached, such as voting, or consensus; and dispute settlement, indicating the 
system’s capacity to manage conflict when there is no agreement, or there are 
challenges to decisions made. Three indicators are linked to implementation: 
behaviour change, used to determine whether the implementation of agreements, 
or substantive outcomes results in changed behaviour regarding the problem that 
the system was created to address (in the case of this study, forest management); 
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problem solving, referring to the extent to which the system has solved the 
problem it was created to address (understood broadly in this study as 
unsustainable forest management); and durability, capturing the two related 
elements of adaptability and flexibility, as well as longevity. Table 3.3 below sets 
out the hierarchical relationship between these PC&I. 
Table 3.3 Hierarchical framework for the assessment of governance quality 
Principle Criterion Indicator 
Inclusiveness 
Equality 
Interest representation 
Resources 
Accountability 
“Meaningful participation” 
Organisational responsibility 
Transparency 
Democracy 
Agreement 
Decision making 
Dispute settlement 
Behavioural change 
Problem solving 
“Productive deliberation” 
Implementation 
Durability 
 
It should be noted that the PC&I method of evaluation suggested here, and 
derived from the forest management literature, is not without its critics in the field 
of environmental science. Indicators in particular have been labelled a 
“pathological corruption of the reductionist approach” resulting in a shadow 
world based on voodoo science.98 This has led to the conclusion that they are best 
used in a controlled manner to account for the critical dimensions of a system, and 
only in conjunction with other simultaneous views.99 With these observations in 
mind, the second tool, designed to locate these P, C, & I within their institutional 
context, is presented here (see Figure 3.3 above). In this representation 
implementation is to be conceived in terms of the interaction between structure 
and process, which have delivered the outcomes in need of implementation. 
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Figure 3.3 Institutional model of governance quality 
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alternative, but simultaneous viewpoint, which takes a greater account of the 
complexity of the interactions within the system.100 
Thirdly, and finally, it remains for these concepts to be located within a 
framework for evaluation. Table 3.4 below presents an evaluative matrix against 
which each of the institutions examined in the following case studies can be 
scored.  
Table 3.4 Evaluative matrix of governance quality 
Principle 1. Meaningful Participation 
Criterion 1. Interest representation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
2. Organisational responsibility 
Highest possible score: 6 
Lowest possible score: 2 
Sub-
total 
(out of 
15): 
 
Indicator  Inclusiveness Equality Resources Accountability Transparency  
High 3 3 3 3 3  
Medium 2 2 2 2 2  
Low 1 1 1 1 1  
Principle 2. Productive deliberation 
Criterion 3. Decision making 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
4. Implementation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3  
Sub-
total 
(out of 
18): 
 
Indicator  Democracy Agreement Dispute 
settlement 
Behavioural 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Durability  
High 3 3 3 3 3 3  
Medium 2 2 2 2 2 2  
Low 1 1 1 1 1 1  
Total 
(out of 
33) 
      
Final 
Score: 
 
Performance is evaluated at the indicator level, and ranked low, medium and high. 
For the purposes of comparative analysis, performance is also recorded in 
numerical terms (from one to three points) with a reference value, or norm, of 2 
(or ‘medium’ rating).101 Following the hierarchical assessment framework of 
PC&I, the cumulative values of the relevant individual indicators demonstrate the 
  107 
degree of fulfilment at the criterion level; these criteria in turn form the 
cumulative basis for determining compliance at the principle level; at both the 
criterion and principle levels a conventional pass/fail target value of 50% has been 
used to determine performance.102 
A question has also arisen in similar studies of global governance as to whether 
qualitative data -- the method used here -- can be applied to develop quantitative 
results.103 Warnings have also been given that conversion of verbal (low, medium, 
high) into numerical descriptions can lead to “judgments… concealed behind the 
illusionary authority of a number, and its pretensions to scientific precision.”104  
There can also be further problems when indicators are weighted differently, or 
when individual results are combined to provide aggregated scores.105 In the case 
of the former, there has been no differentiation in the values of any indicator in 
this study, but there has been aggregation of scores at the indicator level to 
produce results at both the criterion and principle level.  This can lead to a 
situation where a system scores poorly in one indicator, only to meet the threshold 
at the criterion level, or fails to meet the criterion level threshold, whilst still 
meeting requirements at a principle level. This is recognised as a potential 
distortion of the results, and it is accepted that precision in such a qualitative study 
is not always possible. However, the intention behind using three discrete sources 
of information for each case study (primary and secondary sources and 
interviews) is intended to partially address the issue by providing for a 
‘triangulated’ critical analysis, not reliant on a single source.106 
Conclusions 
Governance has been presented as the primary means by which social and 
political interaction can be understood in the global context of state, society, and, 
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given the emphasis in the case studies that follow, the market. In this 
environment, all actors are continuously interacting with one another in modes of 
governing in which communication, and learning, are recognised as essential 
components in dealing with the complex and diverse dynamics of the 
contemporary world. There is now a growing recognition of the importance of: 
[S]ocial-political governing processes (and structures) that take both 
interactions and actors seriously. Interactions shape actors and actors 
shape interactions as well. They are ‘equal’ as basic units of analysis and 
theory development.107 
This is an important observation, since it grounds theory and practice within the 
normative assumption that structures and processes are fundamental to 
understanding the quality of interactions between participants in contemporary 
governance.  
This understanding has taken some time to eventuate, however, and the 
observation could be made that even in the case of Kooiman, quoted here, the 
sophistication of this understanding has evolved over the past two decades or so. 
And yet concurrently, governance theory has directly affected practice, not merely 
in terms of retrospective analysis, but in shaping the strategic directions followed 
by various institutions. This is exemplified by the policy emphasis regarding 
governance practice adopted by the EU for example, and typified by its White 
Paper on governance, or The World Bank and its expectations of ‘good’ 
governance inside developing nations.108 This has meant that governance theory 
has informed practice, and vice-versa. This is particularly apparent in forest 
governance. 
The systems that have arisen in this context therefore cover the whole gamut, 
from the old ‘top-down’ models, to the various new ‘co-’ arrangements (such as 
the network model of governance). But at the same time as governance has 
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evolved, the contribution of some of its key attributes to institutional quality and 
legitimacy has been overlooked, or only partially addressed. This has led to a 
wide range of institutional expressions, and inconsistencies between institutions. 
This is not necessarily a problem, as it is unlikely that any single approach will 
suit the highly complex nature of these times. But it does raise questions as to 
how democracy functions in such contexts. In such circumstances the application 
of a range of ideas from several traditions may prove useful.109 The analytical 
framework presented here has therefore taken concepts from a variety of 
disciplines in order to better understand the relationship between quality of 
governance and institutional expression. In the five chapters that follow, the 
dynamic interplay between the actors participating in global governance is 
explored within a range of systems that function within different social, political, 
institutional, and democratic settings. The nature of the interactions between these 
actors and these contexts forms the basis of determining the quality of 
governance, and ultimately, the legitimacy, of each of the systems investigated. 
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Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 
Introduction 
Having differentiated between the many institutional varieties of contemporary 
governance, and developed a means of determining their effectiveness, this 
chapter begins the process of investigating the four institutions selected for 
analysis. The FSC is the first institution investigated, and, as a system of forest 
certification, it is particularly interesting as it represents an ‘ideal type’ of market-
driven governance on account of its strongly non-state orientation regarding rule-
making authority, standard setting and compliance verification.1 After a history of 
the emergence, evolution and significant developments affecting the institution, 
FSC is located within the governance typology discussed previously. This is 
followed by an analysis of the performance of FSC’s governance system, based 
on the framework presented in the previous chapter, using written and oral 
sources. The chapter concludes with a commentary on the findings, a postscript 
bringing the institution’s history up to date at time of completion, and some 
observations on the institution as a whole. As this is the first of the case studies, 
explanatory material expanding on some of the ideas contained in the previous 
chapters is provided during the course of the chapter. In addition, given the depth 
of the materials investigated, and the focus on global governance arrangements, 
much of the nationally relevant material is to be found in the endnotes. The format 
outlined here is followed in each of the case studies. 
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Historical Overview 
Origins, Institutional Development and Early Controversies 
The labelling of wood products has been traced back to a French royal decree of 
1637, the purpose of which was to designate the quality of the products labelled, 
rather than forest management, as is the intent today.2 Modern forest certification 
was developed in the early 1990s as a specific form of private environmental 
governance to address growing public concerns about global deforestation in the 
previous decade.3 In 1985, Friends of the Earth (FoE) in England and Wales 
proposed what is claimed as the first modern timber certification and labelling 
scheme as part of a campaign to save tropical rainforests. Consumers in Britain 
and Europe were encouraged to avoid purchasing tropical timber produced on a 
non-sustainable basis, and the organisation launched its own ‘Good Wood’ 
scheme. From 1988 onwards, stickers and tags began to be attached to wood 
products as a “seal of approval.”4 In 1989, FoE prepared a proposal for the ITTO 
to look at the feasibility of developing a timber certification and labelling 
programme.5 The ITTO Council received the proposal in May 1989 but rejected 
the recommendations for a forest certification and labelling system.6  
This encouraged NGOs to begin organising around certification more seriously 
themselves.7 At the turn of the decade, the Rainforest Alliance, a US-based non-
profit organisation formed the SmartWood Program, created for the purpose of 
“forestry management certification.”8 The programme’s first certification was 
carried out in November 1990 in Indonesia, covering the teak wood forests of 
Java, managed by Perum Perhutani, the state forestry agency.9 At a meeting in 
San Francisco in 1991 a group of timber traders and social and environmental 
NGOs determined to develop an independently audited global system for “good 
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forest management”, managed by a global umbrella organisation, which, it was 
decided should be called the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), and a working 
group was created to start the process.10 WWF was to directly attribute the 
impetus to move forward on certification as a consequence of ITTO’s lack of 
action, and described the proposed FSC scheme as “leaving the ITTO behind.”11 
In March 1992 interested parties met again in Washington, D.C. An interim board 
was elected, with representation from both developed and developing countries.12 
Six working groups were created with a range of tasks including the drafting of 
principles of forest management, fundraising and communications.13  
Discussions during this period regarding the scope and intent of the emerging 
institution were wide-ranging. Proposals regarding governance arrangements 
created some controversy. Initial thoughts within the working group favoured the 
creation of FSC as a foundation, with no members and only a board of trustees. 
This proposal was resisted by the World Rainforest Movement, which lobbied the 
working group, and urged other NGOs not to adopt this model.14 These groups 
persuaded the working group to adopt a participatory structure including open 
membership and accountability mechanisms and procedures for settling disputes. 
It is claimed that such arrangements provided the emerging FSC “with a 
legitimacy that it would have lacked if established as a foundation.”15 
The term ‘sustainably managed’ was rejected on account of the definitional 
controversies surrounding this term.16 At the Washington meeting a draft of what 
were to become FSC’s Principles and Criteria for Well-managed Forests was 
discussed.17 These were categorised around the following matters: legal and 
administrative, social and economic, and ecological and environmental.18 It was 
agreed that FSC should address all forest types. Deliberations regarding the 
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extension of FSC’s forestry mandate beyond the tropics were not easy, however, 
and northern NGOs were accused of initially wanting certification to relate solely 
to the tropics.19  
In addition to these founding meetings, consultation processes in ten countries 
took place between 1990 and 1993 to determine the level of support for a global 
certification programme for both natural forests and plantations. Following these 
events a founding assembly was held in Toronto in September 1993 consisting of 
130 participants from 26 countries.20 Developing nations were present and 
included a strong representation from the Pacific Region, which played a 
significant role in deliberations. Indigenous peoples present also stated their case 
for the return of their lands. Forest industry representatives included the Canadian 
Pulp and Paper Association (CPPA) and Californian lumber and milling company, 
Collins Pine. A number of government representatives and public authorities 
attended as observers, while research foundations such as the World Resources 
Institute were also present. Participants were identified as either representing 
social, economic or environmental interests, and were placed in ‘chambers’ 
accordingly. The economic chamber contained forest sector representatives as 
well as consultants and certification bodies.21   
Debate as to whether economic interests should be allowed a vote in the 
proposed future General Assembly was also intense, with Greenpeace and WWF 
expressing reservations, whilst FoE argued most strongly that they should not.22 A 
proposal was floated that economic interests be allowed no more than 25% of the 
voting power in the General Assembly, with the remaining 75% being held by the 
social and environmental chambers together. In terms of the proposed Board of 
Directors, two seats were to be reserved for economic interests. Thirteen social 
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and environmental groups, including Greenpeace, FoE and indigenous groups 
then withdrew their support, arguing that economic interests had been given too 
much power, and remained for the rest of the event as observers.23 Discussions 
regarding the types of forest to be certified, including planted forests, also proved 
a subject of intense debate, and the proposed principles of forest management 
were not finalised.24 The chamber system, in which social and environmental 
interests held 75% of votes in one chamber, and forest owners and retailers held 
the remaining minority share of 25% in another, was formalised in 1994.25 The 
initial principles and criteria for “natural forest management”, of which there were 
nine, referred to plantations only in so far as their establishment was expressly 
forbidden on sites of primary and well-established secondary forests, or of 
environmental, cultural or social significance.26  
The ratified Statutes identified the first purpose of FSC to be the promotion of 
the environmentally appropriate, economically viable and adequate management 
of forests, as well as “a forestry production that preserves the environment.”27 The 
By-Laws use the more evangelical term “mission” rather than purpose, redefining 
the organisation’s role as the promotion of “environmentally appropriate, socially 
beneficial, and economically viable management of the world’s forests.”28 This 
mission was to be fulfilled through three activity areas: the promotion of its 
Principles and Criteria of Forest Stewardship by means of voluntary accreditation 
of a programme for certifying forest management; conducting educational 
activities to increase aware of the value of forest certification as a means of 
improving forest management; and the provision of guidance and assistance to 
policy-makers, legislators and forest managers on forest management issues.29 In 
1994 it established its headquarters in Oaxaca, Mexico, consisting of a staff of 
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three and an executive director, gaining recognition under Mexican law as a civil 
association in 1996.30 Following a vote of FSC’s founding members in August 
1994, the Principles and Criteria (P&C) were agreed upon. The Statutes, later 
superseded by the By-Laws on a number of procedural and structural matters, 
were also approved.31  
The response to the development and founding of FSC was mixed. The 
reaction in some parts of the social, economic and environmental sectors, which 
would be expected to favour FSC was not entirely supportive. Some social 
interests felt the founding assembly only superficially addressed their concerns 
about lack of consultation and discriminatory treatment of tropical countries.32 
The idea of certification itself was met, as has been previously related, by strong 
opposition within the ITTO. FSC’s management emphasis on performance was 
similarly opposed by senior figures in the global timber industry. These industry 
forces began a well-planned offensive to undermine performance-based standards, 
such as those proposed by FSC.33 It was not only large-scale interests within the 
forest industry who were concerned about the arrival of FSC. European small 
forest owners met its decision to base itself in Mexico with suspicion.34  
In the same year, and perhaps partly in response to these developments, FSC 
softened its stance on the certification of plantations, and a revised set of P&C, 
further amended in 2000, were to permit the certification of plantations, with 
certain provisos.35 Certification of plantations had been discussed as early in 
FSC’s history as 1991. After the initial approval of the P&C without reference to 
plantations, the Board of Directors had agreed to extend the Principles to include 
plantations in 1993. Consultations were held between 1994 and 1995, and after a 
ballot of the membership in December 1995, in which 89% voted in favour of a 
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plantations-specific addendum, a new Principle Ten was approved at the eighth 
Board of Directors meeting in 1996.36  
This action may have appeased some forestry interests, but it was to cause 
growing concerns about FSC’s credibility amongst some of those environmental 
NGOs that had withdrawn from the founding assembly in 1993.37 FSC also began 
to attract some criticism. At the beginning of 1996 its membership was drawn 
from only 25 countries and Asia and Africa were not well represented. This 
increased to 37 by 1997, but numbers in the economic chamber were still 
criticised as being too low to ensure proper interest representation. Under-
representation of social interests, particularly from Africa and Asia was also 
identified as being a problem during this period, perhaps an even more severe one 
than economic participation.38 On a separate, but related issue, small forest 
owners continued to accuse FSC of being discriminatory, in view of the fact that 
large-scale, tropical forestry certification was both easier to achieve, and more 
cost-effective, than small-scale operations.39  
Nevertheless, between 1993 and 1997 FSC and its supporters were credited 
with making a significant contribution to international forest certification and the 
progress of certification might not have been as far-reaching without it. It 
provided an important forum for policy debate, making certification a reality 
rather than a concept, as well as stimulating the growth of competing initiatives.40 
In 1993 an independent working group consisting of academics and NGOs 
developed an Indonesian ecolabelling standard (Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia - 
LEI). Although criticised by some NGOs as being unduly close to government, 
the programme has been presented as being stricter in some ways than FSC, with 
whom it entered into cooperation in 1997.41 The first accreditation contracts were 
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signed with four certification bodies, and the first certified products bearing FSC 
logo were released in the UK in 1996.42 The first Working Group, also in the UK, 
was established in the same year to develop nationally relevant management 
standards. In the following year the first national standard was endorsed for 
Sweden.43  
Despite these positive developments, serious concerns regarding FSC 
certification, and the manner in which it was implemented by its accredited 
certifiers also began to emerge from the mid ‘nineties. One of the earliest, and 
most controversial cases, was the certification by the Rainforest Alliance’s 
SmartWood Program of teakwood plantations in Costa Rica.44 In 1999 NGO 
frustration over the failings within the FSC system were to culminate in the 
production of a highly critical report published by the Rainforest Foundation.45 
Internally, however, the organisation continued to move forward with a 
number of policy initiatives, which were brought together during 1999. In 
January, following an international workshop held in Mexico in 1998, FSC 
became the first organisation to define high conservation value forests, and to 
delineate those forest characteristics that merited special protection. This was 
promoted as representing considerable progress in resolving forestry conflicts.46 
Policy clarifications were also issued regarding the prohibition on genetically 
modified organisms from certified forests, the use of chemical pesticides, poorly 
defined in the P&C, and matters concerning contract labour. Major revisions of 
the controversial percentage-based claims policy, whereby certified and 
uncertified sources could be mixed, were also undertaken.47 These were seen as 
part of a process aiming at providing a clear interpretation of the policies 
contained within the P&C and avoiding undue bureaucracy whilst making 
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certification accessible, attractive and credible. The intention was to avoid 
‘moving the goalposts’, while coping with changing scientific, technical and 
public opinions.48 
The 1999 General Assembly was marked by a number of governance-related 
motions, attempting to address some of the perceived shortcomings of the 
organisation.49 An experienced facilitator was used to guide the membership 
through the complex procedures now required for speaking to, amending, and 
agreeing on motions under a revised tripartite economic, social and environmental 
chamber system.50 A number of important motions were passed, notably -- given 
external criticisms -- on small landowner certification.51 This and the other 
motions directed at improving FSC’s performance and policy gaps began to be 
implemented over the following year.52 At the organisation’s second annual 
conference about half of the agenda was devoted to social issues, and discussions 
were held regarding workers’ rights, community forestry, indigenous peoples and 
small forest enterprises.53  
Although these initiatives went some way to appease stakeholder concerns, 
FSC was placed under increasing levels of scrutiny by NGOs, both supportive and 
sceptical. In May 2001, European environmental and social NGO FERN, 
published its report Behind the Logo, a comprehensive analysis of FSC and its 
competitor schemes.54 Although generally favourable to FSC and critical of other 
schemes, the findings did not all go in FSC’s favour. The report stressed that FSC 
was not perfect in a number of aspects, including methods of consultation, 
communication, and dispute resolution.55 A number of NGO complaints were also 
raised both formally and informally with FSC during this period. These included 
an ongoing dispute in New Zealand concerning plantation forestry company 
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Fletcher Challenge Forests and its certifier Scientific Certification Systems.56 This 
concern had arisen largely on account of the unpopular practice of undertaking 
evaluations using “interim” standards.57 The environmental and social NGO, 
World Rainforest Movement, also released a number of reports far less flattering 
than Behind the Logo aimed at pressuring FSC to change its stance on a number 
of issues, particularly plantation certification.58  
In November 2001 the Rainforest Foundation published the report, Trading in 
Credibility, which systematically outlined a number of structural and procedural 
weaknesses in FSC system, as well as some of the shortcomings of its 
certification and standard setting activities in a number of countries. Although 
generally negative, the report nevertheless acknowledged that whatever its 
failings, FSC was based on sound principles, which could not be said for its 
competitor, industry schemes, and it was more demanding than them in its 
assessment procedures.59  
Consolidation and Growth 
FSC’s response to Trading in Credibility was relatively measured.60 The reception 
of the report in this manner may be partly attributed to the fact that during the 
course of 2001 FSC had already worked on a series of policies aimed at better 
addressing a range of specific -- and controversial -- issues. These included the 
development of a response to address concerns over plantation certification, the 
production of a draft chemicals and pesticides policy and the creation of a draft 
social strategy.61 Recognising that the organisation had both strengths and 
weaknesses it was also decided to convene a Change Management Team to take a 
“good hard look” at FSC’s strengths and weaknesses.62 The Board of Directors 
approved the report, which contained a plan to address FSC’s challenges, in May 
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2001.63 In response to the report FSC began a process of decentralisation and 
transformation into a global network the following year. Part of these activities 
included the placement of the Secretariat within an International Center, which 
relocated to Bonn in 2003. A decision was also made to create regional offices for 
Latin America, Africa and Asia.64 The regional offices were to support the work 
of the International Center in its role as the “international framework to market 
and promote FSC.”65  
Over the course of 2002 policy matters were addressed in further detail. Work 
on the social strategy continued, built around the objectives of building the 
capacity of the social sector to participate and benefit from certification, and 
increasing FSC’s responsiveness to and communication with its social 
constituents. A related initiative to increase access to certification for small and 
low intensity managed forests also commenced.66 Both these initiatives were 
endorsed at the third General Assembly in November, which somewhat ironically 
coincided with the launch Trading in Credibility.67 A group chain of custody 
policy, aimed at providing small timber processors with more options for 
accessing chain of custody (CoC) certification was also finalised.68 Guidelines 
advising on how to incorporate ILO conventions into the P&C were also released. 
At the forest management level the process to undertake a full review of the 
organisation’s plantation policies was commenced, while the chemical pesticides 
policy, following two years of “intensive discussion and debate”, was finalised.69  
 A significant number of motions debated at the third General Assembly were 
related to governance and revisited some of the uncompleted business of 1999, or 
other controversial matters. In terms of institutional governance arrangements, 
perhaps the most symbolic decision made was to give equal representation to all 
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three chambers on the Board, which was passed by an overwhelming majority.70 
FSC decision making in the General Assembly was also defined in more -- almost 
microscopic -- detail.71 Further measures to improve organisational responsibility 
towards participants in policy development were also instituted.72  
The percentage based claims policy was revised to allow highly mechanised 
sawmills dealing with only small quantities of wood to participate in FSC system 
in “an economically viable manner”, whilst a motion to set the minimum volume 
of certified timber in solid wood products at 70% was defeated.73 Motions to 
further encourage indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ access to 
certification, and to increase southern chambers’ participation in the preparation 
and presentation of motions at General Assemblies were also passed.74 A range of 
other motions aimed at improving the quality, consistency and transparency in 
relation to the activities of certifications bodies were also passed.75 It was agreed 
that the use of interim certification using the certifiers’ own generic, standards, 
which had caused so much trouble in New Zealand, would also be phased out 
over time.  National standards under development by a national initiative, even if 
they were in draft form, were to be incorporated in assessments undertaken by 
certification bodies.76  
Despite the work that had been done earlier in the year on the plantations 
policy, a majority of delegates (75.3%) still considered the current draft to be 
unclear and in need of improvement. It was resolved that eighteen months of 
broad consultation was necessary for the revised policy to give clear guidance on 
how Principle Ten should be interpreted.77 This was a timely reminder on the 
need to work further on plantation certification, as the World Rainforest 
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Movement published another hostile report (cataloguing ongoing problems in 
Thailand and Brazil) in August 2003.78  
The relocation of the International Center to Germany in February 2003 was 
intended to improve services to stakeholders, certification bodies and national 
initiatives. The new arrangement was presented as being more able to respond 
more effectively to the needs of a more flexible, decentralised and global network. 
Staff members were organized into units covering accreditation, policy and 
standards, marketing and communication, human resources and administration.79 
The implementation of the various decisions of the General Assembly 
commenced with the release of an updated social strategy. This was followed by 
announcements regarding reviews of group and multi-site chain of custody policy 
and pilot tests of the new draft chain of custody standards. Trials of the first small 
to low intensity managed forest certification procedures also commenced. New 
draft standards for the development of national and sub-national standards were 
also circulated to the national initiatives for comment, and a specially convened 
technical committee examined the new accreditation standards due to replace the 
old accreditation manual in 2004. An external team of consultants was also 
brought in to develop a guidance document on the interpretation of Principles 
Two and Three for certifiers using generic standards.80 This was in response “to 
the findings of the recent NGO study on the implementation of FSC’s Principles 2 
& 3 in Indonesia” (presumably an oblique reference to Trading in Credibility).81 
The years from 2003 onwards can be summarised as ones of further 
consolidation for FSC, following a major reorientation of the organisation into a 
decentralised global network.82 Characterising its first ten years as being built on 
“youthful enthusiasm”, Chairman David Nahwegahbow and Executive Director 
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Heiko Liedeker accepted the need to move on in “mature and systematic” manner, 
and continue efforts to better involve social stakeholders.83 Internally, the three 
chambers also appear to have reached some level of mutual accommodation 
during this period.84 
Several new or revised standards and procedures were released in 2004, along 
with a simplified trademark manual and labelling guide.85 Two of the four 
standards associated with the new chain of custody arrangements are worth 
mentioning. These related to the handling of non-FSC “controlled wood” from 
uncertified forests.86 The intention was to assist companies, governments and 
financial institutions eliminate “controversial” sources of timber from their supply 
chains, particularly illegally harvested wood.87  
In 2004, a follow-up report to Behind the Logo published by FERN, Footprints 
in the Forest compared FSC to an increasing number of competitor schemes.88 
Although much kinder to FSC than most of the other schemes investigated, and 
still considering it to be “the only credible scheme” for most NGOs, the report 
was nevertheless critical of FSC on matters relating to both policy and 
performance.89 In particular it needed to “seriously address” the problems that 
were associated with plantation certification.90 
The continuous opposition to plantation certification was finally substantively 
addressed by FSC from 2004 onwards. In that year the organisation announced 
the launch of a review, issuing a discussion paper and holding an international 
stakeholder meeting.91 Over 100 individuals from 30 countries attended the event, 
intended to start what was envisaged as a two-year process. Participants heard 
from a range of stakeholders, including NGOs, who “outlined several persistent 
criticisms.”92 In February 2005 a policy working group was established, 
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consisting of twelve participants, representing the three chambers each balanced 
north/south.93 The working group presented its final report to the Board of 
Directors in November 2006.94 The report recommended one common set of 
integrated P&C, rather than retaining a separate Principle Ten.95 It was accepted 
that “certification should be open to operations across the whole continuum from 
low impact management of natural forests to high-intensity short rotation 
plantations.”96 The higher the impacts of management “the greater the emphasis 
needed for prevention, mitigation and compensation measures.”97 Further 
recommendations of significance included putting measures in place to elevate the 
social components of FSC system to an equal footing with its economic and 
environmental aspects. The obligations for engagement with interested and 
affected parties were placed on the forest manager, before commencing 
certification assessment. The role of the certifier was to become one of auditing 
the extent to which the forest management genuinely involved stakeholders in 
discussions, and resolved conflicts.98 A technical phase commenced in April 
2007, with the guidelines and the revisions to the P&C to be presented to the 
General Assembly of 2008.99 A first draft of the revised P&C was made available 
for consultation in June 2008.100  
Governance Within FSC 
System Participants 
Both members and non-members may participate within the FSC system on the 
international, national and regional/local levels. Membership of the institution can 
be held by either individuals or legal entities (including governments under 
specific conditions), which support the association and its purposes and P&C.101 
The organisation is open to all participants who participated at its in its founding, 
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those later admitted by the General Assembly, and those as outlined by the 
provisions laid down in the Statutes. Legal entities must designate a 
representative, who is responsible for maintaining the relationship between FSC 
and the member body.102 The rights and responsibilities of FSC’s associates 
include: active participation in the General Assembly; to vote or hold any elected 
office; to submit for consideration initiatives relating to FSC’s core activities; and 
to report on and publicise its activities within the association.103  
Membership of FSC is broken down into three interest chambers.104 The 
members of these chambers are further sub-divided according to their country of 
origin, identified according to whether the country belongs to the global North or 
the global South. Northern countries are understood according to the United 
Nations criteria as being those with a high income; those from the South are 
determined by having low, middle, or upper-middle incomes. The Board has the 
final say in determining the status of a given country.105 The “economic interest 
chamber” consists of those with a “vested interest in commercial forest product 
organisations”, either for-profit, or not-for-profit.106 The environmental chamber 
is limited to law-abiding non-for-profit NGOs, whose governing bodies are 
independent from governments and which are renewed by periodic elections or 
appointment.107 The social chamber is identified in the By-Laws as consisting of 
indigenous organisations and “social movements.”108 This definition is expanded 
elsewhere to include non-profit NGOs and unions.109 Academic, research, legal 
and forest product associations are assigned to the relevant chamber, based on the 
nature of their activities, by the Board.110  
Members participate in the General assembly according to the tripartite, 
chamber-based arrangement.111 A proxy may represent members at the General 
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Assembly. Non-members may attend the General Assembly at the Board’s 
discretion as observers.112 The Board of Directors consists of nine members. Each 
chamber is represented through three members, a northern and southern member, 
while the third position alternates between the two sub-chambers.113 They may be 
either individual or delegated representatives and may serve two consecutive 
three-year terms.114 Certification bodies may not represent economic interests on 
the Board.115 The dispute resolution committee also reflects FSC’s structural 
representation of six members from the three chambers and sub-chambers.116 It 
also allows for at least one member from North America, Central and South 
America and the Caribbean, Europe, Oceania, Asia and Africa.117 Committees and 
working groups are also expected to seek a balance between the different sub-
chambers. National initiatives, in addition to the expected structural provisions for 
balanced representation, also have the liberty to create more than three 
chambers.118 
The membership application process is complex, and varies according to the 
sector applying.119 Membership fees, charged on a sliding scale on the basis of 
operating expenditure, but without discriminating against southern members, are 
levied to cover the costs of servicing the membership.120 There were 643 members 
of the organisation at the end of 2006.121  
Institutional Arrangements 
International Level 
The structure FS is depicted in Figure 4.1 below. The General Assembly is the 
highest organ of FSC.122 It meets at least once every three years, and its role is 
identified as largely consisting of reviewing the organisation’s activities and 
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finances, amending the Statutes, and admitting or excluding members.123 It may 
raise other matters, but is expected to restrict itself to these tasks.124  
The General Assembly is responsible for electing the Board of Directors, as 
well as the creation of a nomination committee to seek Board candidates. The 
Board is the formal organ of management of FSC.125 If required, the Board may 
appoint technical advisors -- balancing northern and southern interests -- to assist 
in matters for which it does not have the necessary expertise.126 The officers of the 
Board include a Chairman, Vice-chairman and Treasurer, and a Secretary, who 
need not be a Board member.127 The main tasks of the Board are related to the 
management and direction of the association’s affairs, the preparation and 
administration of the budget, and the drafting of By-Laws and managing 
disputes.128 The Board has the authority to establish committees to assist FSC 
with its operational and management tasks, in which both members and external 
experts may serve. An example used in the By-Laws is a technical committee, 
which could review and make recommendations on such matters as the P&C or 
national/regional standards.129 Various committees exist and include membership, 
finance, accreditation, standards, and dispute resolution.130 
The Chairman is responsible for presiding at General Assemblies and Board 
meetings, and the submission of (and reporting related to) the association’s annual 
financial statements and proposed budgets at the General Assembly. The 
Chairman may also represent the organisation to third parties if so determined by 
the General Assembly. The role of the Vice-chairman is to assist the Chairman in 
any of the latter’s designated duties.131  
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Figure 4.1 Structure of the Forest Stewardship Council 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Elliott 2000, p. 19 and Vallejo and Hauselmann, 2004 p. 9, adapted.  
(Dashed lines around Accreditation Systems International indicate autonomy). 
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The Treasurer has the official role of monitoring the organisation’s financial 
affairs, the day-to-day management of which is undertaken by the Executive 
Director and staff accountant.132 The Executive Director automatically fills the 
position of Secretary and is present, in a non-voting capacity, at all Board 
meetings. A Board or staff member may occupy the position in the event that the 
Executive Director is not present.133  
The Board oversees the performance of the Executive Director.134 The 
Executive Director heads the organisation’s Secretariat and is effectively chief 
executive officer.135 The Executive Director is responsible to the Board for 
effectively implementing policy. Other responsibilities include management, on 
behalf of the Board, of the finances, accounting and administration of the 
organisation, and for ensuring that the legal requirements are met in all countries 
where FSC is active. The position is subject to a performance review at least once 
a year.136 The position is not a statutory one, and may be designated at the 
discretion of the Board, or the General Assembly.137 Duties associated with 
heading the Secretariat include the appointment of staff.138 In addition to dealing 
with matters of internal regulation, the Executive Director is also responsible for 
representing the organisation publicly, and encouraging collaboration between 
individuals and groups to assist in the fulfilment of FSC’s mission.139 The 
duration of the office is at the discretion of the Board.140  
The Secretariat as a whole is responsible for supporting and guiding the day-to-
day activities of FSC internationally.141 Located within the Secretariat is the 
Policy and Standards Unit, the role of which is to initiate the development of 
guiding documents, such as standards.142  
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Historically, FSC has run its own accreditation programme “to provide a 
credible assurance that they are competent and independent.” The programme is 
responsible for accrediting certification bodies according FSC’s standards. 143 It is 
also responsible for accrediting FSC’s own standards.144 FSC National Initiatives  
(NIs) must also be accredited.145 In order “to ensure the credibility of the 
certification process” the content of any standards developed in the system are 
evaluated for compatibility with FSC P&C, and local applicability.146 In 2006, 
following international developments in accreditation, a wholly legally and 
constitutionally separate body from FSC, Accreditation Systems International, 
was created to manage the programme’s accreditation services (see also under 
Accountability below). ASI currently functions out of the same building as the 
International Centre.147 As of June 2007 there were 16 accredited certification 
bodies within the FSC system.148  
 National Level 
The Statutes contain little reference to FSC at a national level, other than a 
possible inference, concerning the rights of members to submit ‘initiatives’ 
consistent to its mission and objectives.149 This gap is addressed in the By-Laws, 
which state that FSC is obliged to encourage national and regional initiatives in 
line with its mission.150 The objectives of such initiatives are to encourage local 
participation and decentralise FSC’s activities.151  
National initiatives are intended to assist in the promotion of FSC and make it 
more locally relevant and accessible. They have two main aims: to develop and 
test regional standards by encouraging local participation, with the assistance of 
the organisation’s international membership; and to support the implementation 
and monitoring of certification activities.152 The expansion of national initiatives 
  140 
is built into FSC’s annual business plan, which identifies those countries that are 
to be the focus of activities.153 There are currently 42 national initiatives within 
the FSC system and 28 accredited national standards.154 At the time of writing, 34 
national initiatives were accredited as compliant with FSC requirements.155 
National initiatives go through three developmental stages (contact person, 
working group, advisory board) until a national office is finally established as 
outlined in Figure 4.1.156  
A wide-ranging set of participatory requirements is placed on national 
initiatives. These include dissemination of information to in-country members and 
other national stakeholders, and updating the Secretariat. The extent to which 
information is circulated is determined by consultation with the Secretariat and 
the regional coordinator/director. Consultation is a major aspect of national 
initiatives, both in terms of the contribution of a national perspective on policies 
under development internationally and managing consultations with stakeholders 
relating to certification activities nationally.157 
Standards Development, Accreditation, Chain of Custody and 
Certification  
FSC published a procedure for the development and approval of international 
standards in 2004 (see Figure 4.2 below).158 The procedures comply with the 
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance 
(ISEAL) Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and Environmental Standards 
(2004), ISO/IEC Guide 59 and the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, 
Annex 3.159 Their development is intended to reflect transparency, participation 
and fairness by complying with international best practice.160  
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Figure 4.2 International standards development process within FSC following 
accepted practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ISEAL 2003, following Toth, 2003, p. 8 and FSC-PRO-01-001; dashed lines 
indicate additional components to those identified by Toth, 2003.161 
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approval); and implementation (publication, and review and revision). 
National working groups are responsible for the development of national 
standards (see Figure 4.3 below).162  
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Figure 4.3 National FSC standards development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Scrase and Lindhe, 2001, pp. 13 & 35, adapted.163 
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The purpose behind developing standards regionally is to make FSC standards 
locally applicable and workable. Locally defined forest management standards 
must be endorsed by FSC internationally, and are then used by certification bodies 
in their local activities. These standards form the basis upon which grievance 
procedures are instigated nationally.164 Standards development on the national or 
sub-national level must comply with the requirements of draft FSC standard FSC-
STD-60-006 and FSC-STD-20-002.165 The development of standards is expected 
to demonstrate balanced multi-stakeholder participation and representation, 
accountability and transparency, fair decision making processes (including clear 
grievance procedures), and must harmonise with other regional standards, as 
depicted in Figure 4.3 below.166 FSC forest standards are performance-based, 
defining levels of management that forest operations must achieve in order to be 
certified.167 Performance is based on the system’s ten principles and 56 criteria, 
and although there is variation between national standards they must meet these 
P&C whilst still being appropriate to the country.168 
FSC accredited certification bodies may conduct both chain of custody and 
forest management certification for plantations and native forests, subject to the 
scope of their accreditation. They may also issue sub-licenses for the use of FSC 
name and trademark.169 The generic process of forest certification is outlined in 
Figure 4.4 below, and is applicable to other forest management certification 
programmes discussed in this study. Many of the certification bodies operate 
through affiliated organisations in various countries; these are not listed by FSC, 
but with the parent company.170 The process is initiated through the request of a 
forest owner or manager.  
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Figure 4.4 The forest certification process 
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Where there is an adopted national standard it is used by the certifier as the basis 
for assessment.171 Where there is no endorsed national standard the certification 
body uses their own ‘generic’ standard. 172  
Consultation of interested parties by certification bodies is required under 
Principle Four. A standard for stakeholder consultation undertaken by 
certification bodies during their evaluation of a forest manager’s activities was 
published in 2004.173 The extent of consultation is related to the scale of the 
operation under evaluation.174 
Institutional Typology 
FSC has been generally depicted as being “built out of an amalgam of sustainable 
development discourse, participatory, multi-stakeholder processes, technical 
standards setting conventions, and emerging international trade rules.”175 Its 
governance in particular has been characterised as consisting of delegated global 
transnationalism and in more recent, FSC-specific studies, as global democratic 
corporatism.176 
In terms of authority, the view that FSC is represents an ‘ideal type’ of non-
state market driven governance is reinforced by the fact that it has been created by 
business and NGO interests with a considerable role played by civil society.177 
This places it relatively far along the non-state end of the authority continuum. 
This location of authority places it at some distance from traditional conceptions 
of state-centric international (specifically ‘soft’) law.178 However, it is not purely 
non-state. Governments may play a role in the institution, although this role is 
relatively confined, and government interests are located only in the economic 
chamber. Its authority is therefore somewhere between medium and high. 
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Figure 4.5 Institutional classification of FSC 
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goes beyond the traditionally more aggregative system of the simple majority) it 
is again located somewhere between medium and high. 
FSC’s governance is clearly ‘new’.181 However, the same could be said of the 
other systems, which are examined in subsequent chapters, such as ISO, which 
also demonstrates that non-state and business interests can wield substantial 
regulatory powers in contemporary global environmental governance.182 The 
question here is not a matter of whether the FSC is innovative in its governance, 
but how much. The FSC can be seen as following global institutional norms by 
adopting the terms and structures of the United Nations framework. Here, the 
FSC’s use of the General Assembly model, (even if it has been adapted) and the 
co-option of various UN normative definitions (such as those relating to 
geographical regions, and levels of national economic development or donor 
country status) also make it relatively ‘traditional’. However, the system’s 
participatory structure, which balances traditionally oppositional interests through 
its chamber system, and then further divides these sectors into northern and 
southern sub-chambers, is unique.183 This sets it apart form other global 
governance systems. In terms of innovation, FSC clearly belongs on the ‘new’ 
end of the continuum, and is once again located somewhere between medium and 
high. 
Critical Analysis  
This section examines the manner in which the governance arrangements 
discussed in Chapter Two are demonstrated by the institutions under 
investigation, in this case, FSC. These arrangements are explored using the 
specific indicators identified in Chapter Three (inclusiveness, equality, resources, 
accountability, transparency, democracy, agreement, dispute settlement, 
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behaviour change, problem solving and durability). As outlined in Chapter One, 
the institutions are evaluated on the basis of three sources of information: the 
institution’s own history and documentation; scholarly observations and critical 
commentaries/‘grey’ literature; and personal interviews. Materials collated from 
the case study interviews are generally treated separately, or are included in the 
general commentary associated with each indicator if they contain factual 
information in addition to, or otherwise omitted from, the other sources used.  
Interest Representation 
The representation of interests within a governance system is a fundamental 
aspect of participation. Representation needs to be inclusive in the sense that as 
wide a range of interests as possible has the possibility to be involved in the 
system. Representation also needs to be equal, in the sense that all interests have a 
similar level of influence in the system (access and weight). Finally, resources (or 
capacity) relate to the extent to which participants are supported by the institution 
to represent their interests in the system, either financially or through the 
provision of technical and institutional support.  
In each case study, interest representation is explored by examining firstly the 
manner in which the institution’s constituents, members and non-members, are 
included within its governance system. Inclusiveness is evaluated according to the 
system’s internal governance, and the participatory structures associated with its 
activities (such as standards setting and certification). This is followed by an 
examination of the degree to which the total system demonstrates equality, 
understood here as the level of influence exerted within, and over, the system by 
interested parties, and the balance between each interest grouping. Finally, this 
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criterion is informed by the extent to which the institution provides the necessary 
resources to facilitate participation across the system. 
Inclusiveness 
FSC has been identified as the most inclusive of the forest certification schemes in 
terms of the participation of a broad range of civil society participants, but less so 
for state actors.184 The programme’s deliberate policy in its formative years of 
excluding governments from participating in the system on account of not wishing 
to anger NGOs (who felt state interests already had enough control over forest 
management) has been criticised.185 Following a decision at the 1999 General 
Assembly to investigate the participation of government bodies as members of 
FSC, a motion was passed at the General Assembly in 2002, which permitted 
“government owned or controlled companies” to join the economic chamber.186 
Other government representatives are currently not eligible for membership, 
although the option exists for the creation of a chamber for government at the 
national level.187 
FSC standards acknowledge the importance of including national and local 
stakeholders in the certification process. Both governments and NGOs are 
recognised as stakeholders on the national level, as well as individuals and 
members of the community directly affected by forest management at the local 
level.188 Stakeholders include any in-country FSC national initiative, state forest 
agencies and statutory bodies, national and regional ENGOs, indigenous peoples’ 
organisations and forest dwelling- or forest using communities, labour 
organisations and forest workers, contractors and international NGOs active in a 
given region.189 Some businesses remain dissatisfied with the accommodation of 
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their needs within the system. FSC’s inclusiveness has been identified as a 
constraint in the effectiveness of its dealings with business.190  
Interviews 
Interviewees expressed a range of views on the extent of inclusiveness within 
FSC. On an international and institutional level, NGOs felt that social interests 
had been left somewhat behind.191 Environmental NGO involvement had started 
earlier.192 Another NGO stakeholder felt FSC still needed to be “much more 
proactively inclusive” than it currently was. Generally speaking they felt FSC 
could have put more effort into including wider social and environmental 
movements.193 FSC’s emphasis on social inclusion led another NGO interviewee 
to conclude that this was the reason why local communities had the power to 
discuss, influence, and work with the big firms around them.194  
Business interviewees made a number of observations regarding the extent to 
which economic interests were included in the FSC system. One interviewee felt 
that certification was a developing process. FSC had started earlier than other 
programmes and was consequently more inclusive. In the past FSC had been the 
subject of complaints from forest owners and industry that it was too NGO driven. 
FSC had responded by inviting them to become involved and “change the system 
from inside.”195 Another interviewee elaborated upon this final observation. 
Although the industry had been invited to participate it had not got involved. As a 
result, a number of FSC’s early standards had been “very flawed.”196  
Interviewees from other sectors had divergent opinions on the inclusiveness of 
FSC. One made the observation that their government had become a member 
because FSC had been first scheme for developing a certification system in their 
country. They felt it had been fully participatory from the beginning because 
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private forest owners had been invited to become involved.197 Another 
commented that within FSC system standards setting processes were open to all 
stakeholders whether they are individuals or organisational representatives, and 
all perspectives were taken into account.198 A third interviewee disputed the view 
that FSC was inclusive because it had been dominated by NGOs from its outset, 
and no one had been able to prove the contrary.199 
Views on the effectiveness of the structural arrangements for including the 
different interests varied across the sectoral groups interviewed. One interviewee 
argued in favour of FSC’s chamber system, believing there might be cases where 
governments deserved representation in their own right in a single chamber.200 In 
one instance the system was criticised for being overly bureaucratic, particularly 
in terms of membership application.201  Another saw that despite the apparently 
inclusive appearance of the chamber system and North/South balance, such 
arrangements could still be manipulated. This was the case for other certification 
programmes as well, including PEFC and ISO, but in the case of FSC, private 
forest owners were affected because they could be classified as having a strong 
social interest, but were confined to the economic chamber.202  Finally, there were 
conflicting views, and a number of tensions identified by interviewees, regarding 
the relationship between participation and consultation within the FSC system.203 
Evaluation 
Clearly, inclusiveness is an integral component of FSC’s participatory structures. 
Considerable thought has gone into determining how stakeholders (both members 
and non-members) should be included within the institution’s governance 
structures from the international, through to the local level. The institution has 
also responded to changing socio-political interactions amongst active 
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stakeholders by revising its chamber-based structure. These considerations would 
initially rank FSC’s inclusiveness as very high. However, there have been, and 
continue to be some problem areas. There is some tension among economic 
interests regarding the extent of their inclusion, and some weaknesses persist 
regarding social, and particularly indigenous, inclusion. One particular 
participatory problem concerns the ambiguities surround consultation, where 
interests are not included to the same extent as in standard setting, or FSC’s 
membership-based structures. Despite these caveats, the inclusiveness of FSC is 
rated as high. 
Equality 
FSC’s tripartite governing structure has been identified as being an innovative 
institutional model, which has prevented the organisation from being captured by 
economic interests and has provided a minimal standard for equal North/South 
representation.204 In 1999 Interim Board member Julio César Centeno accused 
FSC of lacking balanced participation from developing countries and of being 
dominated by northern NGOs and their northern industry allies. FSC also cared 
mostly about certifying large-scale producers at the expense of small forest 
owners, for whom certification, unless they were in Europe and had access to 
other certification programmes, was unachievable.205 The North/South imbalance 
in economic representation has been attributed to the increased compliance costs 
associated with ecologically complex tropical forest certification, and the 
prevalence of better regulatory standards in the North, which makes compliance 
comparatively easier, and certification more attractive.206  
Economic interests were initially given less influence in the system, but -- in 
what has been described as a “pragmatic shift to attract greater business support”  
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-- the membership structure was modified in June 1996 in response to claims that 
it was anti-industry.207 The revised structure was designed to avoid the 
domination of the decision making by any single chamber, group or region.208 
Access to FSC certification by small forest enterprises has been criticised as well, 
although improvements have been made in recent years.209 Business interests play 
their role, but in a more limited fashion than in other international forums. This 
level of business involvement defines FSC’s specific identity.210  
The role of social stakeholders in the FSC system has been acknowledged as 
weak in comparison with other sectors. This may be partly attributable to the 
historical fact that social stakeholders in the FSC system did not obtain their own 
chamber until 1996, when the social and environmental chamber was divided. A 
number of initiatives were taken between 1996 and 2001 to improve the 
situation.211 These were to culminate in the publication of a social strategy in 
2002, which acknowledged that workers, local communities, small forest 
enterprises and indigenous people in particular were “marginalized politically” 
within FSC.212 It should also be noted however that the chamber system gives 
proportional power through the weighted voting system to those social interests 
who do participate, even if their numbers are fewer (see also under Democracy 
below). The strategy acknowledged in particular that this was the case for FSC 
certification processes.213  
Equality of participation at the local level during certification assessments still 
remains limited. Although the certification body must take “meaningful 
accommodation” of concerns, it is not required to “seek or develop consensus” in 
modifying standards for the local context.214 Furthermore, although the opinions 
and the information provided by participants are to be “evaluated objectively and 
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meaningfully”, certifiers are not obliged to act upon it. Matters raised by local 
interests impact the certification decision “only in so far as its provides evidence 
of compliance or non-compliance with the requirements of the applicable Forest 
Stewardship Council Standard.”215 Such groups have been identified as being 
easily overlooked by certification bodies, playing an insufficient role in 
certification decisions.216 One response arising out of the strategy was to 
recommend more comprehensive consultation requirements for certification 
bodies to better assess social issues.217 
Numerically, the economic north sub-chamber has consistently dominated, 
with the social south sub-chamber being least represented. See Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1 Composition of FSC membership 1997, 2003 and 2006 
Chamber 1997 2003 2006 
Economic North 66 188 161 
Economic South 17 96 117 
Environmental North 63 122 113 
Environmental South 20 100 141 
Social North 23 71 56 
Social South 11 41 55 
Total 200 618 643 
Individual - 253 - 
Organisational - 365 - 
Source: Elliott 2000 p. 265, 10 years of FSC 1993-2003 p. 14, FSC News and Notes 
4(11), p. 2. 
The social chambers are now equally balanced however, and the economic south 
sub-chamber is catching up on its northern counterpart. For the first time in 2006 
the environmental south sub-chamber overtook its northern counterpart. 
Board members are expected to reflect regional and gender balance.218 The 
regions are identified in the composition of the dispute resolution and 
accreditation committee as being North America, Central and South America and 
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the Caribbean, Europe, Oceania, Asia and Africa.219 The following two tables 
indicate the composition of interests in 2003 and 2007.  
Table 4.2.1 Composition of FSC Board of Directors 2003 
Economic Social Environmental 
Victor Giraldo (Vice-
Chairman) 
Smurfit Cartón de 
Colombia 
South 
South America 
(male) 
Martha Nuñez 
Fundación Ambiente y 
Sociedad 
Ecuador 
South  
South America 
(female) 
Lincoln Querevado (Vice-
Chairman) 
Individual 
Bolivia 
South  
South America 
(male) 
Shaun McCartney  
Global Forest Products 
South Africa 
South  
Africa 
(male) 
David Nahwegahbow 
(Chairman) 
Algonquins of Barriere Lake 
Canada 
North  
North America 
(male) 
Grant Rosomon 
Greenpeace 
New Zealand 
North  
Oceania 
(male) 
Åsa Tham 
Diocese of Västeras – 
Church of Sweden 
Sweden 
North  
Europe 
(female) 
Gisbert Schlemmer 
(Treasurer) 
IG Metall 
Germany 
North  
Europe 
(male) 
Hannah Scrase  
FERN  
United Kingdom 
North  
Europe 
(female) 
Source: 10 years of FSC 1993-2003, p. 14 
Table 4.2.2 Composition of FSC Board of Directors 2007 
Economic Social Environmental 
Roberto Waack (Vice-
Chairperson) 
Orsa Florestal  
Brazil 
South 
South America 
(male) 
Martha Nuñez 
Fundación Ambiente y 
Sociedad 
Ecuador 
South  
South America 
(female) 
Christian Vallejos 
Asociación para la 
Conservación de la Cuenca 
Amazónica 
Peru 
South  
South America 
(male) 
Mario Abreu 
Tetra Pak International 
Sweden 
North 
Europe 
(male) 
Chris van Dam 
Individual 
Argentina 
South 
South America 
(male) 
 
Grant Rosomon 
(Chairperson) 
Greenpeace 
New Zealand 
North  
Oceania 
(male) 
Alan Knight 
Individual 
United Kingdom 
North  
Europe 
(male) 
Chris van der Goot 
(Treasurer) 
Ecohout Foundation 
The Netherlands 
North  
Europe 
(male) 
Eric Palola (Vice-
chairperson) 
National Wildlife Federation 
United States 
North  
North America 
(male) 
Source: http://www.fsc.org/en/about/governance/board_directors accessed 21/06/07 
  156 
Selection of Secretariat staff is expected to be geographically representative 
and non-discriminatory on grounds of gender, race or religion.220 The procedures 
associated with standards setting are also checked as part of the accreditation 
process to ensure their design and development has included a balanced 
consultative process.221 
Interests who are not members of FSC have equal access to participation in 
FSC’s standard-setting activities as members. Internationally, the development of 
standards encourages all stakeholders, and the facilitator of the development 
process is expected to ensure that the full range of stakeholders affected by the 
standard participate in the consultative forums associated with standards 
development.222 Extra provisions also exist for including stakeholders from the 
economic south.223 Non-members may also participate in technical working 
groups responsible for drafting standards.224 The same applies for non-members in 
national working groups as well as national advisory boards under the provisions 
that they do not outnumber FSC members (or FSC members’ representatives).225  
A study published in 2003 has shown that participants within FSC system are 
challenged by a number of equality-related issues (the study preferred the term 
equity).226 In terms of which countries have been getting certified, developed 
countries held 66% of all certificates and 80% of the certified forest area, whilst 
Africa, Asia and Oceania remained small players, with 8%, 4% and 5% 
respectively. Industrial forestry interests predominated, holding 35% of 
certificates covering 66% of the certified area. Most of these certificates were 
over 10,000 ha. Community businesses held 25% of certificates, but over only 3% 
of the certified area. Boreal and temperate forests dominated over tropical and 
sub-tropical forests. Although the data were collected in 1999, little had changed 
  157 
by the publication of the study with the exception that plantations, particularly in 
developing countries, were beginning to challenge the dominance of certified 
natural (coniferous vs. broadleaf) forests.227 Despite its principles of participation 
FSC remained under-represented in the social chamber and it did not provide for 
the balance it intended should exist between each chamber and sub-chamber.228 
This imbalance in interests had the potential to skew perceptions regarding forest 
management and certification issues away from developing countries in favour of 
the north, exacerbated by the fact that certification bodies were also based in the 
north.229 The study did acknowledge that FSC was taking steps to address these 
issues, particularly improving access to certification for small-scale forest 
operations and providing support for increased social interest participation.230  
Interviews 
The biggest single topic of debate regarding the equality of interest representation 
amongst informants concerned the role of NGOs in the FSC system. One NGO 
interviewee commented on the influence wielded by WWF across FSC at both 
international and national levels.231 NGO interviewees admitted there was some 
truth to the perception that FSC had a strong environmental influence, but that this 
was offset by the structural reality, and that it was a balanced system.232 What 
economic interests did not like was the fact that the three-chamber system 
prevented economic interests dominating.233 This balance was what made FSC the 
most innovative of the certification systems, and created the crucial difference 
from the others that equality amongst stakeholder groups meant that all 
participants had to make concessions.234 
Business interests had a range of views on the significance of the influence 
exerted by NGOs over the FSC system. Supporters accepted that there was a 
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perception in the business sector that it had been set up by the green movement, 
but once companies got involved and the scheme got market traction, its NGO 
origins proved not to be the problem they thought it would be.235 Another 
economic supporter stressed the fact that no one interest could dominate the 
system, because the scheme had arisen at a unique point in history brought about 
by Rio, and its philosophy of sustainable development. Under this ideal it was not 
possible to have one group leading, and the others merely consulted.236 Sceptics 
were less enthusiastic. For one it was self-evident that the system was both 
promoted and supported by NGOs meaning there was less room for other interests 
to have their views taken on board.237 This was particularly the case for forest 
owners.238 Structurally they were always in a minority, since they only had one 
third of the votes.239 One business interviewee cited the significance of the role 
played by NGOs as the reason why other certification systems arose.240 This was 
a view shared by one interviewee from the third group of survey participants.241  
Two final observations are worth noting. According to one NGO participant 
the social sector’s late arrival in the FSC system meant it had had to catch up with 
other sectors, but it was now moving at a greater pace than previously. This was 
interpreted as a positive sign of FSC’s ability to balance interests.242 Another 
NGO expressed concern about the lack of equality amongst stakeholders 
interviewed as part of the certification process. Because consultation had a much 
lower requirement for proper participation than standards setting, voices were not 
always weighted equally. Failure to accord equal weight to the views expressed 
during certification made it difficult to uphold the legitimacy of participation at 
the standard setting level.243 On a related theme, another NGO interviewee 
observed that it was hard for local stakeholder interests to penetrate the FSC 
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system if they were not part of the internal group. This was often the case in 
national initiatives, which were often led by WWF or similarly powerful groups. 
Not enough effort was made at either the Secretariat or Board level to bring 
interests in who did not represent the most noisy, internal interests.244 
Evaluation 
FSC has put considerable effort into ensuring its participatory structures provide 
for equality amongst its interests, but there is still a degree of asymmetry 
betweens its northern and southern members. Despite its stated intention of 
gender and regional balance within its structures, males still seem to dominate the 
Board, for example, as do the regions of South America and Europe/North 
America in the examples of Board representation provided. The effort that has 
been made by FSC in this regard should be acknowledged, as should the equality 
between members and non-members within its standards setting structures. The 
issue remains that developing, tropical, small-scale interests do not benefit from 
the system as much as large-scale companies from the developed, 
northern/temperate zones. It also seems undeniable that certain specific interests, 
are “more equal than others” within FSC system (most notably WWF). On these 
grounds, the score is consequently medium. 
Resources 
During the establishment period of FSC, much of its funding was derived from 
private philanthropic institutions and government agencies (see Table 4.4 below). 
The Austrian government was a major sponsor at the organisation’s inception. It 
had some unallocated funds it had initially intended to use for a national policy 
programme aimed at supporting the development of sustainable tropical forest 
management and restricting illegal tropical timber imports. This had been 
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abandoned when the Malasyian government objected and the possible GATT-
related implications of restricting only tropical timber were considered.245 This 
money was channelled through WWF Austria, which had passed it on in turn to 
FSC.246 
Table 4.3 Summary of donations made to FSC A.C. through to 1999 in US Dollars 
Donor details Amount 
Austrian Government 890,310 
European Commission - DGI 541,252 
Netherlands Government - DGIS 501,815 
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation – USA 486,952 
Ford Foundation – USA 302,488 
WWF - Netherlands 237,269 
Avina Foundation - Switzerland 119,970 
J Paul Getty Wildlife Award – USA 100,000 
Wallace Global Fund – USA 79,364 
German Government - GTZ 62,023 
Mexican Government – Sedesol 51,882 
Rockerfeller Brothers Fund – USA 50,000 
Donations under $50,000 each 220,034 
Summary  
Governments 2,047,282 (56%) 
Private foundations 1,038,774 (29%) 
Other 557,303 (15%) 
  
Total  3,643,359 
Source: Annual Report 1999, p. 11. 
More recently FSC’s revenue has been derived through the increased 
commercialisation of services such as accreditation and trademark licensing, and 
these now contribute approximately 30% to the organisation’s global annual 
budget (see Table 4.5 below). 247 Accreditation fees are levied according to the 
scale and location of the operation, and the extent of its conservation set-aside 
areas.248 Currently, some 60% is derived from private philanthropic donors and 
government agencies.249 
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Table 4.4 Summary of FSC revenues in 1994, 1999 and 2004 in US Dollars 
Year 1994 1999 2004 
Membership fees - 49,000 167,360 
Accreditation fees - 186,827 991,207 
Donations 542,209 446,204 2,470,939 
Non-specified  4,070 81,575 100,119 
Total 546,279 763,606 3,039,441 
Sources: Annual Report 1999, p. 10, Financial Report 2003, p. 1, Financial Report 
2004, p. 1. 
FSC provides resources for participation in a number of activities. Where a 
member is unable to attend the General Assembly due to economic constraints, 
they are entitled to seek financial support from the Executive Director.250 Support 
was first made available for under-resourced participants to attend the foundation 
assembly in Toronto, particularly southern NGOs, from both the emerging FSC 
and other large NGOs, such as WWF. Business and large NGOs covered their 
own costs.251 In 2002 about $120,000 was spent on travel, hotel and registration 
subsidies associated with the General Assembly to ensure that members who 
wanted to participate but were unable to afford the costs personally were able to 
do so.252 Living and travel expenses associated with Board meetings are met by 
the association.253 At the third General Assembly it was agreed that Board 
members would receive a stipend to compensate for the number of days they 
spend attending meetings.254 National initiatives are expected to resource all 
aspects of their operations themselves.255 Interests consulted as part of the 
certification assessment process are generally not resourced.256  
Interviews 
A wide range of experiences were provided by both NGO and business 
interviewees concerning their participation in FSC on a national level. One 
common element amongst everybody interviewed was that their involvement had 
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been either self-funded, or their organisation had paid. This included interviewees 
from both developed and developing countries.  
All NGOs commented on the range of costs, not just financial, associated with 
participation in the FSC system, although specific perspectives depended largely 
on the size of organisation, and levels of involvement.257 In terms of financial 
expenditure one NGO identified costs as being considerable.258 Another 
commented that half of their time as a paid campaigner had been taken up with 
the development of the FSC standard in their country.259 One interviewee, whose 
organisation was active in developing countries, indicated that it had covered the 
transportation and accommodation costs for an entire national initiative.260  
Business interests provided two perspectives on the financial expenses 
associated with their involvement in FSC. One interviewee estimated that the 
money put into creating their country’s national standard by business ran to 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash, and if other contributions were included, 
it was closer to one million. On one occasion the FSC Board had been flown in at 
a cost of $24,000, although this was seen as a comparatively minor, but 
worthwhile expense.261 One interviewee observed that since the company they 
worked for had already pursued ISO 14001 certification costs associated with 
FSC had been offset using the same management system.262 
Financial expenditure was not the only cost mentioned by interviewees. Both 
business and NGO interests alluded to the time involved, at both the personal and 
organisational levels.263 Another NGO interviewee observed that participation in 
the certification debate generally had come at a cost to other campaign areas.264  
 
 
  163 
Evaluation 
Participation in the FSC system is costly in terms of a wide range of resources 
(time, money, technical expertise). These costs relate to participation in 
international and national assemblies, standards-related meetings and certification 
(for the company seeking certification and stakeholders consulted). The right for 
all members to participate in the General Assembly is constitutionally enshrined, 
and is provided for. Participating in FSC’s regional, national and sub-national 
structures is less well resourced and varies depending on location. For members, 
the resources to participate internationally are high. For members-and non-
members at the national level the provision of resources to participate hovers 
somewhere between high and medium. At the local level, where certification 
assessments and consultation of locally affected stakeholders occurs, little or no 
resource support is provided for participants.  Across the system, the provision of 
resources for interests to be represented is medium. 
Organisational Responsibility 
In addition to being able to determine whether a governance system demonstrates 
meaningful participation in terms of the representation of interests, it is also 
necessary to ascertain whether the range of organisations involved in the system 
can be considered as acting responsibly.  In the case studies investigated the 
relevant organisations involved in the system include the institution itself and its 
related entities (such as accreditation and certification bodies), and its constituents 
(members and non-members). In the context of the multiple levels of governance 
implicit in these case studies, responsibility relates to the institution itself, the 
participating organisations’ responsibility towards the institution, other 
participants in the system, and their own constituents, as well as the public at 
large. The extent to which an organisation can be held accountable for its actions, 
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and the degree to which its activities are transparent, are both indicators of 
responsibility. Accountability is described firstly in terms of the mechanisms each 
of the system’s participants have in place, according to their location within the 
system (i.e. the institution itself, its agents, or participating organisations). 
Secondly, comment is made, if necessary, in relation to specific aspects of 
behaviour where accountability has been questioned. Transparency refers to the 
availability of documentation and the general openness of the entity in question. 
Accountability  
All members of FSC are expected to support FSC as an organisation, as well as its 
aims, activities and P&C. Prospective members are also prohibited from publicly 
opposing FSC and existing members may also appeal an application submitted by 
a prospective member.265 A number of further provisions are placed on specific 
chambers. Economic applicants for FSC membership are expected to demonstrate 
an active commitment to the implementation of FSC P&C in their operations.266 
Companies seeking membership are not permitted to develop a “model operation” 
in the absence of ensuring their whole operations conform to FSC requirements in 
due course.267 Certification bodies may also become members of the economic 
chamber.268 The environmental chamber is limited to law-abiding not-for-profit 
NGOs, whose governing bodies are independent from governments and which are 
renewed by periodic elections or appointment.269  
The Board is accountable to the organisation’s members and the relevant 
national authorities where the association is based. Its main oversight role is to 
ensure FSC adheres to its Statutes and meets the national legal and administrative 
requirements connected to the organisation’s not-for profit status.270 Three 
directors retire at the end of each year, and are replaced by postal ballot or 
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General Assembly vote. The intention behind rotating the elections in this manner 
is to ensure continuity.271 Directors are expected to make decisions based on the 
interests of FSC as a whole, as well as their respective sectors, but not the 
organisation they come from.272 Criticisms have been raised in the past regarding 
procedural irregularities in decision making.273 
The By-Laws forbid the Secretariat from undertaking any activities in a 
country or a region without first consulting the appropriate local FSC body.274 The 
Secretariat came to grief in 2001 over its behind-the-scenes negotiations with the 
provincial government of Ontario, which had threatened the successful 
completion of the regional standards under development elsewhere in Canada, 
especially British Columbia.275 The Policy and Standards Unit is responsible for 
overseeing and managing the organisation’s international framework of policy 
and standards development, and provides advice on the policies and standards 
once they are developed.276  
In forest certification there is an expectation that the certification process is 
independent of the first and second parties associated with timber -- the seller and 
buyer. The certification body is meant to act as an independent third party (hence 
the term ‘third party certification’). Certifiers themselves also need be 
independently accredited. Previous business practice in which a unit from within 
FSC itself accredited certifiers undertaking assessments under the scheme’s own 
standards generated accusations that the FSC was effectively its own accreditation 
body.277 Responding to such kinds of criticism in 2002, it commenced the process 
of preparing its Accreditation Business Unit (ABU) for establishment as an 
independent legal entity, the intention of which was to facilitate “a genuine 
separation of FSC’s accreditation role from its standard-setting function.”278 It 
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was also to “preclude conflict-of-interest challenges.”279 After the 2002 General 
Assembly the organisation began the process of revising its accreditation 
procedures against the ISO/IEC guides and standards. Certification bodies were 
required to update their practices to operate under the revised standards. In 2004 
the ABU’s revised Accreditation Programme underwent an internal audit and peer 
review of accreditation procedures by the ISEAL Alliance against the ISO/IEC 
Guide 17001.280 In 2005 the Programme’s staff auditors were certified under the 
auspices of International Register of Certificated Auditors.281 Accreditation 
Systems International (ASI) was created by FSC as a separate legal body, 
functioning as a for-profit business and commenced operating the organisation’s 
existing Accreditation Programme in 2006.282 ASI is also governed by a quality 
management system, which covers the procedures associated with the 
accreditation of certification bodies and follows the relevant ISO/IEC terms and 
definitions.283 
Accreditation usually lasts for five years. Once they are accredited, 
certification bodies undertake conformity assessments against the relevant 
standard and issue what are effectively ‘certificates of conformity’ to a given 
standard. Looking at accountability within this aspect of the FSC system in 
vertical terms (i.e. upwards and downwards within the programme itself), the 
responsibility is on the certification body to ensure that the conditions of its 
accreditation are met. Any non-compliance during this period can result in the 
issuing of a “corrective action request”, which must be addressed within a given 
timeframe, or the Board can either fine the offending party or withdraw 
accreditation. Certificates are also issued for five years. 284 Similar sanctions 
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apply to the certified entity. Here, compliance is to FSC’s P&C, and “major 
failures” will lead to de-certification.285  
In terms of horizontal accountability (that is outwards from the system to the 
broader community) it should be noted that one criticism raised by Trading in 
Credibility was that FSC had not specified what was meant by major failure, 
leading to disputes with certifiers over what had, and had not been addressed.286 
This has now been addressed in the relevant FSC standard.287 Certifiers were 
subjected to sustained criticism in the early years of FSC’s development.288 
Standards now exist requiring certification bodies to identify any issues that are 
“difficult or controversial” in a region where a certification assessment is to take 
place. They are required to consult with stakeholders prior to the certification 
audit as to how the issues should be addressed in the evaluation.289 Certifiers are 
held accountable for their activities through compliance with the provisions laid 
down in the relevant standards, and certifiers have been suspended.290  
FSC consolidated its guidelines on the conduct of national and regional 
initiatives into one manual in 1998.291 This is a controlled document and its 
recipients are kept on a register and sent updates to be inserted in the manual if 
procedures change.292 The various components making up a national initiative 
(contact persons, working groups, advisory boards and national offices) are 
governed by a series of formal Agreements. These Agreements detail the rights 
and obligations of both parties one to another relating to services, structures and 
policies.293 
Forest owners outside FSC system view environmental and social interests as 
dominating FSC system, undermining its credibility and legitimacy. This 
perception is further reinforced by the absence of state legitimisation, leading to 
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the belief there is an accountability deficit within the system. In defence of the 
system, the observation has been made that FSC has responded to such 
accusations by promoting accountability and transparency as normative features 
of the system.294  
Interviews 
Two themes emerged in the comments made by those interviewed for this study. 
Firstly, concern was raised regarding what was seen as the unduly close 
relationship between FSC, accreditation and certification bodies, and standard 
setting. Secondly, further comments were made on the relationship between FSC 
and WWF.  
One NGO interviewee considered it to be a considerable weakness of the FSC 
system that the institution itself was the highest standard-setting authority, and 
effectively accredited its own certification bodies. Far too much discretion was 
left to the certification bodies, which varied greatly amongst themselves and had 
widely divergent interpretations of their requirements. This weakened the system 
considerably, given that the majority of FSC certificates were issued in the 
absence of national standards.295 Another NGO, and one business interviewee, 
expressed concerns about the leeway afforded to certifiers, and the blurring of 
roles on the national level.296 
One interviewee commented on the personal internal conflict they had 
experienced in a previous job as a member of a certification assessment team. On 
the one hand the interviewee had wanted to assist local communities and 
stakeholders to build their capacity to interact with the certification system more 
effectively, particularly in making sure they had a say in what was happening. But 
as a team member with a background in forest engineering and ecology it was 
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their role to focus on helping the company, even if FSC was about including 
workers and adjacent communities. The interviewee had found it difficult to 
balance the two needs.297  
One NGO interviewee commented on the indirect financial benefits that had 
accrued to WWF as a result of their relationship with FSC.298  A second NGO 
interviewee commented that WWF was now increasingly distancing itself from 
FSC, as it has become uncomfortable both setting up and participating in 
standards setting.299 Another interviewee, from the third group of informants, 
commented how WWF had both organised and directed the development of FSC 
in their country, which had alienated private forest owners from FSC.300  
Evaluation 
FSC has an impressive array of mechanisms for both ensuring, and demonstrating 
that the institution itself is accountable at all levels, from the General Assembly to 
the national initiatives, and to both members and non-members. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between certifiers and various parts of the system (clients, FSC itself, 
standards bodies) have exposed the system to claims of conflict of interest in the 
past. FSC’s efforts to ensure accountability across the system reflect its 
responsiveness to external criticism. However, FSC’s performance is undermined 
by the role played by NGOs in the past, most notably WWF, which has not been 
required to account for itself to the same degree as FSC. This represents a flaw in 
FSC’s accountability mechanisms, which needs to be addressed to ensure that 
powerful interests do not wield undue influence in the future. An otherwise high 
score is therefore medium. 
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Transparency 
FSC operates in two official languages, Spanish and English. Effort is also made 
by FSC on the local level to address stakeholders in their local language.301 For 
transparency purposes, all relevant policy documents are listed and made 
available on FSC A.C. website, and feedback on policy is actively solicited from 
the membership. The 2002 General Assembly also agreed to the institution of a 
consistent process to facilitate members’ input on policies as they are being 
worked on.302 
National initiatives must engage in their activities in a participatory and 
transparent manner. This is identified as being important for FSC to maintain its 
credibility as a total system. Meetings and subcommittees are open to all 
stakeholders, members or otherwise. Non-members may attend as observers and 
may comment on document drafts on the understanding that they do not impede 
or undermine progress.303 Procedures effecting any internal changes to national 
initiatives must be outlined in the Statutes or By-Laws, which govern them.304 
In 1999 Interim Board member Centeno cited the Flor y Fauna case “as a clear 
example in which FSC has been unwilling or unable, to comply with basic 
principles of transparency.”305 Trading in Credibility also identified a number of 
problems with the public reporting associated with certification, albeit before the 
publication of the relevant standard.306 Since late 2004 certification bodies have 
been governed by a standard, which details their public reporting obligations.307 
Trading in Credibility also claimed flaws in the chain of custody system, which 
could be easily abused, also had the potential to mislead consumers over the 
claims made on FSC’s labels.308 Further standards now exist for the purposes of 
regulating the production of forest certification and chain of custody reports upon 
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which the certification body bases its decision to certify the relevant entity.309 
Standards also exist concerning the transparent sourcing and use of controlled 
wood, the purpose of which is to demonstrate that wood has not been harvested 
illegally, or from controversial sources.310 A standard also covers the “truthful 
application and use” of FSC’s trademark and logo to avoid false claims, which 
might damage its reputation.311 
In 2002 the General Assembly required FSC to identify and recommend best 
practices for the stakeholder consultation, in collaboration with the membership, 
and with the approval of the Board.312 Strategic decisions, regarding national and 
regional matters were also to be made “based on open and transparent 
consultation with FSC members and the National Initiatives of the region.”313 The 
motivation behind these requirements was, apparently, to “strengthen the quality, 
consistency, continuity and effectiveness of FSC system’s stakeholder 
consultation and mechanism procedures.”314  
Although all certification programmes accept the concept of transparency, it 
has been claimed that industry-dominated schemes remain limited in terms of 
transparency, whereas FSC requires more disclosure.315 However, it has also been 
claimed elsewhere (by the same author) that although it makes extensive use of 
stakeholder-driven models, “there are places where FSC system remains 
strikingly non-participatory and non-transparent, particularly at the level of the 
individual certification.”316 
Interviews 
Comments made by interview subjects cover a range of issues concerning 
transparency with FSC. Interviewees from the third group of subjects, as well as 
business informants were concerned at the lack of clarity in the relationship, once 
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again, between NGOs (WWF in particular), FSC, and the World Bank. Concerns 
were also expressed about the lack of transparency in the use of interim standards 
on the national level.317 
NGOs commented on both the benefits and disadvantages of the high level of 
transparency within the system. One interviewee felt that criticism, and critics, of 
the system were welcomed by FSC, and that as soon as a problem was identified 
it was addressed. The down side was that it was not always possible to have a 
speedy resolution of the problem at hand, which could be frustrating, but was a 
necessary part of being transparent. This was important because such transparency 
increased the level of trust in the organisation.318 A second NGO interviewee felt 
that FSC was open to the participation of stakeholders and willing to learn from 
what they had to say, rather than merely setting the standard and subsequently 
seeking stakeholder support.319 Another NGO interviewee felt this very openness 
was at times a disadvantage for FSC, as it meant that the system was both more 
exposed to criticism than other systems, and more likely to have its ideas 
stolen.320 One NGO interviewee made the specific comment that they were not 
sure how effective email communication was as a tool for stakeholder 
participation. Although it was a very transparent method of reaching stakeholders, 
it only worked for those that had access to the Internet.321  
Finally, one interviewee from the third group of subjects commented on the 
tension, which had existed at FSC’s foundation assembly between the desire 
amongst organisers to maintain a balance between participating interests and 
transparency. People had heard about the event and turned up on the day 
uninvited, only to be turned away. This had led to accusations of a lack of 
transparency, but as so much effort had gone into ensuring participating interests 
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were balanced in what was a very sensitive environment, organisers had decided it 
was necessary to restrict access.322 
Evaluation 
Generally speaking, FSC has put in place a number of provisions to ensure that 
the institution, and those associated with it operate in a transparent manner. The 
institution’s documentation, and those of its associates, such as certification 
bodies (confidentiality notwithstanding), is readily accessible. The public nature 
of the debates around controversial topics affecting FSC certification and its 
stakeholders is also healthy. The very high degree of transparency at the 
international and national levels of the institution itself is partly offset by 
transparency issues at the individual certificate level, particularly those assessed 
against generic standards. The nature of the relationship between FSC, WWF and 
The World Bank, and the exact motivations underlying it is also not entirely clear. 
Nor is the relationship with, and expectations from, donors, although the 
publication of gifts received is to be commended. Taking these issues into 
consideration, the overall transparency across the system (as opposed to specific 
components) is medium. 
Decision Making 
Decision making is an essential part of the deliberative process, and is 
demonstrated by three indicators. Firstly, decision making needs to be democratic 
in the basic sense that those involved in deliberations are afforded the opportunity 
to exercise their power of choice regarding a particular decision. Here, it is not a 
question of the type of democracy exercised (aggregative versus deliberative, or 
participatory versus representative, for example), but whether the institution is 
functionally democratic. Secondly, even if the emphasis on deliberation in 
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contemporary governance encourages more collaborative approaches to decision 
making, it is still necessary for a governance system to employ procedures for 
reaching agreement. Similarly, an emphasis on reaching agreements through 
collaborative decision making does not mean that conflicts or disagreements 
never arise. Here again, the indicator is not used to judge the value of one method 
of reaching agreement over to another (consensus versus majority voting for 
example), but whether these methods function effectively. Dispute settlement 
mechanisms are also necessary when agreements cannot be reached and the 
mechanisms and procedures (formal or informal) for addressing grievances are 
also evaluated. These three indicators together demonstrate the level of 
performance of the decision making processes within the governance system 
under investigation.     
Democracy 
The purpose of FSC’s tripartite chamber system is to “maintain the balance of 
voting power between the different interests, without having to limit the number 
of members.”323 In each chamber the membership is further divided into northern 
and southern sub-chambers with 50% of the voting power each.324 All members of 
FSC are represented equally through a weighted voting system.325 Individual 
members, to avoid undue influence, are restricted to 10% of the voting weight in 
each sub-chamber.326 
Commentators have a range of views on democracy within FSC system. 
Beyond their promotion of environmental values FSC’s criteria have been 
described as advocating democracy and human rights.327 Trading in Credibility on 
the other hand has criticised FSC as functioning “poorly as a democratic 
membership-based organisation.”328 This was particularly the case for social 
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interests at all levels of decision making.329 The report acknowledged that the 
strategy contained much of value but remained critical of the fact that local 
communities and indigenous people continued to wield less influence in FSC 
decision making processes. Procedures remained discriminatory against weak 
stakeholders and biased in favour of certifiers and their clients.330 Small forest 
owners have accused the FSC of being biased against their needs.331 Further 
arguments have been made about the appropriateness of placing small forest 
owners in the same chamber as industrial forest owners, supply chain companies, 
and consultants with an overtly environmental interest.332 
Interviews 
Interviewees had mixed views regarding the nature of the democratic processes 
within FSC. NGOs were divided amongst those who were impressed, and those 
who were less enthusiastic. One NGO, who had participated for the first time in a 
General Assembly, was initially dubious that such a chaotic system of decision 
making would ever produce anything. They were more used to opposing parties 
simply trying to convince each other of the merits of their viewpoint, but 
considered the approach whereby motions were discussed and amended in all of 
the chambers as particularly innovative.333 Another felt FSC was so democratic as 
to be “almost non-functional”, even if it was a good way of dealing with 
previously conflicting parties. Board elections in particular were cumbersome, 
and whilst Board representatives might meet the political requirements of their 
constituents, whether they were actually competent to manage the organisation, or 
understand forest management, was another matter.334 Other NGOs were critical 
of procedures on the national level.335  
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One business interviewee felt that FSC went against all the basic tenets of 
Western democracy in that there was no division between executive, legislative 
and judicial powers. The Board essentially exercised all three simultaneously, as it 
approved national standards, determined who could become members, appointed 
certifiers and acted as the final arbiter in disputes.336 Other business interviewees 
shared similar concerns about the democratic processes within FSC. One felt FSC 
went against the provisions of “normal democracy.”337 
Views from the third group of informants varied. One presented the critical 
business perspective, that there was no democratic precedence for the three-
chamber, North/South arrangement. They interpreted FSC’s decision making 
procedures as a tactic to disenfranchise forest owners, and objected to 
environmental NGOs having the power to determine the conservation obligations 
for private landowners.338  Another by contrast interpreted the precedent of the 
three-chamber distribution of power between the forces as being derived from the 
“Brundtland-type” sustainability model. Although FSC’s legitimacy could be 
questioned, for all its faults, the democratic procedures under which it operated 
were far more legitimate than those that occurred within the nation-state and 
similar forest-related governmental processes.339 
Evaluation 
The decision making between members within the in FSC system appears to be 
highly democratic. Procedures appear to be capable of balancing the divergent 
objectives of environmental, social and economic interests to deliver a 
sophisticated ‘triple bottom line’ model of sustainability, which accommodates 
North/South, and numerical, inconsistencies. A similar degree of sophistication 
also exists at the national initiative level, although some interviewees questioned 
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this. It should also be noted that there are criticisms amongst commentators 
concerning the level of democratic input for small forest owners and social 
interests. Overall, democracy in the FSC system is somewhere between medium 
and high, but since the method of evaluation used here does not take half-
measures into account, it is rated medium.  
Agreement  
As a norm, General Assembly decisions are made by consensus, understood as the 
absence of sustained opposition, but not requiring unanimity. In order for a 
motion to move forwards to a vote on the floor a quorum of 50% + 1 of members 
present and voting within each of the sectoral sub-chambers is first required, 
followed by a simple majority approval. Once on the floor, a motion again 
requires 66.6% approval, but this time of all the members present and voting. 340  
The Board also makes decisions by consensus. If this is not possible, a vote in 
the affirmative requires six members, with one positive vote from each chamber 
representative as a minimum requirement for cross-chamber support.341  
National and regional initiatives generally use similar consensus and voting 
provisions, but there are variations.342 However, they are not bound entirely by 
consensus provisions. The selection of National Advisory Boards for example 
may be through either consensus or other democratic decision making 
procedures.343 Working groups must have fair decision making procedures, and it 
is expected that decisions should be reached by consensus. Where this is not 
possible, decisions must be made democratically, although it is not specified 
how.344 
FSC has been described as the most advanced of the certification programmes 
in the use of consensus-based decision making, but it has also experienced some 
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difficulties. There have been instances in Canada when FSC initially accepted 
what were interpreted as consensus outcomes, but which had not included certain 
forestry interests. It has subsequently amended its understanding of consensus and 
now expects industry acceptance of the standards developed.345 Consensus-based 
decision making within the system, it has been claimed, stands in contrast to “the 
authoritarian and majoritarian tendencies of modern electoral politics [based on] 
appealing to and promoting the interests of specific sectors.”346  
Interviews 
Comments concerning how agreements were reached within FSC were wide 
ranging. One business interest commented that it was interesting, if accidental, 
that FSC’s use of consensus met with the requirements of global trade rules. This 
had arisen more from a general philosophy that if power was to be transferred 
from governments to other groups, there was a need for a greater degree of public 
legitimacy. This was derived from the adoption of consensus decision making 
rules, which were designed to represent what most of the participants wanted and 
to avoid conflict.347  
NGO interviewees were generally positive recognising that the use of 
consensus demonstrated FSC’s advanced thinking, but it had its disadvantages 
because it could be both time-consuming and costly.348 Another NGO thought that 
having both the three chambers and consensus within FSC was revolutionary.  By 
bringing different interests around the table FSC provided an opportunity at both 
the international and national levels for people to discuss things they had never 
discussed before, and to understand problems from other peoples’ perspectives. 
Recognising different interests and encouraging dialogue had a significance that 
went far beyond certification.349  
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One interviewee from the third group of subjects commented in some detail on 
the motivations behind using consensus in FSC. They had noted a strong degree 
of reluctance amongst participants to resolve conflicts by voting from its 
beginning. Participants had been more interested in developing joint solutions that 
everybody could endorse, and processes to achieve this had evolved over the 
organisation’s history so that it was very rare that votes were now taken. 
Stakeholders tended to sit together until they had an agreement on the necessary 
solution. If there was no solution, there was essentially no outcome. Although by 
definition the outcomes of such discussions resulted in the lowest common 
denominator, they did not result in compromises, since no participating sector 
would ever agree to anything that compromised its needs. The real difference with 
reaching decisions in FSC was that no stakeholder sector could control the 
process. Participants had learnt to accept that they were not in control of the 
situation, which had been a useful lesson learnt.350  
Evaluation 
The methods used for reaching agreement within the FSC system are interesting. 
The emphasis amongst those interviewed concerned FSC’s use of consensus 
decision making. However, it is debatable whether the general practice of 
‘consensus’ within the system is not in fact a form of qualified majority voting, 
which merely requires a higher percentage of agreement than in conventional 
simple majority systems. The presence of the ‘sustained opposition clause’ would 
appear to act as a catalyst for returning to the negotiating table. The added 
safeguard at the international level of ensuring sub-chamber support also appears 
to facilitate decision making by ensuring certain motions never make it to the 
floor, ensuring a greater likelihood that those that are agreed to. This ability 
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within FSC’s deliberative processes to move between consensus and voting may 
well be the key to the success of the system’s decision making processes, giving it 
a score of high. 
Dispute Settlement  
FSC’s Statutes and By-Laws obliged the Board to institute a Dispute Resolution 
and Accreditation Appeals Committee. Its first role is to handle disputes and 
grievances raised by members concerning the performance of the Board, the 
Executive Director and the Secretariat.351 Its second task is to review decisions 
regarding the accreditation of certification bodies, and to report to the Board on 
the extent to which certification bodies adhere to the P&C and the guidelines 
covering their activities.352 Non-members must have their complaints presented 
by a member.353 The General Assembly is referred to in the By-Laws as the final 
authority in dispute resolutions.354 
An Interim Disputes Resolution Protocol was developed in 1998, which 
explains the procedures for resolving disputes.355 FSC identifies its grievance 
procedures as consisting of four levels: resolving a complaint, resolving a dispute, 
formal dispute resolution and accreditation appeals. Non-members must contact 
an FSC member to have their dispute brought to FSC, and may be asked to pay 
costs.356 Decisions regarding accreditation may also be appealed, but again non-
members must go through a member to do so.357 In the case of appealing a 
certification decision, certification bodies have their own independent review 
committee, and the complaint should be directed there in the first instance.358  
Complaints and dispute mechanisms also exist for the development of new 
international standards. Complaints regarding content are addressed either at the 
time, or advice is provided on how to resubmit concerns in the standards revision 
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period. No further method of appeal is accepted. Procedural complaints if 
unresolved informally proceed to the Protocol.359 National initiatives must also 
establish their own grievance procedures, applicable to their particular 
circumstances.360 National offices provide the structure through which dispute 
resolution processes occur.361 All certification bodies must develop their own 
dispute resolution mechanisms. When a dispute occurs on a national level the 
national initiative must be consulted as part of the process.362 Stakeholders must 
also be informed during forest management assessment that the certification body 
has mechanisms for resolving disputes and handling complaints.363 
More elaborate dispute provisions appear in the standards covering controlled 
wood. Here wood cannot enter the certified supply chain from forest management 
areas where civil rights have been violated, or substantial -- and unresolved --
conflict exists amongst indigenous peoples or civil society groups regarding long-
term tenure or use rights.364 Stakeholders must be fully informed and a process 
put in place for evaluating and addressing stakeholders’ concerns.365  
FSC’s procedures have been heavily criticised in Trading in Credibility.366 
Academic scholars also question FSC’s capacity to settle disputes at the national 
level, leading some to assert “there is a general consensus that [the system] is not 
working well and needs substantial reform.”367 Other commentators also consider 
FSC procedures to be cumbersome.368 The point has been made that dispute 
resolution within FSC does not differ greatly from informal procedures used by 
state-based legal systems, which are themselves restricted in terms of who may 
participate and who may initiate procedures.369 This may be attributable to the fact 
that the Protocol was prepared on behalf of FSC by a law professor.370 Neither the 
formal nor the informal processes within FSC system are considered as being 
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adequate to the task of handling “the pervasive benefit-of-the-doubt dynamics that 
are likely to characterize many certification processes.”371  
FSC acknowledges that dispute resolution is complex, difficult and unclear.372 
A revision process commenced in 2004.373 The Protocol remains on the FSC 
international website as the basis for managing grievances, and is identified as 
such in core documents.374 The problems associated with its dispute mechanisms 
have led one commentator to suggest that the system’s consultation procedures 
need improvement, as does the communication between FSC and its 
stakeholders.375  
Interviews 
Those interviewees who commented on how FSC handled disputes were either 
critical or ambivalent. One business interviewee observed that there was no truly 
independent dispute settlement mechanism within FSC, as was the general norm 
internationally, and as expected under WTO.376 Another observed that if a given 
forest owner is unhappy with a decision made by a certification body the highest 
court of appeal was effectively FSC’s own Executive Director. Such an 
arrangement was both biased and lacking in objectivity. They added that as soon 
as the forest owners in their country had understood this, they had decided there 
were no possible circumstances under which they could join FSC.377 A third 
business interviewee had expressed frustration over FSC’s inability/unwillingness 
at the international level to resolve informal disputes between industry and NGOs 
nationally.378 One final business interviewee had commented that the only way to 
solve disputes in the early days of FSC had been through continuous dialogue.379 
NGOs were generally more interested in the value of FSC as tool to solve 
deeper disputes regarding land use and tenure, rather than its internal mechanisms 
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for resolving disputes. For one, the significance of FSC lay in its P&C, which 
provided a basis for discussions about land rights and ownership.380 Another 
thought FSC had been successful in this regard on the national level.381  
Evaluation 
FSC’s Dispute Resolution Protocol is not well regarded by commentators or 
interviewees, and some sources argue that it is not particularly effective. Its 
complexity, legalistic nature and cumbersome rules are the main criticisms. These 
aspects appear to hamper rather than help communications between FSC and 
those complaining. More research is needed to match the overall number of 
disputes with those, which are settled, but the contribution of the current system to 
productive deliberation would appear to be low. 
Implementation 
Implementation refers to the process of putting commitments into practice.382 
However, the fact that a system has created policies or standards does not 
automatically demonstrate productiveness. Rather, implementation should result 
in behaviour change, and in addition also solves the problem for which the 
institution was created. Finally, these changes in behaviour, the problem 
solutions, and the institution itself need to be durable. Here durability is 
interpreted as referring to longevity, as well as flexibility and adaptability (whilst 
still ensuring a degree of consistency). These three indicators together 
demonstrate the extent to which implementation within the governance system 
can be considered productive, equated in this instance to effectiveness. 
However, it is also important to bear in mind that factors external to the 
governance system also impact on the success of implementation. Governance 
systems stand little chance of improving situations where legal requirements and 
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enforcement capacities are weak, and where social, economic and political 
contexts beyond the institution itself impede successful implementation.383 In the 
case of certification, the point has been made that market-based approaches have a 
limited impact on the problems of forest degradation and deforestation. From this 
standpoint the contribution of each of the case studies should be seen as partial, 
and relating more to the extent to which what they have to offer does in fact 
complement the range of other initiatives aimed at improving forest management 
practices.384 
Behaviour Change 
FSC has been described as having a “norm-building and behavioural effect in the 
field of sustainable development.”385 Its governance arrangements utilise both 
top-down and bottom up processes of information sharing, created within 
networks, which foster organisational learning and mobilise resources amongst 
stakeholders to further improve organisational structures. It is the very diversity of 
the actors involved which facilitates these learning processes.386 
The institution has also been portrayed as having had a beneficial influence on 
the relations between the various stakeholders involved in forest policy 
discussions, notably in those countries where forest governance is weak.387 In the 
case of South Africa, for example, FSC certification has been described as 
bringing previously excluded stakeholders into the national forest dialogue. 
Elsewhere, in countries such as Bolivia, it has worked as a complementary agent 
in encouraging greater compliance with national forestry regulation, or, as in the 
case of Mexico, has influenced the development of national regulation, which 
reflects FSC standards.388 The continued support and collaboration of 
environmental and social interests, the endorsement of some state interests, and its 
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influence on national forest policies are all indicators of FSC’s success in this 
regard. 389  
The need for collaboration regarding the development of solutions to 
contentious issues within FSC system appears to discipline the parties involved. 
This may be attributable to the development of mutual trust and the promulgation 
of norms concerning what is understood as appropriate behaviour.390 Where 
conflicts do arise they are more over problem solutions than definitions or 
diagnoses, which are generally shared. However there is anecdotal evidence of 
increasing tensions over FSC’s levels of compliance.391  
Initially, FSC’s broad stakeholder involvement and strong environmental 
social and auditing standards gave the system the potential to address a number of 
gaps in the existing global forest regime.392 This original capacity of FSC to 
deliver on social and environmental needs may have come at the expense of 
economic interests however.393 The emergence of competitor schemes has 
marginalised FSC in some countries, as forest owners have migrated to these 
systems, reducing FSC’s abilities to set the standard for forest management 
globally.394  
Finally, although it is acknowledged that the impact on sustainability as whole 
arising from FSC certification in developing countries may be small, there may be 
indirect impacts on the behaviour of non-certified forest owners as they learn 
from certified owners around them. Certification may therefore reinforce the 
development of SFM.395  However, the messages being presented to forest owners 
about certification may be mixed.396 
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Interviews 
The comments made by interviewees focussed around FSC’s contribution to 
behaviour change in the areas of organisational learning, economic and ecological 
sustainability and standard setting. Views were both positive and negative. 
NGOs had contrasting views on the impacts of FSC certification on the 
behaviour of economic interests. One was concerned about FSC’s fast-growth 
strategy and the WWF/World Bank Alliance. Certification had proliferated too 
quickly for forest owners to accept management standards and change their 
forestry practices. Things would have been different if certification had been 
allowed to develop at a natural pace.397 Another NGO observed that FSC had 
contributed to what had been an incremental change in the forestry community’s 
understanding of sustainability away from equating it to sustained yield to 
including environmental elements, and now to accepting the idea social 
sustainability. This was directly attributable to FSC Principles Two, Three and 
Six.398 
In terms of the organisational learning associated with FSC one interviewee 
from the third group of subjects was particularly enthusiastic about how FSC 
itself had undergone a process of change regarding the significance it attributed to 
stakeholder participation. Initially it had needed to both learn who its stakeholders 
were, and subsequently how to communicate with them, and ensure their 
participation was meaningful. This is turn had placed FSC’s constituents on a 
steep learning curve before they could learn to trust the deliberative processes 
without knowing what the outcomes would be, or how far they could push 
them.399  
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Evaluation 
There is some evidence that FSC certification has changed the behaviour of forest 
managers, and generated knock-on effects outside the system, but there is not 
much more than can be said on the data available, much of which is somewhat 
equivocal. Basing an evaluation on this evidence could only result in a low score. 
There is more evidence that FSC has influenced national forest policy 
development either directly or indirectly, and reduced forestry-related conflict. It 
has also influenced the behaviour of other certification schemes, particularly the 
attention they now pay to participatory decision making. On these two points, 
FSC’s contribution to behaviour change is high. The biggest contribution to 
behavioural change that the FSC system as a whole appears to have made is to the 
social, organisational and policy-related learning of its participants. This has 
contributed to productive deliberation in the sense that actors understand one 
another and FSC system better, and consequently have the capacity to improve the 
system and policy decisions made. Erring on the side of caution, it is probably 
best to score FSC’s impact on behaviour change as medium.  
Problem Solving 
The emergence of FSC has been linked to the failure of state interests to deliver 
on binding regulations and the need for forestry companies to find new allies as a 
possible alternative to re-regulation. FSC provided a problem solving environment 
more suitable to creating regulation than that afforded by intergovernmental 
agreements.400 It has achieved this through the interrelated mechanisms of 
consensus-based standards setting, compliance verification through independent 
third parties, developed within a private governance model, which exceeds those 
used in the oft-criticised world of public governmental forest politics. These 
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methods have led it to be labelled a “solution facilitator in global environmental 
politics.”401 
Although the FSC system has attempted to integrate the social, environmental 
and economic aspects of SFM, some doubt has been expressed that this has been a 
success in developing countries.402 As of June 2005 FSC-certified sources 
constituted 5% of world market share, and 1.36% of global forest cover. These are 
disproportionately located in North America and Europe (79.2% of certified area), 
whilst Africa, Asia, Oceania and Latin America only represent 20.8%, and figures 
are not greatly different for chain of custody certificates. Given the lack of 
economic and technical capacity in tropical countries and the increased costs 
associated with tropical forest certification in comparison to temperate or boreal 
forests, few tropical producers have been able to earn premium, or transfer costs 
to consumers and retailers, as a result of certification.403 The impact of FSC 
certification on the sustainable use of tropical forests is therefore likely to be 
small. This is compounded by the fact that most certified timber is destined for 
export markets, whilst only 30% of all tropical timber is exported. This is partly 
offset by the fact that some of FSC’s certified tropical forest countries such a 
Brazil export largely to the US and Europe where demand for certified timber is 
high. But with only 10% of all tropical timber being certified, failure to address 
local timber consumption will continue to make the contribution of certification to 
sustainability very small.404 It has been asserted that the majority of tropical 
forests certified have been done so under the auspices of FSC accredited 
certification bodies. Although certification generally benefits broader 
conservation objectives for the tropical regions only in production forests, FSC’s 
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contribution to sustainable production has still been identified as a “major 
achievement.”405  
 Even in significant supply regions such as Europe, the contribution of 
certification generally to ecological sustainability has been questioned. Empirical 
research demonstrates that an increase in certification in Europe would not result 
in a substantial modification in forest management in that region.406 One study has 
suggested however that European forestry practices are likely to improve 
subsequent to FSC certification.407 This finding is reinforced by other research, 
which found that FSC certification in Europe had increased stand diversity and 
tree species as well as improving the protection of rare and threatened species and 
their habitats, and reducing chemical use.408 In the case of Germany for example, 
the fact that 37% of FSC certified forest operations studied did not have to change 
their management procedures could be interpreted as providing evidence either 
way, depending on perspective.409 In the Nordic countries, where large areas are 
certified either under FSC or PEFC, FSC certification has been less effective than 
PEFC in promoting SFM amongst small-scale, as opposed to large-scale forest 
owners.410 
One of the ways in which forest certification can be considered effective is the 
extent to which it improves on-the-ground practices.411 On a performance level, 
FSC certification has been characterised as being more intrusive and rigorous 
regarding forest management and environmental sustainability than the industry-
dominated schemes.412 On an environmental level, this relates particularly to the 
protection of old growth forests and the maintenance of biodiversity, as well as 
restrictions on the use of chemicals and the size of clearcutting operations and an 
outright ban on genetically modified organisms.413 Its standards in relation to the 
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conservation of biological diversity have been emphasised as being the most 
rigorous of all the certification programmes. Its activities in the tropical regions 
are particularly important, as the need for biodiversity conservation in these 
regions is the greatest.414 FSC has also been described as more demanding than 
competitor schemes regarding social issues, particularly the protection of 
workers’ and indigenous peoples’ rights, as well as enhancing community 
wellbeing by sharing the benefits arising from the use of forest resources.415 For 
FSC to retain the confidence of the environmental and social movement for the 
future, however, it needs to enforce stricter implementation of its procedures.416  
Interviews 
Interviewees expressed a number of views about FSC’s problem solving 
capacities. The three most significant topics of discussion concerned the role of 
certifiers, the scheme’s ecological problem solving abilities, and national 
standards. NGOs had both good and bad things to say about certifiers. One felt 
that FSC was the world’s most developed certification system, and its extensive 
documentation resulted in the imposition of reliable corrective action measures by 
certifiers.417 This view was echoed by one business interviewee who considered 
the role of the certifiers to be professional in their conduct of audits. This 
contributed to a well-functioning system, which was capable of identifying 
weaknesses and improving them accordingly.418 Two NGO interviewees did not 
agree that the implementation role played by certifiers was a good one.419  
Views across the three groups of interviewees concerning FSC’s abilities to 
solve ecological problems were equivocal. One business interviewee felt that FSC 
standards focussed too much of the protection of natural forests at the expense of 
other ecosystems.420 One NGO wondered whether all the effort that had gone into 
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developing certification -- and FSC in particular -- as a tool to improve forest 
management had resulted in more attention being paid to the tool itself than its 
goal. 421 Two subjects from the third group of interviewees commented that the 
majority of content within FSC’s standards concerned environmental compliance, 
which had lost it support from forestry interests.422 However, both business and 
NGO interview subjects were concerned about the application of generic 
standards in countries that lacked national initiatives.423  
One interviewee from the third group of subjects believed FSC had contributed 
to solving global forest problems beyond its original expectations. Although the 
original idea had been to concentrate on the tropics, changing political conditions 
had overtaken and FSC had ended up having a world focus. In this regard it was 
initially more significant than its competitor schemes, which, with their regional 
orientation, were not originally GATT compliant. This had given it an influence 
over the norms of SFM, as well as being able to reach aspects of the timber trade 
and forest governance that governments were unable to. FSC nevertheless still 
needed supportive governments to work best and solve problems.424 Both business 
and NGO interviewees also expressed concerns about the costs and the time 
involved with FSC certification. Doing things the right way could take forever, 
and by the time the perfect standard was developed there could be no forest left.425  
Finally two interviewees from the business and NGO sectors commented that 
FSC had been less successful in improving forest management than they had 
originally thought it would be.426 But it had still made a difference, by opening a 
political space for dialogue particularly from an environmental and social justice 
perspective.427 
 
  192 
Evaluation 
It is fair to say that FSC has had some positive impact in addressing the problem 
of deforestation, but given the proliferation of the scheme mostly in the world’s 
non-tropical regions, it has not been extensive. Nevertheless it remains the most 
widespread certification system in the tropical regions, and consequently has had 
some impact on the conservation of biological diversity in some production 
forests there. Here evidence for the temperate zones is more equivocal – and 
disputed. Overall, however, it can be said that FSC has brought more stakeholders 
into the policy debate regarding SFM, and has increased the access of social and 
economic interests to the benefits of certification, albeit only partially. 
Recognising that there are external factors beyond control of non-state agencies 
such as the FSC, and the scale of the problem of global deforestation -- 
particularly the illegal timber trade -- FSC’s contribution to problem solving is 
medium. 
Durability 
The year 2004 marked a significant watermark in the development of FSC 
standards covering a range of certification related activities. Accredited 
certification bodies are now governed by a standard, which interprets the 
application of ISO/IEC Guide 65:1996 (“General Requirements for Bodies 
Operating Forest Product Certification Systems”). The intention of the standard is 
that the certification of forest management and labelling is conducted in a 
“consistent, reliable and credible manner.”428 Auditors of FSC standards are also 
expected to follow a standard set of requirements to ensure they comply with 
international norms, and “to improve the quality and consistency of certification 
decisions.”429 Further standards lay down the normative requirements expected of 
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certification bodies undertaking forest pre-evaluation visits and subsequent forest 
management evaluation.430 These are in addition to those covering the application 
of generic standards in the absence of a national standard and stakeholder 
consultation for forest evaluation.431 
FSC has been described as a certification scheme that aims to be responsive to 
varying socio-economic and ecological circumstances, whilst avoiding the 
‘excessive’ flexibility that business demands might place upon it. To do so would 
alienate its social and environmental constituents and undermine the credibility of 
its standards.432 Some flexibility is built into the system, but it has been argued, 
only to a limited degree; consequently any concessions that economic interests 
should expect from the system would be minor.433 Other schemes tend to be more 
flexible in the application of sustainability requirements, and focus more heavily 
on economic sustainability. The difference has been attributed to FSC’s reliance 
on performance-based criteria, in contrast to the systems- or process-based 
approach of its competitors.434 Performance-based standards are most effective 
they measure, evaluate and verify on the ground activity.435 It has been claimed 
that FSC is unequivocal in its use of performance-based standards, and reference 
in FSC Standard FSC-STD-20-002 to consistency in the structure and content of 
standards has been cited as evidence.436 There are nevertheless some negative 
aspects to FSC system associated with the regional development of management 
standards, most notably the degree of consistency, causing serious problems for 
those developing them.437 This has led to a considerable variability in 
standards.438  
In the face of losing market share to rival chain-of-custody standards in the 
early 2000s FSC itself was obliged to demonstrate a greater degree of adaptability 
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within its own standards than previously. In Sweden a further dual certification 
agreement has been made between the PEFC and FSC systems, known as the 
practice of ‘double bookkeeping’, where companies are certified under both 
schemes, and track wood in and out of both systems.439 
Interestingly, despite its longevity, one FSC insider has made the observation 
that even though FSC is committed to solving the global forest crisis there is no 
intention of keeping the institution “alive beyond need.”440 
Interviews 
Some interviewees felt that the structural flexibility in FSC’s chamber system 
contributed significantly to its capacity to adapt to local conditions. Two business 
representatives pointed to the existence of indigenous chambers in the New 
Zealand and Canadian national initiatives as examples.441 Another business 
representative criticised FSC’s chamber-based governance, arguing that there was 
never any guarantee that rational changes to FSC’s rules would be approved, 
which had made the system slow to adapt and unpredictable.442  
Some broader concerns were expressed about the implementation of FSC 
standards. One business interviewee commented on FSC’s lack of adaptability 
when it came to meeting the necessities of developing countries, which explained 
why so few tropical forests had been certified.443 One interviewee from the third 
group of subjects felt there was no latitude for such countries to develop 
compromise solutions because the standards were too high. They wanted to see 
FSC implement a stepwise approach to standards setting in such situations.444 
Another NGO interviewee agreed that FSC’s system of standards setting needed 
to be made more flexible, as it would open the door for more national 
standards.445 This lack of flexibility was interpreted by another NGO interviewee 
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as one of the strengths of the system as it guaranteed consistency. A company 
certified in one country could be fairly sure that it was at a similar level as another 
elsewhere.446 Another business interviewee contradicted this.447 One NGO felt 
that FSC had been too flexible in meeting the needs of industry, and pointed to the 
changes made to percentage-based claims as an example.448 Another pointed out 
that although it was logical that a system as complex as FSC would constantly 
change its rules, it made it very difficult for people to deal with.449  
Finally, one interviewee from the third group of subjects attributed the success 
of FSC to its longevity. This had allowed it to put well-organised structures and 
professional staff in place, and because it had been around for such a long time it 
was well known and consequently had a comparative market advantage over other 
schemes.450 
 
Evaluation 
Given the fact that FSC is one of the earliest examples of non-state regulatory 
initiatives to combat deforestation, its longevity cannot be denied. It has also 
managed to balance the need for strict and internationally consistent rules with the 
requirements for local flexibility, although this has not been without problems. 
Not all the changes implemented have been sufficient to keep old players or 
recruit new actors. In some instances, such as percentage-based claims and 
“double-bookkeeping” the changes made have been largely pragmatic and 
indicate a downward trend. In others, such as the consistency imposed on 
certifiers’ performance in the 2004 standards, the changes implemented have been 
productive. Nevertheless it is possible to discern an overall upward trend in the 
evolution of FSC’s structures, processes and products over time, and that its 
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adaptive capacity is generally positive. In all the main aspects of durability 
(longevity, flexibility consistency and adaptability) FSC ranks high. 
Governance Quality of FSC 
Method  
Institutional performance in relation to each indicator is rated low, medium or 
high (or one, two, and three points for the purposes of assessment; scores in 
between have not been converted into half marks). The threshold value for 
indicators is a rating of ‘medium’ (or two points). Half points have not been 
awarded. These indicators contribute collectively to the performance of the 
relevant criterion (interest representation, organisational responsibility, decision 
making and implementation), which are scored according to a 50% pass/fail 
threshold. These in turn inform an overall score for the principles of meaningful 
participation and productive deliberation. For the benefit of classifying the extent 
of the system’s overall performance, each principle is also given a percentage 
score. The threshold between ‘pass’ and ‘fail’ across the system is 50%.  
Commentary 
FSC received 24 points out of a maximum total of 33. Three indicators achieved 
high ratings (inclusiveness, agreement, durability) seven medium (equality, 
resources, accountability, transparency, democracy, behavioural change, problem 
solving) and one low (dispute settlement). The conventional pass/fail target of 
50% was exceeded by all criteria (interest representation and implementation 
scoring 78%, and with organisational responsibility and decision making 
achieving 67%). At the principle level, the aggregate result for meaningful 
participation was 73%, exceeding the target value of 50%. The aggregate result 
for productive deliberation was 72%, also exceeding the target value of 50%. The 
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score across the system is 73%, thus passing the threshold of 50% (see Table 4.6 
below). 
Table 4.5 Evaluative matrix of FSC governance quality 
Principle 1. Meaningful Participation 
Criterion 1. Interest representation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
Actual score: 7 
2. Organisational responsibility 
Highest possible score: 6 
Lowest possible score: 2 
Actual score: 4 
Sub-
total 
(out of 
15): 
 
            
11 
Indicator  Inclusiveness Equality Resources Accountability Transparency  
High 3      
Medium  2 2 2 2  
Low       
Principle 2. Productive Deliberation 
Criterion 3. Decision making 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
Actual score: 6 
4. Implementation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3  
Actual score: 7 
Sub-
total 
(out of 
18): 
 
            
13 
Indicator  Democracy Agreement Dispute 
settlement 
Behavioural 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Durability  
High  3    3  
Medium 2   2 2   
Low   1     
Total 
(out of 
33) 
      Final 
Score: 
            
24 
 
Postscript 
FSC Strategic Review 
In 2005 the General Assembly mandated the FSC Board and staff to undertake a 
strategic review of direction, finance and governance system.451 This was in 
recognition of the fact that although the system in place since 1993 had “provided 
enormous legitimacy for FSC in the marketplace and with stakeholders”, a 
“growing variety of growing pains” had been experienced.452 A governance 
review process began in 2007 subsequent to the adoption of the FSC global 
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strategy by the Board. An initial informal consultation phase consisted of 
discussions with FSC staff internationally and nationally, with assistance from 
developmental consulting firm Accountability, and informed by the Greenpeace 
publication Holding the Line, which challenged some of FSC’s controversial 
certificates. A second more formal phase commenced in Febraury 2008 with the 
release of a white paper Options for FSC’s Future aimed at FSC members and 
parties with a strong interest in governance. This resulted in a membership survey 
conducted between June and July.453  
Three substantive components are outlined in the review, relating to 
membership, international and national arrangements, and dispute settlement. The 
intention is to create a two-tier system of membership consisting of traditional 
FSC members, and a new category of FSC supporters.454 FSC members will retain 
their existing voting rights, and prospective new voting members will continue to 
apply for membership under existing application and review arrangements. In 
addition, the quorum rules required for all decision making will be amended to 
reflect the 90%-10% voting weight currently allocated to organisational and 
individual members when making formal decisions. This is to address the current 
imbalance, where individual and organisational members have equal weight in the 
formation of quorums.455 Dues may now be paid to either national initiatives or 
the International Center. It is noted that the intention is to create a “dual 
membership platform eventually”.456 The supporting member category is for those 
interests who do not want to become, or may be legally prohibited from doing so 
(such as government agencies or academic institutions). Fees for such members 
will be reduced or waived in the case of economic hardship, and membership is 
limited to being kept informed of developments, access to discounts for events 
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and meetings, and other benefits to be determined by the Board.457 Both members 
and supporters will continue to participate in consultations and surveys.458 
A second set of proposals concerns the Board of Directors and senior staff 
(including national initiatives). The Board is to become “more strategic and less 
operational”, and will include non-voting technical advisors and a delegate from 
the national initiatives.459 The Board will retain its current size and follow the 
existing balanced composition. The non-voting national initiative delegate is to be 
nominated by the national initiatives on a consensus basis, and will alternate 
between the global North and South. No more than three technical advisors are to 
sit on the Board, and the maximum number of participants is to be 14.460  A new 
layer of management, the Senior Executive Group is also proposed, which will 
consist of Directors from each of the FSC’s business units, answerable to the 
Executive Director, to be renamed the Director General.461 The role of this body 
(including FSC International Center, FSC Global Development and -- 
interestingly, given its theoretical structural separation -- Accreditation Services 
International) is to represent the work of the Group to the Board.462 National 
initiatives are to be established under five year contracts, and are to function in a 
network system operating under a Regional Council, the intention of which is to 
set regionally relevant priorities, but the financial and geographic details of which 
are still to be determined.463 
Finally, it is proposed that an independent Disputes Resolution Committee be 
created, that the existing Board-based system of disputes resolution be disbanded, 
that complaints procedures be streamlined, and an annual report detailing 
compliance actions be produced.464 The new Committee is the “highest appellate 
body” and “body of ‘last resort’” and is to consist of four independent persons, 
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one appointed by the Board on the advice of the chambers, the others representing 
each of the chambers. 465 Its initial proposed tasks are to recommend changes to 
the existing disputes and complaints procedures, report to the membership, and 
recommend final decisions to the Board. The meaning of the term independent is 
defined in the context of keeping “the policy setting functions in the hands of FSC 
staff, Technical Working Groups, and FSC stakeholders.” 466 It is intended to 
increase trust, as well as certify the complaints and appeals-related performance 
of each business unit.467 
The third phase of governance-related consultation commenced at the FSC 
General Assembly in November 2008, where existing and new governance- 
related proposals discussed and generally supported, with some ammendments.468 
These related to: measures to improve governance structures (amended but 
approved as a policy motion); improving dispute resolution mechanisms 
(approved as a statutory motion without amendment); and rules to harmonise rules 
for achieving quorum (approved as a statutory motion without amendment).469 
Changes to the membership system, including the creation of a new category of 
non-voting FSC Supporters were also approved (amended and changed from a 
stautory to a policy motion).470  
Conclusions 
The creation of FSC can be attributed to the failure of previous international 
initiatives to combat deforestation both prior to and post Rio. The particular form 
of its governance, most notably its market orientation, non-state emphasis and 
participatory philosophy reflects the emerging discourses around sustainable 
development prevalent at that time.471 Initially developed largely by 
environmental NGOs and a few, but important, forest industry players, FSC grew 
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extraordinarily quickly, making certification a particularly appealing and 
comparatively “fast track” avenue for global forest policy change.472  
FSC’s NGO origins, and the speed of its development were to have a number 
of longer-term consequences however. Firstly, those industry players who had not 
participated in its formative stages were deeply suspicious of its motives, and their 
fears were not allayed by the original 75%-25% power-sharing arrangements 
negotiated at its founding assembly. Given their suspicion, and the rapidly shifting 
policy climate at the time, the almost instantaneous development of competitor 
schemes is not surprising. Secondly, the haste with which FSC’s initial certificates 
were issued, and the credibility problems they generated, was to have a feedback 
effect on the growth of its rivals. Internally, the “learn by doing” and fast-track 
growth strategies of the early years also severely impacted on the organisation’s 
performance, and severely strained its relations with key stakeholders. 
Whilst these origins have undoubtedly contributed both positively and 
negatively to the forest policy environment of today, the structures and processes 
that underlie FSC’s governance system have undoubtedly contributed to its 
survival. Despite its largely NGO origins, it has managed to capture and maintain 
the support of a wide range of stakeholders. Even though the numerical and 
geographical representation of these interests may not be equal, the chamber 
system addresses any potential power imbalances. The fact that these structures 
exist on both the international and national levels also provides for a generally 
inclusive culture across the system. The institution’s decision making processes 
also contribute to the system’s success as they provide multiple entry and exit 
points for problems to be circulated until solutions are found.473 The constant 
interplay between consensus and voting affords participants the opportunity to 
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revisit issues on several occasions. Interestingly, where the system’s deliberative 
processes are weak, in the case of its dispute resolution mechanisms for example, 
the broader opportunities for collaborative dialogue inherent in the system may 
serve to circumvent such blockages.  
FSC is not without its failings, however. Several recurring issues are a cause 
for concern. Firstly, certification bodies have a real potential to act as ‘rogue’ 
elements in the system. They are of course meant to be independent, but this 
creates problems of its own, most notably in relation to accountability. Secondly, 
the relationship between FSC and one of its core constituents, most notably 
WWF, has not always been a healthy one. Finally, there is a major unresolved 
tension in the system between participation, which is largely structural and occurs 
at the international and national levels, and consultation, which is largely 
procedural, and occurs at the local level. There is some validity to the observation 
that participation is more relevant in the development of standards at the 
international and national levels, than during certification-related assessments at 
the forest management unit level. However, it should also be borne in mind that a 
number of problematic conflicts in FSC (such as plantation certification) have 
their origins at the local level, as does the problem of deforestation itself.  
The proposed changes to FSC’s governance in the current review help clarify  
and improve the democratic relationship between individual and organisational 
members. It is also useful to expand the membership system, as this provides 
more opportunities for the system to demonstrate its organisational responsibility 
to a broader base than before (as well as increasing revenue). The proposed 
changes to international-national organisational structures will require some time 
before their value can be assessed. The true independence of the new Disputes 
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Resolution Committee is to be questioned however, as it is still ultimately under 
the control of the membership and Board, and the concern as to ‘who watches the 
watchdog’ remains. This concern relates also to Accreditation Services 
International, which continues to be institutionally integrated with much of the 
structure and process of the system it is intended to accredit. 
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1999), p. 5. In 1989 Teakwood, a teak plantation investment company based in Costa Rica 
commenced promoting its activities to the Dutch public (Romeijn, Green Gold, p. 5).  WWF 
joined the teak investment programme in 1993, expecting to earn a 5% return on profits generated 
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307 FSC, “Forest Certification Public Summary Reports”, Standard FSC-STD-20-009, Version 2.1 
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ISO and the 14000 Series  
(Environmental Management Systems)1 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the expression of contemporary global governance within 
ISO’s 14000 Series of standards. Because these standards were developed within 
a broader institutional context, it has at times been necessary to look both at ISO 
itself, and the technical committee (TC 207) under which the 14000 Series was 
developed. As a result, the assessment of the governance quality of the 14000 
Series cannot be viewed in isolation from of ISO as a whole, and the evaluation of 
the Series consequently acknowledges this institutional context. As an institution, 
ISO as a whole is much older than FSC, but the 14000 Series is contemporaneous. 
It conforms much less closely to the non-state ideals of FSC, and consequently 
confronts a different set of governance issues, explored below. The chapter begins 
with a descriptive account of ISO and TC 207’s history, general governance, 
connections to forest management, and institutional classification. This is 
followed by an analytical section, which looks more specifically at the 
governance attributes of TC 207 from the perspectives of the ISO itself, the 
scholarly literature and other commentaries, and a number of key informants 
interviewed for this study. The final sections provide an evaluation based on the 
materials discussed, and finishes with some concluding observations.  
Historical Overview 
ISO, derived from the Greek word isos, meaning equal, also known as the 
International Organisation for Standardisation, develops international standards 
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for products, services, processes, materials and systems, as well as for conformity 
assessment and managerial and organisational practice.2 International 
standardisation began in the electrotechnical field with the creation of the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in 1906, and was followed by 
the creation of the International Federation of National Standardising Associations 
(ISA) in 1926.3 ISA’s activities ceased in 1942 on account of the Second World 
War, and in 1946 delegates from 25 countries met in London to create a new 
body, ISO, which commenced work on February 23 1947.4 ISO’s role is to 
“promote the development of standardisation and related activities in the world 
with a view to facilitating international exchange of goods and services and to 
developing cooperation in the spheres of intellectual scientific, technological and 
economic activity.”5 It has developed over 15,000 international standards through 
a network of 156 national bodies and 580 liaison organisations.6 
ISO moved into the arena of social and environmental standard setting 
relatively recently.7 The origins of the 14000 Series have been linked to an 
evolution beyond ISO’s traditional product standards to the process standards of 
the 1980s, exemplified by the ISO 9000 (quality management systems, or QMS) 
standards.8 The 9000 Series has been characterised as representing ISO’s first 
efforts to certify management practices, as opposed to compliance against a 
technical norm.9 The broad uptake of this standard led many national standards 
bodies to see the need for a certifiable environmental management system 
(EMS).10 The ISO 14000 Series of standards in turn delineated the environmental 
management system requirements for firms seeking to become certified.11  
The Rio Earth Summit played an important role in the negotiations over 
environmental management standards.12 It has been argued that the standards that 
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emerged in the post-Rio context demonstrated the failure of previous international 
efforts to govern the environmental and social activities of trans-national 
corporations.13 Earlier negotiations had been underway since 1977 under the 
auspices of the UN Center for Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), regarding 
the creation of a corporate code of conduct, which included environmental 
provisions. According to NGOs the UNCTC was dismantled shortly before Rio, 
under pressure from the US and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). 
This left the way open for “voluntary, self-regulatory initiatives developed by 
corporate actors themselves.”14 Several commentators see the approach adopted at 
Rio as a result of the considerable high level of corporate involvement.15 
There is certainly plenty of evidence of extensive activity to develop 
environmental management standards prior to Rio. Following the widespread and 
successful piloting of British Standard 7750 the EU Commission submitted a 
proposal to the European Environmental Council for the adoption of a regulation 
for the creation of an Environmental Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS).16 
This scheme was voluntary, but did require participating industries to make a 
commitment to continually improving their environmental performance and 
subjecting themselves to an external audit by an accredited verifier if they wished 
to be certified.17  
In 1991 the ICC and the Business Council for Sustainable Development 
approached ISO to develop an EMS.18 The Rio organisers made similar 
requests.19 ISO’s response was to establish the Strategic Advisory Group for the 
Environment (SAGE) to review the possibility.20 The success of industry in 
achieving a voluntary approach to environmental management was reflected in 
the outcome document of the Rio negotiations, Agenda 21. Both private 
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businesses and industry associations were encouraged to adopt such an approach, 
the aim of which was to promote clean production and reduce hazardous waste 
generated by industrial activity.21 After determining that the knowledge required 
for the development of environmental management standards was sufficiently 
distinct from that required for quality management, SAGE recommended the 
formation of a new ISO technical committee.22 As a result, environmental 
concerns were not subordinated to issues of quality, and standards development 
was not located within the technical committee with this purview, TC 176.23 
SAGE’s work on environmental management was instrumental in the ISO/IEC 
recommendations and input into the UNCED preparatory conference in January 
1992. SAGE’s recommendations ultimately became key elements in the 
substantive documents of UNCED, contributing to the comprehensive policy 
guidance contained in Agenda 21 as well as the Rio Declaration itself, which 
delineated the broader principles underpinning sustainable development.24 Within 
ISO, its separation of environmental management from quality management 
resulted in the decision to form a new technical committee, TC 207.25 
It is important to note the global trade environment in which both the ISO EMS 
and the EMAS were developed, especially the influence of Uruguay Round of 
negotiations and the creation of the World Trade Organisation. Here, voluntary 
process (as opposed to product) standards were encouraged as a means of 
addressing environmental concerns without violating trade rules.26 Both schemes 
have been portrayed as seeking to pre-empt the proliferation of national 
environmental laws, which, it was seen, could act as barriers to trade.27 However, 
there were some differences between the two approaches adopted, particularly 
since the EMAS deliberations were national and regional initiatives, leaving them 
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problematic on an international -- as opposed to European -- level.28 Secondly, as 
was to transpire once the ISO 14001 standard was released, differences existed in 
the reporting requirements in the two systems, and the strength of language used. 
ISO 14001 was -- and continues to be -- less explicit about exactly what degree of 
continual improvement was expected in environmental performance, and unlike 
EMAS did not originally require participants in the scheme to publish an 
environmental statement.29 
At the same time, however, the transition into areas relating to environmental 
sustainability, notably in the 14000 Series, has exposed the organisation to a 
broader discussion about the governance of such initiatives, particularly in matters 
relating to stakeholder participation.30 ISO’s outputs are recognised as the world’s 
trade-legal standards under the World Trade Organisation’s Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) Agreement, and it now wields significant influence on the global 
social-political scene with business, governments and civil society.31 This 
transition has not occurred solely within ISO and includes individual initiatives by 
industrial sectors such as Responsible Care in the 1980s, as well as the creation of 
national EMS standards, exemplified by the British Standard 7750.32 
A Brief History of TC 207  
TC 207 was established in 1993 to develop a new series of standards covering 
environmental management, tools and systems.33 ISO stresses that: 
ISO TC/207 does not set limit levels or performance criteria for 
operations or products; instead, its activities are based on the philosophy 
that improving management practices is the best way to improve the 
environmental performance of organizations and their products…By 
providing a framework for improved environmental performance [TC 
207’s standards] will be contributing to one of the key purposes of 
environmental management standards: they will be contributing to the 
goal of sustainable development.34  
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TC 207 held its inaugural plenary session in Toronto in June 1993, establishing 
subcommittees (SCs) with responsibility for six specific aspects of environmental 
management: environmental management systems (EMS - SC1); environmental 
auditing (EA - SC2); environmental labelling (EL - SC3); environmental 
performance evaluation (EPE - SC4) and life cycle assessment (LCA - SC5); a 
final technical group covered terms and definitions.35 SC7 (Greenhouse Gas 
Management and Related Activities) is a more recent addition.36  In addition to 
the specific task-related working groups of the sub-committees, TC 207 has 
established various other working groups (WGs): environmental aspects of 
product standards: (EAPS - WG1); forestry (WG2, now disbanded); design for the 
environment (DFE - WG3, now disbanded) and environmental communications 
(EC - WG4).37 
The specific importance of TC 207 to social and environmental interests is 
noted in the literature and their lack of involvement in the early stages of 
standards development became the subject of demands for improved 
participation.38 TC 207 first recognised the problem of under-representation in 
1998, creating an NGO Contact Group to ascertain NGO attitudes regarding its 
work.39 Based on its findings, an NGO Task Group was formed in 2001, which 
produced two reports containing recommendations on how to expand and enhance 
NGO participation in standards development.40 In 2003 a higher-level task force 
was created, the NGO-Chairman’s Advisory Group (CAG), consisting of four 
NGOs and four representatives of the CAG, to review the recommendations of the 
2001 task group.41 Meanwhile, NGOs also developed their own independent 
forum to solicit input from their constituents to feed into the task force.42 Whilst 
speaking largely to its own internal audience, the task force nevertheless 
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recognised the importance of external “stakeholders” as well.43 Three categories 
of obstacles to NGO participation relating to capacity, structure and process were 
identified.44 Whilst stating that it was not directly responsible for financing and 
sustaining NGOs in ISO 14000 development, it accepted that TC 207 could do 
more to encourage national standards bodies to engage NGOs domestically and 
help find ways to fund NGO involvement.45 Although TC 207 was largely 
exculpated from blame, the report did stress that where necessary, changes should 
be made within the national standards bodies, and to the category of membership, 
liaison organisation, to which most NGOs belonged.46 
In a separate move, TC 207 initiated a review of its Strategic Plan, including its 
scope, through a separate subcommittee, the Future Vision Task Force, in July 
2002.47 Part of its role was to identify trends affecting environmental management 
over the following 5-10 years. One aspect of these investigations was to look at 
the governance structure and procedures of TC 207. The Task Force identified the 
need for TC 207 to have effective control over strategic planning and 
implementation in a more centralised manner. The purpose of this, it was 
suggested, was to make it “ready to deal with the growing number and diversity of 
stakeholders that are now interested in international environmental 
standardization.”48 
In September 2004 the Task Force plan went to members for ballot.49 All 
fourteen recommendations were accepted, and a five-point plan representing the 
essential initial elements was presented as phase one of a longer term plan.50 The 
task force was assigned the role of reviewing those Directives relevant to 
participation and developing operational guidance, as well as assisting in 
implementing the first phase. Further, it was to develop a work plan for further 
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efforts to improve NGO participation. The chair and secretary of TC 207 were to 
review and document those elements of the TC’s governance structure relating to 
the way decisions were made and implemented. Both the chair and the secretariat 
were to work with national standards bodies to analyse and track progress on their 
efforts to have balanced stakeholder representation at international meetings, 
particularly at the Working Group level.51 The work plan was approved 
overwhelmingly by the ballot in December 2004, and began to be implemented 
over 2005.52 In February 2007 the task force released a report containing draft 
recommendations for operational guidance to improve the balance of stakeholder 
participation, based on a review of the relevant parts of the ISO Directives.53 This 
guidance covered the issue areas pertaining to consensus, balanced representation, 
the role of liaison organisation members, procedural issues regarding standards 
development, and appeals.54 
Forestry-related Controversies Within TC 207 
Of the TC 207 subcommittees SC1 and SC3 are of most relevance to forest 
management.55 ISO 14001, generated by SC1, was at first quickly adopted by the 
forest industry for certification purposes.56 By 2003, of the 33,950 ISO 14001 
certificates issued across all industrial sectors, 1,223 were awarded to the forest 
product industries, ranking them eleventh out of the sectors seeking 
certification.57 At the third plenary meeting of TC 207 in Oslo in 1995 the 
member bodies of Canada and Australia submitted a new work item proposal to 
develop an application guide for the forest industry based on ISO 14001.58 The 
proposal had the clear intention of creating a link between the certification under 
ISO 14001 and SFM.59 One impetus for the proposal appears to have been the 
Canadian forest industries wish to gain international recognition for the Canadian 
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Standard Association (CSA) standard for SFM, which was being developed at that 
time.60  
At the meeting environmental NGOs “expressed concerns that such a sector 
guide could be misapplied.”61 Environmental NGO concerns can be traced back to 
the decision that ISO 14001 would not establish absolute requirements for 
environmental performance, and that companies with different levels of 
performance could be in compliance. Although ISO 14001 could not be used to 
communicate environmental performance to the public, there was a fear that EMS 
certification would nevertheless be used to give the impression that a company 
had been awarded an environmental label.62 The development of the Canadian 
CSA standard had occurred in a highly charged political context.63 Canadian 
environment groups refused to participate in the technical committee associated 
with the CSA standard. They expressed concerns regarding the systems- rather 
than performance-based approach, the lack of public participation in standards 
development, and the possibility that their attendance would be misrepresented, 
giving the system an undeserved credibility.64 In the same month as the Oslo 
meeting, Greenpeace, as part of a broader campaign aimed at defending FSC, 
issued a statement signed by over 50 environmental NGOs condemning the CSA 
initiative as a “flawed process” and calling for a new approach, which included 
the “expertise and interests of environmental, aboriginal, scientific and 
community groups.”65 
Consequently “the issue aroused some controversy” at the Oslo meeting.66 
Greenpeace and other NGOs opposed the proposal on the basis that an EMS was 
not an adequate measure of sustainability if it lacked performance requirements. 
They also questioned the adequacy of interest representation in ISO’s discussions 
  253 
regarding SFM.67 ISO members were split between supporters and opponents of 
the initiative, the latter feeling that the proposal for a sector guide approach would 
weaken the core EMS documents.68 By the concluding plenary it was clear that 
more discussion was needed, and Canada and Australia asked that the new 
proposal for a formal work item be reclassified as an item for discussion. It was 
agreed that a broadly based group of interests would discuss ISO’s role in SFM 
over the next year. The group was to include representatives from TC 207, 
consumer groups, industry and environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace and 
WWF.69 The Canadian and Australian initiative as it had originally stood was 
therefore withdrawn.70  
The failure of Canada and Australia has been attributed to four factors. Firstly, 
CSA appears to have underestimated the degree of coordination between NGOs, 
who were able to gain observer status at Oslo and fight against what they 
interpreted as an attack on the FSC. Secondly, it is also possible that in seeking to 
gain international recognition for the Canadian standard and also appearing to try 
to undermine the FSC, CSA and the Canadian forest industries were 
overambitious. Thirdly, CSA did not factor in the opposition of member bodies to 
sector-specific standards. Finally, although supported by the Australian national 
standards body, Canada was unable to secure further support. Opposition to forest 
certification per se (in the case of the US member body), contrasted with support 
for the FSC (in the case of Sweden), may have contributed to this.71  
But as the following events were to demonstrate, the campaign was far from 
over. Discussions over the next year took the form of an “informal study group” 
established by ISO’s New Zealand member body (Standards New Zealand).72   
There was agreement that it would exist outside of TC 207 and meet prior to the 
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1996 plenary meeting of TC 207. The initiative fell foul of environmental groups 
from its first meeting. Despite being informal the process was seen as being 
linked too closely to ISO, especially since attendance was limited to ISO 
members, although the rule was selectively applied. Greenpeace was initially 
denied access, only to be invited on the day of the meeting. NGOs claimed that 
their input into the first meeting was systematically ignored -- particularly 
suggestions that sought to expand discussions regarding forest certification 
beyond the EMS approach. The minutes wrongly claimed that there was 
consensus that ISO 14001 was a suitable framework for forest certification. NGOs 
did not participate in the second meeting.73 
The study group submitted a report to the 1996 TC 207 plenary identifying TC 
207 as the most appropriate body to address the issue, recommending that a 
bridging document be developed to provide information as to how ISO 14001 
should be applied in the context of forest management.74 The report was accepted, 
and TC 207 resolved to establish a new working group, WG2, to develop the 
document.75 The resolution was resolved by 15 to 14 votes.76 At the same plenary 
environmental NGOs failed to gain acceptance of a resolution clarifying and 
limiting the claims that could be made about EMS certification.77 The convener of 
the working group, Ken Shirley, was the same person who had headed the 
informal study group for Standards New Zealand. The secretariat was given to 
Canada, to be managed by CSA on behalf of the Standards Council of Canada. 
The working group document was not to specify performance levels for forestry, 
nor was it to be used to form the basis for environmental performance claims or 
for product labelling schemes. The working group met first in Toronto in 
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November 1996, and the report was published as a technical report (TR) ISO TR 
14061 in 1998.78  
Despite previous NGO objections a connection nevertheless exists between 
forest management performance in ISO 14001 and TR 14061, which was 
described as a ‘bridging’ method for creating a procedural relationship between a 
company’s ISO 14001 certification and its environmental performance under a 
given forest management programme.79 This relationship was established in a 
number of ways. Firstly, by soliciting the views of interested parties, the public 
participation processes under a given forest management programme were fed 
into a company’s own environmental policy, objectives and targets. Secondly, the 
indicators and specific requirements for SFM under the programme were 
developed into measurable performance requirements applicable to the company’s 
own environmental policy. Thirdly, the indicators for SFM were defined by the 
specific programme and become performance measures, which were fed into the 
company’s own policy-related monitoring and measurement procedures. Fourthly, 
the forest programme’s on-the-ground performance was measured and also fed 
into the company’s own monitoring and measurement procedures. The 
performance data was reviewed against the company’s own stated policy 
objectives and targets, and fed into the final stage of ISO 14001, the audit and 
review.80 
One commentator, writing before the publication of the final technical report 
both criticised -- and anticipated -- the nature of ISO TR 14061, arguing that such 
an approach had the potential to “encourage companies to chose the set of 
standards they wish amongst the Helsinki C&I, Montréal C&I, ITTO criteria and 
FSC [P&C], etc, using EMS as a framework.”81 Advocates of ISO TR 14061 
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supported this assertion, and argued that ISO 14001 was compatible with all of 
the various non-governmental and intergovernmental initiatives that have been 
established in the wake of Agenda 21 and the Statement of Forest Principles.82 
The intergovernmental approach was portrayed as constituting different sets of 
C&I for SFM, which were “intended to assess the sustainability of the forest 
management at the national level.”83 On the other hand it was argued, there were 
examples, such as the Forest Stewardship Council certification scheme, whose 
principles and criteria related “to forest management objectives to be achieved 
with respect to the maintenance of the forest eco-system, as well as the ecological, 
social and economic functions of the forest.”84 
Some observations from the academic forestry literature should be made at this 
point concerning the difference between the two approaches. Firstly, it is quite 
possible that standards developed for monitoring and reporting environmental 
performance at a regional and national level will not be compatible with those, 
which assess the quality of forest management at the level of the forest 
management unit (FMU).85 Secondly, national standards have been developed for 
reporting sustainability at the national level, whereas the focus for assessing 
sustainability under a certification scheme is at the FMU level.86 Thirdly, these 
various standards are based on widely ranging definitions of terms, making 
comparison between them difficult. Consequently, the requirements for SFM 
imposed by these different types of standard makes the comparison of one with 
another difficult.87  
The forest controversy surrounding the Canadian and Australian proposal for 
ISO 14001 inevitably played itself out within SC3 and the discussions around 
environmental labels. Firstly, concerns were raised within analyses sympathetic to 
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the NGO viewpoint, that the possible misuse of ISO14001 might exempt forest 
certification from environmental labelling altogether.88 The reason for such a 
strategy it was argued was on account of the stringency of some environmental 
labels. It was an attempt by “less progressive elements in the international forest 
trade” to avoid the environmental improvements that an environmental label such 
as the FSC would require.89 The second issue affecting the labelling debate related 
to SC3’s failure to examine “single-issue” labels, which only related to one aspect 
in the life cycle of the product -- the extraction of the timber.90 Single-issue labels 
it was argued -- such as those granted under the FSC system -- could still be 
comprehensive, as they employed wide ranging principles and criteria, which 
ensured consistency in environmental requirements, and required third-party 
verification.91 However, ISO 14020, the standard covering the general principles 
for environmental labels and declarations, was intended to cover all eco-labels.92 
This created the potential that it could override all other standards on 
environmental labelling, currently existing (like FSC) or in the future.93 It was 
also designed to be broadly compatible with the forest certification related aspects 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) -- including the emerging and 
industry-preferred competitors to FSC.94 Canada’s CSA standard used criteria 
similar to those of the IPF.95 Arguments over the guidelines for all types of 
labelling occurred largely in WG3, where it appears that NGO initiatives to 
change the content and direction of ISO 14020 were consistently overruled by 
narrow margins.96 This was to lead to an observation that “WG3 is the perfect 
example of a working group where consensus has not been achieved.”97 
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Governance Within ISO 
System Participants 
Oberthür et al, referred to extensively below, provide a detailed commentary on 
ISO’s membership. The status of members differs considerably from country to 
country. While most are non-governmental corporate bodies, others might be 
government or quasi-governmental institutions.98 There are several categories of 
interest groups recognised within ISO, and seven generally associated with ISO 
TC 207: industry (representing a specific professional group, or individual); 
consultant and registrar (engineering, technical, training and accreditation service 
providers related to ISO 14000 standards and ISO 14001 certification); standards 
organisations (also including ISO 14001 certifiers, where they are also standards 
bodies); government (representatives from ministries or agencies, excluding 
standards bodies if they are public entities); research (research or academic 
institutions); NGO (such as consumer organisations, environmental advocacy 
groups and other civil society representatives); and other (groups that do not fit 
into other categories such as financial institutions, media and intergovernmental 
organisations such as OECD and UNCTAD).99  
ISO membership is broken down into three categories. A member body of ISO 
is “a national body most representative of standardization in its country.”100 Only 
one such member body per country is allowed, and it may participate and exercise 
voting rights on any policy or technical committee within ISO. 101 Such members 
are referred to as participating, or P-members.102 ISO currently has member 
bodies representing 150 countries.103 A second category, the correspondent 
member, “is usually an organization in a country which does not yet have a fully 
developed national standards activity.”104 Such a member may not participate 
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actively in policy and technical committees, although they are kept informed, and 
may use any standards developed in their own country.105 They may observe, but 
not vote in the General Assembly.106 Correspondent members, as well as member 
bodies, who choose not to participate actively within committees, are referred to 
as observers, or O-members.107 A third category, the subscriber member, also 
exists for countries with very small economies, who pay a reduced membership 
fee, but who do no more than “maintain contact with international 
standardization.”108 They may attend General Assemblies as observers.109 They do 
not appear in the category of O-members for technical and policy committees.110 
ISO also has formal relations with a range of international organisations, the 
intention being to “complement the network of its national members.”111 These 
organisations participate in ISO’s work in a number of ways. They may influence 
ISO through its Central Secretariat, or they may be directly involved within an 
ISO technical committee, as advisory experts. They constitute a further sub-
category of participant, and are referred to as a liaison member, or occasionally as 
L-members.112 These include consumer groups as well as industry associations, 
intergovernmental organisations and UN agencies.113 Other specific sectors of 
civil society are also included in this category.114 
Liaison organisations are themselves broken down into four categories. 
Category A organisations make an effective contribution to the work of a 
technical committee of subcommittee. They receive all relevant documents and 
are invited to meetings. They may also nominate experts to participate in an ISO 
working group or project team. Category B refers to organisations that wish to be 
kept informed of the work of a technical committee or subcommittee. They are 
entitled to receive the reports on the work of any relevant committee. Category C 
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is reserved for the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 on Information 
Technology. Category D is for those organisations that wish to participate in the 
specific work of a working group or project team. They receive all relevant 
documents and are invited to working group or project team meetings. Category A 
and D organisations can coincide where the former nominates an expert to 
participate in a specific working group or project team.115 Obligations run both 
ways between ISO and liaison organisations, with expectations that both 
contribute suitably to each other’s work.116 Participation of liaison organisations 
within ISO is convoluted and constrained. ISO’s Secretary-General, in 
consultation with the relevant technical committee secretariat, is responsible for 
establishing such liaisons. The status of such liaisons is centrally recorded and 
reported to the Technical Management Board.117 The procedure for approving 
such liaison organisations by a technical committee is subject to the consultation 
and unanimous approval of all P-members in the committee. If not, applications 
are dealt with on a case-by-case basis.118  
Individuals cannot be members of ISO, and are reliant on the national member 
bodies to include them in their participatory structures.119 Individuals contribute to 
standards development through selection by ISO members to serve on national 
delegations to ISO technical committees and the may also provide input during 
“the process of developing a national consensus for presentation by the 
delegation.”120 
Institutional Arrangements 
ISO characterises itself as a voluntary, market-driven, consensus, worldwide, 
system, and a non-governmental organisation.121 It makes the following 
qualifications, however: 
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Its members are not, as in the case of in the United Nations system, 
delegations of national governments. Nevertheless, ISO occupies a 
special position between the public and private sectors. This is because, 
on the one hand, many of its member institutes are part of the 
governmental structure of their countries, or are mandated by their 
government. On the other hand, other members have their roots uniquely 
in the private sector, having been set up by national partnerships of 
industry associations.122 
International Level 
Various institutional entities exist within ISO (see Figure 5.1 below). A General 
Assembly consisting of ISO members meets annually to make decisions of a 
broad strategic nature.123 For the purposes of organisational development, the 
General Assembly may establish advisory committees.124 As a body, the General 
Assembly consists of the officers of the organisation (President, two Vice-
presidents, a Treasurer and a Secretary-General) and no more than three delegates 
per member body.125 Delegations may also contain additional observers, and 
correspondent and subscriber members may also attend as observers.126 Each 
member body has only one vote, however.127 Resolutions are adopted in the 
General Assembly itself or via letter ballot by majority vote.128 ISO’s general 
orientation is currently driven by its Strategic Plan 2005-2010, which was 
approved by the General Assembly in 2004.129 The proposals put to the members 
of the General Assembly are developed in advance by the ISO Council, which 
ISO itself describes as a “business-style” board of directors, consisting of 
representatives from the membership as a whole.130 It consists of the Officers of 
the organisation and eighteen members elected in accordance with ISO’s Rules of 
Procedure.131 The Council has the right to establish ad hoc advisory groups 
consisting of executive level leaders of organisations with a major interest in 
international standardisation.132 Three policy development committees -- 
conformity assessment (CASCO), consumer matters (COPOLCO) and developing 
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country matters (DEVCO) -- and two standing committees -- finance and strategy  
-- report directly to the Council.133  The Council meets twice a year, and the 
positions within it are rotated. It is chaired by a president, who holds the position 
for two years and who is “a prominent figure in standardization or business.”134 
Figure 5.1 Structure of ISO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ISO, 2008.135 
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The technical work associated with standards development is overseen by the 
Technical Management Board (TMB), which is responsible for establishing 
technical advisory groups (TAGs) and technical committees. The technical 
committees are created to “serve specific industries or generic subjects, in order to 
develop international standards or other ISO publications appropriate to the needs 
of that sector.”137 The TMB consists of a chair and twelve member bodies, either 
appointed or elected by the Council.138 Technical committees may establish 
subcommittees to look at specific elements required for standards under 
development, and working groups, whose role is to examine particular tasks 
related to an overall programme. 139 The TMB must ratify these entities.140 
Technical committees may also set up further advisory groups, study groups, ad 
hoc groups and editing committees to support their activities.141 Decisions 
concerning a committee’s overall policy and strategy are made at the technical 
and subcommittee levels. These bodies are managed by a committee secretariat, 
provided by one of the ISO members. The working group level is reserved for 
researching and drafting, and managed by a convener.142 Committee secretariats 
are required to be neutral, and must consist of a P-member of the committee. 
Committee secretaries work with the chair in managing the committee’s work 
programme.143 Committees are also assigned a technical programme manager 
(TPM) to act as a contact point between the committee and ISO’s staff and 
governance structures.144 
National Level 
Member bodies are permitted to use ISO standards as a basis for their own 
national standards.145 They attempt to follow the development of international 
standards domestically through the establishment of what are generally referred to 
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as “mirror committees”, although the exact nature of these committees varies by 
country.146 A national member body may create a technical advisory group to 
develop national level positions for consideration at the international level, and 
may send three member body delegates and other observers to attend international 
technical committee meetings, as either a P- or O-member.147 NGOs do in some 
instances participate both in national standards bodies and their technical advisory 
groups. They may also be present within national member delegations to ISO 
meetings. 148  
Standards Development 
The development of international standards is a decentralised process, undertaken 
through technical committees at both national and international levels and 
involving stakeholders across the ISO “network.”149 Standards development 
follows several recognised stages (see Table 5.1 below).150 
Table 5.1 Stages in the development of ISO International Standards 
Stage name Product name Acronym 
Preliminary stage Preliminary work item (project) PWI 
Proposal stage New proposal for a work item NP 
Preparatory stage Working draft(s) WD 
Committee stage Committee draft(s) CD 
Enquiry stage Draft International Standard DIS 
Approval stage Final draft International Standard FDIS 
Publication stage International Standard IS   
Source: ISO, 2005, p. 11. 
TC 207 
Located in Canada, TC 207 is one of the largest technical committees within ISO, 
producing (and continuing to oversee) the ISO 14000 Series (see Figure 5.2 
below).151 SC1 is responsible for ISO 14001 (environmental management systems 
- specification with guidance for use) and 14004, (general guidelines on 
principles, systems and supporting techniques).152  
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Figure 5.2 Structure of TC 207 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Hauselmann, 1997, p. 7; ISO, 2008 (adapted).153 
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ISO 14001 is the only standard designed within the Series for registration (another 
term for certification) by a third party.154 Alternatively, a company can use the 
specification for internal guidance only, or for self-declaration purposes, and may 
choose not to seek third party verification.155 These two standards were first 
released in 1996.156 Neither internal nor external audits require the evaluation of a 
company’s environmental performance.157 ISO 14001 has undergone revision and 
now exists in a version published in 2004 (ISO 14001:2004).158  
Figure 5.3 The Environmental Management System model for ISO 14001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Edwards et al, p. 15; Elliott, 2000, p. 15.159 
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associated training and awareness raising (implementation); development of a 
system for checking, correcting, monitoring, reporting and preventing 
environmental impacts (measurement and evaluation); and the establishment of 
management review and associated continuous improvement processes (review 
and improvement - see Figure 5.3 above).160 TC 207’s subcommittees and 
associated working groups have been responsible for managing the generation and 
revision of a number of standards under the 14000 Series.161 
Institutional Typology 
ISO as an institution has been portrayed as constituting an “indirect monopolist 
global governance arrangement.”162 Under such an arrangement, government 
influence is present, but it is not direct, nor all-controlling. However, although the 
system is administered by independent agencies, the monopolist nature of the 
arrangement does mean that one single private actor supplies governance.163  
Such an arrangement impacts on the structures and processes of governance in 
particular ways. The group of active participants in ISO is relatively 
homogeneous and generally private in nature, although the role of government is 
still quite strong.164 ISO is relatively inclusive of these types of organisation 
although most of its members continue to have a western, transnational corporate 
background. To this should be added the observation that inclusiveness within the 
processes of decision making is rather minimal.165 Some commentators also refer 
to the development of ISO 14001 as occurring either in the shadow of public law 
or, more generally, in the shadow of hierarchy, referring to the role of government 
in certification.166  
In view of these observations, and those of this study, ISO has been identified 
as a governance system that sits closer to the non-state, rather than the state-
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centric end of the sovereignty continuum, but only slightly. States nevertheless 
have a degree of interest in and influence over ISO’s standards given the often-
close linkages of the latter to state regulations and international trade rules. Some 
member bodies may be state institutions, or if private, receive funding from the 
state, and it is at the country, not organisational level, whence ISO derives much 
of its authority. The strong role of industry inclines the institution towards the 
non-state end of the axis as well, but this is itself mitigated by the subservient role 
played by other non-state interests, such as NGOs, and the close alignment of 
business and quasi-state interests such as national standards bodies. Consequently, 
it is located on the non-state end of the authority axis, but with a rating of low.  
Although ISO is located towards the deliberative end of the democracy axis, it 
is still effectively an institution that functions along aggregative democratic lines. 
There is undeniably an emphasis placed by the institution on the use of consensus 
in its public literature, and the “qualified majority” voting associated with 
standards approval, which requires 75% agreement, and this should imply a high 
degree of deliberation within its decision making bodies.167 This is offset however 
by the use of the aggregative democratic method of voting by simple majority 
throughout most other parts of the institution, and the discretion given to technical 
committees as to whether they use consensus or majority voting. Added to this is 
the inconsistent use of voting and consensus within TC 207, the main sub-
institution studied here, in its committees and working groups. ISO consequently 
sits along the aggregative end of the democracy axis, but acknowledging the use 
of consensus in some associated entities, it is rated low. 
Given its age as an institution and its monopolist, rather than shared, 
arrangements, it is difficult to view it as representing a particularly ‘new’ model 
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of governance. Some commentators, however, do see the institution as being an 
example of ‘mixed’ mode governance, referring to its private-public nature.168 
Figure 5.4 Institutional classification of ISO 
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the commensurate lack of a role for NGOs, also leads to the conclusion that ISO 
is not especially innovative in its institutional design. ISO is to be seen as having 
a relatively ‘old’ governance model, although recent developments, most notably 
the efforts to increase NGO representation on a formal level (if not yet fully 
realised), indicates some willingness to change. Consequently it has been located 
on the ‘old’ end of the innovation continuum, but is rated low (see Figure 5.4 
above). 
Critical Analysis  
Interest Representation 
Inclusiveness 
Under ISO rules member bodies must take into account the full range of interests 
relevant to the development of a given standard. This is expected to entail the 
arrangement of national consultations and the preparation of national positions 
representing a balance of interests.169 Some national rules provide for consultation 
and participation of NGOs. Other member bodies do not formally exclude NGOs, 
but neither are they obligated to consult with them.170 The national member 
bodies within the development of ISO 14001, for example, have been criticised 
for their low NGO participation rates.171 The conversely high presence of industry 
groups is deemed as inappropriate by some commentators.172 The historical extent 
to which NGO interests have been included in TC 207 has been identified as a 
pressing problem. Representation in plenary meetings between 1997 and 2003 
remained relatively unchanged, and low, at only 3% of delegates, in comparison 
to the top four attendees: industry 32%, standards organisations 21%, consultants 
18% and governments 10%.173 
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Developing countries’ participation in ISO is also a historical problem. The 
need to enhance the representation of developing countries’ interests within ISO 
has been officially recognised since 1961, when the organisation created a policy 
committee, DEVCO, to look into the needs of developing countries in relation to 
standard setting and related activities. In 2002 ISO created the Developing 
Countries Task Force (DCTF) to identify specific responses to the issue of under-
representation. DCTF has produced a programme for action, which specifically 
refers to the need to establish procedures whereby the secretariat can allocate and 
appoint committee chairs and co-chairs to developing countries. The effect of 
these programmes has been questioned.174 ISO literature presents the case that it 
has responded to the need to increase participation through the creation of a five-
year plan for developing countries. The plan has five key objectives: to increase 
awareness; develop capacity; increase national and regional cooperation; develop 
economic communication and expertise in IT tools; and increase participation in 
ISO’s governance and technical work.175 ISO has also developed the concept of 
“twinning”, whereby a member from a developing country may seek assistance 
from a developed country member to share committee secretariat positions, or 
enhance expert-level input.176 
ISO 14001 in particular has been described by scholars as “a self-regulatory 
international environmental management standard created by and for industry, but 
without the full participation of weaker stakeholders in the international 
community.”177 There is some evidence that the participation gap between 
developed and developing countries has affected perceptions regarding ISO 
14001, particularly at the delegate level.178 Parties who became involved in the 
programme well after it started felt that their absence had reduced the overall 
  272 
quality of the scheme itself.179 Absence from the early stages made delegates 
resentful and they felt that the regime had been devised mostly in the absence of 
their input, thus weakening its legitimacy and affecting future interactions 
between delegates.180 This exclusion was not an overtly deliberate attempt to 
disenfranchise any groups, but mostly due to a lack of financial and technical 
capacity, but was experienced mostly by developing country delegates. There was 
however no effort to reach out to these groups, although with hindsight it was 
recognised that their earlier presence would have made later text renegotiations 
unnecessary.181 Given the inefficiencies of redrafting, it has been concluded that 
both developed and developing countries “would have benefited from greater 
stakeholder participation in regime formation.”182  
This raises the issue as to whether the manner in which private authority has 
been exercised within the TC 207 process has impacted on the legitimacy and 
efficacy of ISO EMS certification as an international regime.183 Some further 
corroborative evidence is found in a survey of 55 certified companies in the US 
conducted in 1998, which showed that 67% per cent of ISO 14001 certified 
companies had not involved community stakeholders in developing or 
implementing their EMS.184 
Interviews 
The views provided by interviewees regarding ISO’s inclusiveness were mixed. 
Business interests appeared generally happy with their involvement, partly 
because of their direct experience of implementing ISO 14001, and on account of 
their role in shaping the course of the Series’ application nationally, but did not 
comment in any great depth.185  NGOs believed that the extent of their sector’s 
involvement within ISO was marginal, which was the reason for their focus on 
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trying to change the governance of TC 207 and across ISO more generally.186 The 
situation on the international level was counterbalanced by anecdotal observations 
at the national level, with one NGO commenting that they were included in their 
country delegation, and on that level their inclusion and input was never 
questioned.187 
Other interviewees, notably those from the third group, defended ISO’s degree 
of inclusiveness.  On a national level it was claimed that there were examples of 
countries, which had a very open systems of participation, although in others, 
such as New Zealand, participation was less developed.188 It was stressed that ISO 
was changing, and was beginning to see the need for better engagement with all 
interests.189 However, different countries and processes were at different stages of 
development, referred to by one interviewee as: “blissful ignorance”, where 
interest representation was not a priority; “open door policy”, where interests who 
wanted participate were not excluded, but had to initiate contact themselves; and 
“proactive stakeholder engagement”, where interests were sought out, and the 
reasons for their non-participation analysed and addressed. TC 207 was portrayed 
as existing somewhere between stages two and three; it had tried to engage with 
NGOs more effectively and had created processes to do so, but it was also 
acknowledged that there was resistance from some committee and sub-committee 
chairs. ISO generally was presented as being at the open door stage, rather than 
proactively engaging all interests, since its membership rules restricted full 
participation.190 What was seen as more important was that at present NGOs could 
be included “one way or another”, via mirror committees, delegations, or as 
liaison organisations.191 
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Some acknowledgement was given to efforts being made to include developing 
country stakeholders more effectively through the ‘twinning’ process of having 
co-chairs from developing countries, and by giving them more responsibilities 
within the ISO system. Countries, which did not attend international meetings, 
could still discuss and vote at a national level on the documents generated, but it 
was also acknowledged that subcommittees tended to represent more important 
countries.192 Inside small and developing countries, national positions could be 
determined by the position of whoever was at a given meeting on a particular 
day.193  
There was a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the future of interest 
representation within the organisation. This uncertainty related to the future role 
for non-state interests of all complexions, such as multinational corporations and 
trans-national NGOs, who had restricted rights. Since ISO’s structure was driven 
by the philosophy that true stakeholder involvement occurred at the national level, 
member bodies were already expected to represent the views of interested parties 
domestically.194 This could be a problem if insufficient interests were represented, 
because it led to elites dominating the national position.195 Nevertheless, there 
were examples of civil society and national NGO agendas being at the core of 
documents written by ISO.196 One NGO interviewee commented that NGO 
inclusion in TC 207 depended on the subject matter: the less “business driven”, 
the greater the chance of involvement and influence.197 
This variation in the way in which people were included in ISO’s structures 
appeared to influence stakeholder perceptions regarding the value of participation 
in a given process. A national institutional stakeholder might invest a considerable 
amount of time and money into a position within an international committee, 
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because it gave them a degree of inside involvement in activities that could be 
used to their economic advantage. By gaining access to information that could be 
used for seminars, training courses and publications a national body could 
generate funds for general business operations. NGOs might choose to be 
involved simply to change the governance arrangements in order to gain the same 
rights as other stakeholders in influencing standards setting processes. This was a 
tactical move to gain a “veto position” by NGOs and strategic non-attendance was 
possibly also being emulated by business.198 
Evaluation 
ISO is characterised by a considerable amount of variation in the extent to which 
different interests are included in its representative structures. Members, who 
essentially represent national interests, are themselves divided into three different 
categories, only one of which is entitled to vote in the General Assembly and in 
the technical committees and sub-committees associated with standards 
development at the international level. Civil society interests, particularly NGOs, 
are even less included. The degree to which different interests are represented at 
the national level also varies country by country. This affects the country 
positions adopted and presented at the international level as articulating the 
national consensus. In terms of TC 207, there are only a handful of NGO groups 
that can really be characterised as involved. Another civil society inclusiveness 
problem arises in relation to consultation associated with company level 
implementation of ISO 14001.  
Some effort has been made to address the issue of interest representation more 
effectively, but this has been almost glacial in its progress, and has met some 
resistance. The developments within the area of social responsibility and within 
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TC 207 have the potential for longer-term positive structural impacts. Although 
they have yet to be fully realised, plans to revisit the status of liaison members are 
encouraging. Given these mitigating factors, ISO’s inclusiveness is medium. 
Equality 
The make up of ISO member bodies by region and their participation in standards 
development within ISO’s technical committees is uneven (see Table 5.2 below). 
It is interesting to note however, the degree to which government, industry and 
NGO participation has changed over a ten-year period within ISO as a result of 
increased civil society engagement (see Table 5.3 below). 
Table 5.2 ISO member bodies and technical committee participation by ISO 
geographical region  
Region ISO Member 
Bodies  
Average TC 
participation 
TC 
Secretariats 
(NB: 4% 
vacant) 
TC Chairs 
(NB:18% 
vacant) 
Western 
Europe 
12% 48% 58% 47% 
North 
America 
2% 7% 19% 22% 
Asia 25% 22% 10% 8% 
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
15% 13% 3% 2% 
Africa 30% 4% 3% 2% 
Oceania 2% 3% 2% 1% 
Central and 
South 
America 
14% 3% 1% 0% 
Source: Morikawa and Morrison, pp. 9-13 (as of October 2004) 
Commentators also observe that standards organisations and consultants, “who 
are not the primary users of the standards, but the ones who thrive on standards-
related business…have more presence in ISO 14000 standards development than 
industry, the audience for whom the standards are presumably intended.”199 One 
interesting further observation made by both developed and developing country 
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delegates omitted from the early stages of the Series’ development was that the 
needs of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) had been overlooked.200 Given 
that the later revisions of the standard were necessary to make it more applicable 
to SMEs, a conclusion might be drawn that large companies originally shaped the 
standard to their own ends.201 
Table 5.3 Comparison of sector representation (industry, government, NGOs) 
within two ISO standard setting bodies relevant to environmental and social policy  
Forum Sector Composition 
TC 224 (water quality) registered 
delegates (October 2004) 
  
 Industry 26% 
 Government 18% 
 NGOs 5% 
Working Group on Social 
Responsibility participants (March 
2007) 
  
 Industry 25% 
 Government 19% 
 NGOs 17% 
Sources: Morikawa and Morisson, 2004 pp. 8-22; Slob and Oonk, 2007, p. 2. 
Interviews 
Interviewees from the third group of informants recognised that certain interests 
had the potential to dominate under existing arrangements. Draft standards, for 
example, were developed in working groups that met all over the world and 
whose membership was much smaller than at national levels.202 It was also 
acknowledged that there was no specific guidance from the Central Secretariat to 
its ISO member bodies on how participation should be made effective.203 This 
was despite the fact that each country had a responsibility, according to the ISO 
Statutes, to have balanced stakeholder consultation in their country.204 At an 
international level ISO had accommodated non-state interests as a result of its 
move into social-environmental standards setting. This had put pressure on its 
current country-representative structure, and there was a level of resistance to 
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changing the existing arrangements. There was a fear amongst national member 
bodies that introducing new groups into the decision making processes could 
upset the existing balance between nation-states and that the system could 
collapse if the one-country-one-vote rule were abandoned.205 The existing 
governance of ISO via member bodies that were essentially state-oriented had left 
NGOs feeling that they did not have a fair and effective position. However, 
discussions about giving NGOs the same voting rights as ISO members still had a 
long way to go before such a proposition was accepted.206  
All three groups of interviewees acknowledged the role played by NGOs in 
forcing ISO to address the imbalance in interest representation, and attributed this 
largely to the efforts of the various groups established in TC 207, which had had a 
flow on to its social responsibility initiatives.207 The possibility of direct 
stakeholder influence separate from membership-driven governance had also 
affected the current re-evaluation of the procedures concerning the rights and 
duties of liaison organisations.208 One NGO interviewee commented that 
comprehensive steps were needed. Some progress could be seen in the social 
responsibility initiative but overall business interests were still in the majority.209 
NGOs noted that there had been a degree of institutional resistance, 
particularly within TC 207, where some interests had dismissed the social 
responsibility initiative as an exceptional issue. The observation was made in this 
context that it was harder to change an existing structure such as TC 207 than 
create a new one, where it was relatively easy to institute new procedures.210 One 
interviewee from group three agreed that the NGO and social responsibility 
initiatives had both contributed to the opposition of some country delegations in 
TC 207.211 Other interviewees confirmed that NGOs faced problems being heard 
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even with the creation of these new processes.212 Some national standards bodies 
within TC 207 had voted against a number of NGO-related procedural 
recommendations.213 
NGOs also believed that institutional resistance to change was related to the 
fact that business enjoyed close relations with national standards bodies, both of 
whom thought that their influence - and the business oriented emphasis of ISO - 
would suffer if new players were brought into the equation.214 One NGO, 
commenting on the lack of equality in terms of NGO input into standards 
development, argued that although ISO committees had access to the expertise of 
NGOs, there was no legal obligation for them to seek it, and in the cases where 
they did, they could dismiss it should they so choose.215 Another commented that 
despite ISO providing guidance on there being balanced interest representation in 
national delegations, this was not the case, and their group had decided it was 
better simply not to attend, rather than provide their national delegation with what 
they referred to as “alibi participants”.216 The need for NGOs to create their own 
forum outside TC 207 to advocate for change was portrayed as arising from a 
need to defend minority public sector interests in the face of industry domination, 
be it manufacturing-, standards- or certification-oriented. This external pressure, 
and the information on representation it presented to TC 207, it was argued, was 
the main reason why TC 207 had responded. 217 
General concern was raised regarding issues of equality in TC 207, particularly 
the increasing professional and technocratic dominance in TC 207, referring to 
business interests (including certifiers and consultants) government bureaucrats, 
and standards bodies.218 This observation was reflected across a number of TC 
207’s subcommittees, including SC1, SC2 and SC3.219 SC5 was noted as an 
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exception to this general rule.220 Some acknowledgement was given to attempts to 
increase developing country participation (particularly in relation to SC1).221 This 
was disputed by one interviewee, who saw the lack of southern and developing 
country participation -- across all ISO standards, but especially in the 
development of the 14000 Series as a “huge deficit.”222 This lack of balance is 
presented as an institutional weakness attributable to outdated and consequently 
inefficient arrangements, which over-emphasise business interests.223  A further 
interesting observation was made that it was in fact a shift of governmental 
employees into the private domain that had led to a numerical bias of consultants 
in particular.224 
Business interests did not comment to the same degree on the issue of equality 
within ISO. One noted that big business had much more to gain from certification 
under 14001 than small to medium enterprises, which might explain their lack of 
involvement in the system.225 Another felt that the current structure of ISO had 
the correct balance, and should not be changed.226 
Evaluation 
Business, standards bodies and certifiers in combination have a much greater 
degree of influence than all those interests that make up civil society. They are 
well represented within member bodies domestically and they are also present on 
national delegations, whilst the number of NGOs is considerably lower, and in a 
minority. Only members may chair technical sub-committees, and here there is a 
further problem within ISO’s membership associated with western European and 
North American member domination.  
ISO’s current participatory structures by their very nature favour certain 
stakeholders over others. The President of the ISO Council is expected to be a 
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leading business or standards figure, and the structure of Council itself follows a 
business model. Economic interests sit within ISO’s executive structures. 
International NGO organisations, the main civil society protagonists, cannot 
occupy many of the positions of power that business and standards bodies can, 
since they have no membership rights. NGOs can be on national delegations, but 
they are in a minority. Equality in ISO is low.  
Resources 
ISO’s national members pay subscription fees, in proportion to a country’s trade 
figures and gross national income. The fees are used by ISO to meet the 
operational costs of running the organisation’s Central Secretariat. 227  As of 2005, 
the Central Secretariat had a budget of about 40 million Swiss francs per annum 
(approximately USD $34 million in 2008).228 Membership fees generate 
approximately two thirds of income, while commercial revenue, from the sale of 
standards, copyright royalties, and so forth, provides the rest.229 The other costs of 
the system are borne by member organisations through their active management 
of and participation in standard setting.230 Participants in ISO’s own executive 
organs, such as the Council, are expected to cover their own travel and 
subsistence costs.231  
Some effort has been made in ensuring developing countries are resourced to 
participate in ISO activities. Every three years, DEVCO carries out programmes 
for developing countries (DEVPRO), aimed at increasing informational capacity 
through training and the publication of training manuals, and providing travel 
assistance to technical meetings of ISO. 232  
  282 
Interviews 
The costs associated with participation in ISO were a major preoccupation across 
all groups of interviewee.233 In the international standards setting arena it was 
acknowledged that participants attended at their own expense, and they did not 
attend if they were unable to do so, with some qualifications.234 The ISO Central 
Secretariat spent approximately $2 million a year sponsoring developing country 
participation and training in standards development. For example, ISO had funded 
a representative from Ghana to TC 207. Since developing countries were 
generally only able to send one person, usually from the national standards body 
itself, the participant’s value was limited, as they had to cover a whole range of 
different topics.235 Mention was made of one other fund established by ISO to 
assist consumer community groups to help defray their costs to participate.236 The 
Dutch government also provided funds for developing country participation.237 
Canada sponsored and paid for NGO and civil society delegates to represent the 
country in international standards. 238 
For those groups such as liaison organisations, who did not represent a country 
position, it was a matter of working out their own way of getting to meetings.239 
Travel and accommodation costs for such groups to participate in ISO meetings 
were described as “extremely high”, because meetings occurred all over the 
world, often at prestigious locations. Such costs did not include the use of experts, 
which constituted further expense. NGOs contended that costs associated with 
international meetings were too much even for industry to pay.240 
The manner in which ISO bodies funded themselves also varied. For standards 
organisations, the need for income arose from the necessity of having to survive 
economically if they were to do the tasks they were assigned as members of 
  283 
ISO.241 For them, funding came from a range of sources including industry and 
government, and from the fees and royalties derived from the sale of standards.242 
Over half of ISO’s national standards bodies were government-funded 
departments; the Department of Standards Malaysia was one such example. There 
were a lesser number of standards associations, for example the American 
National Standards Institute, which were funded by subscriptions from industry, 
NGOs and social interests. Since each country had a different way of funding its 
national standards body there were different pressure points that influenced the 
basis upon which each country’s interests were represented on the international 
level.243  
How stakeholders were resourced to participate in standards development 
nationally varied greatly across countries.244 Essentially, member bodies were 
expected to create and fund processes that allowed all interests to be involved and 
to influence the national position. But in many countries this was not the case. 
According to one institutional interviewee, this was usually due to a lack of 
resources rather than some political directive to close people out, but not 
always.245 One NGO observed that it was easy for any institution to open wide its 
doors and have environmental interests participate, but the sector’s basic inability 
to send sufficient participants would always keep it in a minority.246  
One interviewee from group three observed that the NGO community, like 
developing countries, did not have sufficient capacity to fund its own participation 
in related processes.247 One NGO subject expanded upon this analysis, and 
commented that most of the power in ISO resided at the national level, but it was 
here that NGOs lacked the economic capacity to participate. On the other hand, 
international NGOs had funds, and could bring technical expertise to bear, but 
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were only allowed to participate actively at the working group level. Higher-level 
committees could simply overturn any decisions made at that level. This situation 
effectively meant that NGOs were excluded at the national level through lack of 
funds, and internationally through lack of access.248 Institutionally, to make 
matters worse, ISO itself was accused of being wasteful of the resources it had at 
its disposal.249 
Evaluation 
Access to the resources necessary for meaningful participation is uneven amongst 
ISO’s participants. On the membership level developing countries struggle to 
participate effectively in ISO’s standards setting processes on account of 
insufficient funds. However, ISO as an institution has put some mechanisms in 
place to assist developing country members, particularly through DEVCO and the 
“twinning” concept. For non-member groups, such as liaison organisations, there 
are generally no funds available on an international level, although there are 
exceptions. The high costs associated with international standards development 
challenges even the ability of some businesses to participate, particularly SMEs.  
There are also problems associated with access to resources on a national level. 
The fact that some of ISO’s member bodies finance standards development on a 
user pays basis may lead to a participation gap of under-resourced groups such as 
NGOs, which is created by an inability to cover participation costs. The need for 
standards bodies to raise funds through the sale of standards or via sponsorship 
from government or industry, and the financing of NGO participation by industry 
and government has the potential to lead to conflicts of interest. Given these 
mixed results, the provision of resources to participate is medium.  
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Organisational Responsibility 
Accountability  
In many ways, the Technical Management Board, rather than the General 
Assembly, Council or Board, has the highest degree of responsibility for the 
governance of ISO as at it appoints chairs, monitors work progress and oversees 
the implementation of the organisation’s rules associated with the development of 
standards, known as the Directives.250 Under ISO rules member bodies are 
expected to include a wide range stakeholders in the development of standards. 
Despite these expectations, there are no specific directions as to how this should 
be done. 251 In the absence of such details, national member bodies are 
accountable only to themselves, operating under their own rules and procedures, 
and determining the manner in which interests are represented differs across 
countries.252 
TC 207 has in particular has acknowledged that the move away from technical 
standards has necessitated “processes leading to standards that are used in public 
policy are held to higher levels of accountability” than those that lead to “non-
policy related technical standards.”253 Nevertheless an accountability problem 
regarding the exact status and nature of delegates participating in the development 
of the ISO 14000 Series has been identified, which has implications beyond TC 
207. Country-member delegates (who may actively participate in standards 
development) are referred to by their country of origin not their organisational 
affiliation. For example, a delegate from France working for Thompson 
Electronics is not listed according to their sector, but simply as a French 
delegate.254 This affects what has been identified as a fundamental principle of 
public or private governance, namely the ability to hold an individual accountable 
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for their action through a clear allocation of responsibilities and a clearly defined 
role.255 This also affects the institution’s transparency. See below. 
Interviews 
Comments regarding the accountability of ISO were confined largely to NGOs 
and the third group of interviewees. NGOs expressed concerns about the roles 
played by both consultants and certifiers in the ISO system. In the case of 
consultants, it was not clear to whom they were ultimately responsible. This 
would not be particularly important if they were solely engaged for their technical 
expertise, but they tended to be hired because they knew how to manipulate the 
system for the benefit of their clients.256 Another NGO stakeholder echoed this 
view, but referred to certifiers more stridently as the “pushers in the system.”257 
Concerns about accountability were also raised in the third group of 
interviewees. Certifiers were specifically identified as representing a possible 
accountability problem in the ISO system. Like the quality-related ISO 9000 
Series an industry had grown up around the ISO 14000 Series. It was claimed that 
ertifiers had  “flogged it to death” on the basis that they would certify companies 
who could then differentiate -- and promote themselves -- themselves in the 
market place as a ‘green’ company.258 Another possible accountability problem 
regarding the non-state organisations participating in ISO was also raised. One 
interviewee did not want ISO to move away from the current system, legitimated 
as it was by association with the nation-state, and rejected the idea of moving to a 
system of representation based around international organisations. They 
questioned the extent to which groups such as WWF, the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC), the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) and the 
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International Labour Organisation (ILO) were truly accountable to their own 
memberships.259 
ISO itself was seen to be relatively accountable by one NGO interviewee. The 
argument was presented that standards bodies should be seen as the people most 
interested in ensuring the system was objective, democratic and transparent. 
While the system might not be particularly environmentally minded it did have an 
interest in proper process.260 
Evaluation 
As an institution, ISO displays a fairly high degree of accountability towards its 
franchised membership, and has a range of mechanisms whereby members can 
participate in the governance of the institution. However, because correspondent 
and subscriber members have lesser rights than full members, their ability to hold 
the institution to account is more restricted, since they cannot pass resolutions or 
vote. The extent to which the organisation is answerable to civil society 
stakeholders is similarly reduced. The situation for liaison organisations is 
unsatisfactory, since not only can they not hold ISO accountable at the ballot box, 
they also appear to have very few avenues of appeal. The whole process of 
seeking to increase the effectiveness of NGO participation in TC 207 should be 
seen as an attempt by public interest groups to both secure more of a voice, but 
also to render ISO more accountable to the general public. 
It is true that the amount of accountability that such stakeholders as NGOs 
demonstrate towards their own membership can be questioned, but the same can 
be said of private business interests, who may be answerable only to their 
shareholders. The variation in national member bodies’ institutional arrangements 
also affects their accountability. Private bodies may consider paying clients more 
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important than community interests, whilst state-managed institutions may deem 
the mandate of an election as a sufficient level of accountability. A degree of 
concern was expressed by a number of stakeholders on the role played by 
certifiers. This relates to their significance in overseeing the implementation of 
ISO’s standards and the economic nature of their relationship with companies 
seeking certification. An otherwise low rating is mitigated by the initiatives within 
the various TC 207 task forces and groups and within the institution’s social 
responsibility initiatives to render ISO more accountable to non-members, making 
it medium. 
Transparency 
ISO aligns itself to the WTO and that organisation’s requirement for transparency 
and openness to be observed by international standardisation bodies.261 According 
to ISO its international standards embody “the essential principles of global 
openness and transparency…safeguarded through its development in an ISO 
Technical Committee…representative of all parties, supported by a public 
comment phase.”262 The literature on the other hand is critical of ISO, and 
identifies a lack of transparency in public reporting in two regards. Internally, the 
organisation is criticised for the very limited nature of publicly available 
information regarding the scope of representation in standards development. 
Because there is no systematic approach to monitoring participation it is not 
possible to determine whether input from a full range of interests has been 
achieved.263 This lack of information affects the degree to which ISO can be held 
accountable for participatory shortcomings, should there be any. A second, 
externally relevant issue of transparency concerns the previously identified 
problem of environmental performance. ISO certified businesses are not obliged 
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to target or prioritise specific environmental impacts, but only to “consider” those 
“environmental aspects” they deem as “significant” within their own policy. 
Further, a company is not required, as with EMAS, to provide a validated 
statement describing the company’s environmental impacts.264 This absence of 
public disclosure in ISO 14001 is seen as creating a credibility gap since public 
interest groups who may wish to determine the extent to which a certified 
organisation impacts on the environment have no access to information.265 This 
observation would appear to be reinforced by the finding in a US study that 67% 
of ISO 14001 certified companies did not publish an annual environmental report 
of their activities.266  
It should be noted however that ISO 14001 was revised in 2004 with the 
intention of providing clarification on some of the matters that were unclear in the 
first iteration.267 ISO 14001:2004 places a greater emphasis on demonstrating 
continual improvement, and partly responds to concerns about environmental 
reporting by requiring organisational transparency regarding what the system 
actually does. It has also partly addressed further criticisms by placing an 
emphasis on the need for a company to identify its significant environmental 
aspects. An EMS is also required to be legally compliant. A further transparency 
initiative requires a company to provide documentary evidence of its EMS.268 
Interviews 
NGOs were the only group of interviewees to comment on the transparency of the 
ISO system. One commented that ISO’s standards setting procedures compared 
poorly with other standards bodies. Pointing to ISO 14031 (environmental 
performance evaluation) specifically, they argued that it was not developed in an 
open process at all. In ISO documents were made available to people in the 
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various committees, but during the public enquiry phase the documents had to be 
purchased by other interested parties if they wanted to make a comment; in many 
cases the public did not even know that the documents were available. They 
contrasted this with the Global Reporting Initiative, where all discursive 
transactions were undertaken through the Internet, and everybody was afforded 
the opportunity to comment upon them. Within the GRI system there were clear 
instructions on how to develop indicators and how to communicate them to the 
public. They stated that everyone used the GRI guidelines, rather than the ISO 
standard, which they felt said “everything about the inherent quality of the 
document”.269  
Another NGO interviewee raised the problem associated with country of origin 
as a means of identifying particular interests, and provided a telling example of 
lack of transparency. In their dealings with ISO 14001, they had finally uncovered 
four representatives from Exxon within their particular committee, who sat on a 
number of country delegations, but who did not disclose their corporate 
affiliations. 270 Exxon was identified by another informant as one of the key large 
industrial stakeholders responsible for influencing the initial creation of TC 
207.271 
Evaluation 
It is difficult to consider ISO on either a national or international level as being 
particularly transparent. The development of standards is largely an “insider” 
process, and documents are generally not available to the public until the enquiry 
phase. ISO 14031 is to be negatively contrasted with the Global Reporting 
Initiative in this regard, for example. This is partly offset by ISO’s efforts in the 
area of social responsibility, where some materials are published online. However, 
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given the number of standards being developed by ISO, and the decentralised 
nature of their development, the accessibility of information is questionable. 
Another problem relates to whose interests given stakeholders are representing 
when they participate. The constituencies of the various civil society groups are 
quite obvious, but this is much less so in the case of business interests 
participating in national delegations or at the technical committee level and 
below. The example of Exxon serves as a case in point for the ISO 14000 Series. 
Consequently, the transparency of ISO is low. 
Decision Making 
Democracy 
It is important to understand the difference in status within ISO between members 
and other stakeholders, as this results effectively in two classes of participant in 
ISO: member bodies with voting rights; and those without voting rights, which 
participate in ISO’s processes more generally.272 An O-member, for example, in 
the opinion of one commentator “merely receives information and watches from 
the sidelines”.273 Liaison organisations may participate in discussions and may 
receive all information, but they are not entitled to vote in the balloting that is 
associated with advancing standards through ISO’s drafting stages.274 
TC 207 has recognised that external and internal stakeholders are likely to have 
differing perceptions regarding the effectiveness of the 14000 Series, but has 
stated that its concerns lie with its internal stakeholders. In this context 
effectiveness is understood in a democratic context as overcoming “obstacles that 
reduce a stakeholder’s opportunity to influence the decision making process 
relative to other stakeholders.”275 
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Interviews 
Judging by the extent of criticism, ISO’s democratic processes appear to have 
impacted most negatively upon NGO interests, one of whom commented that 
NGOs did not have any rights within ISO, merely the right to participate.276 
Within TC 207 the exercise of choice was usually by majority vote and minority 
interests were unable to outvote industrial interests. 277 One interviewee associated 
with the development of ISO 14001 could recall only one instance when their 
viewpoint carried the day. This was only because favourable interests were in the 
room at the moment of voting to achieve the desired outcome. They considered 
this the only positive experience they had ever had.278 
Business interests were generally positive. One viewed the current ISO rules of 
procedure as sufficient. If the rules were changed it would give NGOs undue 
power, undermining democracy, as it was traditionally understood.279 Another 
interpreted ISO as having an electoral system dependent on the nation-state. Only 
technical people from the various ISO countries could vote, and as they were 
linked to government, they effectively represented the state.280 
One interviewee from the third group of subjects showed some sympathy for 
the NGO viewpoint. ISO’s reluctance to change was indeed creating problems for 
the civil society interests that had appeared over the past twenty years. These 
interests operated at an international level and had a supranational focus, giving 
them a global understanding and focus on particular issues, but they were not able 
to bring their experience to the fore because they could not vote.281 
Evaluation 
For those members of ISO who can vote it is fair to say that decision making is 
highly democratic. Standards are developed through a multistage process, and 
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reflected at the national level through mirror committees. However, voting is a 
small part of the deliberative processes associated with the creation and 
publication of standards within ISO. Looking at TC 207 in particular, which has 
been fairly closely investigated in this study, a number of mixed democratic 
signals emerge. Firstly, there is the fundamental question, partly addressed earlier 
in this section, whether a process that is limited in the inclusiveness and equality 
of its participatory structures can be considered democratic. Secondly, there 
appears to be a considerable degree of latitude exercised by those in positions of 
authority in the various subcommittees and working groups over which 
democratic procedures should occur. There are several examples where ISO’s 
procedures have not been followed as in SC3 and the working group on forestry. 
The tension here is between the high levels of democracy in the balloting 
standards, and for voting members, versus the dubious nature of the exercise of 
democracy within some of the subcommittees and working groups in TC 207. At 
best, the democracy of decision making associated the ISO 14000 Series should 
be considered medium. 
Agreement 
Resolutions at General Assemblies and Council meetings, as well as the initial 
determination by member bodies to establish new technical committees, are 
adopted by a majority vote.282 Technical committees, unless otherwise determined 
by the Technical Management Board function under “consensus agreement of the 
member bodies actively participating in the work of the technical committee, 
either in person or by correspondence.”283 Despite these expectations, there are no 
specific directions as to how such national consensus should be attained.284 
Confusingly, given their status, liaison organisations are also expected to agree to 
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decisions made. Although they cannot vote, technical committees and 
subcommittees are expected to seek the “full, and if possible, formal backing” of 
category A organisations for each international standard in which the organisation 
participates.285 “Full and formal backing” is not defined. 286  
Under ISO rules member bodies are expected to present a national consensus 
position to the appropriate technical committee.287 The high level of business 
interest participation in decision making has been challenged since it raises 
questions regarding the real nature of consensus within national standards 
bodies.288 The extent to which to which standards development is driven by 
consensus -- as opposed to voting -- is unclear, as the procedures during the 
committee stage of standard drafting indicate. Under its agreement with WTO, 
ISO must implement principles of ‘good governance’ including consensus.289 The 
role of consensus is stressed in ISO documentation: 
International Standards of the type produced by ISO, based on a double 
level consensus – between countries and across stakeholders – are, more 
than ever, in demand.  
The political context in which International Standards are developed has 
evolved drastically, with the expansion and scope of the World Trade 
organization, the multiplication of free trade agreements, the pressure for 
better public governance, the concentration of industry in ever more 
global companies, the growing influence of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) for more equitable and sustainable development 
and the increasing public demand for the social accountability of 
economic actors.290 
Secretariats are given the power to appoint a committee chair to assist in 
reaching consensus.291 The chair’s role in obtaining consensus seems to be an 
active one:  
The chair has the task of steering the committee towards that consensus 
and recognising when it has been reached. In general this will mean that 
the committee agrees that a particular solution is the best possible for the 
international community at that point in time.292 
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It is possible that ISO current procedures on consensus decision making are not 
well suited to negotiating controversial issues.293 At present ISO defines 
consensus as: 
General agreement, characterised by the absence of sustained opposition 
to substantial issues by any important part of the concerned interests and 
by a process that involves seeking to take into account the views of all 
parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments. Note: 
consensus need not imply unanimity.294 
In the development of the 14000 Series this definition of consensus has proved 
elusive.295 There are several examples when consensus has been replaced by a 
majority vote and issues affecting the broader strategic direction of environmental 
standards have been defeated by the narrowest of margins.296 In these instances, 
there were also inequalities in interest representation before the issues went to 
vote, and since developing countries’ and NGO participation was already weak, 
there were repercussions on both the content of the drafts agreed, and ultimately 
the standards themselves.297 Within their working groups, convenors have the 
right to determine the procedures used and working group rules within TC 207 
varied from one person one vote, to one delegation or liaison organisation one 
vote.298 This led one commentator to note that the very fact that voting systems 
were employed demonstrated that consensus was not in operation. The closeness 
of some votes resulted in a situation “far from the ‘absence of sustained 
opposition’ required under ISO rules to achieve consensus.”299 
Interviews 
Both business and NGO interviewees were critical of ISO’s existing 
arrangements, particularly the use of consensus within the institution, and the 
implications for democracy. One interviewee was deeply concerned that 
inappropriate use -- or misuse -- of consensus in a governance situation could be 
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akin to a government cheating an election. 300 Another interviewee challenged the 
idea that ISO’s current processes for reaching agreement were sufficient. They 
argued that as an overarching principle national consensus building must be 
complemented by the input from a range of interests. Every organisation should 
have the possibility to communicate a given position to ISO’s committees in 
addition to the national consensus position. This was supposed to be embedded in 
ISO’s rules, but they commented, that the procedures encouraged the creation of 
national positions based on majority voting. All interests needed either full voting 
rights, or the ability to fundamentally object to positions. ISO needed to make it 
clear that consensus building within such decision making bodies should also 
include liaison organisations.301 One business interviewee criticised ISO’s 
decision making processes for being overly bureaucratic, whilst not actually 
delivering particularly effective decision making processes.302 
The third group of interview subjects provided a fairly detailed analysis, and 
defence, of ISO’s processes for reaching agreement. At the General Assembly 
level, decisions were taken under a UN model based on consensus, but also 
allowing a country-based single vote. There was no weighted voting, and ISO had 
deliberately steered away from getting into debates about voting between 
countries such as the US versus economic communities such as the EU. This was 
seen as a dangerous route to follow, and one that had consistently dragged ISO 
back to the status quo.303  
The technical committee level was identified as being vital to the running of 
ISO at an international level, since it prevented UN-style stalemates.304 The 
secretary and chair managed the processes of decision making, which were 
essentially driven at this level by the standards bodies involved. Together they 
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decided upon a range of issues including the acceptance of new work and final 
standards.305 TC 207 was described as being driven by resolutions, voted upon by 
“P” members, and which were “generally” passed on a majority basis, but such 
resolutions were more related to governance matters. There had been occasions 
where resolutions had been put to a vote and it was necessary for the committee to 
go into division to determine the extent of opposition. However, TC 207 was also 
portrayed as being driven by consensus.306 It tried to follow consensus, but at the 
end of the day resolutions were accepted “on a majority basis.”307 The same 
situation was described as occurring within the bodies where the actual standards 
setting occurred, but to this was added the caveat of the need to ballot members. 
The confusion between whether the decisions were taken by consensus or by 
voting was clarified as follows: “the standards setting as they say is by consensus, 
and there is a definition of consensus, but the practical answer is we go through 
several rounds of voting.”308 Voting also occurred in the subcommittees as well. 
One anecdotal example of decision making in SC 3 was described as constituting 
an example where participants tried “pretty hard to thrash out the issues so we 
didn’t have to ever get to anything where there was [a] vote.”309 Non-state, liaison 
status members could not vote in these subcommittees. This arrangement was 
defended on the basis that they could still influence the process, and a few 
examples were provided where a concession had been made to ‘green’ groups.310 
This approach to consensus and voting was further defended as constituting a 
much better approach to decision making, than WTO’s technical barriers to trade 
committee on environmental labelling. There, some issues had been discussed for 
nearly twenty years, but because deliberations continued until no dissenting voice 
was heard, the only matter resolved had been to adopt ISO’s recommendations.311 
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Decision making at the national level was portrayed as a process whereby 
conflicting parties could voice their opposition to a given decision but abide by 
the views of the majority. The permitted option of sustained opposition is avoided 
by seeking a middle ground option agreeable to all parties.312 The postal ballot of 
standards, passed by a two-thirds majority of the whole ISO voting membership 
or rejected if more than 25% vote no is also explained as a necessary mechanism 
for broader national membership approval. Sub-committees under technical 
committees may have no more than six country members participating, so interest 
representation may not be sufficient to capture the views of all ISO countries, 
hence the ballot.313 The staged process approach to document development also 
means that standards effectively work their way through a series of agreements at 
the mirror-, technical- and sub-committee levels as well as the membership-wide 
level.314 Decision making around standards development varies across 
countries.315  
Evaluation 
ISO contains a wide array of mechanisms for reaching agreement, from simple 
majority to qualified majority, and from consensus to compromise. There is some 
logic behind the variation in methods of agreement. It makes sense that the 
product of a small subcommittee’s decisions should be reflected by a much 
broader, and higher level of agreement at the international level. So too does the 
recourse to consensus amongst a wide variety of multi-stakeholders. The idea of 
initially scoping a process through consensus and moving to voting as discussions 
increase in complexity has been identified as a useful way of reaching agreement 
in multi-stakeholder processes.316 The problem with ISO’s processes for reaching 
agreement is that external (i.e. non-member) stakeholders are involved in decision 
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making from the beginning, but their ability to procedurally ‘agree’ to anything at 
any stage is severely restricted. The exercise of consensus also appears to be more 
honoured in the breach than the observance. There is also the unresolved 
confusion as to when and where standards development should be driven by 
consensus or voting. Lack of clarity regarding how consensus is defined within 
ISO generally also affects the validity of this particular decision making tool. 
What should be a high rating is consequently reduced to medium. 
Dispute Settlement 
In terms of dispute settlement, ISO has three points of entry for those entitled to 
complain. In technical work, only P- and O-members of a national body may 
appeal, as indicated above, in a system whereby the complainant goes to 
increasingly higher bodies until the dispute is settled i.e. from subcommittee to 
technical committee, thence to the TMB, and ultimately the Council. The decision 
of the Council is final. Complaints regarding standard setting largely relate to 
procedural matters only, unless matters of principle or the reputation of ISO is 
challenged. These disputes may be taken by a P-member to the committee chair 
for resolution, and if unsuccessful there, to the TMB. 317 Liaison organisations 
appear to have little ability to have grievances addressed within the ISO system. 
Designation of liaison status is at the discretion of P-members, and the applicants 
have no formal right of appeal.318 Again, liaison organisations are supposed to 
give their approval to standards, but the mechanisms whereby they can complain 
if their backing has not been obtained are not specified.319 
ISO itself does not undertake certification of conformity to its own standards. 
It does not have a system to address complaints or disputes regarding the 
conformity of assessment by third parties or organisations using standards.320 
  300 
Here the authority rests with the certification body awarding the certificate. From 
there the complaint could proceed to the body that accredited the certifier.321 
Interviews 
Interviewees from the third group of key informants were the most positive 
regarding ISO’s approach to dispute settlement processes, which were 
characterised as using both formal and informal methods. At the international 
technical committee level there was a formal dispute settlement process. Conflict 
at the lowest, working group, level was referred to the relevant sub-committee, 
and if it could not be settled here, to the technical committee itself.322 In 
particular, the chairman’s advisory group was empowered to look at decisions 
made. It was portrayed as a “court of appeal” to which a country could refer its 
grievance.323 Finally, it was possible to refer a complaint to the Technical 
Management Board for a decision. The TMB consists of twelve countries: ISO’s 
largest members (including the US, Japan, France and Germany) occupied 
permanent positions, with the rest being rotated. National standards bodies 
determined whom to send, but it did not contain any NGO representatives.324 
There were however no formal processes delineating in what manner, or from 
which interests, the Board was to seek input.325 The observation was made that 
there were also external dispute resolution mechanisms built into ISO’s own 
standards, which obviated the need for protagonists to resort to such measures as 
the courts.326 
Within TC 207 informal dispute settlement measures were more often used. 
This appeared to work most effectively when the dispute in question related to 
operational matters, rather than substantive issues, which could at times be 
heated.327 Disputes were eventually sorted out through compromise 
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arrangements.328 Alternatively, matters were worked out through repeated 
meetings; rather than seeking a two-thirds majority a committee chair might on 
occasions allow deliberations to continue until almost every national delegation 
agreed.329 
Whilst business interviewees did not comment, the informal approach used in 
TC 207 elicited mixed responses from NGO subjects. Only one was able to recall 
an instance where conflict had resulted in a beneficial change as the result of 
extensive debate and discussion.330 Another interviewee commented that 
consultants acting on behalf of industry or government often manipulated the 
nature of disputes, and simply pretended that a contested political issue was not 
“feasible”, using a technical pretext to oppose something that was not in their 
brief.331  
Evaluation 
Disputes within ISO appear to be managed by passing them higher up the 
command chain if they cannot be settled at source. There are also no detailed 
procedures for settlement. The lack of appeal procedures regarding accreditation 
of non-state interests and the ambiguity of procedures should there not be 
unanimous agreement amongst P members for their accreditation is problematic. 
So too is the lack of procedures on what to do in the case of a liaison organisation 
not giving its full and formal backing to an International Standard. These issues 
may explain why most disputes -- at least in TC 207 -- appear to have been settled 
largely informally. Given that there are dispute settlement measures in place, but 
that informal approaches appear to be the preferred model, the score is low. 
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Implementation 
Behaviour Change 
A connection has been made in the literature between the level of a company’s 
performance, the degree of behaviour change, and the extent to which an 
environmental problem is addressed.  One study of 40 Israeli companies 
hypothesises that the higher the standards adopted in ISO 14001 certified 
organisations, the better their environmental performance.”332 High standards 
relate to better performance when there is no gap between an organisation’s 
planned environmental system and its daily activities. A certificate on the wall 
represents the lowest level of daily practice.333 The study points out a 
misconception in the ISO management standardisation literature, in which the 
view is expressed that certification provides for uniformity in implementation 
across organisations.334 In fact organisations seeking certification may have a 
range of objectives, such as meeting a customer’s quality requirements, or 
complying with government regulations, and/or meeting an environmental 
objective.335 Although the Greek isos means equal, companies certified under ISO 
14001 do not implement standards in the same way, and there are significant 
differences as to how they manage their environmental operations.336  
Further studies have identified grounds for scepticism that the outcome of ISO 
14001 certification, like other voluntary programmes, is little more than 
‘greenwash’ that does little to improve members’ performance.337 The most 
obvious grounds for scepticism is that since ISO 14001 is sponsored by an 
organisation with a heavy input from multinational corporations, environmental 
NGOs are justified in their suspicion of its self-regulatory approach. Secondly, the 
conditions under which companies are eligible to join the scheme are extremely 
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broad: companies with a poor compliance record can join up so long as they can 
afford to establish and maintain a certifiable EMS.338 Thirdly, firms can join ISO 
14001 opportunistically without following its mandate since they lack the 
incentive of having invested in any assets specific to the scheme itself.339 
Fourthly, although ISO 14001 does require annual rectification audits, it does not 
appear to have any methods to sanction members who fail to comply with 
standards. Finally, firms are not required to demonstrate improvements in 
regulatory compliance to stay accredited, and there is no guarantee companies 
will make use of the materials collected in the EMS process to actually improve 
performance.340 ISO 14001 merely seeks their commitment to do so, and 
considers the evidence that a company has established and maintained its EMS as 
sufficient.341  
Interviews 
Observations regarding the ISO 14000 Series’ ability to change behaviour were 
confined almost exclusively to NGO interviewees. A lot of blame was placed on 
the certifiers for the system’s failure to change behaviour. British certifiers in 
particular had played one of the most damaging roles by lobbying ISO to develop 
an environmental management scheme once the ISO 9000 market became 
saturated. They wanted an easily accessible programme, capable of maximising 
their business opportunities, rather than one with ambitious performance targets 
that would only be accessed by ten to twenty per cent of businesses. The resulting 
standards were condemned as the result of deal between British industry and the 
certifiers. Industry wanted a green label without having to be green and the 
certifiers wanted to expand their markets. The role played by British interests had 
been harmful since it was claimed they were “light years” behind Germany and 
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the Nordic countries. 342 A second specific criticism of the programme’s problem 
solving capacity was that it did not differentiate between the environmental 
pioneer and the heavy polluter, both of whom could be certified under the same 
standard.343  
ISO 14001 was identified as being particularly open to abuse since it was 
regularly used for promotional purposes to make the world believe a company had 
a high environmental performance when it did not. There was nothing inherently 
wrong with using the system to analyse environmental performance in relation to 
the extent to which, for example, a company does or does not comply with the 
law. But there was a problem when the system was exploited as an instrument of 
quality assurance. A company might simply choose some easy -- and cheap --
performance-related fruits to harvest, such as reducing room temperatures by one 
or two degrees across the company. This could only be done once or twice before 
the room became too cold to work in, but over that timeframe a company could 
nevertheless demonstrate “continuous improvement” in its environmental 
performance. In this way it could implement easy solutions and avoid the need to 
undertake stronger environmental protection measures.344 
The final NGO criticism was that the decision to have a thorough system was 
at the discretion of the company, and this decision reflected on the company itself, 
not the standard. In this case, any system the company adopted would be 
implemented with that intention of changing behaviour. The ISO EMS actually 
had very little to do with it.345 One business interviewee echoed this observation. 
What a company was prepared to implement had to be done with the conscious 
intention of improving performance. If this was the intention, the system could 
change corporate behaviour. That was the challenge of the system.346  
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Evaluation 
Whether companies change their behaviour towards the environment as a 
consequence of being certified under ISO 14001 is disputed. There is even some 
evidence to suggest that companies may seek ISO certification to avoid the more 
onerous constraints of other systems. Behavioural change can certainly be 
associated with having an EMS in place, but this does not have to be an ISO one 
specifically. The degree of behaviour change also seems to depend on the 
company, not the system. The decision to orientate the ISO 14000 Series of 
standards around process outcomes, rather than performance has attracted both 
leaders and laggards. The extent to which laggards change their behaviour is 
likely to be limited. However, the fact that the ISO 14000 Series did include civil 
society interests appears to have resulted in a degree of behaviour change within 
the institution regarding NGOs. However, the extent of environmentally oriented 
change within the standard over its ten-year life has been limited. The failure of 
civil society interests (consumer and environmental) to change ISO 14001’s focus 
away from process to performance leads to the conclusion that any institutional 
learning has been social-political, rather than social-environmental in nature. The 
impact of ISO 14001 in particular on changing behaviour, being the only certified 
standard, is mixed. The uptake of ISO 14031, relating specifically to 
environmental performance, has been low. This does not speak well for 
performance-enhancing benefits of the system as a whole. It is difficult to 
determine whether the score should be low or medium. The decision here is to err 
in favour of ISO and consider behaviour change as medium. 
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Problem Solving 
ISO 14001’s lack of mandatory external performance-based reporting has been 
cited by critics as proof that certification “will do little to avert the historical trend 
of global environmental damage closely associated with transnational industrial 
activity.”347 Further evidence appears in another study to support the view that 
firms that certified with ISO 14001 between 1995-2001 tended to have a lower 
environmental performance than their peers. Of firms that already had an EMS in 
place before 1995 those with a poorer environmental performance were more 
likely to certify with ISO 14001.348 These findings directly contradict the 
testimony put before the US Congress by members of TC 207 that the scheme 
was designed to credibly differentiate organisations with superior environmental 
performance.349 Certification of weak performers can impact negatively on higher 
performers and the system as a whole; for example, if weak performers gain 
certification by simply improving the most easily achievable aspects of their 
environmental performance merely to fulfil the requirements of a supply chain 
partner.350 This leads to the conclusion that “strategic decisions shape the meaning 
and function of a certified management standard, and it shows that this realised 
meaning differs from that expected by some of the institution’s creators.”351 
A decision was made to remove compliance and performance auditing 
measures from the ISO 14000 Series in 1995.352 Nevertheless, ISO 14001 has 
been defended for its anecdotal ability, through the adoption of environmental 
management practices, to improve self-reported compliance with public law.353 
This has led to a conjecture that: 
ISO 14001’s mandated third-party auditing mitigates wilful 
noncompliance by compelling members to measure up to club standards 
while ISO 14001’s EMS standards address noncompliance stemming 
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from ignorance by directing members’ attention to root causes of 
regulatory noncompliance.354 
Related analysis supports the credibility of ISO 14001 by demonstrating that 
the scheme does improve regulatory compliance, and this is to be understood as 
an improvement that is beyond what would have happened had the firms not 
joined.355 However, compliance improvements generally occur within a 
regulatory environment where facilities receive government-initiated inspections, 
and regulatory stringency effectively compels companies to join a scheme such as 
ISO 14001. It also appears that voluntary regulation cannot replace mandatory 
regulation, nor would ISO 14001 be as effective if mandatory requirements were 
weaker. It is likely that the efficacy of such voluntary programmes varies across 
regulatory and policy environments.356 
A number of studies have revealed the environmental performance of firms 
involved in voluntary schemes is mixed, and depends on the scheme adopted.357 
There is clearly a need “to look beyond regulatory compliance and examine 
whether joining ISO 14001 improves facilities’ environmental performance, that 
is reduces their pollution emissions.”358 The authors of a 1998 US study of 55 
certified companies conclude that ISO 14001 serves as a ‘“least common 
denominator’ of voluntary commitment to environmental protection beyond 
regulatory compliance.”359 However they consider the standards of the Series 
“neither detailed nor strong enough in their current state to be the crucial 
international policy tool that it has the potential to be.”360 They further conclude 
that ISO 14001 should be used only as a management tool and that “it is not 
strong enough to be used as an effective regulatory tool.”361 They found that 
company-specific EMSs often meet most of the ISO 14001 requirements. This 
makes it difficult to detect significant changes in environmental performance 
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upon implementation of ISO 14001, questioning its value to companies if they 
already have an EMS in place.362 One sceptical view argues that measuring 
environmental performance cannot be achieved using solely systems-based 
auditing, either ISO 14001, or EMAS. It provides the evidence that “an analysis 
of information from 280 European companies at 430 production sites turns up no 
statistically significant relationship between better environmental performance 
and certification.”363  
Nevertheless there is some evidence that the adoption of an EMS can be linked 
to better site environmental management and regulatory performance, and can 
reduce air emissions and hazardous waste production.364 However, it is important 
to stress here again that it is the adoption of an environmental management system 
itself that is associated with performance improvement, not necessarily the 
certification process of ISO 14001, according to a later study of 7,899 
manufacturing facilities in the US undertaken by Duke University researchers.365 
Echoing the 1998 study, they also found that certification in itself does not 
necessarily lead to improvement nor does it signal superior performance.366  
This has been recognised by environmental advocates who expressed 
disappointment that the 2004 revised standard had not been changed in response 
to accusations that it did “not even require improved performance, only a 
commitment to continually improve the management system.”367 
Interviews 
NGO and business informants looked at the Series’ problem solving capacity 
from different perspectives. There were a number of objections from NGOs 
regarding the value of putting an ISO EMS in place. The first was that the 
systems-based approach to environmental management was questionable 
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conceptually. Because it had no performance requirements, it was untrue to claim 
that it was a system of environmental excellence and good environmental 
performance. The standards bodies and their dual imperatives of selling standards 
and appeasing business were the main reason for this weakness, exemplified by 
the low uptake of the only ISO 14000 Series standard related to performance, 
14031.368 Secondly, the preponderance of technical interests within the ISO 
system was seen as a barrier to solving specifically environmental problems. They 
were useful if the matter under discussion concerned the tolerance threshold of 
light bulbs, for example. But once ISO initiated the 9000 and 14000 Series, where 
discussions had moved on to matters of quality and environmental management, 
technicians were not sufficiently competent.369 NGOs also questioned the extent 
to which the ISO 14000 Series solved the targeted problems of pollution 
prevention and waste reduction, pointing to European studies, which were 
equivocal regarding the system’s abilities in these areas. One Swiss study 
considered ISO 14001’s results regarding reductions in the use of materials, waste 
production, and in energy consumption to be “disillusioning.”370  
Business interviewees admitted in one instance that the failure of ISO to 
include any performance requirements was a disappointment to some of its 
earliest and most influential industrial advocates. However, there was nothing 
inherently wrong with having a systems-based approach, so long as it was 
understood that it did not provide any indication of performance, and that 
standards in the Series were used for the right purpose. A similar observation 
could be made concerning performance standards. In the same way that such 
standards needed some systems-based elements to interpret performance along a 
continuum, systems based standards needed performance-related requirements as 
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well. 371 This meant that for a company the ISO management system had to be 
written in such a manner that its implementation led to actual environmental 
improvement.372 
Business interviewees and informants from group three identified a number of 
issues relating to the Series’ actual contribution to environmental problem 
solving. One obstacle resided with the standards bodies themselves. Because they 
were generally only responsible for setting standards they were less interested in 
how they were implemented. This was seen as impeding their ability to exercise 
control or to address the public policy implications associated with the 
implementation.373 Secondly, the scheme only measured the extent to which a 
given management system complied with the standard; it did not demonstrate how 
the standard had improved the situation on the ground.374 Clients misunderstood 
the fact that the Series was not intended to make such value judgments.375 
Furthermore, there was no ‘green label’ associated with the ISO 14001 
certificate.376 This had led to the unintentional and negative outcome that clients 
had certain expectations of the Series that it was never intended to address. They 
wanted certifiers to accredit them as a ‘green’ company and they wanted to make 
claims on their products. They thought that because they had an environmental 
management system their customers should pay a premium for buying a green 
product. However, the standards were not directed towards that outcome, they 
were a process to any outcome. Some certifiers had explained the limits of the 
system; others had not. The deliverables had been oversold, and had created 
problems with clients when they found out what they had actually bought.377 
Consequently, ISO 14001 in particular needed to be understood as simply offering 
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a useful framework.378 It was best regarded as another management tool, and not 
as a marketing tool because of its system- not performance orientation.379 
The same two groups offered some thoughts on ISO’s dealings with forest 
management. One interviewee explained that the standards only covered matters 
that related to how an environmental management system was operationalised. In 
terms of associated product labelling, the standard did not stipulate what the 
requirements should be in terms of on-the-ground forest management; nor were 
there specific provisions for how stakeholders were to be involved or how a 
programme was to be run by the company.380 According to business interviewees, 
the limits of the programme were understood by the sector.381 Its value was seen 
in terms of its application to the development of a good environmental 
management system.382 It provided the necessary management system 
requirements, whilst certification, via FSC in particular, met the necessary 
environmental requirements and appeased NGOs. 383 One industry solution to the 
lack of a label with ISO 14001 had been to group together by country and 
combine existing national forest certification systems into an international 
programme that could be used for marketing purposes.384 One informant 
commented that ISO itself had also accepted the ultimate failure of its foray in 
forestry. In comparison to FSC and PEFC, it had no real role in forestry, given the 
age, lack of interest in and use of ISO 14061, and -- combined with the degree to 
which things had moved on since 1998 -- it was likely to be dropped.385 
Evaluation 
ISO 14001 has the prevention of pollution as a policy commitment.386 There is 
however a considerable difference between a policy commitment and an actual 
impact on environmental quality. ISO 14001’s weakness with regard to the latter 
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is attributable to the fact that the standard sets no thresholds, and contains no 
specific performance targets. These aspects of the standard have been visited 
several times in the course of this study, and they appear continually in the 
literature, and amongst some of the key informants interviewed. The ISO 14000 
Series has certainly not been successful in tackling pollution on a global level, but 
it has, along with other environmental management, made a contribution. 
However, this contribution has occurred alongside a deeper normative shift in 
environmental attitudes in the wake of Rio, whereby certain companies have 
embraced sustainability changed their industrial practices on a more profound 
level than that offered by 14000. Had the interests behind the creation of the 
SAGE and TC 207 made a different set of decisions regarding what was to 
become the ISO 14000 Series, the impact may have been greater. Given the 
equivocal nature of the literature, the strident criticisms of some stakeholders, the 
desire of some of the standard’s original framers for more -- rather than less – 
stringency, and the absence of performance measures necessary to render the 
standard effective, the score is low. 
Durability 
In the past ISO’s activities have been oriented around producing technical 
standards for specific products, but the more recent expansion in its scope is 
having wider impacts on social and environmental policy generally. These 
activities include environmental and water management, greenhouse gas emission 
accounting and verification, and the ethical behaviour of business, now the subject 
of an international standard for social responsibility.387 TC 207 has also adapted to 
the need for greater NGO inclusion, attributing its ability to change to the 
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“flexibility and latitude” that ISO’s committees and subcommittees enjoy under 
ISO procedures.388 
Interviews 
Two interviewees acknowledged ISO’s longevity.389 One business interviewee 
noted that one of the organisation’s strength was that it has been developing 
standards for more than fifty years, and as a consequence its technique was good. 
A weakness was its historical association with largely technical standards, the 
procedures of which were less adequate for its new move into social responsibility 
and environmental management.390 This was corroborated to a certain degree by 
one interviewee from group three, who recognised that other institutions were 
better adapted to dealing with environmental issues and ISO’s procedures were 
not really suited to making what amounted to political decisions about what was 
and was not acceptable.391 
Unless standards bodies changed NGOs argued that they would continue to 
question the processes associated with the ISO 14000 Series at the national level. 
They noted however that the working group on social responsibility had created a 
precedent that the standards bodies would have to follow eventually, albeit 
slowly. Standardisation was furthermore acting as a complement to legislation, 
particularly in Europe, where conformity to legislation was becoming a 
precondition to accepting standards documents. At some future date standards 
bodies might be asked to change their procedures, and since they had changed 
them in the past there was no reason not to do so in the future. However, they felt 
standards bodies tended to be defensive when criticised and pointed to a lack of a 
culture of political debate as an impediment to change, meaning they would 
require external pressure before they reacted.392 They saw part of the problem as 
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being linked to the fact that ISO’s standards setting procedures had never been 
subjected to any kind of debate; consequently when they were criticised, this was 
interpreted as a threat.393  
Interviewees from group three also identified the need to change, particularly 
with regard to how it managed interest representation. The tension between 
international organisations’ participation versus the role played by national 
member bodies might eventually result in the development of ways to combine 
the two approaches. However, ISO was struggling with these changes, but they 
were necessary otherwise the organisation would be left behind. There were some 
considerable challenges regarding the extent to which the organisation’s members 
were prepared to embrace such new concepts. Nevertheless, the institution was 
changing, albeit slowly.394 One business interviewee echoed this view, 
commenting that it took the institution an extremely long time to implement any 
change.395 In the case of TC 207 in particular another NGO interviewee 
acknowledged that some NGO recommendations had been adopted, but the 
process was very slow.396  
Evaluation 
ISO is a long-lived institution. It has proved itself capable of adapting to changed 
circumstances, moving first from the standardisation of products, to processes, 
and now systems. It has moved into different policy arenas, including those 
related to environmental sustainability and social responsibility. Procedurally, it 
has a degree of flexibility, which allows it to deal with changing circumstances, 
such as the arrival of new stakeholders onto the scene. However, the degree of 
latitude that can be exercised within the standards setting processes by those 
responsible for managing the various committees, subcommittees and working 
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groups can also act contrary to the participatory structures of the institution. There 
is also a degree of resistance to change in some member bodies, which has made 
change slow. Nevertheless, the ISO 14000 Series of standards have also gone 
through two iterations in some cases, and are proving their durability. Given the 
overall longevity, adaptability and flexibility of the institution as well, the rating 
here is high. 
Governance Quality of ISO  
Commentary 
Table 5.4 Evaluative matrix of ISO governance quality 
Principle 1. Meaningful Participation 
Criterion 1. Interest representation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
Actual score: 5 
2. Organisational responsibility 
Highest possible score: 6 
Lowest possible score: 2 
Actual score: 3 
Sub-
total 
(out of 
15): 
             
8 
Indicator  Inclusiveness Equality Resources Accountability Transparency  
High       
Medium 2  2 2   
Low  1   1  
Principle 2. Productive deliberation 
Criterion 3. Decision making 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
Actual score: 5 
4. Implementation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3  
Actual score: 6 
Sub-
total 
(out of 
18): 
            
11 
Indicator  Democracy Agreement Dispute 
settlement 
Behavioural 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Durability  
High      3  
Medium 2 2  2    
Low   1  1   
Total 
(out of 
33) 
      Final 
Score: 
            
19 
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ISO and the 14000 series in particular received nineteen points out of a maximum 
total of thirty-three. Four indicators achieved low ratings (equality, transparency, 
dispute settlement and problem solving), and one the highest rating (durability). 
On the criterion level the conventional pass/fail target value of 50% for interest 
representation (56%), decision making (56%) and implementation (67%) was 
exceeded; organisational responsibility reached, but did not exceed, the target 
value. At the principle level of meaningful participation, the combined values of 
the two generated a result of 53%, exceeding the target value of 50%; in the case 
of productive deliberation the target value was also exceeded with a result of 
61%. A total score of 58% was achieved overall. 
Postscript 
Developing NGO Relations 
As indicated in the historical overview, TC 207’s relations with NGOs have 
evolved, and are continuing to evolve, over the life of the 14000 Series. Two main 
items are worthy of note. The first relates to the ongoing development of 
structural participation by NGOs within TC 207, the subject of unfinished 
business at the time the historical overview was first prepared for this case study. 
The second refers to the ongoing NGO concern over the intrinsic value of the 
14000 Series.  
TC 207 has continued to examine its participatory structures since further 
effort to ensure “meaningful representation” from developing countries and NGOs 
was identified in the 2005 Strategic Plan.397 In April 2007 the ISO TC 207 
NGO/CAG Task Force published a number of draft recommendations on interest 
group participation and deliberation within the system.398 These included 
addressing the problems associated with balanced representation (including the 
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role of liaison organisations and national level input into ISO’s structures), as well 
as the principle of consensus building and other procedural issues associated with 
standards development and appeals.399  
One of most noteworthy proposals was to develop new categories for those 
participating in meetings, classified under the new headings of Government, 
Producer Interest, Service/Professional and General/Public Interest, and to track 
the balance of meetings based around these four categories.400 Much of the 
materials on how to achieve balanced representation were taken from the ISO 
Working Group on Social Responsibility, and it was further acknowledged that 
there were currently “no provisions in place to achieve a balanced composition in 
Working Groups.”401  
In relation to consensus building, it was recommended that there should be 
written procedures detailing what was meant by “sustained opposition” and 
“substantial objections” and that these procedures should be available to both 
participant P-members and liaison organisations. Objections, it was further 
suggested, should be treated equally regardless of the level of the organisation or 
member objecting, and all conflicts were to be resolved “as far as possible.”402 In 
addition, “informal conflict resolution mechanisms” were to be developed, in an 
attempt to keep disputes out of the wider ISO system and address them within TC 
207 itself.403 
Shortcomings in involving relevant interests at the national level were also 
identified as part of NGO-CAG Task Force process, and national standards bodies 
were interviewed to determine their current activities and views.404 Failure to 
achieve “optimal stakeholder balance”, and the lack of resources, especially in 
terms of travel and accommodation, were identified as impediments to national-
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level engagement and consultation. The inconsistencies in arrangements for 
interest representation at the national level from country to country were also 
identified.405  
Despite the recognition of these problems, and the suggestions to address them, 
a degree of opposition is to be found in various comments made by some national 
standards bodies to the proposals. The French response clearly articulates unease 
at the new provisions, most significantly expanding the role and powers of non-
state interests, and re-examining the consensus building provisions. A concern 
was expressed that under these new proposals, it would no longer be possible for 
any national delegations to “be then labelled any more according to the origin of 
its representativeness [sic]”.406 The proposals were also met with resistance from 
the UK member body, which indicated it was “happy to discuss” the process but 
did “not agree with the content of the proposals.”407 If such changes were to be 
made, they should be applied across all of ISO’s TCs.408 These provisions have 
yet to be finalised. 
In October 2007, NGOs published a review of the 14000 Series.409 Repeating 
earlier claims that the Series lacked mandatory performance requirements and 
indicators, they called for “substantive reform.”410 The current approach, they 
argued, shifted decisions away from “democratic institutions, involving public 
interest advocates” to the companies themselves, which meant that, given the 
absence of minimum performance requirements, “even legal compliance cannot 
be taken for granted.”411 NGOs also reiterated previous criticisms that the failure 
to differentiate between good and bad performers further demonstrated that there 
was “not much convincing evidence on the table” to show that the EMS standard 
had in fact improved performance.412 As a result, the system continued to be built 
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around largely procedural issues rather than substantive guidance, which in the 
case of 14001 rendered the instrument “questionable” and made it “an ideal 
greenwash tool.”413 
Conclusions 
ISO’s development in the direction of environmental and social standards has 
resulted in considerable attention being paid to the role, nature and extent of 
participation and deliberation within the institution. This attention comes from 
several different quarters. The scholarly literature generally emphasises the 
business orientation of ISO and the role of business in crafting and directing 
ISO’s new approach in the pre- and post Rio world. The reports focussed around 
NGO activities generally stress the nature of non-state involvement, presenting a 
strong case that it is both structurally and procedurally weaker than that enjoyed 
by ISO’s member bodies. There is almost universal recognition that the extent of 
developing country representation within ISO, whether it is on the level of 
country membership, or in terms of southern NGO involvement, is problematic. 
Not surprisingly, the picture painted by the institution itself is generally upbeat. 
Here the emphasis is on the importance attributed to the participation of all types 
of members and liaison organisations and the consensus-based nature of 
deliberation regarding standards development.  
Given the external and internal analysis it is clear why certain sectors contest 
the conceptions of participation and deliberation within ISO. In terms of 
‘participation as structure’ some interests cannot participate at all. Correspondent 
and subscriber members cannot vote in ISO’s supreme body, the General 
Assembly, where voting membership is based not just on having a fully fledged 
standards setting body domestically, but also on ability to pay. This impacts on 
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interest representation within the institution itself. Given the lack of balance 
between ISO membership by region, and participation in technical committees, 
there are also some structural inequalities in participation within ISO. Western 
Europe, for example, with its greater access to resources, plays a much larger role 
than Africa, despite the latter’s larger percentage of membership by region. 
Secondly, with no clear rules on how country members are to receive the input of 
domestic stakeholders, interest representation within enfranchised member bodies 
is also inconsistent. This has impacts on both the accountability of member bodies 
to their domestic constituencies, and on ISO itself as an accountable member of 
the global community.  
Within the technical committees themselves participation is differentiated, 
between P- and O-members and liaison organisations.  P-members clearly 
dominate the decision making, and whilst some O-members may consciously 
choose a lesser status, they may still reserve the right to vote on standards when 
they go to ballot. Not only are liaison members not permitted to participate in the 
General Assembly, they may neither vote within technical committees nor on 
standards when they go to ballot. This affects the democratic nature of the 
decisions made within technical committees. The evidence of the participatory 
structures and deliberative processes within TC 207 provides some corroboration 
of the broader institutional survey above. The use of majority voting when 
confronting controversial -- most often forest related -- issues within a number of 
the subcommittees and working groups would appear to contradict both the spirit 
and practice of consensus. These historical practices within TC 207 have the 
potential to render ISO’s WTO-related commitments to consensus as little more 
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than tokenistic, and largely for trade-related, rather than good governance, 
purposes. 
However, ISO has proved itself to be somewhat flexible in adapting to the 
changed stakeholder dynamics brought about by moving into environmental and 
social standards development. It is even possible to see a degree of learning and 
reflexivity in the initial attempts to address stakeholder participation in TC 207 
influencing other technical committees (TC 224) and in the more progressive 
approach adopted within social responsibility initiatives.414 But given the amount 
of time to address issues such as developing-country representation (more than 45 
years) and NGO participation (almost a decade), and the unfinished nature of this 
business, change is slow. 
ISO 14001 is intended to encourage organisations to commit themselves to 
compliance with relevant domestic legislation and regulations, continually 
improving their overall environmental performance and preventing pollution.415 
However, with respect to environmental performance it is the company that 
determines the level it wishes to reach and what objectives it intends to meet. All 
the company is required to do is demonstrate that it is continually improving its 
on the ground performance until it meets its own self-created environmental 
policy. Even ISO advocates acknowledge that sceptics see this as a weakness. 416 
NGOs voiced their opposition to the process- versus performance-based approach, 
and expressed their disquiet over the ISO 14001 and SFM linkages. This critique  
-- and NGOs’ failure to have it addressed within the structure and processes of 
ISO -- is significant. Whether the ISO 14000 Series can be shown to have 
improved environmental performance and to have tackled the problem of 
industrial pollution in its absence is important. The effectiveness in 
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implementation of the 14000 Series may therefore be a key determinant in the 
quality of governance associated with TC 207 specifically, and ISO generally. 
ISO has reached a significant point in its history, but where it goes from here is 
uncertain. It has moved beyond the development of product standards relating to 
such relatively simple concepts as the orientation of the thread on a screw, the 
subject of its first standard. The change from product to process standards in the 
ISO 9000 Quality Management Series marked the transition. Since Rio, with the 
support of world governments and world trade, it has been elevated to a 
leadership position in such highly complex global issue areas as environmental 
management, and now, social responsibility. Previously, ISO merely provided a 
decision making space for deliberating technical solutions in response to the needs 
of a client base largely comprised of business, or manufacturing, interests. The 
decision to pursue the objective of pollution prevention, willingly taken at the 
behest of such bodies as the ICC and UNCED, brought with it a whole new series 
of responsibilities -- and new constituents. Now it was obliged to cater to the 
economic, environmental and social dynamics of sustainable development, which 
included balancing the demands of a range of multi-stakeholders operating at 
multiple levels, not all of them satisfied with a purely technical response to a 
given problem.  
Unfortunately, the future ISO 14000 Series was to be built on the participatory 
and deliberative practices of the past. Furthermore, TC 207’s agenda had also 
been effectively set before standards discussions began. This included the 
decision to pursue a systems- rather than performance-based approach to 
environmental management. These two issues were to become major sticking 
points for ISO’s new environmental and social stakeholders. They objected to 
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both the institution’s exclusive participatory arrangements, in which 
environmental and social stakeholders were effectively second-class citizens, and 
the Series’ failure to embrace any performance targets. These two elements were 
to form the basis of civil society criticisms of the Series, and still do.  
The ability for the NGOs present in the system to make anything other than 
incremental gains in the various decision making processes within TC 207 has 
been limited. The systems-based approach has left much of the implementation 
and policy-related aspects of the ISO 14000 Series in the hands of the companies 
purchasing the standards -- for better or worse. NGOs have effectively won the 
participation debate, and some concessions have been made at this point.417 But 
the increased recognition of NGO participation may have been won at the expense 
of environmental performance. The defeat of interests seeking to extend the ISO 
14001 systems-based approach to the certification of SFM through a sector-
specific standard is one notable exception. 
Whether ISO can, or will, change at a more profound level remains to be seen. 
The problems associated with moving away from its existing structures and 
processes, not the least of which is the one-country-one-vote approach to 
democracy are likely to make any change extremely slow. There are positive 
signs, but some of the larger issues, such as the enfranchisement of civil society, 
or North/South equity, whilst acknowledged, continue to meet resistance from 
some national standards bodies. This resistance would appear to highlight the 
tensions between state and non-state interests in the ISO system, or perhaps better 
stated, between those interests currently benefiting from the status quo, and those 
seeking more influence. NGOs also continue to be unhappy about the lack of 
performance requirements in ISO 14001. 
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that ISO should develop a social responsibility standard (Morikawa and Morrison, Who Develops 
ISO Standards, pp. 23-24). The enabling resolution contained several statements recognising 
stakeholder involvement and the provision of resources for this to happen, and also “agreed to 
ensure that ISO processes are adjusted where necessary to ensure meaningful participation by the 
full range of interested parties” (ISO Technical Management Board resolution 35/2004 in: 
Morikawa and Morrison, Who Develops ISO Standards, p. 24).  
After two meetings in 2005 to lay the groundwork for what was to become an international 
standard for social responsibility, an ISO working group commenced drafting the contents of the 
new standard. Three Task Groups (TGs) were created to examine specific clauses. A second 
iteration of the draft was to be the subject of discussion and resolution at a meeting in Lisbon in 
May 2006 (INNI, “Drafting of ISO Social responsibility Standard Begins” media release 
(07/03/06), http://inni.pacinst.org/inni/CSR.htm#SocialResponsibility, accessed 02/05/07. Slightly 
before the meeting a sign-on letter was sent to the ISO Central Secretariat by 12 NGOs expressing 
concern over the status of interest representation in the process on two fronts. The first concerned 
lack of transparency regarding participation to date particularly at the national level, whilst the 
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second related to the lack of funding and support to enable civil society participation in the 
standard’s development.  This was despite the fact that the SAG had set several preconditions and 
recommendations regarding full and balanced stakeholder participation in the standard 
development process (INNI, “Improving the ISO 26000 Standard Development Process” media 
release (31/07/06), http://inni.pacinst.org/inni/CSR.htm#SocialResponsibility, accessed 02/05/07. 
This led one NGO to comment: 
Those preconditions however, have not been met two years into the process. To date, 
there has been no effort from ISO management to make sure that national member 
bodies are fulfilling their responsibilities to ensure full participation of affected 
stakeholders. Rather domestic stakeholder involvement is being considered by ISO as a 
“national sovereignty” issue, and many countries remain unwilling to provide 
information (ibid). 
The complaints did however elicit a proposal by one of the task groups to establish a Social 
Responsibility Trust Fund to help support participation by under-represented stakeholders (ibid). 
The standard is to be designated on completion as ISO 26000, and is to be applicable to both the 
public and private sector. It is a guidance standard, stressing better performance, but consisting of 
guidelines, not requirements, it is not a management system, and not capable of certification (Bart 
Slob and Gerard Oonk, The ISO Working Group on Social Responsibility: Developing the Future 
ISO SR 26000 Standard (Amsterdam: SOMO/Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations, 
2007), p. 2). In its current state, the initiative is subject of several criticisms from NGOs. Firstly, 
the changed emphasis on expanding the standard to be applicable to all public and private sector 
organisations has weakened the concept of corporate social responsibility. It is these activities not 
those of NGOs, universities or churches for example, that are the focus; consequently, the working 
group has not addressed the real problem. Secondly, by its voluntary nature, the standard is 
attractive to industry and government since they have little appetite for a regulatory framework for 
CSR. The interest of civil society organisations, however, is for binding international 
arrangements (Slob and Oonk, The ISO Working Group on Social Responsibility, p. 6). The 
second element is teased out in more detail by one NGO: 
ISO 26000 is intended to be a guidance document, and thus is not supposed contain any 
mandatory requirements in the text. However, in order for this standard to become 
meaningful, it will likely have to provide information on what are considered to be the 
minimum requirements for the organizations to be “socially responsible”…Without 
having a clear framework on what constitutes baseline expectations regarding social 
responsibility, organizations could pick and choose cursory options from the standard 
and deem it sufficient to be social responsible  
(http://inni.pacinst.org/inni/CSR.htm#SocialResponsibility, accessed 02/05/07). 
After a working group process in Vienna in November 2007, after which civil society engagement 
was predicted to be less effective on the drafting of text, the standard is to be voted on, requiring 
the full and formal backing of liaison member organisations. The release of the standard is 
expected to be late in 2009 (Slob and Oonk, The ISO Working Group on Social Responsibility, p. 
7). 
55 Elliott, Forest Certification, p. 14. 
56 Elliott, Forest Certification, p. 16. 
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57 Eliana Acuña, The ECL Space Project. Learning from Social and Environmental Schemes for 
the ECL Space: ISO 14401 Case Study (Pully: Pi Environmental Consulting, 2004), annex 4, p. 
40, citing ISO, The ISO Survey of ISO 9000 and ISO 14001 Certificates, Twelfth cycle, 2002. Pulp, 
paper and paper products and wood and wood products are counted separately, with 860 and 363 
certificates awarded respectively, placing the two sectors 14th and 24th out of 39 recognised 
sectors, or 11th, if counted together. 
58 Articles and News, “3rd Meeting of ISO/TC 207 in Oslo, Norway” (August, 1995), pp. 6-7. 
59 Articles and News, “Environment – ISO/TC 207 Considers Industry’s Needs”, (August, 1995), 
p. 3. 
60 Elliott, Forest Certification, p. 16. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 11. 
63 Environmental NGOs objecting to clear-cut forest management and the use of chlorine 
bleaching in Canada had secured the cancellation of international pulp orders and were heavily 
criticising the CSA standard, whilst both domestically and internationally the FSC was gaining 
ground as a forest certification programme (Elliott, Forest Certification, pp. 147-148). 
64 Elliott, Forest Certification, pp. 149-156. 
65 Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 12. 
66 Articles and News, “3rd Meeting”, p. 7. 
67 Elliott, Forest Certification, p. 16. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Articles and News, “3rd Meeting”, p. 7., p. 7. 
70 Articles and News, “Environment”, p. 3. 
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72 Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 13. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Articles and News, “Environment”, p. 3. 
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76 Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 15. 
77 Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 12. 
78 Articles and News, “Environment”, p. 3. 
79 Dick Hortensius, “ISO 14000 and Forestry Management: ISO Develops ‘Bridging Document’” 
ISO 9000 + ISO 14000 News 4 (1999), pp. 11-20 at pp. 17 and 20. 14061 is described as:  
A link between the management system approach of ISO 14001 and the range of forest 
policy and forest management performance objectives, including principles, criteria and 
indicators of SFM, that a forestry organization can consider… 
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ISO/TR 14061 should be used in conjunction with ISO 14001 and/or ISO 14004. It is up 
to the forestry organizations to decide whether they want to meet externally developed 
performance objectives such as the sets of SFM…If so the technical report can be of 
help to organizations in the joint implementation and sustainable forest management… 
ISO/TR 14061 hopefully will support further application of ISO 14001 in the forestry 
sector and thereby contribute to the implementation of good forest management with a 
view to conserving one of the most precious resources of our earth (ibid). 
80 Hortensius, “ISO 14000 and Forestry Management”, p. 17. 
81 Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 13. 
82 Hortensius, “ISO 14000 and Forestry Management”, p. 13. He lists the International Tropical 
Timber Organization, Pan-European (Helsinki) Process, Montréal Process, Tarapoto Proposal, Dry 
Zone Africa Initiative, North Africa and Near east Initiative, Central American Initiative of 
Leparterique and the African Timber Organization Initiative. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Erik M. Lammerts van Beuren and Esther M. Blom, Hierarchical Framework For The 
Formulation Of Sustainable Forest Management Standards (Leiden: The Tropenbos Foundation, 
1997), p. 7. 
86 Van Beuren and Blom, Hierarchical Framework, p. 15. The general problem here seems to be 
the level at which data is aggregated and reported. 
87 Van Beuren and Blom, Hierarchical Framework, p. 17. Hauselmann comments about the 
bridging concept (ISO inside out, p. 13), concluding that: 
The result would be a range of claims about ‘sustainable forest management’ that would 
be very confusing in the market place…In fact, given the 14001 framework, this 
bridging document has the potential to allow companies to claim SFM without 
specifying what performance levels are required. A case could be made that this 
proposal is indeed a way to bring back the CSA proposal that was withdrawn in 1995. 
88 Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 13. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Elliott, Forest Certification, p. 14. ISO recognises three types of environmental label. A Type I 
label refers to third party, multiple-issue eco-labels (Elliott, Forest Certification, p. 14). Type I 
labels have been characterised as covering the environmental impacts of their products within their 
whole life cycle, from extraction to production, use and disposal (Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 
8). ISO 14021 covers self-declared environmental claims, or Type II environmental labelling, and 
was published in 1999 (Articles and News, “Communiqué from the 7th Annual TC 207 Plenary”, 
ISO/TC 207 N357 1999-06-06 (July, 1999) p. 5. This can only be inferred from the document (the 
FDIS ballot closed in July of that year); however, it is referred to as published in ISO/TC 207 
“Communiqué 8th Annual Meeting of ISO/TC 207 on Environmental Management”, N429 REV 
01:2000-07-10 (June, 2000), p. 3). These labels generally cover claims made by companies about 
the status of a given product, for example, whether it is recyclable (Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 
8). ISO 14025 on Type III labels was published in 2000 as a technical report, the status of which 
  332 
                                                                                                                                 
was to be reviewed in 2003 (TC 207, “Communiqué from the 7th Annual TC 207 Plenary”, p. 6. A 
technical report is not intended to be, or to become, an International Standard, but rather contains 
information from a report or survey, for example, intended to represent “state of the art” 
knowledge and does not have a predefined lifetime (ISO, MY ISO Job, p. 14). However, ISO/TC 
207, “Communiqué 13th Annual Meeting of ISO/TC 207 on Environmental Management”, CAG 
N386, (September, 2005), p. 6 implies that that the technical report is to be published as a 
standard, ISO 14025, in the near future (as at 2005). Type III labels cover those environmental 
declarations, which act as environmental report cards (Elliott, Forest Certification, p. 14). 
Although they are third party they do not require any performance thresholds, but rate a product’s 
different environmental effects, thus assisting consumers in choosing a product based on its given 
attributes (Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 8). 
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95 Elliott, Forest Certification, p. 157. 
96 Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 8. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Oberthür et al, Participation of Non-governmental Organisations, p. 165. 
99 Morikawa and Morrison, Who Develops ISO Standards, pp. 14-15. The ISO Working Group on 
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accessed 02/05/07. 
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some 20 documents covering its international rules, standards and guides in the area of conformity 
assessment. These are the international documents, which are accepted and recognised by the 
World Trade Organization and other multinational government-to-government relationships 
(Personal interview, 30/06/5). 
134 http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/index.html, accessed 02/05/07. 
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and 1.11, ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. 
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147 Oberthür et al, Participation of Non-governmental Organisations, p. 167, citing Clause 5.5 
ISO Rules of Procedure and Article 6.1 ISO Statutes.  
148Oberthür et al, Participation of Non-governmental Organisations, pp. 167-168.  
149 ISO, My ISO Job, p. 3; Oberthür et al, Participation of Non-governmental Organisations, p. 
166. 
150 ISO, My ISO Job, p. 11. Firstly, an ISO member body must be approached by an industry or 
business sector that feels the need for a standard, and the member body must propose the standard 
as a new work item. These two stages are referred to as the preliminary and proposal stages, and 
the written products generated at these points are known as a preliminary work item, or project 
(PWI), and a new proposal for a work item (NP), respectively (ISO, My ISO Job, p. 11). To move 
forward at all, ISO as a whole must be persuaded that there is a clear market requirement for a new 
standard (ISO, “How ISO decides what standards are developed”,  
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/index.html, accessed 02/05/07). ISO member 
bodies within an appropriate technical committee or subcommittee must then formally agree by 
ballot to the need for an international standard (ISO, “Stages in the Development of International 
Standards” http://www.TC207.org, accessed 10/05/07). Approval occurs if a majority of P-
members of the relevant committee approve and at least five of them agree to participate actively 
(Acuña, The ECL Space Project, p. 22). A project team leader is appointed to be responsible for 
the work item (ISO, “Stages in the Development of International Standards” 
http://www.TC207.org, accessed 10/05/07).  
A working group of experts is then established by the technical committee or subcommittee, in 
which the project leader acts as convener. Working drafts (WD) are produced until the group is 
satisfied that the best technical solution to the problem at hand has been considered. The group 
then refers the draft to the parent committee for what is referred to as the consensus-building 
period (ibid.). The O- and P-members of the technical committee or relevant subcommittee, 
discuss the working drafts until consensus is reached, and a committee draft (CD) is approved. 
Where there is doubt over consensus, approval is by a majority of two thirds of the technical 
committee or subcommittee (Acuña, The ECL Space Project, pp. 21-22). 
Once consensus is achieved the text is finalised and enters the enquiry stage as a Draft 
International Standard (DIS - http://www.TC207.org, accessed 10/05/07). According to the TC 
207 Business Plan, it is at this stage (referred to there as the technical enquiry phase) that public 
comment occurs, although how this takes place is not specified. During this stage the ISO Central 
Secretariat circulates the DIS to all ISO members, who have five months to comment and vote 
(ISO/TC 207, “Business Plan ISO/TC 207 Environmental Management”, N726R0/CAG N 376R3 
Version 3 (June, 2005) lines 13-14, p. 2). A ballot of all P-members involved in the technical 
committee also occurs, assent being required from two-thirds for approval (Eliana Acuña, The 
ECL Space Project, p. 2). However, if the DIS receives 100% approval it may proceed to 
publication once comments have been received and dealt with (ISO, My ISO Job, p. 12). 
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Otherwise, a ballot of all ISO P-members takes place, 75% of those who vote being required for 
approval (Morikawa and Morrison, Who Develops ISO Standards, p. 7). If these approval criteria 
are not met the text returns to the technical committee or subcommittee for further work and the 
revised document is sent back out again for voting and comment (ISO, “Stages in the development 
of International Standards” http://www.TC207.org, accessed 10/05/07).  
The draft standard then enters what is referred to as the approval stage, and the ensuing Final 
Draft International Standard (FDIS) is circulated by the Central Secretariat to all ISO member 
bodies over a two-month period for a yes/no vote (ibid). A report covering the voting on the DIS 
and how any comments received were addressed is also circulated (ISO, My ISO Job, p. 12). Any 
technical comments received during this period are not adopted, but registered for consideration in 
the future iteration of the standard. The voting arrangements are the same as during the DIS. If 
more than a quarter of the total votes are negative, the draft standard goes back to the originating 
committee for reconsideration, and the technical comments accompanying the negative vote are 
addressed. Otherwise, the document enters the publication stage when only minor editorial 
changes may be made and the ISO Central Secretariat finally publishes it as an international 
standard. All such standards are subject to review three years after publication, and after the first 
review, every five years. A simple majority of the P-members of the technical committee or 
subcommittee determines if the standard should be withdrawn, confirmed or revised (ISO, “Stages 
in the Development of International Standards” http://www.TC207.org, accessed 10/05/07).  
151 Oberthür et al, Participation of Non-governmental Organisations, p. 173. 
152 Tibor and Feldman, ISO 14000, p. 37. 
153 http://www.TC207.org/Structure.asp, accessed 18/06/08. 
154 Tibor and Feldman, ISO 14000, p. 38. The standard-related literature varies in its use of 
language regarding the certification processes associated with ISO 14001. Elliott explains this by 
way of the Canadian context where standardization regulations apply the term registration when 
referring to a management system, and certification to a product. This goes back again to the 
systems versus performance debate, but he notes interestingly that although being a systems-based 
standard, Canadian industry preferred the term certification (Elliott, Forest Certification, p. 150 
and footnote 40. TC 207 related documentation is at times confused, in one instance referring to 
ISO 14001 as “the single world-wide EMS standard for self-declaration and 
certification/registration purposes” (Articles and News, “Environment – ISO/TC 207 Considers 
Industry’s Needs”, p. 3, alluding to events occurring subsequently and as late as 1998). 
155 Tibor and Feldman, ISO 14000, p. 38. 
156 Parto, Aiming Low, p. 183. 
157 Parto, Aiming Low, p. 185. 
158 ISO, My ISO Job, p. 2. 
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159 Both acknowledge ISO, ISO 14001 Environmental Management Systems – Specifications with 
Guidance for Use (Geneva: ISO, 1996). 
160 Tibor and Feldman, ISO 14000, p. 50. 
161 SC2 generated 1410 (environmental auditing - general principles), 14011 (auditing procedures) 
and 14012 (qualification criteria for auditors) (Tibor and Feldman, ISO 14000, p. 37). These were 
released in 1996 (Parto, Aiming Low, p. 183). A further standard 14015 (environmental 
assessments of sites and organizations) was published in 2001 (ECOSOC, “Economic 
Commission for Europe, Committee for Trade, Industry and Enterprise Development, Working 
party on Technical Harmonization and Standardization Policies, Twelfth Session, 28-30 October 
2002, Item 8(b) of the Provisional Agenda, Environmental Management Standards, Summary of 
the Main Results of the Tenth Annual Meeting of ISO/TC 207”, Document 
TRADE/WP.6/2002/12 (October, 2002), p. 3). SC3 has had a number of associated working 
groups and standards associated with environmental labelling. ISO 14020 (goals and principles of 
all environmental labelling) was released in 1998 (Parto, Aiming Low, p. 183).  
SC3 addressed three types of environmental labelling recognised in ISO. ISO 14024 covers 
Type I labels, and was published in 1999 (TC 207, “Communiqué from the 7th Annual TC 207 
Plenary in Seoul, Korea”, Articles and News (July, 1999), p. 6).  A Type I label refers to third 
party, multiple-issue eco-labels (Elliott, Forest Certification, p. 14). Type I labels have been 
characterised as covering the environmental impacts of their products within their whole life cycle, 
from extraction to production, use and disposal (Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 8). ISO 14021 
covers self-declared environmental claims, or Type II environmental labelling, and was published 
in 1999 (Articles and News, “Communiqué from the 7th Annual TC 207 Plenary”, p. 5. This can 
only be inferred from the document (the FDIS ballot closed in July of that year); however, it is 
referred to as published in ISO/TC 207, “Communiqué 8th Annual Meeting of ISO/TC 207 on 
Environmental Management”, p. 3). These labels generally cover claims made by companies about 
the status of a given product, for example, whether it is recyclable (Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 
8). ISO 14025 on Type III labels was published in 2000 as a technical report, and reviewed in 
2003 (Articles and News, “Communiqué from the 7th Annual TC 207 Plenary”, p. 6. A technical 
report is not intended to be, or to become, an International Standard, but rather contains 
information from a report or survey, for example, intended to represent “state of the art” 
knowledge and does not have a predefined lifetime (ISO, MY ISO Job, p. 14). However, ISO/TC 
207, “Communiqué 13th Annual Meeting of ISO/TC 207 on Environmental Management”, p. 6, 
implies that that the technical report is to be published as a standard, ISO 14025, in the near future  
(as at 2005). Type III labels cover those environmental declarations, which act as environmental 
report cards (Elliott, Forest Certification, p. 14). Although they are third party they do not require 
any performance thresholds, but rate a product’s different environmental effects, thus assisting 
consumers in choosing a product based on its given attributes (Hauselmann, ISO inside out, p. 8). 
SC3 and SC5 communicated actively with each other regarding the life cycle aspects of 14025 
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(Articles and News, “Communiqué from the 7th Annual TC 207 Plenary”, p. 7). SC3 created a 
working group (WG4) to address these issues, and to begin development of a working draft 
(ECOSOC document TRADE/WP.6/2002/12, p. 4). In 2005 SC3 reconfirmed the general 
principles of ISO 14020 and commenced a process for the development of a strategic plan to 
review all standards under the committee, commencing in 2008. 
SC4, the subcommittee on environmental performance evaluation generated only one standard, 
ISO 14031, published in 1999 (Articles and News, “Communiqué from the 7th Annual TC 207 
Plenary”, p. 8). This standard is a process guide for measuring, analysing, assessing and describing 
the environmental performance of an organization against the agreed targets contained its is 
environmental policy objectives (Parto, Aiming Low, p. 183). An associated technical report, 
14032 (environmental management - examples of environmental performance evaluation) was 
also scheduled for release in 1999 (Articles and News, “Communiqué from the 7th Annual TC 207 
Plenary”, p. 8). However, it was decided not to publish a formal interpretation mechanism with the 
standard, but rather to refer interested parties to their ISO member body for an unofficial response. 
It is worth noting that one NGO stakeholder interviewed regarding ISO considered 14031 to be a 
poor standard, and consequently not adopted by industry. They pointed in contrast to the wide 
uptake of a competitor, the Global Reporting Initiative, which they saw as “the international 
deliverable” on environmental performance reporting. The difference as they saw it was that: 
 The Global Reporting Initiative contains a close set of requirements. It does not just 
mention a number of different indicators as ISO 14031 does, and say, ‘pick what you 
like’…whoever follows the GRI guidelines has to follow certain rules, where the user of 
ISO 14031 just has to show that he has considered everything” (Personal interview, 
04/09/07). 
A number of standards relating to life cycle assessment have been produced by SC5. The first, 
ISO 14040, covers the general principles and guidelines relevant to life cycle analysis (Tibor and 
Fieldman, ISO 14000, p. 37). It was released in 1997 (Parto, Aiming Low, p. 183). In 2002 it was 
confirmed for a further period of five years (ECOSOC document TRADE/WP.6/2002/12, p. 5). 
ISO 14041, covering goal and scope definition and inventory analysis in life cycle assessment was 
finalised in 1998 (ISO/TC 207 “Communiqué 6th Annual Meeting of ISO/TC 207 on 
Environmental Management”, N283 (June, 1998), p. 4). ISO 14042, life cycle impact assessment, 
and ISO 14043, life cycle interpretation, were finalised in 1999 (TC 207, “Communiqué from the 
7th Annual TC 207 Plenary”, p. 11). A technical report, ISO TR 14049 providing illustrative 
examples on how to apply ISO 14041 was also finalised in the same year (ibid). In 2002 ISO TS 
14048, covering the format for data documentation, was released. Originally intended as an 
International Standard, it was published as a technical specification (ECOSOC document 
TRADE/WP.6/2002/12, p. 5). A technical specification sits below and international standard and 
above a technical report as a work still under technical development, or where there is a future for 
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Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification 
Schemes (PEFC)1 
Introduction 
This chapter investigates PEFC, the second forest certification system to be 
examined in this study. It provides an interesting counter-example to FSC, since 
like FSC it was largely initiated originally by a single interest grouping, but in its 
case forest owners, as opposed to NGOs. As an essentially ‘private’ model of 
governance, how it expresses the various institutional attributes identified in this 
study as contributing to quality and legitimacy provides some interesting insights 
into the effectiveness of this type of forest governance versus the more ‘civic’ 
model of FSC. In addition, the performance of PEFC as a certification institution 
also contributes to the broader understanding of the strengths, and weaknesses, of 
certification as a regulatory tool for forest management. The chapter begins with a 
historical analysis of the development and growth of the institution, and, given its 
origins, traces the history of its relationship with NGOs and other public interests. 
The study repeats the critical analytical methods used in the previous chapters, 
and includes a postscript that reflects on the most important events that have 
occurred within the institution subsequent to the data acquisition phase of the 
study, most notably the PEFC governance review. The chapter finishes with some 
broad conclusions regarding the programme’s performance and governance-
related issues. Given the emphasis of this study on PEFC’s governance at the 
global level, much of the nationally relevant material is to be found in the 
endnotes, as are further observations on FSC and certification generally.  
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Historical Overview 
Origins and Institutional Development 
The creation of PEFC can be linked to fears amongst certain forestry interests of a 
monopoly of FSC certification in Europe.2 German publishers and printing houses 
had been under pressure from Greenpeace since 1993 to cease using paper 
sourced from old growth or poorly managed forests sourced in Nordic countries. 
In 1995 the Association of German Paper Producers and the Association of 
German Magazine Publishers issued a statement committing themselves to 
products, which could be sourced under a credible global programme. NGOs had 
not insisted on FSC, but publishers had the FSC programme in mind.3 In 
cooperation with various European forest owner groups, Finnish forestry interests 
collaborated in a campaign focussed on Axel Springer Verlag as well as Otto 
Versand, two of the largest publishers and consumers of FSC paper in Germany. 
In December 1997 eight hundred people from eleven European countries 
demonstrated outside the companies’ offices in Hamburg, condemning the 
companies’ support for FSC.4 This event has been identified as “the psychological 
point of origin of the European forest certification system.”5 
By the late 1990s European forest industries began to see the need to have 
“credibility without tight engagement with the FSC” and to pursue their own 
certification initiative via an alternative market system.6 This was similar to 
developments in North America, where forestry interests responded to the 
creation of the FSC in 1993 by commencing the development of their own 
competitor certification schemes: the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) and 
the US Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI).7 European efforts were again led by 
Scandinavia, and between 1995 and 1996 forest industries and forest owners in 
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Norway, Sweden and Finland attempted to develop a “pan-Nordic” project. This 
foundered on account of NGO opposition to anything other than FSC certification 
(see below).8 Forestry interests on the other hand preferred national certification 
initiatives, which they considered more cost-effective, and better suited to small-
scale forest ownership structures, although it was understood that they were not 
sufficiently credible for non-domestic markets. The view emerged that a pan-
European system, into which national schemes could fit, would provide the 
necessary international framework for forest certification.9 By this stage, the 
conclusion had been reached that the FSC was not meeting the needs of private 
forest landowners.10 Following their experiences in Sweden and Finland, 
Scandinavian landowner associations in particular were already feeling excluded 
from FSC processes.11  
In 1998, the Finnish Forest Industries Federation (FFIF) raised the idea of 
enlisting the support of the EU in developing an initiative for the certification and 
labelling of products from sustainably managed forests.12 The European 
Commission was lobbied to create an EU-level certification framework, and there 
were discussions with four directorate generals (industry, agriculture, 
development and environment) as well as Parliament members.13 No directives or 
regulations were issued on the subject however, although a meeting was held 
between the forestry ministers of Finland and Germany in March 1998.14 A 
subsequent seminar was held between representatives from the German and 
Finnish forestry sectors, where it was agreed that a European certification system 
should be developed. The FSC was considered generally unsuitable, and the 
Germans particularly wanted “a functioning European system before the FSC 
gained a foothold.”15 It was decided to recruit Sweden, the UK, Norway, Demark, 
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France, Austria and Poland to the cause. A decision was made to keep 
government participation in the background, but the state authorities of Finland, 
Germany and France provided behind the scenes support during negotiations 
associated with the scheme’s development. The need for such assistance appears 
to have been partly on account of the geo-political niceties associated with 
balancing the influence of an emergent French-German axis through the 
recruitment of further Nordic and Austrian interests.16 
Several technical working group meetings were held to oversee and develop 
the content of the proposed scheme.17 The time was right, it was observed, “to 
construct a European alternative to the FSC.”18 After initial meetings a draft 
certification framework was developed and it was determined to invite “market 
partners” and an enlarged number of participant countries to subsequent events.19 
It was agreed that a general assembly should be constituted, as well as a board of 
directors. The general assembly would be based around country representation, 
with one to three votes being allocated according to the scale of cutting in a given 
country. Other European and international organisations could attend, but they 
could not vote. The proposed board would represent geographical region and 
annual harvest volumes.20 
Attendees at meetings appear to have consisted largely of forest owner 
associations, industry interests and experts from Europe, although representatives 
from the American Tree Farm System, Australia and Malaysia also invited 
themselves and were allowed to attend as observers.21 This participation generated 
broader, more speculative, policy discussions and between 1998 and early 1999 
the idea that the scheme should not just be confined to Europe was given serious 
consideration. The European focus of the scheme, it was suggested, might be 
  356 
perceived as constituting a barrier to trade, and a solution might be found by 
creating a process of mutual recognition for national certification programmes 
beyond Europe.22  
Having finalised the general framework, deliberations regarding the 
development of the European scheme continued until June 1999, when it was 
launched in Paris under the name Pan European Forest Certification (PEFC).23 
Eleven country representatives from Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
France, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland 
participated.24 The PEFC’s interim Board was established at the same meeting, 
consisting of five forest owner associations and one seat each for industry, 
processors and NGOs.25 The first PEFC schemes from Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
Germany and Austria were endorsed in 2000 and in May 2001 the Canadian 
Standards Association (CSA) joined the PEFC Council.26 Canada’s certification 
scheme, known as the National Standard for Sustainable Forest Management 
Z809, had been in operation domestically since 1996.27 PEFC passed the FSC’s 
area of certified forest for the first time in July 2001 (36.42 million hectares to 
22.38 million hectares).28 The endorsement of the French, Latvian, Czech and 
Swiss schemes occurred in the same year, followed by Spain and Denmark in 
2002, and in the same year the revision process began for some of PEFC’s earlier 
standards, most notably in Finland and Norway.29  
Some effort was also put back into re-engaging forest owner interests during 
this period. Revisiting the tactics of the late ‘nineties, forest owner groups were 
again placed at the forefront of PEFC’s campaigning activities, protesting outside 
the German DIY stores of OBI against its “boycott” of the PEFC label in favour 
of FSC products. OBI was represented on the board of FSC Germany and was a 
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member of the WWF buyers group. As a result of the demonstrations the 
company agreed to meet with owner representatives in an attempt to defuse the 
situation.30  
Towards the end of 2002 another four national schemes from Australia 
(Australian Forestry Standard Ltd - AFS), Brazil (CERFLOR), Chile (CERTFOR) 
and Malaysia (Malaysian Timber certification Council - MTCC) were elected at 
the General Assembly as PEFC members.31 The recruitment of such schemes into 
the PEFC camp has been linked to more concerted efforts to go global.32 As a 
result, the General Assembly became the main forum for discussions regarding 
the globalised format for the system during this period.33 These discussions were 
followed by an invitation from Gabon to the PEFC Chairman to discuss the 
feasibility of developing a pan-African forest certification system.34 The 
possibility of expansion led the Board of Directors to establish a Globalisation 
Working Group.35 Determining to keep the same initials, but recognising that it 
had “extensively extended its geographical coverage…over the past four years”, 
the General Assembly agreed to change the scheme’s name and orientation in 
October 2003. PEFC was consequently renamed the Programme for the 
Endorsement of Forest Certification schemes in the same year.36  
The scheme’s global expansion continued in 2004 with the launch of a 
promotional campaign in Asia, sponsored by Australia’s National Association of 
Forest Industries, one of the original instigators of the Australian scheme.37 The 
Australian, Italian, Chilean and Portuguese national programmes were also 
endorsed as member schemes. In 2005, the certification schemes of Canada 
Brazil, Luxembourg and the Slovak republic were also formally endorsed as well 
as the US-based Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI).38 With this growth in 
  358 
international membership there also came a shift in governmental attitudes 
towards PEFC, and from this point onwards, European markets -- and government 
procurement policies -- began a process of mutual recognition of both FSC and 
PEFC schemes, which may also be attributable to PEFC’s political mobilisation 
around procurement issues.39 
2006 was a significant year for PEFC. Asia and Africa experienced an 
expansion of the Programme’s chain of custody certificates.40 Other countries 
identified with PEFC in its global statistics for this year include Hungary, Japan, 
Morocco and the Netherlands along with Poland and Slovenia, whose schemes 
were under assessment.41 PEFC members lining up for, or pending, endorsement 
included the UK, Estonia, Malaysia, Russia, Gabon and Belarus.42 By the end of 
the year, thanks to its endorsement of a number of previously discrete schemes 
such as the SFI, PEFC controlled 69% of the world’s certified timber, in 
comparison to FSC’s 24%.43 As of 2007 PEFC had a membership of 33 
“independent national forest certification systems”, 22 of which had already 
undergone assessment, with the remaining country schemes being at various 
stages of development and recognition under PEFC procedures.44 PEFC’s area of 
certified forests rose from 32.37 million hectares in 2000 to 196.325 million 
hectares by April 2007. Chain of custody certificate holders increased from 
approximately 100 in 2001 to 3,127 by April 2007. 45  
Conflict with NGOs and External Relations Initiatives 
The failed pan-Nordic and subsequent Finnish certification experiences heavily 
informed PEFC’s institutional attitude towards NGO interests. Environmental 
NGOs were initially included in discussions regarding the development of an 
industry-initiated forest certification process for Finland prior to the creation of 
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PEFC. WWF, the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (FANC) and the 
Finnish Nature League (FNL) collaborated with the Finnish Forest Industries’ 
Council (FFIC) and the Finnish Forest Owners’ Association (MTK) in the 
development of a draft standard. Greenpeace Finland did not participate in the 
process and was actively critical. A draft was negotiated between June 1996 and 
March 1997, but the consensus between parties was short-lived and the agreement 
collapsed.46  
Forestry interests acknowledged that “some difficulties” had been encountered 
in negotiations and that new methods were needed to create mutual trust.47 
Recognising that credibility arose from the development of certification standards 
that allowed “all interested parties to participate and have the possibility to 
influence the standards”, a decision was made to restart the negotiating process.48 
Discussions on the development of what was now referred to as the Finnish Forest 
Certification System (FFCS) began in November 1998 under the auspices of the 
Finnish Forest Certification Council (FFCC), and MTK.49 The two organisations 
issued invitations to the members of the 1997 standards development group to 
discuss the launching of the Finnish certification system, but environmental 
groups did not attend.50 The standard was finalised in the absence of 
environmental NGOs. This action was justified under the argument that NGOs 
were not needed since their dissatisfaction had been addressed in the new 
criteria.51 Negotiations regarding forest management as a whole did not require 
further stakeholder consultation, but only in the context of the development of the 
necessary criteria, which had already occurred.52 This resulted in accusations from 
NGOs that the forestry sector had exploited their participation, and had not 
properly informined the public that NGOs had withdrawn from the process.53 
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How to include dissenting interests therefore became a major issue for the 
emergent PEFC scheme, particularly if participating countries had already 
developed their standard. At an August 1998 meeting in Helsinki, it was agreed 
that environmental NGOs were not be invited to participate until forest interests 
had determined the framework of the scheme, and only then would they be 
consulted. This only seemed to confirm NGO criticisms of the system.54 The 
decision was to cause problems, as one of the guiding principles of the system 
was that it should be developed by means of open access and “participation that 
seeks to involve all relevant parties.”55 Since this had not occurred, it was 
necessary to clarify that the scheme would be a “voluntary private sector initiative 
based on a broad view among relevant interested parties.”56 It was also agreed 
that the perspectives of other parties (presumably meaning NGOs) would be 
considered, but that they would be informed subsequently about the process. Only 
then would they be invited to participate in subsequent events.57 
Consequently even before its launch, PEFC was being criticised by NGOs as 
an attempt by European forest industry groups to create an international FSC-
alternative.58 A major concern was that as a membership organisation, PEFC 
would only give voting rights to national governing bodies established by forest 
owners and industry associations, who were not obliged to include other 
interested parties. It was also pointed out, quoting from the scheme’s own 
documentation, that the forest owners themselves were responsible for the 
development of forest management criteria.59 This made it clear, it was argued, 
that the PEFC was an organisation “by and for forest owners.”60 It would also not 
enjoy much support from European NGOs unless it developed performance 
criteria, and although European NGOs acknowledged forest owners’ problems 
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with the FSC, they argued that their needs would be better served by engaging in 
dialogue with FSC.61 
Shortly after the launch of the scheme German environmental NGOs warned 
printers not use PEFC certified paper. They pointed out in particular the scheme’s 
failure to ban clearfelling and the use of pesticides, the shortcomings in 
monitoring provisions, and the minimal ability for environmental and social 
groups to exercise any influence.62 By February 2001 relations between NGOs 
and PEFC had deteriorated to such an extent that they were being described by 
external commentators as constituting a “certification war”, and by PEFC 
supporters as a “tribal war.”63  Most NGOs seem to have displayed their 
displeasure with the PEFC system by refusing to participate in standards setting 
processes.64 NGO engagement with PEFC was consequently largely confined to 
the production of detailed critiques outlining the structural and procedural 
shortcomings across the system, and in comparative studies with other schemes.65 
PEFC members and supporters roundly condemned the studies.66 When WWF 
challenged the legality of the Austrian scheme, PEFC responded by accusing 
WWF of issuing “inaccurate, sensationalist…and…discredited” information.67 It 
asserted that: “WWF only supports the FSC labelling system, which was 
originally designed for tropical rainforests.”68 
However, environmental NGOs did not constitute an entirely united bloc of 
resistance to PEFC. At the organisation’s General Assembly in July 2001 two 
individuals from Germany and France who declared an environmental interest 
were elected to the Board of Directors. Although both had extensive backgrounds 
in forestry and also served on the national Boards of PEFC in their own countries, 
they nevertheless also represented national environmental organisations in their 
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own countries.69 The participation of the French peak environmental NGO France 
Nature Environnement (FNE -- on whose Board a French PEFC Council Board 
member also sat) has been acknowledged by NGO commentators as: “a large 
coalition of environmental NGOs.”70 Nevertheless FNE’s decision to participate 
in the French PEFC standard setting was described as an exception to the general 
environmental NGO practice of non-participation.71 In the case of Germany, NGO 
critics dismissed the groups as “small environmental and social NGOs.”72 PEFC 
Germany commented that it was correct that major NGOs were not participating 
in the scheme, but claimed that “this is not the fault of the system but rather it is 
the intention of these groups to weaken the PEFC process by their absenteeism.”73 
It suggested: “ENGOs should carefully consider if it is worth to continue [sic] the 
struggle for power, or if it would be wiser to participate in a system that is already 
delivering on 40% of the German forest area.”74 
Despite these incremental gains in national NGO support, a somewhat 
frustrated note can nevertheless be detected in PEFC literature during 2001 
regarding NGO attitudes to the system. WWF’s accusations that the Austrian 
system had no minimum ecological standards and insubstantial controls and that 
that environmental organisations had no influence on PEFC Council were 
dismissed as being “substantially wrong”. PEFC stressed that NGOs could 
participate in national PEFC institutions and vote in them.75 WWF’s claims were 
simply dismissed as “attempts to shame the successful PEFC Initiative.”76 PEFC 
Germany responded to NGO criticisms regarding the system’s auditing 
procedures by inviting them to witness a forest audit first hand in the region of 
Rheinland-Pfalz, but no group participated.77 Later in the year an attempt at 
negotiating an agreement between NGOs, trade unions and the timber industry 
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was only partially successful, and the major NGOs were accused of not signing 
for tactical reasons. PEFC expressed the hope that the process would prevent 
“groundless attacks” in the future and constitute “a first step towards a peaceful 
co-existence” between PEFC and FSC.78  
In Norway and Finland NGO-forestry relations remained hostile. In Norway, 
WWF launched further attacks on the system’s credibility during this period. 79 In 
Finland, PEFC’s revised standards were published in 2002, and encountered NGO 
objections, as did those of Norway, published in 2003.80 The release of the revised 
standard in Finland led NGOs to conclude that the “standard has actually been 
weakened”, whilst “other weaknesses have remained unchanged.”81 Differences 
between PEFC and NGO supporters of the FSC were not always irreconcilable, 
however. Discussions in Sweden between PEFC and FSC interests resulted in an 
arrangement for the processing of timber by mills certified under either 
programme.82 Nevertheless, NGO objections also began to emerge elsewhere in 
the PEFC system, most notably Malaysia, Chile and Australia. These national 
schemes were accused by local NGOs of being dominated by industry, 
imbalanced in their arrangements for stakeholder participation, and lacking in 
adequate performance-based thresholds.83 Canada’s scheme had also been heavily 
criticised by NGOs previously.84 
2002 also marked a change of tack in PEFC’s response to NGO criticisms. It 
commissioned a report to review the criticisms and arguments of its opponents 
and to determine the significance of any underlying issues. The report was made 
public in the hope that “those with an interest in participating in the further 
strengthening of the PEFC scheme” would make contributions. Ben Gunnerberg, 
the institution’s Secretary General, looked back at the “unwarranted, and 
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unfounded criticism” of the previous years, but took a pragmatic approach, seeing 
it as part of a learning process to take on board criticisms that helped it grow, and 
to ignore “the destructive, misleading and untrue.”85 At this time a growing 
understanding of the importance of participation in the development of national 
schemes began to emerge, even if the emphasis was placed on forest owners 
rather than major environmental NGOs. It was recognised that collaboration 
would occur only if participants were “actively involved in establishing and 
developing the cooperation structure.”86  
Recognising the importance of public perception, and embracing the need to 
gain support from NGOs, PEFC France and French NGO FNE organised a 
symposium in France in May 2004 for environmental NGOs interested in and 
supportive of “the PEFC approach to sustainable forest management 
certification.”87 The purpose was to bring about an exchange of views between 
participating environmental NGOs regarding the system, and to discuss creating 
an international NGO network to express their views internationally.88 Fifteen 
NGOs from 13 countries attended. In an attempt to consolidate national NGO 
support, agreement was reached to establish an informal global network built 
around national and sub-national NGO interests involved in national schemes.89 
FNE was given a leading role in the new network and took on the secretariat of 
what was referred to as an “international platform.” The global network was 
“open to all international, national and sub-national ENGOs wishing to take part 
in the ongoing development of PEFC national schemes.”90  
The conflict between WWF and PEFC also took a new turn in 2004. PEFC 
Council sent an open letter to the World Bank/WWF Alliance challenging their 
lack of multi-stakeholder participation in the development of a questionnaire for 
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assessing the comprehensiveness of PEFC and FSC forest certification schemes in 
12 European countries. The questionnaire was condemned as having a strong bias 
towards FSC, and PEFC called upon the Alliance “not to continue with this 
flawed approach.”91 Instead it offered an alternative process for “open and 
transparent discussion… that all stakeholders [could] have trust in.”92 PEFC 
affiliates also came into conflict with the World Bank on a separate, but related 
certification matter, as the Bank’s forest certification fund had refused to provide 
support for PEFC certification account of its treatment of indigenous people, 
particularly the Sámi. The affiliates criticised this policy as being inappropriate to 
the evaluation of sustainability in Europe.93 The PEFC Board of Directors met 
with a representative of the World Bank in early 2005, reiterating its willingness 
to cooperate “once the current exercise with only one stakeholder [i.e. WWF] 
having a disproportionate say in the World Bank’s internal lending policy” came 
to an end.94  
Work Bank problems notwithstanding, PEFC worked to ensure external 
international recognition of its approach to forest certification for much of 2004. 
One important development in this direction was the organisation’s acceptance as 
an association member by the International Accreditation Forum (IAF).95 The 
alliance was identified by PEFC as an opportunity “to ensure that accredited 
forest certification certificates issued in one part of the world are recognised 
everywhere else.”96 Further significant steps in its campaign to gain international 
recognition of its legitimacy in the forest management domain followed. During 
the same timeframe it sought recognition under the IAF, it also gained 
consultative status in the United Nation’s Economic and Social Council.97 In 
2007, PEFC was granted observer status in the Ministerial Council for the 
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Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE), the European intergovernmental forest 
process, allowing it to “actively contribute its expertise” in the process.98 
In the latter half of 2006 PEFC received a further boost to its credibility when 
its social criteria were recognised, along with those of FSC, as “good” in a test of 
ten eco-labels undertaken for German trade union IG BAU. PEFC was 
particularly recognised for its requirement that companies in the system offer 
training places.99 In the same year Luxembourg national environmental NGO, 
NATURA, became a member of PEFC Luxembourg.100 Ben Gunnerberg, PEFC 
Council Secretary General was to comment that: “more national initiatives, 
ENGOs and associations in the forest, timber and paper sector are seeking to 
participate in the PEFC Council’s activities.”101 At the General Assembly of the 
same year, Peter Seligmann, co-founder, chair and CEO of Conservation 
International  (CI) presented the keynote speech.102 In 2004 CI had established a 
forum in collaboration with pulp company Aracruz Celulose, previously an FSC-
certified entity, and the Partnership Fund for Critical Ecosystems to facilitate 
dialogue between environmental NGOs and forest plantation pulp companies in 
Brazil.103 This process led to the development of “forestry partner programs” in 
2007 with farmers.104  
In April 2007 PEFC issued a brochure, which claimed it was supported by 
environmental NGOs. The intention of the brochure was to provide the facts 
“behind a number of incorrect assertions”, concerning indigenous peoples’ 
participation, environmental NGO support of PEFC and its social dialogue.105 
Both French-based FNE, and CI were also listed as supporters.106 The 
participation of the Austrian organisation Umweltdachverband, representing 34 
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national ENGOs was cited as evidence of support of PEFC by environmental 
NGOs.107 
Governance Within PEFC 
System Participants 
Participation within the PEFC system occurs both internally and externally on 
several different levels (internationally, nationally and/or regionally), and within a 
range of processes associated with standards setting, endorsement and 
certification. Membership consists of national governing bodies, whose objective 
is to instigate the creation of a PEFC scheme within their own country, and who 
may apply to join the international body, referred to as the PEFC Council.108 
Following ISO 14004 the Council identifies a stakeholder or interested party as 
“an individual or group of individuals with a common interest, concerned with or 
affected by the operation of an organisation.”109 Other associations may become 
members, such as international organisations, “which support the objectives of the 
PEFC Council”, but they are classified as extraordinary members with no voting 
rights.110 At the end of 2006 there were eleven extraordinary members 
representing forest owners, managers, processors, and trading interests.111  
PEFC’s Statutes are not explicit regarding the membership composition of the 
national governing bodies, which have sole responsibility for determining who 
should be invited to become members.112 These provisions have resulted in a 
degree of variation in stakeholder composition in national governing bodies. In 
some countries, as in the case of Australia, for example, only government and the 
country’s forest industry associations were responsible for overseeing the 
development of the scheme.113 In France, by contrast, an environmental NGO sits 
on the national PEFC Council.114  
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Institutional Arrangements 
International Level 
PEFC is based in Luxembourg, and bound by the Luxembourg law of April 21, 
1928 concerning non-profit making associations and foundations.115 PEFC 
describes itself as “a global umbrella organisation for the assessment and mutual 
recognition of national forest certification schemes developed in a multi-
stakeholder process.”116 The name “PEFC Council” is used to describe the 
associative relationship between members of the institution.117 The PEFC Council 
is the governing body of the scheme, and the formal representative of the system 
with a minimum size of six members.118 The General Assembly is the highest 
body of the PEFC Council. It meets annually and is comprised of one official 
delegate per national programme, and who may be accompanied by up to two 
observers from its governing body.119 The assembly has a number of tasks. It 
elects and dismisses the Board of Directors and members, revises the Statutes, 
documents and procedures of the scheme, adopts the budget and accounts and 
selects the auditors, chooses the institution’s location, and is responsible for 
dissolving the PEFC Council.120 It also elects the organisation’s Chairman, and 
First and Second Vice-Chairman.121  
Three years after its foundation, at the General Assembly of November 2002, it 
was agreed to totally revise the organisation’s existing technical documents. This 
was partly in response to external criticisms, and it commissioned an independent 
evaluation by a respected consultant.122 In order to “ensure compatibility with 
national accreditation organizations represented by the International Accreditation 
Forum” the system’s assessment procedures for its revised member schemes were 
expanded. A Panel of Experts was created, partly to provide a mechanism for 
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quality assurance.123 Further revisions of PEFC’s normative documentation as 
well as its existing guidelines and the development of new requirements 
followed.124 These started to be approved over 2003.125 
Figure 6.1 Structure of PEFC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PEFC Technical Document, p. 5; solid black lines indicate entities 
associated with PEFC Council  
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to the Board, and exists to ensure communication between members, support the 
work of Board, attend meetings, take minutes and manage the Secretariat, which 
can be based in any of its member bodies.129 An Executive Committee, consisting 
of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairmen, and permitted to co-opt other Board 
members as required, exists to undertake tasks assigned it by the Board. 130 See 
Figure 6.1 above. 
 National Level 
The normative operational bases for PEFC-member schemes are: the Pan 
European Operational level Guidelines (PEOLG); the Principles Criteria and 
Indicators for the Sustainable Forest Management of African Natural Tropics 
(ATTO/ITTO PC&I); Criteria and indicators for the Conservation and Sustainable 
Management of Temperate and Boreal Forests (Montréal Process C&I); and a 
range of other regional processes.131 These existed prior to the establishment of 
PEFC. National schemes are instigated by “national forest owners’ organisations 
or national forestry sector organisations having the support of the major forest 
owners’ associations.”132  
At the behest of this national governing body of forestry organisations, 
interested parties are subsequently invited to constitute a forum for the 
development of national standards. Such parties “should” represent the “different 
aspects of sustainable forest management” and include forest owners, forest 
industry, environmental and social NGOs, trade unions, retailers and other 
relevant organisations at a national or sub-national level.133 Figure 6.2 below 
outlines the institutional relationship between national governing bodies, the 
PEFC Council and other related entities. 
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Figure 6.2 Structural and procedural arrangements for standards setting and 
related activities within the PEFC system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: http://www.pefc.org/internet/html/acitivities.htm (adapted); Rules for 
Standard Setting, p. 3, PEFC Technical Document, p. 6 
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constitute committees, councils, working groups or similar.135 Formal consultation 
regarding the drafting of standards consists of the views of interested parties 
arising from consultation being “discussed”, and the national forums must give 
“general information” on the changes made in the light of the consultation 
process.136 Once national standards and national schemes have been developed, 
there is a process for their endorsement, mutual recognition and revision by 
PEFC.137 The process of assessment is “transparent and consultative”, and occurs 
on international and national levels.138  Procedures also exist for the development 
of chain of custody standards, although it is not clear if there is any public 
participation.139 
Certification enterprises must also be accredited by a national accreditation 
body, which in turn must be a member of either the International Accreditation 
Forum or the European Co-operation for Accreditation (EA) and follow the 
requirements of ISO Guide 61. Depending on the type of national certification 
standards the certification body further requires accreditation under a national 
accreditation body that is either competent in the “specified field of operation”, or 
familiar with ISO quality and environmental management systems (ISO 
9000:2000 or ISO 14001) or EMAS.140 As of 2005, certification bodies that had 
accredited forest management or chain of custody standards without these 
necessary provisions were given four years -- from the issuance of the first 
national scheme certificate -- to catch up with accreditation requirements. Non-
conformance is stated to render the certificates of such entities invalid.141  
Certification under PEFC covers forest management on a regional, group and 
individual level and chain of custody. All forms of certification, under different 
arrangements, permit the use of the PEFC logo and trademark.142 Chain of 
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custody requirements for public consultation are lacking in the relevant PEFC 
normative document.143 Forest management certification under the PEFC-
framework is based on existing international management systems, product 
certification and the EMAS verification procedures.144 Management systems 
certification can be either quality or environmental, and all procedures are based 
on either the relevant ISO Guide (62, 66, 65) or EC Regulation 761/2001, as 
appropriate.145 Additional procedures covering forest management and chain of 
custody certification may be developed by the given scheme, but this is 
optional.146  
In 2002, the General Assembly also agreed to the development of an 
international chain of custody programme, and supported the work of the 
Confederation of European Pulp and Paper Industries (CEPI) and the European 
Confederation of Woodworking Industries (CEI Bois) on a similar project for 
almost two years. In January 2004, the Board determined to pursue its own 
parallel initiative to create a standard, and thus bring the two processes together 
under one international generic chain of custody.147 The standard was approved 
and subsequently released after the General Assembly of 2004.148 The 
relationships between these structures and processes are set out in Figure 6.2 
above. 
Institutional Typology 
Forest certification has been located within a general movement that displays a 
trend towards international private/civic governance, in which actors largely 
govern their own affairs, without state involvement, or without the legitimisation 
of state political authority. This has led to the definition of forest certification, as 
discussed by Cashore et al as an example of non-state market-driven governance 
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(NSMD). However, owing to the increasing interest by nation-states in forest 
certification, and the relationship -- albeit tangentially -- to intergovernmental 
forest-related activities, the purity of this vision has been somewhat diluted. 
Created as a response to FSC, PEFC has provided an umbrella under which 
national certification initiatives have challenged this ‘original’ model of NSMD. 
National forest certification has both influenced -- and been influenced by -- the 
changing laws and policies associated with SFM and national forest programmes. 
This has led to a revision of the classification of certification, which is now seen 
as operating in the shadow of governmental hierarchy, and an example of the 
‘mixed’ mode of governance.149  
PEFC relies heavily on European and other regional intergovernmental forest 
policy frameworks and is comprised of national certification programmes 
generally recognised by national governments. National governments have also 
played -- and continue to play -- an important role in its development. For 
example, a governmental forestry agency is represented on the Board of Directors. 
Clearly non-state interests constitute the most significant players in the system, 
but as these largely consist of economic interests, it is an exaggerated claim to 
assert that PEFC represents a ‘pure’ non-state system comprised of a wide range 
of non-state actors. It belongs in the state-centric, rather than the non-state end of 
the continuum, but given its relatively autonomous nature, with a rating 
somewhere between medium and low.  
Following normative international trends, PEFC lays claim to being consensus-
based in standards setting. However, once they are submitted for endorsement 
internationally, standards require a qualified majority vote of two-thirds of the 
General Assembly. Furthermore, in both the General Assembly, and the Board of 
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Directors, the PEFC Council functions democratically on the basis of voting by 
simple majority. These factors place the institution towards the aggregative rather 
than the deliberative end of the democratic continuum, but with a rating of 
somewhere between medium and low. 
Figure 6.3 Institutional classification of PEFC  
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public-private partnerships between governments and forest interests. These 
considerations also make it relatively innovative. However, the close linkages 
from sub-national/national programmes, upwards to intergovernmental forest 
policy frameworks tie it to more classical, hierarchical notions of governance.150  
This places it on the ‘new’ end of the innovation continuum, but with a rating of 
medium. See Figure 6.3 above. 
Critical Analysis  
Interest Representation 
Inclusiveness 
The argument has been advanced that unhindered participation is fundamental to 
the concept of sustainable governance.151 A general trend has also been identified 
in forest certification specifically towards greater procedural and structural 
participation.152 The forest industry faces several dilemmas when it comes to 
improving, or maintaining, market access through initiatives such as certification. 
It needs to ensure inclusiveness, which delivers credibility, but also needs to 
respect forest sector sensitivities, thus ensuring producer participation. The rivalry 
between PEFC and FSC on this view is interpreted as being based upon different 
approaches to the common problem of gaining rule-making legitimacy between 
NGOs, forest owners and forest product purchasers.153 This has resulted in very 
different concepts of governance between the competing programmes.154 The 
approach adopted by schemes dominated by forestry interests such as PEFC may 
in fact reflect a contending conception of participation, but one that is 
nevertheless still subjected to an “upwards pull” towards greater participation.155 
PEFC has been found to be moving only slowly on issues relating to 
participation, however.156 One commentator has noted that: “there are marked 
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differences between the design of the FSC and PEFC systems in the degree to 
which they allow for stakeholders’ participation.”157 PEFC enjoys a close 
relationship with governments, and has succeeded in bringing government 
agencies into direct interaction with the system.158 This interaction has led some 
commentators to claim that governments were actively involved in the 
Programme’s establishment.159 It has led others to conclude that while PEFC may 
be formally non-governmental it is heavily dependent on governmental and semi-
governmental agencies.160 The problem here is not that government participates in 
forest certification.161 Rather, it is that PEFC claims to be participatory but, being 
controlled by landholder and industry groups, in reality chooses quite deliberately 
which additional stakeholders are included in decision making.162 The 
determination regarding the extent to which other stakeholders are included, and 
when, is also in the hands of forestry interests.163 
Internationally, in the case of the Board, it is stated that membership “should 
aim to reflect the major interested parties who support the PEFC” as well as 
geographical spread, scale of harvesting rates and gender balance.164 “Should” in 
the context of PEFC’s normative documents is understood as indicating 
provisions, which are “expected to be implemented”, but are not mandatory (in 
which case “shall” is used).165 The voluntary nature of this arrangement allows 
PEFC considerable latitude regarding interest representation and forest owners 
and industrial interests predominate (see Table 6.1 below). The institution itself 
states that: “the participatory elements in the PEFC framework are applied 
predominantly at the national and sub-national level.”166 Here, it is only a 
recommendation, and not mandatory, that all “participating interested parties be 
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provided a fair, ongoing and appropriate possibility to influence the decision 
making” of the national governing body.167 
Table 6.1 List of interests represented on the Board of Directors of PEFC Council 
2003 2006 
Name, position Interest Name, position Interest 
Josef Barton-
Dobenin, 
Director 
Forest owners Björn Andrén, 
Director 
Forest industry 
(Forest products) 
Christian Brawenz, 
Second Vice 
Chairman 
Forest owners Kathy Bradley, 
Director 
Forest industry 
(Paper industry 
association) 
Michael Clark, 
Director 
Forest industry  
(Paper industry) 
Michael Clark, 
Chairman 
Forest industry 
(Paper industry) 
Phil Davies, 
Director 
Union Hans Drielsma, 
Director 
Forest owners 
(Government) 
Sébastien Genest, 
Director 
Environmental NGO Andrey Frolov, 
Director 
Forest industry 
(Manufacturing) 
Dr. Hans Köpp, 
Director 
Environmental NGO Sébastien Genest, 
Director 
Environmental NGO 
Ulf  Österblom, 
Director 
Forest owners Dr. Hans Köpp, 
Director 
Environmental NGO 
Henri Plauche-
Gillon, Chairman 
Forest owners  Luis Costa Leal, 
Director 
Forest industry  
(Pulp industry) 
Luis Costa Leal, 
Director 
Forest industry 
(Pulp industry) 
William Luddy, 
Director 
Labour 
Robert Simpson, 
Director 
Forest owners Felix Montecuccoli, 
Director 
Forest owners 
Hannu Valtanen,  
First Vice 
Chairman 
Forest industry 
(Industry 
association) 
Antti Sahi, 
First Vice Chairman 
Forest owners 
Marian Freiherr 
von Gravenreuth, 
Director 
Forest Owners Bob Simpson, 
Second Vice 
Chairman 
Forest owners 
Paul Wooding, 
Director 
Forest industry 
(Forest products) 
Paul Wooding, 
Director 
Forest industry 
(Forest products) 
Sources: PEFCC Newsletter 17, pp. 5-8, PEFC news 22, p. 6, Annual Review 2005, p. 
10, Annual Review 2006, pp. 12-13. 
Forestry interests are responsible for inviting “national organisations representing 
all relevant interested parties” to form the basis for a PEFC national governing 
body.168 Country schemes have their own preferences regarding which 
stakeholders should participate in standards setting. This can include government 
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(see Table 6.2 also below). Standards must subsequently be reviewed in a 
participatory manner. 169 Claims that national standards have been approved with 
the participation of major NGOs have been challenged by NGO critics as a 
“misrepresentation of reality”, and that “there is very little proven support for the 
PEFC in any of the countries which either have, or are developing standards 
and/or schemes.”170 There do not seem to be any participatory or consultation 
arrangements associated with the pilot testing of standards.171  
Table 6.2 Sectors listed as being included in national schemes from Europe, South 
America and Australasia 
Lithuania Brazil Australia 
Private forest owners Producers Forest industries 
NGOs Consumers Private forest owners 
State forest service Governments (i.e. Federal 
and state) 
Public forest owners 
Forest industries NGOs Governments (i.e. Federal 
and state) 
Research institutions Other (universities and 
research institutions) 
Unions 
  Community 
Source: PEFCC News Special (December 2002), pp. 4-7 
 Participation in certification assessments is confined largely to the auditing 
phase of the certification process, when the certification body examines the 
conformity of forest management activities against the forest management 
standard. At this point the certifier is obliged to “include relevant information 
from external parties (e.g. government agencies, community groups, 
conservations organizations [sic], etc.), as appropriate.”172  
Interviews 
NGOs interviewed characterised their involvement in PEFC as “non-existent.”173 
At an international level there was no room for NGOs to become part of the PEFC 
Council other than as observers. The Board was only open to members of national 
governing bodies and even international organisations such as the ILO only 
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enjoyed observer status in the Council.174 Some national schemes had been 
developed almost exclusively as a result of pressure from the private sector and 
the sawmill companies they supplied as well as big companies, who coordinated 
the development of the system largely in collaboration with management 
agencies.175 The structures of national certification schemes mitigated any ability 
to influence their outcomes and it was as hard to have an influence now as in pre-
PEFC days.176 The motives underlying the scheme’s creation had fundamentally 
affected its stakeholder composition.177 NGO participation country-by-country 
ranged from “minimal to zero”, and in the case of Europe, of the nine or ten major 
international NGOs, none were participating.178 They were seen as “outsiders” 
within national PEFC schemes. Everybody else had already decided what the 
outcomes of negotiations would be, and NGO exclusion meant they had been 
reduced to a minority viewpoint.179 It was wrong to describe PEFC as inclusive of 
environmental interests simply because it had national environmental NGOs 
participating.180  
A significant weakness of the system as a whole was the lack of stakeholder 
participation in both standards setting and the actual certification process. This 
was to be understood as the reason why certain groups did not want to be 
consulted.181 The problem was the difference between participation and actually 
being heard.182 Many forest management agencies talked extensively about 
participation but it was simply a mechanism to justify decisions that had already 
been made.183 This was reflected in the treatment of indigenous interests. In one 
country the development of national criteria directly affecting indigenous people 
had occurred without including any representative associations or asking them to 
participate. The relevant organisations had to insist they be heard before they were 
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invited.184 One informant noted that labour interests were represented on their 
national board, however.185 
Most business interests argued that NGOs were adequately included in the 
system, so long as it was understood that those groups that did participate did not 
refer to groups connected with FSC, such as WWF, Greenpeace and Friends of 
the Earth, and that the groups that were involved were “not as radical as the 
international ones.”186 By deliberately excluding themselves from the PEFC, 
international NGOs were manufacturing an excuse so they could claim that the 
PEFC was not sufficiently representative.187 NGO supporters of PEFC included 
national groups in France, Germany, Austria and elsewhere.188  
There were also admissions that some important groups had been omitted from 
the system, however. Consumer groups in particular, had not been adequately 
included in certification since its inception.189 NGOs had been involved in the 
development of the intergovernmental criteria and indicators (C&I) processes 
before the establishment of PEFC. But NGOs had only withdrawn from PEFC 
because they had been pressured by other, mostly international, NGOs. 
Nevertheless, it was accepted that NGO criticisms weakened the system.190  
Business interests also noted the preponderance of forest owner, forest industry 
and forest-dependent trade representatives within the system.191 PEFC was 
essentially an initiative by the forest sector and forest owners, with a few other 
selected stakeholders taking part in the system.192 The system functioned as a 
means of ensuring active involvement in the coordination and development of 
joint positions, firstly on a national level, then regionally, subsequently on a 
European level, and ultimately internationally.193 It was forest owners rather than 
large industrial interests that had been central to pushing PEFC initially in 
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Europe: they were at the heart of PEFC; the participation of all other interests was 
peripheral.194 However, small forest owners were less significant than the forest 
owner associations to which they belonged. They were running things, but were 
not really including their membership.195 Such private forest owner interests could 
be described as “the political arm of the PEFC.”196  
Some interviewees from the third group of informants supported the idea of the 
centrality of forest owners to the PEFC system. They were the ones who had been 
sufficiently motivated to protest against the German printing houses.197 NGOs had 
a totally different perspective, and should be understood as “outsiders who are 
looking in on the forests.”198 One interviewee from the third group of informants 
was particularly unhappy with the closeness of the relationship between certain 
governments and forest owner interests, and the extent of NGO inclusion in 
PEFC. The exclusive nature of this relationship had led their regional government 
to determine not to involve itself in the system.199 
Evaluation 
On an international level, the Board of Directors can claim to include the key 
three economic, social and environmental sectors, but the level of inclusion, based 
on the figures from 2003 and 2006 is uneven (see Equality below). On the 
economic side, the range of interests is excellent and includes public and private 
forest owners both large and small, as well as industry associations, forest product 
producers, down stream processors and manufacturers. On the social side, 
indigenous interests are entirely absent. Labour interests are present, but they 
represent the entire social sector and occupy only one seat at the table. 
Environmental groups are slightly better off, with two nationally focussed 
representatives, but there are no major international environmental NGOs. There 
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is also no representation of developing country interests on the Board, and only 
one Director is from the southern hemisphere (Australia). Board membership 
should also reflect geographical spread and gender balance, according to the 
Council Statutes, but it does not. The General Assembly contains an even weaker 
spread of interests, mostly attributable to its membership structure, which permits 
only national governing bodies to actively participate, but on behalf of the country 
schemes, not stakeholder sectors. There is no better representation of interests in 
the associate category of membership, with neither labour nor environmental 
NGOs, and only foresters’ associations complementing the usual mix of non-state 
economic interests. However, due to the endorsement of their schemes in recent 
years, there is some developing country representation within the General 
Assembly.  
On a national level, the PEFC Council Statutes militate against any interest 
other than forest owners or forest industry initiating the development of the 
country scheme. The national governing bodies themselves, once formed, should 
represent diverse interests, but this is not mandatory. It is only at the level of 
standards setting that the PEFC Council Statutes oblige the national governing 
bodies to invite all relevant interested parties to participate. But even here it is 
unclear in this wording, if it is the act of inviting, rather than the participation 
itself, which is mandatory. In terms of the certification processes themselves, 
interests are only represented in so far as they can provide information relevant to 
the assessment of conformity of forest management activities to the standard. 
Here, the requirements are further confused by the fact that in a number of cases 
certificates were initially issued without such requirements. While the 
representation of forestry interests across the system is very high, the degree of 
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inclusion of other stakeholders is very low. In view of these two extremes, and the 
unsatisfactory developing country representation, PEFC’s inclusiveness is low. 
Equality 
PEFC’s imbalance in stakeholder representation, it is argued, provides limited 
opportunities for minority interests to influence rule making within the system, 
particularly in terms of compliance and standard implementation.200 As early as 
1998 European NGOs indicated they could not support the emerging PEFC 
system if it did not make “structural changes to ensure the equal input of other 
sectors.”201 Not surprisingly, this has led environmental NGOs in particular to 
make a number of broader claims concerning the system. 202 By ignoring 
environmental NGOs and other stakeholders it has been argued that the scheme 
may have placed its reputation at risk.203 
Another major aspect of contention, which goes beyond the environmental 
NGO sector is the status accorded to indigenous interests within the PEFC system. 
After the withdrawal of environmental NGOs from the Finnish certification 
scheme, for example, the Sámi and state forest manager Metsähallitus came into 
conflict after the former claimed they had not been sufficently listened to in the 
process of defining the standard.204 The PEFC system as a whole came into 
conflict with the World Bank on this matter, on account of the Bank’s lending 
policies, which did not permit PEFC to receive grants to expand its certification 
activities on account of its failure to acknowledge indigenous peoples’ rights.205 
In December 2005, the Belgian Government, following other EU member 
countries, initiated a process to evaluate the legality and sustainability of certified 
forest products which feeding into its public procurement programme. An expert 
commission was convened to determine which certification schemes would be 
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accepted under the policy. Some (but not all) PEFC scheme were a source of 
concern on account of the low extent to which the rights of indigenous peoples 
were accepted by the schemes.206 PEFC Council published a position paper 
regarding indigenous people in December 2005.207 The policy acknowledged the 
various intergovernmental processes for SFM, including the Helsinki and 
Montréal processes, as well as the role of the Ministerial Conference on the 
Protection of Forests in Europe. These intergovernmental arrangements, in 
combination with the member schemes’ own national policy frameworks led the 
Council to conclude that indigenous peoples were already accounted for in 
PEFC’s processes.208 The development of this position at the executive level, it 
was stated, was to provide the framework for subsequent national policies.209  
Interviews 
NGOs presented a detailed analysis of what they perceived to be the lack of 
equality within the PEFC system, a problem they identified as affecting youth and 
indigenous people as well as environmental groups.210 Unless NGOs had real 
power, and the unequal weighting of different interests was resolved, there was no 
point in participation, and their involvement would be misused, as had been borne 
out in some PEFC initiatives.211 PEFC’s governance structures failed to 
sufficiently acknowledge indigenous peoples’ rights. The issue of forest peoples’ 
rights had been a minor issue in Europe when the scheme had started, but 
problems had subsequently escalated in Sweden, where the differences between 
PEFC and FSC on this matter were substantial. As PEFC expanded into southern 
countries, this weakness would become more apparent.212  
Business interviewees mostly disagreed with the NGO complaint that PEFC 
discriminated against indigenous peoples and environment groups.213 One 
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business interest did comment however, that PEFC’s governance structures did 
not provide the conditions for weaker stakeholders to feel at ease within the 
system, and that was why they were not participating.214 Landowners by way of 
contrast saw PEFC as providing for “a more balanced opportunity to negotiate a 
standard that protects their private property rights than the FSC system 
delivers.”215 Another business informant thought this might be attributable to the 
fact that forest owners felt that the PEFC system would provide them with a 
multi-stakeholder process, which protected private property rights. They pointed 
to both the Sustainable Forestry Initiative and the Australian Forestry Standard as 
being motivated by these considerations. For both large and small owners the 
decision to be involved in a given system all came down to the politics of the 
scheme.216 Another informant echoed this viewpoint, indicating that an equal say 
was important, but they objected to economic interests being placed in a situation 
where their voice was structurally counterbalanced as in the FSC system. For 
them, such a system did not deliver an equal say for economic interests.217  
One interviewee from the third group of informants provided an alternative 
perspective. They felt that PEFC looked at things in an overly economic way. The 
system allowed for the maximisation of economic returns, which was nice in 
principle, but it had minimised the environmental effort required in gaining such 
returns.218 
Evaluation 
It is undeniable that forest owners and the forest industry played the most 
significant role in the establishment of PEFC. Many of the scholarly sources, as 
well as most of those stakeholders interviewed in this study, acknowledge the 
dominant role played by these interests within the system. Where other 
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stakeholders do play a role within the system’s participatory structures, it is 
limited. Forest owner- and forest industry interests initiate the development of 
national schemes, and even if other stakeholders are invited to participate in 
national governing bodies and standards setting, it is on an unequal footing. This 
is particularly the case with indigenous peoples in the Nordic countries. Equality 
in the system is therefore low. 
Resources 
Information regarding PEFC’s financial activities is not publicly available on its 
website, and no response was made to a request for financial information during 
the course of this study (see Transparency below).219 Commenting on the 
international funding situation for PEFC, one business interviewee observed that 
financing possibilities had been “very poor”, and membership fees remained the 
only source of income. Even after seven years of existence the global budget was 
roughly half a million Euros, which was expected to run the whole entity.220 
Forest owner associations from supporting countries were identified as being one 
of PEFC’s main funding sources.221 
One interviewee from the third group of informants provided some detail 
regarding the financial arrangements associated with their national scheme. 
Funding had remained at a relatively constant level over the life of the scheme, 
and was derived from a forest industry fund, the purpose of which was to promote 
the use of wood. The body raised voluntary contributions from forest owners and 
wood buyers and had provided funds to the scheme annually. A very small 
amount of income, about 1%, was generated from charging for the materials 
associated with the issue of PEFC logo licenses; this was not a user’s fee, but 
covered the costs of producing CDs, documents, and so forth. In addition there 
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were member fees levied on membership organisations. In terms of participation, 
the general rule was that stakeholders funded their own attendance, although there 
were some exceptions; the chairman received an annual fixed fee (but the rest of 
the Board paid their own expenses), and some travel costs were provided to 
members far from the capital. The costs associated with the two standards setting 
processes had been borne individually, while the secretariat of the scheme had 
managed the facilitation of the process.222  
Interviews 
No participants interviewed received funding to take part in any of the system’s 
standards setting or governance processes. NGOs and business interests all 
confirmed they funded their own participation.223  
A number of NGOs stressed the cost in terms of time and money to participate 
in PEFC either directly or indirectly. One national NGO commented that they had 
employed a volunteer to participate in standards setting, and their hours, if 
remunerated, would have amounted to several thousand Euros.224 One national 
NGO observed that indigenous interests had to go to environment groups for 
funding when they had wanted to engage with PEFC.225 The view was expressed 
that the Programme had a greater range of resources at its disposal than FSC, by 
comparison.226 
One of the international NGO representatives interviewed explained that the 
expenditure of resources regarding PEFC had been at a level that was concerned 
mainly with analysing the Programme’s governance structures and providing 
external commentary. Funds to undertake this work had been provided by 
foundations or governments interested in certification. They observed however 
that time spent on one issue area inevitably reduced the money and time available 
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for campaigners or individuals to work on other issues.227 A second international 
NGO commented that while they had received no support from PEFC, they had 
decided not to participate anyway, until some fundamental changes were made.228 
A third international NGO informant commented that earlier in the scheme’s 
existence their organisation had had been running a certification campaign in 
Europe, which had created a lot of tension between PEFC and FSC. Having 
finished the campaign, and having made it clear to certification users and 
customers that the two systems were not the same, the decision was made to 
concentrate on building and supporting the FSC. With the limited resources 
available it had been determined that the time and effort required to engage with 
and influence PEFC to restructure itself as profoundly as NGOs thought necessary 
was not worth the investment. This was particularly the case when there was no 
guarantee that such efforts would deliver anything anyway. 229  
Business informants confirmed that there had been support from industry to 
underwrite PEFC. One interviewee commented that industry groups had provided 
technical support in the development of the Programme’s chain of custody 
standard, because it needed industry expertise. This was because this was 
industry’s normal way of working; as a supporter of certification it could not keep 
out of the forest debate and just passively use the system. In addition to this direct 
support, industry had also had its own expenses in terms of time and money, such 
as attending PEFC General Assemblies, and hiring consultants.230 Another 
indicated their organisation had invested money and time in the PEFC process.231  
Evaluation 
The evaluation of PEFC’s provision of resources does not refer to its sources of 
general income, but rather the amount of funding, or general capacity building it 
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undertakes to encourage various interests to participate in the Programme. As a 
rule, PEFC does not provide resources for the different sectors to participate 
internationally and there does not appear to be any mechanism to fund 
participation in PEFC Council.  Anecdotally, some key members are funded to 
participate in meetings at the national level, but more marginalised interests, such 
as indigenous people, must rely on support from external sources, rather than the 
institution itself, to have their interests represented. The provision of resources to 
participate in PEFC is low. 
Organisational Responsibility 
Accountability  
Although the General Assembly is identified as the highest body of the PEFC 
Council, decisions that are “binding to the PEFC Council financially or 
politically” are the responsibility of the Board.232  
Accreditation procedures within the PEFC system occur on the national level. 
A problem identified with this approach is that national bodies accredit both 
systems and performance-based standards. This can undermine the value of 
schemes within the system that use performance-based standards since a scheme, 
which may use the ISO 14000 Series, systems-based approach, such as Norway, 
can certify all national forests in one stroke, yet enjoy the same status within the 
Programme as performance-based schemes.233 Furthermore the assessment of 
such region-wide certificates can be based on random sampling rather than 
comprehensive audits.234 NGOs have criticised this approach in terms of the 
degree of commitment that can be expected from individual owners, and they 
question the legality of such forms of “passive consent” to certification.235 
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There are also historical problems regarding the lack of public consultation and 
availability of public documentation associated with schemes that were accredited 
before 2005. Although procedures put into place by PEFC in this year to address 
this problem stipulated that compliance by forest certification schemes would be 
audited at subsequent annual surveillance visits, it is not specified whether 
relevant interests would be re-contacted for consultation after what was, in some 
instances, a considerable lapse of time.236 Finland fell into this category, and NGO 
commentators claim that most of the country was certified before accreditation 
procedures were adopted.237  
As an institution, PEFC did not develop any of the base criteria of member 
schemes, except to determine initially, when the scheme was still essentially 
European, that certification would be based on the C&I of the Minsiterial 
Conferences of Helsinki, 1993 and Lisbon, 1998.238 These developed C&I that 
eventually informed the creation of the Pan-European Operational Level 
Guidelines (PEOLG).239 The decision to follow these guidelines as the underlying 
framework for PEFC occurred before most interested parties had the opportunity 
to consent to their use.240 Environmental and social interests in particular had 
already expressed reservations regarding the content of the PEOLG even before 
they were adopted and adapted by PEFC.241  
Interviews 
NGOs analysed accountability in certification as being particularly important for 
consumers, who were looking for a credible statement demonstrating that timber 
had not been procured according to the needs of economic and industrial interests 
alone. For a system to be credible, it needed more than just these interests to be 
involved in the development of a scheme from the very beginning.242 Several 
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interviewees expressed concerns that PEFC had used the involvement of their 
organisation as a means of endorsing the Programme and standards setting, 
without actually taking their views into account. This had made them all 
extremely cautious about having anything to do with the system in the future, and 
in their dealings with those holding official positions.243 The system was also 
heavily criticised by NGOs for a lack of performance related obligations on 
landowners, which was seen as impacting on their accountability and sense of 
responsibility for their actions.244 
One NGO informant conceded that the role played by NGOs in certification 
had not initially been an entirely responsible one and that NGOs were partly to be 
held to account for the creation of PEFC. WWF had set huge targets for certified 
forest by 2005, without realising that that 50% of Europe’s forests were in the 
hands of small private forest owners, not big corporations. These small forest 
owners saw the proposed targets as an enormous threat, not as a means of 
improving their forest management. WWF had engaged solely with the larger 
producers, aggregated within buyers’ groups. This was an essentially “top down” 
approach that had failed to consider the views of small forest owners and although 
not intentional, had generated a huge degree of antipathy. Had they included the 
small forest owners, “PEFC might not even have been born.”245  
Business interests ventured a range of views on the degree of accountability 
with the PEFC system. One commented that forest interests did not always 
consider the NGO community to be accountable because they were not actually 
responsible for implementing anything.246 Another raised a number of issues 
regarding the role of the certifier and the processes of accreditation. As part of a 
national scheme’s endorsement by the PEFC Council it was necessary to undergo 
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an independent evaluation of its procedural arrangements, which are checked by a 
consultant. The interviewee expressed concerns that previously these consultants 
had been quite clearly linked to some of the national schemes, not necessarily 
with the particular country programme being evaluated, but with the PEFC system 
in some way. This had been quite common before PEFC’s major revision, and 
represented a potential for conflict of interest. Another problem that was still 
unresolved at the time of the interview was how the PEFC intended to deal with 
certification bodies that had not been accredited. Previously, the system had not 
needed accreditation, but now it did. It was unclear what was required for the 
former certificates that had been issued by certifiers who had not been accredited, 
nor what would happen if the certifier failed to obtain accreditation. In a final, and 
uncorroborated comment, this interviewee claimed that a number of national 
schemes had presented PEFC as precondition of membership to the EU in their 
dealings with countries in Eastern Europe. This had left foresters in Eastern 
Europe believing they had no choice but to adopt PEFC.247  
One informant from the third group of subjects noted the tensions underlying 
government involvement in the business of forest certification, which was 
essentially a non-governmental activity, but they saw the level of governmental 
involvement in the PEFC system as perfectly acceptable.248 
Interviewees from all three sectors expressed misgivings about regional or 
country level certification. Because PEFC certified by area and not one forest 
exclusively, that this created the situation where forest owners who did not care 
about certification could still end up being certified without knowing it.249 This 
concern was raised in relation to PEFC certification in both Russia and Finland.250 
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Evaluation 
The analysis of PEFC’s institutional accountability is usefully informed by 
looking at its activities in vertical and horizontal terms.  As far as vertical 
accountability is concerned (i.e. the extent to which it is answerable to those that 
have delegated their responsibility to the institution), PEFC in some instances 
may be overly close to some interests, such as government bodies and their 
agents. A similar observation might be made regarding PEFC’s relationship with 
forest owners and forest industry interests. Certifiers, supposedly independent 
agents, are also close to the system on account of the provision of consultancy 
services relating to the evaluation of country schemes for endorsement. There are 
also ongoing and unresolved problems relating to certifiers who were not 
accredited at the time they granted certificates. Whilst these may not be matters of 
concern for most of the institution’s internal constituents, this has affected 
external perceptions, and consequently PEFC’s horizontal accountability (that is, 
the degree of accountability demonstrated to those who will be affected by the 
actions taken by the institution and its affiliates). PEFC has demonstrated a degree 
of antipathy, if not outright hostility, towards (external) international NGOs, and 
national NGOs who do not support its activities. In relation to indigenous 
interests, who like most environmental NGOs also remain external parties, some 
PEFC affiliated schemes have not demonstrated a particularly responsible, or 
responsive attitude. Nationally, a number of PEFC’s member schemes certify 
entire forest regions and this has resulted in forest owners entering the system 
who have been either unwillingly, or unwittingly certified. This issue also affects 
the accountability of forest owners as a sector, and it is unclear what effort has 
been made to address this problem by either forest owner associations or PEFC.  
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PEFC seems to be more accountable vertically than horizontally -- as are many 
‘traditional’ agencies. But even PEFC’s vertical accountability is weak -- 
particularly given the highly devolved methods of oversight whereby most 
responsibility for standard development and implementation is at the national 
level. Given these issues the degree of accountability within the PEFC system is 
considered to be low. 
Transparency 
A guiding principle adopted during the early stages of PEFC’s formation was that 
the system should be developed transparently.251 On a national level, the written 
procedures of standards development forums must be available to interested 
parties if requested. 252 Transparency within the context of standards setting refers 
to communicating the commencement of the standard setting process, and by 
making information on the development process available to interested parties 
through such media as the Internet.253 Standards must subsequently be reviewed 
in a “fair and transparent” manner.254 Summaries of certification assessments 
must also be made available to the public, as required under the provisions of the 
particular certification scheme. International public consultation lasts for 60 days 
and is based on advertising the scheme on the PEFC web site and soliciting 
comments.255  
Some of PEFC’s normative requirements, while emphasising transparency, are 
either vague regarding implementation, or restrictive in application. In the case of 
the former, whilst the views of all those who are invited to participate in the 
creation of national schemes and standards are expected to be “documented and 
considered in an open and transparent way”, it is not specified if divergent views 
must be addressed.256 In the case of latter, it is true that the minutes arising from 
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General Assemblies are available for scrutiny, but only to members and “parties 
having a legitimate interest”, and only as extracts approved by the Chairman and 
Secretary General.257 Financial information is not publicly available (see 
Resources above). 
Scholars note that NGOs consider PEFC to be lacking in transparency.258 NGO 
commentators have themselves pointed out that a lack of transparency was 
identified as early as 1999 by consultants engaged by the emerging system as an 
“Achille’s heel” that needed to be resolved.259 
Interviews 
NGOs saw that there were substantial weaknesses in PEFC regarding 
transparency.260 Three interviewees, speaking from both national and international 
viewpoints, expressed concerns that the PEFC system was neither open nor 
transparent. The lack of public availability of documentation, the opacity of 
governance structures, and the unclear decision making processes were the main 
areas of complaint.261 Responsible certification instruments should fulfil the 
requirements of openness and transparency as a minimum.262 Transparency was 
important because there always came a point in a given process when people 
would disagree, and people needed a clear understanding of what to do, and what 
the aim of the process was in such a situation, and what their rights and 
obligations were.263 PEFC had made commitments to improving its consultation 
and participation processes, and its chain of custody arrangements, but the 
materials were not easily accessible or publicly available. This made it difficult to 
assess where PEFC stood on anything, or whether past failings had really been 
addressed.264 Another informant observed that PEFC had a policy “high up” that it 
would not talk to anybody it considered critical of the system. They thought the 
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system had a deliberate policy of diversion, or not responding, to anything 
properly.265 
Business informants had various views regarding the transparency of the 
system. One, commenting on the transparency of the national standard setting 
procedures noted that standards were developed inside schemes, which 
represented forest owners. It was true that the standard was open for consultation, 
and available for at least some time for the public to make comments. But the 
ultimate decision about what to incorporate from this feedback rested with the 
scheme itself, and how it dealt with comments was not at all clear.266 A second 
comment was made regarding the extent to which PEFC publicised its activities, 
which, it was admitted, might be seen as a weakness of the system.267  
One informant from the third group believed that the priority for certification 
was that decisions were made in an open manner but this was delivered by the 
broader, national, “political process.”268 This view was echoed by another 
member of the third group of informants, who believed that the democratic 
mechanisms of society in general provided sufficient transparency in decision 
making; stakeholders participating in certification could trust these to deliver what 
was required.269 However, another interviewee admitted that the lack of clarity 
regarding who was ultimately responsible for the approval and justification of 
decisions made within PEFC was a disadvantage of the system.270 
Evaluation 
It could not be said that the initial development of PEFC occurred in a particularly 
open, or transparent manner. This was recognised as a problem by some of 
PEFC’s original members. Some information is not publicly available at all (such 
as financial matters), and much of what goes on inside the system’s internal 
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participatory structures, such as meetings of the Board of Directors and General 
Assemblies, continues to be opaque. This opacity may be partly attributable to the 
fact that transparency within the PEFC system has a particular definitional 
context, and refers more to the process of issuing public information, than the 
openness of the system’s structures and processes to public scrutiny. NGOs 
interpret its failings in this broader sense. Here the critique relates to the 
availability and quality of information, rather than timeliness. However, even in 
this more limited interpretation, PEFC has been criticised by supporters as well as 
opponents for failing to adequately publicise its activities. Information on some of 
the institution’s activities is available through its newsletters and on its website. 
Overall, however, transparency within PEFC is determined to be low. 
Decision Making 
Democracy 
The observation has been made that “PEFC relies on the democratic procedures 
where the society at large defines the rights and duties of different forest users and 
implements them through normative regulations.”271 The notion that PEFC 
considers itself democratically legitimated by such external arrangements 
deserves some consideration in the light of how democracy is exercised internally. 
Within the General Assembly enfranchised members have between one and three 
votes commensurate with the annual cutting rates of less than 10 million cubic 
metres, between 10 and 30 million m3, and more than 30 million m3.272 This 
approach to decision making has been criticised as rendering the system 
undemocratic, as it disproportionately favours large producers. This is 
compounded by the fact that forest interests also predominate at a Board level 
where decisions are reached on the basis of simple majority.273 Non-forestry 
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interests are also in the minority in national decision making bodies, and their 
involvement occurs at a relatively late stage of the process.274 The procedures 
adopted within PEFC have been defended by PEFC supporters, and contrasted 
with those used within the FSC, which has been accused of creating an “artificial 
democracy” amongst participating interests.275 
Interviews 
For NGOs, because the system favoured the forestry sector (forest owners and the 
forest industry) the manner in which decisions were made were totally weighted 
in their direction.276 One informant considered it a waste of time to sit in so-called 
consensus processes that merely resulted in the production of minority reports 
stating the NGO view, but with little effect.277 Another felt that the PEFC could 
be made to work if the procedures underlying the establishment of standards 
setting processes ensured stakeholder balance. But currently, the process was 
clearly unbalanced: forest owners set the rules and the forest sector as a whole 
dominated the process; they paid the consultants and invited people “to get a little 
buy in and legitimacy.”278 In one national scheme, for example, although 
decisions were usually taken by consensus, this had proved unworkable for 
NGOs, because they were expected to support the national certification 
programme and its conception of forest management in order to participate.279 
Business informants accepted that NGOs would be more likely to participate in 
PEFC if they were given greater voting rights, and that final decisions were made 
in “rather small committees.”280 Furthermore, PEFC was built on the Helsinki 
process, which had already addressed these issues, so there was no need to 
reinvent the wheel. In contrast to PEFC, FSC’s decision making processes directly 
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contradicted the constitutional legitimacy of electoral decision making.281 Such 
processes constituted a “strange image of democracy.”282 
This view from within the business sector was echoed by one informant from 
the third group of subjects, who questioned the fundamental validity of increasing 
NGO democratic rights. Only those who were committed to forestry had the right 
to decide what was good for the forest, not NGOs. Environmental and social 
groups had that right in the FSC system, but this was not the case in the real 
world, because it was ultimately the owners who were responsible for undertaking 
forestry activities. The democratic processes within the nation state inherently 
addressed the divergent views in society, and nothing more was required.283 
Evaluation 
PEFC displays a clear institutional preference for leaving democracy within the 
confines of the nation-state. Some interviewees in the study expressed the deeply 
held fear that alternative models would give NGOs excessive powers, create 
uncertainty, and undermine the rights of forest owners. A common view amongst 
interests supportive of PEFC was that there were already sufficient safeguards in 
the governmental regulatory environment for stakeholders to influence decision 
making regarding forest management. Governmental processes already fulfilled 
the social requirements of SFM (see also behaviour change below). Such views 
were clearly influential during the formation of PEFC, and have affected its 
democratic style ever since.  
Internationally, when non-forestry interests are accorded the right to vote, the 
combined social and environmental forces are unable to outvote those 
representing economic interests. International voting procedures also mean that 
large forest producers outweigh smaller interests. Across its national schemes, 
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PEFC publicly promotes itself as a ‘multi-stakeholder’. Institutionally, however, 
the stakeholders making up the divergent interests associated with SFM do not 
enjoy the same ability to exercise powers of decision making within the system. 
This undermines the democratic functionality of multi-stakeholder processes of 
decision making when they are utilised. It is not surprising that certain interests 
have expressed their frustration with these arrangements, whilst others are more 
than satisfied. Currently, some of those dissatisfied with the standards developed 
by the various national schemes (indigenous and environmental interests) tend to 
exercise their democratic rights in the public domain through protest and dissent, 
rather than inside the institution. 
Consequently much of the forest discourse within the system has been pre-
determined and debate, understood as the free exchange of views for the mutual 
benefit of all, plays very little role in decision making. The democratic legitimacy 
of PEFC is therefore open to challenge. But the challenge to PEFC’s legitimacy is 
not about the intrinsic worth of deliberative versus aggregative democracy. The 
problem is rather that PEFC’s democratic processes are not seen as neutral, and 
participants are treated -- and heeded -- differently, resulting in divergent levels of 
trust in decision making authority.284 The opportunity for democracy to flourish in 
such an environment is low.  
Agreement  
Unless stated in the Statutes otherwise, decisions in the General Assembly are 
made by a simple majority of votes.285 Voting within the Board of Directors is 
also on a simple majority basis and may be exercised by email.286 The Executive 
Committee, which sits under the Board of Directors, does not have any formal 
mechanisms for reaching agreement.287 
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It is interesting to note in contrast to the majority voting associated with the 
PEFC Council, that the process of standards setting at the national level -- once it 
has been initiated by forestry interests -- is on the basis of consensus. 288 National 
forums are obliged to develop their own written procedures for the formative, 
“consensus building” stage of national standards development.289 The definition 
of consensus within the PEFC system follows that of ISO.290 Approval of the 
standards is also based on consensus.291 The validity of this claim has been 
challenged by NGO commentators who claim “publicity material cites 
organisations as being part of a consensus, when in fact they were not” (see 
comments provided by informants immediately below, and under Dispute 
Settlement).292  
Once the national body has developed the final draft of national standards, they 
are distributed nationally as part of a formal process of consultation.293 
International consultation occurs after the national scheme has been submitted for 
assessment and an impartial consultant, with no vested interest has been engaged. 
The applicant national body “actively requests comments from interested groups”, 
which are passed on to the consultant. The PEFC Council encourages everyone 
with an interest to provide comments to the consultant.294 Once they have been 
developed and assessed, national schemes are endorsed internationally by a vote 
requiring two-thirds majority firstly by the Board and subsequently by the General 
Assembly.295 
Interviews 
Comments on how agreements were reached in the PEFC system concerned both 
voting and consensus, but had little to do with procedural mechanics, and more to 
do with politics. One NGO pointed out that there was a problem with the voting 
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system internationally, as NGOs could only ever be associate members, and had 
no voting power.296 Similar views were expressed by another interviewee, who 
added that neither social nor environmental stakeholders had any formal power on 
any level of governance within the PEFC because of its voting arrangements. 
They noted that PEFC said it wanted environmental and social stakeholders to 
participate, and acknowledged that the scheme had met, for example, with labour 
interests to this end. But there had as yet been no changes to any of the voting 
procedures.297 The problem with PEFC was that “somebody else” always made 
the final decisions and that NGOs had lost their input by that stage.298 In their 
country, according to one informant, there was no consensus and the process was 
always majority rule.299 However, a further interviewee pointed to the Stock-Dove 
process in Sweden as a “different dialogue” between PEFC and FSC interests, and 
represented something PEFC should learn from.300 
Several business interviewees commented on the nature of decision making 
within PEFC and FSC. One argued that the structures of both PEFC and FSC 
were open to influence. Decisions were made differently in each system, but in 
both cases the ground rules affected the nature of the decisions made.301 Another 
went so far as to claim that one raison d’être for the PEFC was in fact to resist the 
new, shared decision making processes within the FSC system. If the discussion 
on certification had remained confined to technical matters of forest management 
the differences between the varying interests would probably have been resolved. 
But views as to whether NGOs and other groups had the right to decide if forest 
management was good or not was an underlying problem. Groups that wanted to 
keep such processes to themselves largely retained the decision making powers.302  
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An interviewee from the third group commented that the differences between 
private forest owners and NGOs as to how reach agreement were both 
philosophical and political, and almost irreconcilable.303  
Evaluation 
PEFC contains a range of procedures for reaching agreement. There is some use 
of qualified majority voting on an international level, in the case of endorsing 
national schemes, but this method of agreement is largely a legislative 
requirement under PEFC’s articles of incorporation. Generally speaking, PEFC 
functions on a majority voting system internationally, clearly defined in the rules 
governing the General Assembly and the Board of Directors. International bodies, 
which are not the national governing bodies of the various member schemes, have 
no procedural role in reaching agreement (see Equality and Democracy above). 
On a national level, there appears to be some variation in how national governing 
bodies function in terms of reaching agreement. There is also a lack of clarity on 
the exact definition and function of consensus within the different standard setting 
processes of member schemes, even if consensus is formally defined at the 
international level. An otherwise high degree of clarity at the international level 
regarding methods of agreement is offset by inconsistencies at the national level, 
resulting in a medium score. 
Dispute Settlement  
According to PEFC, “[t]he right for appeals and appropriate grievance procedures 
related to the implementation of the certification schemes, ensures fair and 
impartial scheme implementation and certification.”304 All appeals, complaints 
and dispute procedures are couched within PEFC’s normative documents in the 
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context of national certification schemes. There do not appear to be any formal 
international mechanisms. National stakeholder forums associated with standards 
development are expected to have written procedures outlining an appeal 
mechanism for impartially dealing with any procedural or substantive complaints 
that arise.305 The same procedures apply to developing chain of custody 
standards.306 Both the national governing entities and certification enterprises are 
also required to develop dispute settlement bodies, or have procedures for 
developing such bodies on an ad hoc basis, to address certification-related 
problems.307  
NGOs however have criticised PEFC for the absence of complaints procedures 
and dispute resolution mechanisms.308 Although there is a mandatory emphasis on 
consensus building in standards development and the views of dissenting voices 
must be recorded, their concerns do not have to be addressed. This kind of 
procedural ambiguity makes dispute resolution, even where such processes exist, 
difficult to implement effectively.309  
Interviews 
Three NGOs discussed the ideal and the reality of dispute settlement within their 
national systems. One expressed the view that it was a very important part of any 
governance system to have conflict resolution and complaints mechanisms in 
place; without them, it could not function.310 One national NGO informant 
commented that during the standards development process they had submitted a 
letter of complaint to the chairperson of the scheme seeking a response on a 
number of substantive issues, but it was neither circulated, nor its contents 
addressed.311 Another discussed the problems indigenous people experienced in 
having any of their grievances addressed within the PEFC programme in the same 
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country, either at the level of the scheme itself, or via its accredited certifiers. It 
had “fine stakeholder processes” for consulting with indigenous people about land 
use and what they were planning, and what their opinions were, but they actually 
had no powers to stop anything. Such processes existed solely for PEFC “to be 
able to say they have a process.” They felt that after years of dialogue there 
should be some understanding of indigenous grievances, but in reality forestry 
interests “did not want to know” and simply disregarded their views.312 Concerns 
were also expressed regarding the extent to which both the certification scheme 
and the certifiers implemented the requirements for dispute settlement arising 
from stakeholder consultation. One NGO reported that there had been so many 
complaints raised against large forestry companies in their country by local 
communities and indigenous stakeholders that people now considered that the 
companies were basically self-certifying. This interviewee had tried instigating 
grievance mechanisms against one of the companies, but there had been no 
detectable changes. They commented that the standard looked very good on paper 
but nothing was accomplished practically.313 Another informant was of the 
opinion that the decision making processes within the system set up inherent 
conflicts.314 
One interviewee from the third group of subjects provided an anecdotal 
observation on how disputes were settled within the PEFC system. Within their 
national scheme conflicts regarding the system, or relating to standards setting, 
were addressed through the one person-one vote procedures of the board and the 
national certification council. Since NGOs had chosen not participate in the 
development of the national system the problem of economic and environmental 
groups needing to resolve discussions by such means had not arisen. Mitigation of 
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conflict through any other means was neither constitutionally nor legally 
permitted for associations in their country. The membership as a whole 
constituted the highest decision making body, and issues that needed to be 
resolved were determined by balloting the members.315 According to the one 
business interviewee who did comment on dispute settlement, the view was 
expressed that conflicts between interests were best resolved in the market.316 
Evaluation 
The settlement of disputes in a formal sense occurs only at the national level 
within the PEFC system. National member schemes are obliged to create either 
dispute settlement bodies, or have other procedures, but it is unclear how effective 
these mechanisms really are, or in some cases if they have been used at all. A 
further problem may lie in the fact that complaints mechanisms are restricted to 
matters regarding standards setting, certification or implementation. The absence 
of any body to which complainants may take grievances concerning national 
governing bodies or the PEFC Council itself is also problematic. So too is the lack 
of clarity concerning what national governing bodies and the PEFC Council does 
once it has “considered” stakeholder concerns arising during the course of 
national standards setting, or national schemes’ accreditation. It seems more 
important in the PEFC system to be able to demonstrate the existence of dispute 
settlement mechanisms per se rather than have disputes settled. The ability of 
PEFC to settle disputes is low. 
Implementation 
Behaviour Change 
Both forest governance scholars and NGO commentators challenge PEFC’s 
commitment to SFM. The system has been described as a “strategic move to 
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regain control over an issue area predominated by environmental interests and co-
opt the discourse on forest certification.”317 
Having failed to achieve its objective of gaining EU-level support for forest 
owners, Europe’s forest industry set out to create a certification framework 
suitable for small forest owners, and against the FSC.318 PEFC’s framers appeared 
initially to be reluctant to adopt any C&I.319 However, as internal deliberations 
over the requirements for a certification system progressed, it was acknowledged 
that some guidelines were required as framework around which to develop 
national standards.320 However, the very value of using C&I processes as a basis 
for certified forest management activities is questioned by NGOs, as are the 
governmental processes, which gave rise to them. C&I have the value of 
improving communication and awareness of sustainable management, but it is 
argued they should be seen as being independent of certification or other quality 
assurance processes, and can only provide an “indicative reference.”321 It has been 
further stressed that they should “not be used in isolation to determine 
sustainability in forest management.”322 As early as 1997 in the IPF process it was 
recognised that “criteria and indicators are not performance standards for 
certifying management.”323 This intergovernmental view was echoed by NGOs in 
2000, who reiterated that C&I processes were “neither an indication of nor a 
commitment to sustainable forest management.”324   
Interviews 
NGOs generally interpreted PEFC as a reaction, or counter-initiative, to FSC.325 
One had reached the conclusion after seeing the first version of their country’s 
standard that the process had been designed to obscure the FSC. By muddying the 
waters people would be unable to tell the difference between the two schemes, 
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thus creating an opportunity for PEFC to play for time and see how things 
developed. This interviewee thought this strategy had been successful.326 
Certification was a significant tool for achieving SFM, and various substitute 
systems, most of which had joined PEFC, had arisen with the intention of 
avoiding some of the more critical aspects of the original idea. The creation of 
national certification schemes was a way for industry to avoid dealing with 
international environmental groups and the stricter demands of such international 
systems as the FSC.327  
Schemes within the PEFC system were also challenged regarding the level of 
their commitment to stakeholder consultation. Forest managers had put a lot of 
pressure on PEFC to ensure that there should be no public consultation regarding 
management at the individual forest unit level. This had changed after various 
European countries started implementing timber procurement policies. In the case 
of the UK PEFC faced the possibility of not being granted the status of 
sustainably produced timber on account of not including stakeholders, and it had 
had to make changes. This had resulted in a lot of changes on paper, its 
governance structures, standard setting processes and forest assessment, but these 
had yet to be turned into practice.328 Another commented that PEFC certification 
had changed nothing in terms of consultation in their country. They were simply 
told that logging would occur, and although they might be able to delay it by 
some months or possibly years, it still went ahead, and it was the managers, not 
the stakeholders, who decided how much to cut. Despite explaining that certain 
management practices impacted on their livelihoods, nothing changed.329 NGO 
interviewees were prepared to concede that at least in terms of forest owners, 
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attitudes had improved considerably from the early ‘nineties, and that behaviour 
had changed.330  
Improvements in forest owner behaviour notwithstanding, as it currently stood, 
PEFC remained a reactive instrument, established not with the aim of driving 
standards up, but to maintain the status quo.331 Other informants expanded on this 
idea, referring to PEFC as a public relations exercise, and branded the system an 
example of “greenwash”, or in similar terms.332 Finally, one NGO considered that 
because their particular national standard did not “require anything that would be 
above the requirements of the law”, this made the value of the certificate very 
low. Certification in this instance had become “a kind of obligatory national forest 
policy, which everybody gets, and nobody has to do anything.” Because PEFC 
was so well established nationally, NGOs could have no effect, even if they 
publicised “scandalous cases” on the Internet.333 
Business informants preferred to analyse the system in terms of its contribution 
to what were perceived as “the well-established international norms of 
certification.”334  On this view, the differences between the standards of FSC and 
PEFC were not particularly great; it was the philosophy underlying the policy 
processes driving the schemes that was significant.335 Because PEFC was more 
“realistic” than FSC, managers had made commitments to improving their forests; 
legislative changes were therefore secondary.336 Another informant observed that 
they had suggested to PEFC that it should change the word “endorsement” in their 
title to “evaluation.” Use of the word endorsement, in their opinion, made the 
Programme look “like a rubber stamp.”337 
One interviewee from the third group of informants commented that PEFC was 
proving to be a useful option for negotiating certification in private forests. The 
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advantage in having a system like PEFC was that it could provide a lot of 
certificates in a short amount of time, but the disadvantage was that there was 
very little obligation for scheme members to act in accordance with the rules.338 A 
second interviewee attributed the lack of change brought about by PEFC to 
concerns amongst landowners that they would lose money if they pushed the 
boundaries of SFM. They pointed to the difference in rules between FSC and 
PEFC regarding the retention of dead wood as a case in point.339 Another agreed 
that there was a lot of variation between the attitudes of different forest owners; 
there were some who threw every communication they received into the rubbish. 
This was not an issue for the system, however, but an issue for private forest 
owners to deal with.340 
There was extensive debate within all three groups of informants as to whether 
the governmental C&I processes adopted by PEFC had either positively or 
negatively influenced the system. Views in the NGO group were generally 
critical, while business interests were positive. Informants from the third group of 
subjects provided widely discrepant views, one seeing the governmental C&I 
processes as having given the system a great deal of legitimacy and stakeholder 
buy-in, while a second accused PEFC of manipulating and subverting 
intergovernmental agreements to serve their own ends.341 PEFC was seen to be 
not as good as FSC in terms of forest protection, and some uncertainty was 
expressed as to whether private forest owners would “change their habits” under 
PEFC. If they did not, then there would be no progress.342 
Evaluation 
The accusation is made both by commentators, and by a number of informants 
interviewed in this study, that PEFC was established as a reaction, or a counter-
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initiative to FSC. Nevertheless there is also some recognition that private forest 
owners, for instance, have moved a long way from their original position of 
outright opposition to certification, to accepting it as a regulatory tool for forest 
management. The impact of PEFC on behavioural change should therefore be 
understood as coming, at least in the case of private landowners, from an 
extremely low base. The impact of PEFC on shaping the normative behaviour of 
forest owners should not be underestimated; but it is more a case that these 
interests have moved from a position of hostility to the idea of SFM as it is 
expressed in forest certification, to acceptance. Similarly, where PEFC schemes 
sit alongside existing codes of forest practice, they should be interpreted as 
articulating the status quo of forest management, rather than moving beyond it. 
These considerations contribute to a rating of medium.  
Problem Solving 
As the PEFC framework is based at the national level it has been argued that it 
should not be understood as a genuinely international scheme, but as “a mutual 
recognition framework through which national certification schemes can 
recognise each other as having equivalent standards.”343 Six pan-European criteria 
for SFM were elaborated at the 1998 Lisbon conference into guidelines (Pan 
European Operational Level Guidelines - PEOLG), which were intended as series 
of recommendations to promote sustainable management on a purely voluntary 
basis.344 
The use of the C&I of the MCPFE process and the PEOLG was controversial, 
since they were adopted without seeking the advice of the MCPFE secretariat. 
Had the PEFC done so, it is likely it would have been advised that the criteria and 
indictors were not designed as the basis for a standards setting system, nor was the 
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process prepared to endorse or oppose any certification scheme.345 However, 
given the voluntary nature of such guidelines, PEFC initiatives are not bound to 
follow these C&I and the creation of rules and procedures is left to the discretion 
of national governing bodies.346 This strategic use of pre-existing C&I for PEFC’s 
own ends has been interpreted as injecting confusion into the forest certification 
debate.347  
NGOs have been deeply critical of PEFC’s refusal to mandate performance-
based standards across the system, and argue that: “there is very little evidence 
that systems-based schemes alone can lead to environmental improvement.”348 
Where PEFC schemes do have performance-based standards, it is further argued 
in some instances that they still do not adequately meet social and environmental 
criteria.349 The failure of the PEFC framework to address performance issues it is 
argued raises “serious doubts…about the capability of the system to bring about 
better forest management at the ground level.”350 
Interviews 
NGO interviewees were negative regarding PEFC’s general claims to deliver 
SFM. One felt that a central question was whether the standard for their country 
actually required any changes to the existing regime. Simply claiming, as industry 
did, that it was committed to the standard and that forest owners were aware of 
and prepared to fulfil its requirements, did not mean the problem was solved.351 
All the while the clear-cutting of ancient and high conservation value forests 
continued, and was labelled, the problem of biodiversity decline would remain.352 
It was merely a way of providing an eco-label for existing forest management and 
there was no way to prove any claim that forest management had been improved. 
353 The assumptions underlying PEFC’s governance presented problems.354 This 
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was because there was no real vision “to really reform forestry.”355 This related to 
the issue of performance, and particularly whether any of the PEFC schemes 
could be considered as delivering genuine performance standards.356  
Given the range of business interests interviewed, views on PEFC’s 
performance varied. One informant supported the NGO contention regarding 
performance. PEFC’s decision to allow weak verification mechanisms had the 
potential to render even the strongest of standards meaningless. The PEFC 
Council process of endorsing national schemes worried them. Independent 
consultants were expected to check that different stakeholders had been consulted 
during standards development. This informant believed that these processes were 
more to determine whether stakeholders had been contacted, than whether their 
input had actually been adopted.357 Another argued that a study of PEFC and FSC 
in Germany had found no differences between the systems at the forest stand 
level, but that PEFC was stronger in some areas than FSC and vice versa. They 
defended the PEFC’s performance record as nothing to be ashamed of and 
explained the problem in terms of the fact that it was the role of NGOs to criticise. 
These were not fact-based arguments, but political.358 Another informant, 
speaking more generally, felt here was little to tell the PEFC and FSC systems 
apart on the level of standards, C&I. They acknowledged, however, that 
differences had been highlighted in the UK government’s timber procurement 
policy regarding stakeholder participation, interest representation and 
transparency in the two schemes.359 However, one interviewee from the third 
group of informants thought that PEFC was “a bit below the level” of other 
standards in their region.360 
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Some informants adopted a more sanguine view regarding the contribution 
made by PEFC. It was necessary to recognise that PEFC schemes represented 
“small steps in the right direction”, and that it was better to have the “wrong” 
scheme than not have any. 361 
Evaluation 
Attitudes regarding PEFC’s problem solving capacity in both the literature and 
interviews were are not overly complimentary, particularly regarding 
performance. Here the problem is not simply whether PEFC’s impact on the 
ground has been effective, but whether this impact is quantified, especially if 
performance is not a desired outcome of some standards in the case of process, or 
systems-based approaches. As PEFC was initiated in Europe, where deforestation 
and other problems such as illegal logging are less of a problem than in 
developing countries, the impact of the scheme on tackling environmental issues 
in the tropics has been limited. PEFC’s problem solving ability is rated as low. 
Durability 
It has been argued that industry and forest owner certification schemes ( which 
PEFC is considered to be an example) believe in the dominance of industry in 
rulemaking. The intent behind such schemes is to keep the policy agenda 
confined, whilst at the same time delivering flexibility in terms of policy 
options.362 Elsewhere, the observation has been made that single sector 
domination in standard setting has allowed for flexible and efficient rule making 
across the PEFC system.363 This has become a problem on account of the lack of 
any mechanism for ensuring consistency in standards across the system.364 A 
consequence is that some interested parties, particularly NGOs, point to lax 
standards.365 NGO commentators have also accused PEFC endorsement 
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procedures of being unduly flexible, leading to inconsistencies that make the 
system only as strong as its weakest link.366 In the absence of uniform and binding 
criteria, it is argued inconsistencies can exist not only across schemes but also 
within countries.367 
Interviews 
Inconsistency between PEFC schemes was a major theme in NGO criticisms of 
the system. In Russia, for example, there were two, competitive, PEFC systems, 
one dominated by industry, the other developed by forestry academics. The latter 
was closely modelled on the FSC, and was identified as one environmental NGO 
as having the potential to be beneficial. It was unclear which scheme would 
ultimately prevail, however.368 PEFC standards were also “highly variable”, 
making some schemes worse than others.369 It did not have an internally 
consistent structure; this was exemplified by the different structures for standards 
setting.370 Having no across the board performance standards that everybody had 
to adhere to was a critical oversight. From a consumer perspective this meant that 
when you bought timber or paper with a PEFC logo it did not mean a thing.371 
This had produced a flawed process, which did not attempt to ascertain what the 
outcomes would be in the different national systems.372 
NGOs also criticised PEFC for being overly variable in the manner in which 
interests were represented. One NGO informant expressed deep concerns about 
the initial way in which the standard setting discussions in their country were 
broken down into FSC-style chambers. They disagreed with the placement of 
organic farmers in the environmental chamber, when they were economic 
stakeholders, and the location of harvesting contractors in the social chamber, 
when they too were economically involved.373 Another argued that there was an 
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inconsistency in PEFC whether consultation occurred at the forest management 
unit, or regional level. In some countries, consultation occurred at the forest unit 
level, which was good, but this was an exception. Most countries did not consult 
at that level, and their requirements for consultation were “very scant, or very, 
very minimal.”374 
There was also recognition by one NGO informant that PEFC had proved itself 
to be highly adaptable and flexible, and the institution could certainly not be 
accused of standing still. It had grown continually, and had proved itself capable 
of adapting to changing conditions. It had accepted the PEOLG, and responding 
to the EU governmental timber procurement policies, it had later recognised the 
need to make consultation a requirement during certification assessment. PEFC 
had also moved closer to, and emulated, FSC, as demonstrated by its chain of 
custody improvements. However, the major difference that it did not require the 
equal participation of different stakeholder groups in the standard setting process 
still remained. Flexibility was a major strength of the system and it had changed 
considerably from where it had started, and change was still ongoing. The system 
was changing “more in the direction of a proper certification scheme”, and it was 
not possible any more to say that the Programme’s C&I were not as good as the 
FSC. For any “person on the street” there was no discernible difference; but the 
problem with the system -- “even more so than the FSC” -- was the lack of 
implementation. 375 
One business informant acknowledged that there were “discrepancies across 
the national system”, but put this down to the system’s processes of continual 
improvement. It was a matter of fact that national processes all originated from 
different starting points, and they would “not all get there at the same time and 
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moment.”376 According to another, this created a problem, because even if 
standards in some instances were not bad, there were so many discrepancies that 
the whole system looked like it had been made “to endorse just about 
anything.”377 
Evaluation 
Acknowledging that PEFC has been in existence since 1999, the observation 
should be made that the scheme has had at least two major makeovers in its 
lifetime. It has changed from being a certification programme for European forest 
management, to an international one, and having achieved international status, has 
been substantially revised once. These imply a certain ability to adapt to changing 
market conditions, and to respond to external criticism. Such flexibility could be 
viewed positively, showing the system is responsive to governmental and non-
governmental pressure, and committed to continuous improvement. Alternatively, 
this constant ‘shifting of goal posts’ makes determination of PEFC’s core values 
difficult.  
However, a very clear criticism of ENGOs, and apparent in an examination of 
the national schemes themselves, is the lack of consistency across the system. 
Standards can be either system or performance based; certification can be at either 
a forest management unit, regional or national level; and governance 
arrangements at the national level can also vary considerably. This may reflect a 
genuine attempt to respond to local conditions, or economic/social/political 
expediency. Consideration of PEFC’s adaptability and variability (both positive 
and negative) gives it a ranking of medium. 
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Governance Quality of PEFC 
Commentary 
Table 6.3 Evaluative matrix of PEFC governance quality 
Principle 1. Meaningful Participation 
Criterion 1. Interest representation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
Actual score: 3 
2. Organisational responsibility 
Highest possible score: 6 
Lowest possible score: 2 
Actual score: 2 
Sub-
total 
(out of 
15): 
 
            
5 
Indicator  Inclusiveness Equality Resources Accountability Transparency  
High       
Medium       
Low 1 1 1 1 1  
Principle 2. Productive deliberation 
Criterion 3. Decision making 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
Actual score: 4 
4. Implementation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3  
Actual score: 5 
Sub-
total 
(out of 
18): 
 
            
9 
Indicator  Democracy Agreement Dispute 
settlement 
Behavioural 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Durability  
High        
Medium  2  2  2  
Low 1  1  1   
Total 
(out of 
33) 
      Final 
Score: 
            
14 
PEFC received fourteen points out of a maximum total of thirty-three. Eight 
indicators achieved low ratings (inclusiveness, equality, resources, accountability, 
transparency, democracy, dispute settlement, and problem solving), and three 
medium ratings (agreement, behaviour change and durability). The conventional 
pass/fail target value of 50% was met by one criterion (implementation). The 
scores achieved were 56% (implementation), 44% (decision making), and 33% 
(interest representation and organisational responsibility). At the principle level, 
the aggregate result was 33% for meaningful participation, constituting a failure 
  420 
to reach the target value of 50%.  The aggregate result for productive deliberation 
was 50% thus reaching the target value (see Table 6.3 above). 
Postscript 
PEFC Governance Review 
As part of its October 2007 strategic plan, PEFC resolved to undertake a 
comprehensive review of its governance.378 A panel of “leading experts in 
sustainable forestry” was convened, and included three members of the Board of 
Directors and four independent individuals (two of whom were from international 
environmental and animal welfare organisations). The mandate of the panel was 
to review PEFC’s effectiveness with regards to those aspects of its governance 
concerning rules, standards, implementation and monitoring, the extent of support 
from existing members, and to engage in dialogue with environmental NGOs.379  
The review followed the general analytical methodology of the international 
institution One World Trust, which evaluates quality of governance based on 
three governance attributes: participation, transparency, and complaint and 
response.380 In terms of participation, the review recommended that PEFC should 
“consider developing and adopting a participation policy document outlining the 
opportunities for external stakeholders to participate in PEFC processes as well as 
procedures ensuring meaningful participation.”381 Specific elements of 
recommended action included the convening of a PEFC-sponsored conference to 
initiate dialogue with environmental NGOs, identifying and recruiting local 
stakeholders to participate in national governing bodies and providing means for 
them to participate substantively in PEFC at the international level.382 To this end 
the review proposed the expansion of the existing extraordinary members into a 
broader, forum-based range of stakeholders, to “be granted specific rights and 
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responsibilities in the organisation’s governance process.”383 The resulting 
Stakeholder Forum would be permitted to both nominate two positions of the 
Board of Directors, and to the Programme’s Panel of Experts.384 The Forum 
would be enfranchised with a one-member-one-vote method of reaching 
agreement, and be given powers constituting a maximum of 50% of the votes 
allocated to PEFC Council itself.385 Measures for improving the transparency of 
the institution were to include consideration of the development and adoption of a 
“disclosure and transparency document covering the disclosure of information 
through both the website as well as direct information requests, including a 
compliance monitoring mechanism.”386 This was identified as a priority for the 
institution.387 The review concluded that PEFC’s existing requirements for dispute 
settlement already covered a large amount of the One World Trust’s indicator list, 
but the Programme “should consider revising its guidelines [including] issues of 
retaliation against internal stakeholders (members) and monitoring processes.”388 
However, the value of the recommendation was somewhat mitigated by the 
recognition that PEFC had “no control” over the existing complaints and appeals 
procedures of its associated organisations. Nevertheless it could “improve the 
clarity and accessibility of its own process and consider options to assist or 
facilitate enquiries or complaints to reach resolution through the proper 
channels.”389 This would make PEFC’s existing decentralised system more “user 
friendly”, and would help direct complaints to the appropriate point in the 
system.390 
Other elements of note within the review included a recognition that the 
Programme needed to respond to criticisms more constructively, under the maxim 
“the most strident or vitriolic the attack, the more gracious and engaging the 
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response.”391 A tropical initiative aimed at creating new alliances and advancing 
PEFC’s standards for SFM should also be developed.392 A Technical Unit would 
also be established to “provide capacity-building services to members and 
prospective members.”393 Substantial changes were also recommended relating to 
the institution’s organisational structure at the international level, and assessment, 
endorsement and mutual recognition processes.394 
Conclusions 
PEFC’s genesis is best understood as a counter-initiative to the market dominance 
of FSC in Europe, tailored to meet the needs of specific stakeholders, and 
subsequently expanded to meet the same set of imperatives globally. PEFC might 
well be described as an advocacy coalition made up of a variety of actors from 
public and private organisations, sharing basic policy beliefs and seeking to 
interact with and influence the decisions of government institutions.395 In the case 
of PEFC, this coalition is built largely around private forest owners and those 
industries that derive their forest products from such sources. 
These origins need not have mattered significantly if they had not had such a 
profound impact on the structures and processes that underlie the Programme’s 
governance system as a whole. Internationally, key stakeholders such as 
environmental NGOs, unions and indigenous peoples are effectively excluded 
from actively participating in the institution’s highest organ, the General 
Assembly. While they enjoy a degree of representation on the Board of Directors, 
it does not match the power wielded by forest owners and the forest industry. 
Although it is technically possible for NGOs or other groups to attend the General 
Assembly as delegates, or delegation observers, they would attend in a national 
representative, not sectoral, capacity. Again, although other international 
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organisations can become non-voting members, none of these represent 
environmental interests, and are all either forest industry, forest owner, or forestry 
management oriented. In addition to the low degree of environmental interest 
representation, the degree of developing country representation is also mixed. 
This can be partly explained by its early history, but the institution still remains 
largely Euro-centric in terms of representation in both its Board of Directors and 
the General Assembly.  
With the democratic emphasis at the international level being largely based on 
systems of majority voting, it is difficult to consider its decision making processes 
as being particularly deliberative in nature. Furthermore, voting members of the 
General Assembly consist of national governing bodies, the establishment of 
which is the responsibility of national forest owners’ organisations or national 
forestry sector, sanctioned by the major forest owners’ groups of the country. 
Under these procedures minority viewpoints are unable to wield the same degree 
of influence as those that predominate numerically. Early decisions to 
disenfranchise selected interests from shaping the future direction of the 
institution have also resulted in a form of procedural discrimination, whereby only 
those groups which support the forest-owner and forest industry orientation of 
PEFC have a seat at the negotiating table. 
PEFC acknowledges itself that its primary participatory framework is at the 
national and sub-national levels. Nationally, however, the system is ultimately in 
the hands of forest owners and/or forest industry. Although multi-stakeholders 
must be invited to participate in standards setting, there is no such requirement for 
the earlier formative stages of the national institution itself; in fact it is quite the 
reverse. Only forest owners and/or the forest industries in a given country can 
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initiate regime formation. Furthermore, all stakeholders are expected to support 
the Programme. Historically, and constitutionally, the documentation associated 
with the Programme makes it quite clear that member schemes are really only 
accessible to those who support PEFC, and its conception of forest management. 
Again, this might not matter if all stakeholder sectors were included in regime 
formation, but they are not. Some national bodies have been accused of a lack of 
balance in stakeholder representation. In some instances, schemes have been 
developed either entirely by forest owners in the case of Norway, for example, or 
by government and the forestry industry, in the case of Australia.396 
These factors combine to make it structurally difficult for groups in conflict 
with certain aspects of the scheme to have an effective voice, and may go some 
way to explaining why certain interests have withdrawn from national schemes. 
Either unintentionally or intentionally, the system encourages the non-
participation of such interests. Non-core stakeholders consequently face an 
impossible set of choices regarding participation within PEFC. If they do 
participate, the nature of their relationship to the system affords them only limited 
influence in comparison to core interests. If they do not participate, they face the 
risk of being locked out of the national dialogue around forest management, since 
many PEFC schemes comprise, or are fully compatible with, governmental forest 
programmes. This two-pronged incentive not to participate has led a number of 
stakeholders to move even closer to the FSC than they might originally have been, 
thus subjecting them to accusations of bias, making their participation in PEFC 
even more untenable. This situation has only served to reinforce the divide 
between environmental/social and industry/owner interests and the pro- and anti-
PEFC ‘camps’. 
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Similar conclusions can be made regarding PEFC’s decision making processes, 
in the sense that they can be interpreted as non-deliberative. This can be seen at 
the relatively superficial level in the almost complete lack of dialogue between the 
institution and some stakeholders, who should be considered obvious constituents. 
As one informant commented, “there is no discourse.”397 But on a procedural 
level it runs deeper. One example of this is the lack of clarity within the system 
regarding whether substantive concerns raised during the standards development 
phase must be addressed. Another is the system’s inability to settle grievances, for 
what are complaints if not an attempt to initiate dialogue, albeit on a somewhat 
fractious level? In terms of decision making, the very procedures, which are 
supposed to encourage dialogue, such as consensus and qualified majority voting 
cannot function effectively because the broader frameworks in which they operate 
are not functionally democratic. Internationally, there is no universal franchise, 
and a weighted voting system is used when majority votes are cast amongst 
enfranchised members. There may be dialogue within national standards setting 
processes, and there may be consensus, but in terms of the systemic predominance 
of forestry interests, there is very little opportunity for compromise. Why would 
such interests compromise over something that affects them directly, when they 
have control of the process? In terms of both structure and process, it is apparent 
that a number of governance attributes are missing from PEFC. 
Interaction between parties cannot really be interpreted as being social-political 
in nature, but rather as being merely politicised. As an institution, PEFC displays 
some level of competence in terms of implementation. However, due to the many 
different national governing bodies, country schemes are highly inconsistent, 
largely on account of different attitudes regarding the adoption of performance- or 
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systems-based standards. Here, PEFC reflects the existing (and contradictory) 
international norms, and operates within them. But it does not go any further, and 
in some instances fails to meet even some of these normative expectations.  
With the system largely geared around government and forestry interests and 
designed with the aim of accommodating industry needs, it should not be 
surprising that PEFC has been identified by forest governance scholars as having 
virtually no credibility in the NGO sector.398 However, it is as wrong to portray 
environmental NGOs in particular as innocent victims or the unwitting subjects of 
strategic manipulation, as it is to exculpate the PEFC from any blame.399 This 
should caution against an overly simplistic analysis of the relationships between 
environmental and economic interests within PEFC, particularly regarding the 
degree of accountability -- and more broadly, responsibility -- demonstrated by 
NGOs towards those European private forest owners who were initially involved 
the development of PEFC. But it still leaves matters concerning the social sector, 
particularly indigenous peoples, unresolved. 
Whether PEFC has the ability, will and internal support to implement the far-
reaching recommendations of the 2007-2008 governance review is, at this time, 
unknown. It is perhaps worth noting here that many of the recommendations in 
the review are couched in the subjunctive, “should” rather than the imperative 
“shall”, and are not mandatory.400 
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to negotiate with Sámi representatives, they had nevertheless been forced to institute lawsuits and 
file appeals to the United Nation’s Human Rights Committee. The Committee found the logging a 
violation of the Sámi indigenous rights, but forestry activities continued to expand, and the Sámi 
were again required to take Metsähallitus to court. The Sámi parliament had earlier demanded that 
forest management be conducted in Sámi areas under the P&C of the FSC. Herders claimed that 
the criterion realting to the Sámi’s traditional means of  livelihood was not being met under the 
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led to an overall reduction in logging by 50%. Game and fishing interests argued that the forests 
were being overgrazed on account of excessive reindeer populations (Auvo Kaivola, “Ongoing 
Debate about Forestry and Reindeer Husbandry in Upper Lapland in Finland” PEFC News 25 
(April 2005) p. 8). 
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March 2006, the timber industry insisted that PEFC should be treated as one system. However, 
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list (ibid). PEFC responded to the commission saying that it was “regrettable that opinion, rather 
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committee appointed to assist the Minister” (PEFC News, “Belgian Public Procurement Policy 
Includes PEFC”, 31 (May 2006) p. 2.). It should be noted that PEFC has been generally 
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procedures (PEFC News, “UK Government Timber Procurement Policy Continues to Recognize 
PEFC Certified Timber, 26 (July 2005), p. 3, PEFC News, “UK Government Confirms PEFC as 
Source of Legal and Sustainable Timber” 35 (January 2007), p. 1) and in Germany in 2007 (PEFC 
News, “German Government Specifies PEFC”, 36 (March 2007), p. 1). Japan, not a part of the EU 
processes, also included PEFC in its public timber procurement policy (PEFC News, “Japanese 
Public Procurement Policy Chooses PEFC”, 31 (May 2006), p. 1) in 2006. 
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Communities, Forest Dependent Communities and the PEFC Council”, November 2005. 
208 PEFC reiterated its own role as being confined to assessing nationally developed certification 
schemes (PEFC Council, “Position Paper”, p. 2). The paper stated that PEFC insisted upon, and 
only recognised, “the results of full national standards setting” (PEFC Council, “Position Paper”, 
p. 3). Intergovernmental processes were identified as being responsible for the rights regarding, 
and definitions of, anyone who lived in or near forestlands. National processes in turn were 
responsible for ensuring that all stakeholders, including indigenous peoples, and communities 
could  “fully participate”, but this was at the local level. The policy stated that the views of these 
local interests were “considered along with all other stakeholders and consensus is required for all 
national schemes which are endorsed by PEFC Council.” Finally, the certification audit at the 
forest level ensured their views were also “considered” (ibid). As a result of these arrangements 
PEFC Council concluded that: 
Indigenous and other local peoples can participate in both the development of the criteria 
for SFM, the standard setting process and in the public consultation process which 
accompanies a certification audit for the forest they live in, near or are dependent upon 
(ibid). 
209 In the following year PEFC Sweden published its own arrangement “to ensure a balance 
between forestry and reindeer herding interests” (PEFC News, “PEFC Sweden Publishes Policy on 
Sámi Reindeer Herding”, 31 (May 2006) p. 1). It defined “how dialogue and collaboration 
between reindeer herders and the forestry sector” took place (ibid). 
210 One young NGO informant complained that youth were not seen as stakeholders in forest 
issues in their country. The level of inclusion was superficial because within the youth-related 
forestry initiatives it was invariably the over-fifties who occupied all the positions of influence. 
Youth was not powerful enough to wield more than a minor role (personal interview, 13/08/05). 
Another business sector informant in the same country disputed this arguing that youth interests 
were represented within the country’s national certification system (personal interview, 09/09/05). 
     In relation to indigenous people, certification had the potential to be a means of securing basic 
indigenous rights, which were threatened by current forestry activities, but indigenous people were 
effectively treated as second-class citizens when considering livelihood-related issues in forest 
management (personal interview, 26/08/05). One NGO argued that according indigenous people 
equal status with other interests undermined their rights. Considering them a “stakeholder” 
reduced the importance of their struggle to obtain recognition for their rights to their land. As 
“landowners” access to and recognition of land rights were crucial to their survival and 
livelihoods, and gave them a higher significance than other interests. Consequently, indigenous 
peoples should be referred to as rights holders, rather than stakeholders. Certification had the 
potential to assist them in gaining justice, but there was a danger that certification could 
circumvent higher-principle governmental decisions over the status of land. Indigenous people 
often had disputes that needed to be resolved first before matters pertaining to management could 
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be addressed. In such a situation it was not possible to give equal weight to everybody without 
denying or disregarding indigenous rights (personal interview #1, 05/07/05). 
211 Personal interview, # 2, 05/07/05.  
212 Personal interview #1, 05/07/05. 
213 The arguments were as follows: The system was open to them, it was a matter a choice that 
they were not involved (personal interview, 15/09/06); people could not be forced to participate, 
there was nothing that could be done if they made the decision to join another system (personal 
interview #1, 18/07/05); NGO behaviour was “purely a political thing…they did not want to come 
because they are protective of FSC” (personal interview, 12/07/05); NGOs wanted “to have a 
power monopoly for themselves and not real stakeholder processes” where all interests were 
promoted equally (personal interview, 09/09/05); NGO perceptions had some validity, but should 
be understood only in relative terms, when comparing NGO views on their participation in FSC 
compared to PEFC (personal interview, 22/09/05). 
214 Personal interview, 12/07/05. 
215 Personal interview, 15/09/06. 
216 Personal interview, 15/09/06. 
217 Personal interview, 09/09/05. 
218 Personal interview #1, 01/09/06. 
219 Email to PEFC Secretariat sent 01/11/07. 
220 Personal interview, 09/09/05. 
221 Personal interview, 12/07/05. 
222 Personal interview #2, 22/08/05. 
223 By way of example: personal interview, 05/09/06; personal interview #1, 18/07/05; and 
personal interview #1, 17/08/05.   
224 Personal interview #1, 17/08/05. 
225 Personal interview, 26/08/06.  
226 Personal interview #2, 17/08/05. PEFC was very well connected to the established forest 
sector, and had good government contacts. This placed PEFC more in the mainstream than FSC 
and had provided access to funding and political contacts as well as lobbying capacity. The 
national structure of PEFC also meant it had connections to national forest authorities and 
governmental bodies, particularly in France, Austria and Finland. All this had resulted in far more 
money being channelled into PEFC in such countries that FSC, and government investment in 
FSC had been “quite an unequal thing” (ibid). One national NGO representative argued that PEFC 
had very strong government support in their country. They thought this was not justified, because 
certification was supposed to be a market initiative, and governments should not preference one 
system over another financially (personal interview #1, 17/08/05). Another national NGO 
representative from the same country attributed the strength of the system to the support from the 
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forest sector.  This included the ability to pay people to lobby paper buyers or other clients that 
forestry in their country was sustainable (personal interview, 13/08/05). In addition, PEFC was 
particularly attractive to forest owners as system because unlike FSC, certification was basically 
free at the forest owner level (personal interview #1, 17/08/05). The position of indigenous 
interests was in marked contrast to forest owners. Lack of resources had led them to work with 
environmental groups who had assisted them to develop a common statement on the impacts of 
forestry on reindeer herding. This had been necessary because forestry interests had all the money 
and resources to be public in the media, and they wielded vast power in that domain in comparison 
to the herders (personal interview, 26/08/05). 
227 Personal interview #1, 05/07/05. 
228 Personal interview #2, 05/07/05. 
229 Personal interview, 11/07/05. 
230 Personal interview #1, 18/07/05. 
231 Personal interview, 16/09/05. 
232 Articles 6.7 and 6.8, PEFC Council Statutes, p. 4. 
233 Humphreys, “The Certification Wars”, pp. 20-21. 
234 Rehbinder, “Forest Certification and Environmental Law”, p. 340. 
235 Vallejo and Hauselmann, PEFC: An Analysis, p. 26. 
236 Chapter 6, Certification and Accreditation Procedures, p. 4. 
237 Vallejo and Hauselmann, PEFC: An Analysis, p. 5. 
238 Mäntyranta, Forest Certification, pp. 146-154. 
239 Ministerial Conference on the Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE, “Report on the 
Follow-Up of the Strasbourg and Helsinki Ministerial Conferences on the Protection of Forests in 
Europe”, Follow-up Reports on the Ministerial Conferences on the Protection of Forests in 
Europe, Volume 1, ed. Liaison Unit in Lisbon. (Lisbon: Ministry of Agriculture, Rural 
Development and Fisheries of Portugal, 1998)), p. 6, Cashore et al., Governing Through Markets, 
p. 14.  
240 Having embraced the UNCED Forest Principles MCPFE determined at Helsinki to extend the 
concept of sustainable forest management by resolving to develop general guidelines for SFM and 
the conservation of biodiversity in Europe’s forests (MCPFE, “Sustainable Forest Management in 
Europe, Special Report on the Follow-up on the Implementation of Resolutions H1 and H2 of the 
Helsinki Ministerial Conference”, Follow-up Reports on the Ministerial Conferences on the 
Protection of Forests in Europe, Volume 2, ed. Liaison Unit in Lisbon. (Lisbon: Ministry of 
Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries of Portugal, 1998)), p. 257). These criteria are: 1) 
Maintenance and appropriate enhancement of forest resources and their contribution to global 
carbon cycles; 2) Maintenance of ecosystem health and vitality; 3) Maintenance and 
encouragement of productive functions of forests (wood and non-wood); 4) Maintenance, 
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conservation and appropriate enhancement of biological diversity in forest ecosystems; 5) 
Maintenance and appropriate enhancement of protective functions in forest management (notably 
soil and water); 6) Maintenance of other socio-economic functions and conditions (MCPFE, 
Follow-up Reports, Volume 2, p. 258)).240  
      Special emphasis was given at the Helsinki conference to “cooperation for enhancing the 
development of the forest sector” (MCPFE, “Report on the Follow-Up”, p. 1). The criteria were 
described by Pekka Paatosaari, at that stage Forestry Affairs Attaché at the Finnish Embassy in 
London, as providing for the: “assessment of how different countries have progressed in their 
efforts to follow the principles of sustainable forest management and the conservation of 
biological diversity” (Mäntyranta, Forest Certification, p. 123, MCPFE, “Report on the Follow-
Up”, p. 6). Luis Costa Leal, later to become a PEFC Council Director, was then forest advisor to 
the Portuguese Minister for Agriculture and responsible for the preparation of the Lisbon 
conference (PEFC News, “Election of New Board of Directors”, 17 (November 2003), pp. 5-8 at 
p. 8). He identified the outcomes of the MCPFE processes at that time as constituting “a new 
mechanism for forest cooperation in Europe”, resulting in an “appropriate framework for action” 
(MCPFE, “Report on the Follow-Up” p. 1). The PEOLG themselves were developed with forest 
managers and owners and government decision-makers in mind, and for application at the sub-
national level, but to be implemented effectively required local adaptation, and it was only at this 
point that “participation of all interested parties should be encouraged” (MCPFE, “Sustainable 
Forest Management in Europe”, p. 258). The broader context in which these guidelines were 
developed therefore happened externally to PEFC, at a lower level participation of interested 
parties, and not within the PEFC system itself. 
241 Ozinga, Behind the Logo, p. 22, footnote 48.  
242 Personal interview #1, 17/08/05.  
243 Personal interview #1, 17/08/05; personal interview #2, 17/08/05; personal interview, # 2, 
05/07/05.  
    One NGO representative working on a national level questioned the impartiality of the 
chairperson during the development of the standard. This individual was a bureaucrat in the 
country’s ministry of forestry. Questions regarding whether the national standard would follow 
PEFC or FSC had gone unanswered, and interested parties had been allocated to FSC-style 
chambers without consultation. The chairperson had challenged the NGO representative as to 
whether they intended to participate in the process or not. At that point they had withdrawn from 
the scheme because it had failed to respond to their questions (personal interview, 23/08/05). A 
second NGO informant corroborated this view. The national scheme had originally been proposed 
and driven by the government and private forest owners, whose views largely coincided. 
Informally, NGOs had been told that once the standard was developed it would be sent to the FSC 
for approval. There was no formal agreement, or even a name, for the standard at that time. After 
several of their proposals to improve the scheme were rejected, NGOs left. Shortly after the NGOs 
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left, the government, forest owners, forest workers, unions and industry decided not to send it to 
FSC, but to create a national certification scheme. Shortly after that the PEFC was created on a 
pan-European level. The national scheme was certified under the programme. This stakeholder 
thought it inappropriate for the PEFC to have endorsed their national scheme, since it was really 
the national scheme that led to the creation of PEFC (personal interview #1, 17/08/05).  
      One, third sector, informant had a different perspective on the same situation. This scheme was 
one of the first certification standards created, and it was not a question of FSC/PEFC rivalry, as 
PEFC had not been around. It was correct on one level as events after the NGO withdrawal 
demonstrated, but the interviewee claimed that it was never stated anywhere that it would be a 
PEFC or an FSC standard, it was to be a national standard. It was only after 1996 that the question 
was raised as to whether to follow FSC or not. It was at the point when the answer “not 
necessarily” was given that the international and national positioning in favour of one scheme or 
another began. This positioning turned the whole situation into a political matter (personal 
interview #1, 22/08/05). 
244 One NGO interviewee speaking about their national scheme placed a high degree of 
responsibility on the scheme for failing to give private forest owners any real role in the system, 
since a forest owner did not have to do anything to become certified.  After the first release of the 
standard, NGOs had identified fifty examples where they believed the criteria had been violated. 
The revised standard had failed to address the specific ecological concerns raised (personal 
interview #1, 17/08/05). Another interviewee from the same country commented that they 
managed the forest of a relative, who had never been obliged to sign any agreement, nor commit to 
any criteria. When the system claimed that 90% of the country’s forests were certified, it was also 
including forests such as this. The way the standard functioned at the moment was that the only 
requirement on the landowner was at the point of timber purchase, when the purchaser asked the 
landowner if they were certified. This interviewee considered such an approach as resulting in a 
system of “certification by logging”, which they considered the “totally wrong way of seeing it.” It 
meant there was no risk that landowners could ever break the standard because there were no 
specific requirements on them. The standard was so weak and unclear that even large owners with 
multiple assets scattered across the country could not violate it (personal interview, 23/08/05). One 
informant from the third group of subjects, and who was also a private forest owner in the same 
country, disputed this second criticism. They were prepared to guarantee that every forest owner 
was committed to certification and knew what it entailed. They might not understand its details but 
they knew it affected their forests. When the landowner came to sell their wood, the contractor 
was obliged to ask if they knew their forest was certified. They could not sign the contract without 
answering this question. Without such a contract it was impossible to sell the timber. The 
contractor could always explain any details about certification that the landowner did not know. It 
was not possible to undertake forest assessment with every individual forest owner. This was 
already covered by national legislation. All the certifier needed to do was check with the 
authorities. This avoided the unnecessary duplication of systems such as FSC, where instead of 
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trusting the forest organisations to do their job, the information was gathered separately. There 
was no need to generate new information when the authorities already had all the registers of 
forest owners, and activities undertaken were available for inspection. The process was still 
independent (personal interview #2, 22/08/05). 
245 Personal interview #2, 05/07/05. 
246 Personal interview #1, 22/08/05. 
247 Personal interview, 12/07/05. 
248 Personal interview #1, 22/08/05. For them ‘non-governmental’ implied that certification was 
not led by government, and should not be overruled by government. Government needed to be 
involved to ensure that they were working in the same direction as other private players were. It 
then became a question of how to get governments involved in the process, and that varied 
considerably in different parts of the world (ibid). One business interviewee portrayed perceptions 
regarding the role of government in forestry as evolving. Certification was originally understood 
as a response to the failure of Rio to address forestry, and as a private initiative made on behalf of 
governments, since they were not doing their job properly. This had worked well, and at that time 
everyone wanted to keep governments out of certification. Now, because the best door for 
accessing European markets was through government timber procurement policies, the preference 
was to bring governments into certification, as timber procurement was worth billions of Euros. 
By involving governments more directly, the argument was now that certified timber could both 
increase its market share, and work as a regulatory mechanism for banning all forms of illegal 
logging. By using governmental processes to promote itself, certification was no longer being 
presented as a voluntary market instrument but as proof of legality. This change, they admitted, 
“might be a bit frightening” (personal interview #1, 18/07/05). 
249 Personal interview, 28/08/05; personal interview, 12/07/05. 
250 Personal interview, 12/09/06, personal interview #1, 17/08/05 and personal interview, 
22/08/05. 
251 http://www.faf.de/paneuro_e.htm, accessed 20/09/1999.  
252 Chapter 3, Rules for Standards Setting, p. 3. 
253 Chapter 3.5.2, PEFC Rules for Standard Setting, p. 3. 
254 Chapter 6, PEFC Rules for Standard Setting, p. 5. 
255 Chapter 6, Endorsement and Mutual Recognition of National Schemes, p. 6.   
256 Chapter 3.5.1, Rules for Standards Setting, p. 3. In Australia, for example, the national scheme 
was developed without the involvement of either environmental NGOs or indigenous peoples 
(Ozinga, Footprints in the Forest, p. 59). Responsibility for the scheme was subsequently taken 
over by a private company, Australian Forestry Standard Limited (PEFC News, “Australia – A 
Change in the Woods”, 16 (October 2003), p. 3). 
257 Article 5.13, PEFC Council Statutes, p. 3. 
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258 Gulbrandsen “Sustainable Forestry in Sweden”, pp. 343-347.  
259 Vallejo and Hauselmann, PEFC: An Analysis, p. 24, referring to Markku Simula, “Key 
Elements in the International Certification Procedures: Review of the Pan European Certification”, 
paper presented to the Pan-European Forest Certification (PEFC) Seminar and Workshop, 
Würzburg, April 19-21, 1999. 
260 Personal interview #1, 05/07/05. 
261 Personal interview #1, 17/08/05, personal interview #1, 05/07/05, and personal interview, 
11/07/05. 
262 Personal interview #1, 05/07/05. 
263 Personal interview #1, 17/08/05. 
264 Personal interview #1, 05/07/05. 
265 Personal interview #2, 05/07/05. 
266 Personal interview, 12/07/05. 
267 Personal interview #1, 18/07/05. 
268 Personal interview #1, 22/08/05. 
269 Personal interview #2, 22/08/05. 
270 Personal interview, 25/08/05. 
271 Savcor Indufor Oy, Effectiveness and Efficiency of FSC and PEFC Forest Certification on 
Pilot Areas in Nordic Countries (Helsinki: Federation of Nordic Forest Owners’ Organisations, 
2005), p. 94. 
272 Article 5.12, PEFC Council Statutes, p. 3. 
273 Vallejo and Hauselmann, PEFC: An Analysis, pp. 6 and 23. 
274 Rehbinder, “Forest Certification and Environmental Law”, p. 340.  
275 Finnish Forest Industries Federation, “Finnish Forest Industries Need Raw Material from 
Certified Forests”, media release 07/09/00.  
276 Personal interview #2, 05/07/05. 
277 Personal interview, 23/08/05. 
278 Personal interview #2, 17/08/05. 
279 Personal interview #1, 17/08/05. 
280 Personal interview, 09/09/05; personal interview, 12/07/05. 
281 Personal interview, 16/09/05. 
282 Personal interview #1, 18/07/05. They elaborated that it seemed that the more democratic the 
world became, the more the pressure increased to have stakeholder consultation and participatory 
processes. Once people exercised their right to vote, they had already sent their message. By 
asking for greater consultation and participation they were showing that they did not believe in the 
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democratic value of popular elections. It now appeared that that they would rather scrap this 
approach and replace it with a multi-stakeholder process comprised of unelected representatives 
(ibid). 
283 Personal interview #1, 22/08/05. This interviewee could not conceive of a situation where a 
landowner who had managed their forest sustainably for ten or fifteen generations should be told 
one day by some NGO “off the street” that their forests were not well managed, and ten per cent 
should be protected. This decision should come from the bottom up, in order to gain the 
commitment of private forest owners. PEFC took account of the voices of private forest owners, 
and the scheme was based on their opinions. The interviewee expanded further, commenting that 
people were more accustomed to solving problems through legislation and regulation. Because 
certification standards were not really very different from regulation, the democratic opportunity 
for stakeholders to influence the decision was through the traditional regulatory process. 
Bypassing these democratic processes and established democratic institutions was something new 
to forest owners, and difficult for them to accept. They further argued that landowners had already 
fought with the government to gain their own independence, national sovereignty and operating 
framework. Forest certification was a new element, and represented greater uncertainty over the 
long run because there was no established experience, and the ground rules were always changing 
(ibid).  
284 Susan Summers Raines, “Perceptions of Legitimacy and Efficacy in International 
Environmental Management Standards: The Impact of the Participation Gap”, Global 
Environmental Politics 3 (3) (2003), pp. 47-73, at p. 52. 
285 Article 5.9, PEFC Council Statutes, p. 3. 
286 Article 6.2, PEFC Council Statutes, p. 4. 
287 Article 6.6.ii, PEFC Council Statutes, p. 4. 
288 Chapter 2, PEFC Terms and definitions, p. 2. 
289 Chapter 3, Rules for Standards Setting, p. 3. 
290 Chapter 2, PEFC Terms and definitions, p. 2. 
291 PEFC, “PEFC Council Minimum Requirements Checklist”, GL 2/2005 revised 28 April 2005, 
p. 2-3 and Chapter 2, PEFC Terms and Definitions, p. 2. 
292 Vallejo and Hauselmann, PEFC: An Analysis, p. 30. 
293 Chapter 3.5.3, PEFC Rules for Standard Setting, p. 3. 
294 Chapter 6, Endorsement and Mutual Recognition of National Schemes and their Revision, p. 4-
5. This assessment process was heavily criticised by ENGOs in Australia, who accused the 
consultant of “misrepresenting community participation” and of repeating “a gross 
misrepresentation about the motives for ENGO’s withdrawal from the scheme” (The Wilderness 
Society, Certifying the Incredible, The Australian Forestry Standard. Barely Legal and not 
Sustainable” (No location: The Wilderness Society, 2005), p. 18).  
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295 Chapter 6, Endorsement and mutual Recognition of National Schemes and their Revision,  
296 Personal interview #1, 17/08/05. 
297 Personal interview #2, 05/07/05. 
298 Personal interview #1, 05/07/05. 
299 Personal interview, 23/08/05. 
300 Personal interview, 23/08/05 and personal interview #2, 17/08/05. 
301 Personal interview, 22/09/05.  
302 Personal interview, 12/07/05. 
303 Personal interview #1, 22/08/05. In the case of Europe, it was important to understand the 
background to forest ownership. Forest owners who had occupied their property for generations 
were simply not culturally attuned to the idea of supporting a standards development process in 
which other groups determined how their land should be managed into the future. Such an 
approach might possibly be conceived for state forests, but it should not even enter into 
consideration for private property. One interview subject from the third group of informants 
echoed this view. They agreed that participation was all about stakeholders being given a chance 
to influence the decision making process, but opinion was deeply divided over the chamber-based 
system favoured by NGOs, and found in the FSC system (personal interview, 09/09/05). 
304 Chapter 10, PEFC Technical Document, p. 13. 
305 Chapter 3, Rules for Standards Setting, p. 3. 
306 Chapter 4, Rules for Standard setting, p. 4. 
307 PEFC, “Basis for Certification Schemes and their Implementation”, Annex 3, 29 October 
2004, at p. 8.  
308 Gulbrandsen “Sustainable Forestry in Sweden”, pp. 343-347. See also Vallejo and 
Hauselmann, PEFC: An Analysis, p. 24-25. 
309 Yrjö-Koskinen et al, Certifying Extinction, p. 9, referring to Finland, where the following 
observation was made:  
A dispute settlement body exists to deal with any complaints made under the FFCS, but 
there is no provision for complaints to be filed by interested parties such as 
environmental organizations or reindeer herders. It is therefore unsurprising that that no 
complaints have ever been filed (ibid). 
310 Personal interview #1, 17/08/05. 
311 Personal interview, 23/08/05. 
312 Personal interview, 26/08/05. This informant explained that reindeer herding cooperatives had 
been in dialogue with the forest managers for twenty years, for others, it had been fifty years. 
Herders had pointed out that cutting on their winter grazing areas would affect the herds, and the 
people, but the state manager Metsähallitus did not see that, nor did they recognise the reindeer 
herding system used. Metsähallitus also had a habit of selling off public lands to private interests, 
and hereders were not informed. Having reached a situation of formal conflict with state forest 
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managers, the reindeer herders’ cooperative formulated a statement of grievances, which they took 
to the Ministry for forestry. The statement explained that the herders had been in negotiation with 
managers for decades and that they had repeated continuously that logging was destroying 
reindeer pastures. They did not want logging to continue, but it had had no effect, and it carried on 
regardless. They had thought that by going to a “higher decision-maker”, they would be able to 
explain that they were no longer able to cope with Metsähallitus, and needed things to change. 
That had been in 2002. Negotiations processes had been ongoing, but they logging kept going on 
as if nothing had happened. Following a failed attempt to negotiate with managers at meeting in 
mid 2005 the Sámi Council (from Russia, Sweden, Norway and Finland) had determined to 
intervene as well. They were so shocked by forest management activities on reindeer herding, that 
they decided to work on behalf of the local reindeer herders’ against the state management agency. 
The informant further reported that they had complained to the certifier of operations in their 
region that the forest management agency was not meeting their social criteria relating to 
indigenous peoples. The certifier had told them they needed to demonstrate that they had legal 
evidence that the forest manager was not meeting the requirements. When the certifier had been 
informed that the matter was before the UN Human Rights Committee, they had responded by 
saying the area affected – 2,500 square kilometres - was not large enough to challenge the validity 
of the certificate, which covered 90% of identified indigenous territory in the country (ibid).  
     Another NGO infomant reported that the reindeer herders had appealed to the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee in October 2005, who in turn had communicated to the government that 
logging should be suspended in the region to give indigenous interests time to gather information 
for a legal action against the state management agency. A logging moratorium had been imposed 
to allow for the collection of information, formal actions against the agency commenced in 2006, 
and the moratorium was extended for a further six months. Without the intervention of NGOs to 
support the Sámi, followed by a change in attitudes regarding the FSC amongst some industry 
players, and finally UN intervention, this informant did not think either the ministry or the 
government would have shifted. The conflict had been elevated to a whole knew level, because the 
discussion was now about human rights, and it was not just a case of another weak sector – the 
NGOs – working with the Sámi. As a result of these developments the regional forest manager had 
been replaced and had subsequently also been allegedly charged with discrimation against NGOs 
by the police (supplementary interview, 11/09/06). 
313 Personal interview, 14/07/05. 
314 Personal interview, 11/07/05. This observation contradicts the comments of another informant 
that it was the FSC’s tri-cameral decision making process, which segregated interests that resulted 
in unnecessary conflict amongst stakeholders (personal interview #1, 22/08/05).  
315 Personal interview #2, 22/08/05. 
316 Personal interview, 09/09/05. 
317 Gulbrandsen, “The Effectiveness of Non-State Governance Schemes”, p. 138.  
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318 Humphreys, “The Certification Wars”, p. 19. 
319 Ozinga, “The European NGO position on PEFC”, p. 5. 
320 Mäntyranta, Forest Certification, p. 203. 
321 MCPFE, “Sustainable Forest Management in Europe”, p. 259. 
322 MCPFE, “Sustainable Forest Management in Europe”, p. 258. 
323 Ozinga, Footprints in the Forest, p. 15, quoting from ECOSOC document E/CN.17/1997/12, 
“Report of the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Panel of Forests on its Fourth Session,” March 20, 
1997.  
324 Hans J.H. Verolme, William E. Mankin, Saskia Ozinga and Sophia Ryder, Keeping the 
Promise? A Review by NGOs and IPOs of the Implementation of the UN Inter-governmental Panel 
on Forests “Proposals for Actions” in Select Countries (Washington: Biodiversity Action 
Network – Tides Project/Global Forest Policy Project, 2000), p. 9.  
325 Personal interview #2, 05/07/05 and personal interview #2, 17/08/05. One business interviewee 
was also of this view, and did not see that the PEFC served the same policy purposes as FSC. It 
had certainly evolved from a counter-offensive into a “promotional tool now”, but those were its 
origins (personal interview, 22/09/05). 
326 Personal interview, 23/08/05. 
327 Personal interview, 14/07/05.  
PEFC was not considered as strong as FSC on social matters, and in terms of compliance and 
implementation of forest management operations in the presence of unresolved indigenous rights 
displayed major weaknesses (personal interview, 05/09/06; personal interview #1, 05/07/05). 
Reporting against the criteria was so weak according to one interviewee that it was considered 
sufficient if the forest manager simply told the certifier over the telephone that they were fulfilling 
the criteria. Everything was formulated in such a manner that it made no difference whether the 
criteria were there or not, particularly in regard to indigenous issues, and indigenous stakeholders 
were not formally included in the auditing processes. Both the national legislation and certification 
criteria covering indigenous rights in their country provided no protection at all. Forest managers 
and the paper companies carried on as if the legislation and the criteria simply did not exist 
(personal interview, 26/08/05). In terms of the forest owners, the system was so strongly biased 
towards forest interests, with all the necessary arrangements undertaken by the timber buyers, that 
they did not have to do anything but sit back and gain certification (personal interview, 23/08/05). 
In the same country, according to a third NGO informant, national standards had implemented 
somewhere between one and three alternations to national legislation, and in key environmental 
criteria, such as threatened species, the standard had simply lifted sections from the national 
legislation. They considered the blurring between national certification and national governmental 
agencies to be problematic. They claimed government officials did much of the work relating to 
monitoring and controlling forest management activities, and certifiers generally went to them for 
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information, making the system incredibly cheap (personal interview #1, 17/08/05). A fourth NGO 
commented that once NGOs left this particular national system, the standard actually got worse 
(personal interview, 23/08/05). 
328 Personal interview #1, 05/07/05. 
329 Personal interview, 26/08/05. 
330 One informant pointed to the changed attitudes at a peak level in the Confederation of 
European Private Forest Owners (personal interview #2, 05/07/05). At first CEPF sought to 
boycott anything on the EU level that related to certification, and to promote labels of origin 
instead. Over the years this had evolved away from an oppositional boycott to a counter-initiative. 
This constituted huge progress from the point of origin. Furthermore, over the years, because of 
the power of the FSC, they had been dragged into incorporating a lot of things into their own 
system that they had had no intention of doing at the beginning. They had moved from wanting 
nothing, to a label of origin, to accepting certification, and finally, to taking ownership of the 
PEOLG. Even though forest owners still did not implement anything, it was nevertheless possible 
to see “a seriously big shift” (ibid). The third interviewee did not think this shift in forest owner 
attitudes could have occurred if only FSC had existed. As an instrument generated by forest 
owners, PEFC had meant that they had to become engaged in the certification debate with other 
groups in society. Without PEFC it might have been easier for them to disassociate themselves 
from the debate, but now there was discussion in most countries amongst private forest owners 
about developing standards. This not happened amongst private, small and medium forest owners 
in the FSC; at least with their own scheme there “was a kind of engagement.” The crucial issues 
for PEFC were to acknowledge and strengthen the rights of forest peoples, improve forest 
management, and provide for balanced involvement amongst all parties in decisions made about 
forests (personal interview #1, 05/07/05). Another felt that both PEFC and FSC had strengthened 
the position of union interests when it came to bargaining new agreements with companies. The 
existence of these schemes, combined with environmental NGOs acting as watchdogs had ensured 
that negotiated contracts were respected and followed (personal interview, 05/09/06). 
331 Personal interview #1, 05/07/05. 
332 Personal interview #1, 17/08/05; personal interview #2, 17/08/05; personal interview, 
13/08/05; personal interview, 14/07/05; personal interview, 23/08/05. These comments are worth 
describing in more detail. PEFC’s intention had never been to improve anything, and this had been 
apparent from early on. The scheme never really responded to any substantive criticisms, but 
somehow still promoted the system’s forest management as sustainable (personal interview #1, 
17/08/05). Another informant reiterated this view, and believed PEFC to be little more than a 
communication platform, stemming from the conviction that no change was needed in European 
forest management (personal interview #2, 17/08/05). Two NGOs from the same country thought 
that the forest sector in their country needed a green label to sell their timber in the face of market 
pressure from FSC (personal interview #1, 17/08/05 and Personal interview, 13/08/05). They 
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developed their own system and fixed their standard so they did not have to change anything, or 
only minimally. The label had been designed so NGOs had no effect, and the fact that all players 
in the forestry sector were happy with it proved that it “sucked” (personal interview, 13/08/05). 
Another interviewee from a different country was of the opinion that the certified companies had 
showed quite clearly that they had no intention of being swayed by environment groups (personal 
interview, 14/07/05). PEFC provided a smokescreen for those very forest owners, who had no 
intention of changing their practices, or recognising indigenous rights (personal interview #1, 
05/07/05). Another NGO representative provided some anecdotal corroboration. They claimed that 
they knew of one company, which after talks about their management problems with NGOs had 
stalled, merely carried on with “business as usual” with no intervention from PEFC (personal 
interview, 23/08/05).     
333 Personal interview, 23/08/05. 
334 Personal interview, 09/09/05. 
335 Personal interview, 22/09/05.  
One informant from the third group discussed this at some length, providing an anecdotal insight 
into PEFC attitudes. Initially, they admitted, forest owners had questioned the value of forest 
certification in Europe. Since forest management was already sustainable certification had no 
added value. Nowadays, owners knew and understood the concept of certification, but they did not 
worry overly about it, because it only came into force at the point of the timber sale. It was not 
possible to place the kind of requirements they wanted on private land, because forestry in such a 
context dealt with private interests and private forests. Such requirements might be realistic for 
state-owned forests, but not generally. The interviewee accepted nevertheless that forest 
management must continually improve, but the requirements of environmental groups were too 
demanding, and not at all realistic. These “crooks” also made unsubstantiated environmental 
claims; they should stick to the scientific facts, but they never did (personal interview #1, 
22/08/05). 
     Another business interest argued that the competition between PEFC and FSC was not about 
sustainable forest management, because that was now commonly accepted and agreed upon. For 
industry it had been, and still was, much more about branding and market share. Industry had 
shown interest in PEFC initially because it did not want a monopoly determining what would be 
labelled as sustainable, and this was still the position today. Industry had given its support to the 
one alternative they considered credible. This had provided mills with options when it came to 
sourcing timber. The fact that most of the competition for the certified market was over the “nice 
part of the cake” in the US, Canada and Europe, while illegal logging was uncertified and rampant 
elsewhere, proved that the main angle was to make money (personal interview #1, 18/07/05). 
     Finally, one business informant argued that PEFC was not about improving management, but 
the development of business-to-business certification. Any changes, that had come about in the 
system in response to criticisms were superficial and cosmetic. The core elements remained 
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unchanged, which was intentional. This included attitudes regarding stakeholder participation and 
balanced decision making, both of which were designed advantage forestry interests. PEFC would 
lose its reason for existence if these elements were changed. PEFC strength lay mostly in its public 
relations value (personal interview, 22/09/05).  
336 Personal interview #2, 22/08/05. 
337 Personal interview, 15/09/06. 
338 Personal interview, 25/08/05. 
339 Personal interview #1, 01/09/06. 
340 Personal interview #2, 22/08/05. 
341 According to the NGO analysis, European forest owners realised that they could not get away 
with labels of origin as a response to forest certification, and saw that they could develop a 
systems-based certification system built around the Helsinki criteria. This was a clever move, 
because Helsinki had nothing to do with forest certification; it was a reporting mechanism for 
national governmental forest programmes. They concluded that PEFC had essentially converted a 
process, which bodies such as FAO had deemed inappropriate for forest management unit level 
certification, and claimed it as their own. The Helsinki criteria were European wide, supported by 
governments. PEFC had “cornered” the market, and all sorts of people who did not understand 
what had happened supported the process. As a result, the PEFC gained a level of support from 
both industry and governments that the FSC never had. Later, the scheme had required national 
systems to add the Pan European Operational Level Guidelines (PEOLG – see also under Problem 
Solving below) to their programmes, but not all schemes had done this. This had created a 
situation where PEFC demanded one thing internationally on paper, but even on paper it had not 
been implemented on the national level, let alone been translated on the ground. This interviewee 
argued that a majority of PEFC’s endorsed schemes did not even meet the guidelines (personal 
interview #2, 05/07/05). One environmental stakeholder did identify PEFC’s adoption of the 
governmental Helsinki and Montréal processes as providing the structural potential for systemic 
improvement, but this was a potential only (personal interview, 12/09/06). 
     The business analysis was that the decision to adopt PEOLG had worked out well for private 
forest owners, and had become one of the strengths of the PEFC. As a flow on from Helsinki, the 
PEOLG had been developed with small forest owners in mind, on account of the forest ownership 
structure in Europe, and they fitted with European conditions much better than FSC. The fact that 
the guidelines had arisen from a government process, which included “a true stakeholders’ 
process”, had generated “unanimous support” for their adoption (personal interview #1, 18/07/05).  
   The first interviewee from the third group provided their perspective on the history behind 
Helsinki. Having developed C&I to determine what was happening in Europe’s forests, the debate 
had arisen at the Ministerial Council as to whether they could be related to forest certification and 
what the role of such governmental processes should be. Certification itself was not an instrument 
to follow forest conditions, but these conditions could be tracked through the governmental C&I 
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process, which would allow for data collection, forest monitoring, and stakeholder participation. 
Forest certification was identified as a voluntary market instrument that should remain separate 
from government, but the decision was made to use the Helsinki C&I as a basis for certification in 
Europe. Pan European forest certification had arisen as a result. PEFC was a realistic approach to 
forest certification that used “available infrastructure”, like the PEOLG, which could be applied to 
local conditions (personal interview #1, 22/08/05). The second informant from this group had a 
strikingly alternative perspective: 
 The PEFC originally did not really use the Pan European Operational Level 
Management Guidelines, no, they just picked some of the ideas out of the C & I of the 
Helsinki Criteria that more or less underpinned their own vision of sustainable forest 
management, but they were very selective. They left out some of the more difficult parts 
for the private forest owners, things that really cost money, like maintaining dead trees, 
for instance. They left some of those things out, but they were not very honest in their 
translation of the MCPFE ideas, and the Helsinki Criteria and Indicators, and the 
PEOLG – and they used that for the basis of the PEFC certification system (personal 
interview, #1 01/09/06). 
342 Personal interview, 28/08/05. 
343 Humphreys, “The Certification Wars”, p. 20. 
344 MCPFE, Follow-up Reports, Volume 2 p. 258.  
345 Humphreys, “The Certification Wars”, p. 20. 
346 Cashore et al, Governing Through Markets, p. 14, following Ozinga, Footprints in the Forest 
and Eric Hansen and Heikki Juslin, The Status of Forest Certification in the ECE Region (New 
York and Geneva: United Nations, Timber section, Trade Division, UN Economic Commissions 
for Europe, 1999). 
347 Ibid. This view is also expressed one informant who commented:  
There was concern about consumers seeing various acronyms and labels, and confusing 
everything. And that of course has happened even with retailers, and institutional buyers 
to some extent. So we perceived that threat. We saw basically the threat that counter-
initiatives by creating confusion, and by inserting bad examples in the certification 
context, could actually wear down and blunt the tool of certification (personal interview 
#2, 17/08/05). 
348 Ozinga, Behind the Logo, p. 18. 
349 Ibid, referring to Sweden. See also Yrjö-Koskinen et al, Certifying Extinction pp. 11-19 
(referring to Finland). 
350 Vallejo and Hauselmann, PEFC: An Analysis, p. 8, referring to PEFC certification in Europe. 
351 Personal interview, 23/08/05. 
352 Personal interview, 13/08/05. 
353 Personal interview #1, 17/08/05. 
354 According to this analysis PEFC’s governance was not conducive to improving forest 
management because it did not deliver on “those fundamental and principal requirements for a 
certification scheme” including transparency and balanced input from the different interests 
involved in land use decision making (personal interview #1, 05/07/05). None of the policy drivers 
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behind PEFC were really oriented towards better forest management, but rather to “educate” the 
consumer about the good forest management that was already in place. Europe had the best 
forestry, and all that was needed was to inform the ignorant consumer and the general public that 
European management was not devastating the forests, as in the tropics (personal interview #1, 
17/08/05). 
355 Personal interview #2, 17/08/05. 
356 One NGO informant identified a number of general weaknesses relating to the scheme’s design 
and governance, standards setting, certification procedures, accreditation, and chain of custody and 
product claims. They felt that the lack of “reliable independent assessment through the 
certification process…was system wide.” This mean that it was not at all clear if PEFC was 
delivering what its documentation required on the ground (personal interview, 11/07/05). As an 
umbrella scheme PEFC lacked clear benchmarks, minimum thresholds, and forest management 
unit level requirements (personal interview #1, 05/07/05). The commonly mentioned exceptions 
were Sweden and the UK (personal interview #1, 05/07/05, personal interview #2, 17/08/05 and 
personal interview #2, 05/07/05). 
357 Personal interview, 12/07/05. 
358 Personal interview, 09/09/05. 
359 Personal interview #1, 18/07/05. They did not see this as a problem; what mattered was that 
the systems operated in a generally comparable fashion. Such issues were important, but this 
interviewee believed they did not relate directly to the performance of the system (ibid). Another 
informant did see a difference between FSC and PEFC and identified a design fault whereby 
PEFC standards, which did contain performance requirements, were still verified by certifiers 
using systems-based assessment methods. This did not matter very much for business-to-business 
product declarations, but such methods were insufficient for consumers who wanted to know 
exactly how forests were managed (personal interview, 12/07/05). 
360 Interview with government representative #1, 01/09/06. This informant commented on the 
expectations of governments regarding performance. Governments were not overly worried as to 
how certification institutions structured themselves, and what processes they followed. They were 
more concerned that the standards such institutions developed met a certain level, which was more 
or less compatible with governmental forest policy and official definitions of sustainable forest 
management. Consequently, governmental forestry administrations preferred to concern 
themselves with examining the basic requirements for sustainable forest management that 
standards described (ibid). 
361 Personal interview #1, 01/09/06; personal interview, 28/08/05.  
It is worth noting that some informants questioned the contribution of forest certification per se to 
solving forest management problems, and particularly in terms of its ability to tackle illegal 
logging (personal interview #2, 22/08/05). One asked whether it existed to raise sustainability to a 
higher level, or simply to guarantee purchasers that the wood they had bought from a given region 
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could be relied on as “ok.” They did not believe that forest certification had been able to influence 
the management of tropical forests. If it did not work there, what use was it? In terms of its 
application to managed forests, it had led to some progress in sustainability, but the interviewee 
wondered whether some other tool should be used for problematic, tropical areas. The problem of 
illegal logging brought certification closer to government policy making, and it might be possible 
to use it to achieve some progress in that direction. However, this might mean abandoning the 
current concept, which was not necessarily the most efficient approach; the best solution was 
unclear (personal interview #1, 22/08/05). A second interviewee stressed that illegal logging did 
not belong in the certification arena, it was a societal problem, and the two should not be confused 
(personal interview #2, 22/08/05). Interestingly, other business interests wondered whether 
certification nowadays really about combating deforestation or rather about politics, emotion, and 
branding. Business interests, it was claimed, were now questioning whether certification was sill 
about sustainable forest management, or whether it had strayed from its original objective. Once 
the FSC had had lost the battle for largest amount of forest certified when CSA joined PEFC the 
certification debate had shifted to one about market share, rather than how to deal with the 
hundreds of millions of hectares forest that were not certified (personal interview #1, 18/07/05). 
Other processes were proving to be much more valuable in addressing the fundamental problems 
associated with deforestation. It had proved relatively useful in Europe, North America and 
Australasia and a few other areas, but it was never going to deal with the major problems 
confronting the world’s forests. These comments are worth reproducing in full: 
I’ve tried to move on beyond certification. What has certification done? They’ve 
certified the forests of Europe, and the well-managed forests of North America. You’re 
not going to achieve much progress anywhere else. There are some exceptions, parts of 
Australia, part of New Zealand, part of South Africa. Certification was seen as an easy 
win - a silver bullet, or certainly promoted as such by the environmentalists in the early 
days - but people’s appreciation of the underlying causes of deforestation are far more 
profound now, and certification does not stop population pressure, does not stop loss of 
forest cover through urbanisation, endangered species, poverty, or unsustainable 
agriculture. People have moved on. I mean, I’m much more interested in combating 
illegal logging, and wood tracking and legality verification and getting more money into 
capacity building, making capacity building in forest rich countries that are losing their 
forest cover. That should be a big focus for World Bank investment, Asia Development 
Bank investment and the Dutch Government. They should not waste their time putting 
money into FSC, or PEFC verification processes for well-managed forests. That should 
be an end point, really. If you’re serious about sustainable forest management, 
certification is really the fourth step: get back to the first step, the second and third step. 
That’s why I’m on an FAO process that’s come out of the [UNFF] Collaborative 
Partnership on Forests. The FAO have set up a special facility to encourage and 
subsidise – or ‘incentivise’ – countries which have got incredible forest assets, but are 
losing them the quickest. We’ve got formulae that identify these countries [and] actually 
develop a national forest policy through a multi-stakeholder process, followed by 
investment, and training forest managers in combating illegality. That’s something 
PEFC or FSC will never do (personal interview, 15/09/06). 
362 Benjamin Cashore, Graeme Auld and Deanna Newsom, “Forest Certification (Eco-Labelling) 
Programs and Their Policy-making Authority: Explaining Divergence Among North American 
and European Case Studies”, Forest Policy and Economics 5 (2003) pp. 225-247, at p. 227. 
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United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the United Nations Forum on Forests, the last, and most 
historically recent, of the four case studies selected for investigation. It has been 
chosen for the express purpose of rounding out the comparative analysis, which 
follows, by enabling the reader to compare the non-state, market-based systems 
examined previously with a more conventional, state-based approach to global 
governance. With no formal standards development process, and no related 
certification scheme, it differs considerably from the other case studies in this 
regard. As an intergovernmental body, most of its activities are concerned with 
UN member countries and their national forestry-related regulations and 
programmes. It concentrates less on the role of the market as an environmental 
problem solving mechanism, and places more emphasis on forest policy instead. 
Consequently its approach to participation and deliberation is viewed more in 
terms of the sovereignty of the nation state, than the other systems examined.  
This orientation produces a different expression of contemporary global 
governance, but one that is equally suited to the analytical methods used in the 
preceding three studies. Commencing with a historical overview examining the 
development and growth of the role played by non-state interests in 
intergovernmental forest-related processes, it continues with a structural analysis 
of UNFF, its relationship to national-level programmes, and its institutional 
classification.  The subsequent critical analysis reviews the governance 
arrangements underpinning UNFF. This too follows the methods adopted in 
previous chapters, but contains more detail from key informant interviews, since 
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these provide numerous insights into the quality of governance within the 
institution that are otherwise lacking in official documentation. These interviews 
occurred before some of the more recent developments within UNFF, and a 
postscript is included, bringing the historical overview up to date at time of 
publication. A concluding section reflects on the materials presented in the 
chapter. 
Historical Overview1 
The evolution of global environmental governance and contemporary 
international forest deliberations are historically linked to the growth of non-state 
participation within the UN and its institutional structures. Influenced by the 
findings in Our Common Future published by the Business Council for 
Sustainable Development in 1987, the UN General Assembly agreed to convene 
UNCED, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Two interesting developments in non-
state participation occurred in UNCED. Firstly, major corporations (such as ICI) 
as well as private foundations supported the event. Secondly, public interests 
played a role in the negotiations in the lead-up to UNCED, including involvement 
in a number of preparatory committees. This is to be contrasted with UNCHE, 
where civil society participation was confined to the identification of items for 
discussion.2 As a consequence of these developments, large numbers of non-state 
observers were present at the Rio conference to lobby government delegations.3 
The extent of NGO participation in intergovernmental activities around the 
environment enhanced the degree of recognition accorded to public participation 
by state interests. Increased governmental recognition of non-state interests also 
reflected the broader normative influences of where NGOs and other agencies 
played a significant role in decision making in other intergovernmental processes, 
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such as those relating to aid. However, witin the environmental policy domain,  it 
also been argued that while it may appear that NGO concerns are reflected in the 
language of the the negotiated texts arising from intergovernmental environmental 
processes, this should not necessarily be taken to demonstrate actual NGO 
influence.4 The role of NGOs in UNFF is a case in point, as discussed below. 
International Forest Deliberations and the Creation of UNFF   
The idea of establishing a set of international forest talks has been attributed to 
Swedish Prime Minister Ola Ulstein, who put forward the proposal as a response 
to the failure of existing international programmes to protect forests.5 Between 
January and December of 1990 at least nine separate proposals to create a global 
forest initiative were discussed in various forums. The Food and Agriculture 
Organisation’s “Possible Main Elements of an Instrument (Convention, 
Agreement, Protocol, Charter) for the Conservation and Development of the 
World’s Forests” emerged as the major contender and was only eclipsed by the 
UNCED process itself.6  
The intergovernmental negotiations at Rio failed to bring the same degree of 
cooperation to forests as they had with climate change, biological diversity and 
desertification. These issue areas resulted in a series of formal Conventions, but 
the much-anticipated Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) on forests did not 
eventuate.7 Nevertheless Agenda 21 contained a Statement of Forest Principles, 
which employed much of the language first used in the documentation associated 
with the FAO initiative.8 As with other Rio materials and going beyond FAO, it 
included relatively strong language relating to non-state participation in forest-
related policy making.9 
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Nevertheless, a number of institutions within the UN system with relevance to 
forest-related policy did arise in the wake of Rio. One, the Commission for 
Sustainable Development (CSD), responsible for implementing Agenda 21, was 
initially given the mandate to deal with forests on account of Chapter 11 of that 
document (“Combating Deforestation”). CSD, as a subsidiary organ of the UN’s 
second highest body, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) continues to 
occupy a relatively significant position within the UN system. Substantive 
decisions made within CSD are sent upwards to ECOSOC for final approval, 
usually in the form of draft resolutions.10  
Subsequent to the creation of CSD, a decision was made to establish a specific 
body to tackle the forest issue and the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF), 
which functioned from 1995-97, was created to “provide a forum for forest policy 
decisions.”11 In 1997 the ECOSOC then established the Intergovernmental Forum 
on Forests, which ran until 2000. Both the IPF and then the IFF were formed on 
an ad hoc basis as subsidiary bodies of CSD, with reports and decisions being 
submitted to CSD and subsequently, to ECOSOC. 12  
In terms of substantive outcomes, the IPF/IFF deliberations generated 270 
Proposals for Action (PfA).13 The PfA repeated the inclusive language of Agenda 
21, referring to  “participation that seeks to involve all interested parties, 
including local communities.”14 NGOs were also successful in gaining 
recognition of the need to incorporate multi-stakeholder dialogues in subsequent 
forest discussions, a means of non-state inclusion that had first been used at the 
UN Conference on Human Settlements in 1996.15 The IFF concluded its 
deliberations in February 2000, and submitted a final report suggesting that 
forests were in need of a more independent organ, not linked to the CSD. 
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Negotiations were held to develop a draft resolution, which was submitted to 
ECOSOC. This was approved and discussions on the nature of the international 
arrangement on forests began.16  
In September 2000 eight nation-states met with the purpose of working with 
existing forest-related structures and institutions to develop the concept as well as 
the basic elements of a new programme of work. The group came to be known as 
the Eight-Country Initiative and included Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Iran, 
Malaysia, Nigeria and Germany. This group provided the background material for 
an international expert consultation, which produced a non-consensus document 
canvassing a range of views and ideas on the institution’s context and work areas. 
The initiative was open to all relevant parties (state and non-state) and was 
conducted in a transparent manner, and a synthesis report was produced.17  
NGOs were particularly active in the Initiative, and in the light of previous 
experience, determined to steer the proposed forum in the way they wanted.18 By 
the mid-1990s NGOs’ views on the value of a forest convention had shifted from 
an initial position of support immediately post-Rio to outright opposition, based 
on concerns that a convention would divert attention away from existing 
initiatives and halt action on the ground while governments negotiated the 
convention. They were also sceptical regarding the strength of such an instrument 
given the historical disagreements between governments and the related refusal to 
pledge financial resources.19 They had also become embittered over the extent to 
which governments had chosen to overlook their input into both IPF and IFF, 
particularly the textual content they had developed during inter-sessional meetings 
of IFF, where they had had a relatively equal degree of input. A major source of 
contention was the treatment given to NGO materials in IFF’s final published 
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documents. In the case of the PfA, recognition of self-determination and 
autonomy for indigenous peoples and affording them rights in mainstream 
international law and forest policy were not incorporated. Wording relating to the 
empowerment of local communities, the impacts of colonisation, and the 
privatisation of forests, were also watered down or omitted in IFF’s final report. 
These actions led NGOs to conclude that it would be better to ensure that the new 
body did not adopt any further proposals, and should instead concentrate on 
implementing what had already been agreed to. Secondly, they wanted to 
concentrate on implementation at the national level, and confine UN-level 
discussions to reporting and peer review, rather than multilateral negotiation. The 
issues of implementation and reporting were to become two sources of NGO-
government conflict at subsequent sessions of the new body.20 NGO participation 
per se was to prove to be another.  
History of UNFF Sessions 
The United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) was created as a subsidiary organ 
of ECOSOC itself, at the same level as CSD. 21 Previously, it had been CSD that 
approved the reports of IPF and IFF but was in turn subordinate to the ECOSOC, 
which acted as the final decision making body. All this changed with the creation 
of UNFF, which reported directly to ECOSOC. Although CSD still retained the 
mandate to follow the implementation of Agenda 21, it will not now discuss forest 
issues until its work cycle for the years 2012-2013.22  
A preliminary organisational session of UNFF was held 12-16 February 2001, 
which adopted two decisions on the location of the UNFF and its future methods 
of work. The first session (UNFF-1) was held in the United Nations New York 
headquarters 11-22 June in the same year, and was mainly administrative, 
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producing draft decisions on the date and venue for UNFF-2, the report of its first 
session and the provisional agenda for UNFF-2. It adopted three resolutions 
concerning the continuation of the PfA, carried over from IPF/IFF, the 
development of a Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF), and a multi-year 
programme of work (MYPOW).23  
The third resolution covered the accreditation of intergovernmental 
organisations and also included reference to other non-state organisations, which 
were referred to as ‘major groups’. The resolution stressed the importance, 
involvement and input of major groups in the work of the Forum, and particularly 
the role of multi-stakeholder dialogue at all levels in the implementation of 
SFM.24 Provisions, following the established rules and procedures, were made for 
major group accreditation and participation at UNFF sessions via the format of a 
formal multi-stakeholder dialogue (MSD), the first of which would be held at 
UNFF-2.25 Non-state interests were reminded that for them “meaningful inputs” 
constituted “balanced stakeholder participation of developed and developing 
countries”, and they were invited to present their experiences in the form of case 
studies.26 
UNFF-2 was held 22 June 2001 and 4-15 March 2002 in New York and 
resulted in three resolutions. The first was a ministerial declaration to the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development, to be held later the same year.27 The second 
related to the implementation of the IPF/IFF PfA, which were the basis of 
UNFF’s plan of action over ensuing sessions.28 The third resolution laid down 
specific criteria for a subsequent review of the effectiveness of the whole of 
UNFF’s areas of activity, collectively referred to as the International Arrangement 
on Forests (IAF).29 The review was to be presented at UNFF-5, and the UNFF 
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secretariat and CPF were invited to present a process to facilitate the carrying out 
of the review at UNFF-4.30 
The first MSD was held on 6 March 2002. Two papers were presented, one 
from the International Union of Forest Research Organisations (IUFRO), a CPF 
participant and major groups’ member on various scientific and technical forest-
related matters. The second represented the perspectives of private forest owners, 
who called for secure land tenure rights and a bottom-up approach to 
implementation. There was general consensus between the countries present and 
the major group representatives that those affected by and implementing forest 
policies needed to be involved in both planning and decision making. NGOs in 
particular emphasised that the Forum “need not develop more proposals for 
action, but should instead take concrete actions.”31 There were general complaints 
over the length of time taken to accredit major group representatives and the need 
for more preparatory time to make the dialogues effective.32 The Chairman of the 
Forum presented his summary of the MSD to the high-level ministerial segment 
on 13 March.33 
UNFF-3 was held in Geneva 26 May - 6 June 2003. Agreement was reached 
regarding the composition, terms of reference, scheduling and reporting of three 
ad hoc expert groups agreed to as part of the inter-sessional work associated with 
the MYPOW. Three resolutions were made regarding the implementation of the 
PfA relating to: economic aspects of forests; forest health and productivity; and 
maintaining forest cover to meet present and future needs.34 All participants at the 
session were “urged…to continue their efforts to implement them.”35 Two further 
resolutions were passed regarding enhanced cooperation and policy coordination 
and strengthening the role of the Secretariat.36 One other decision of note was a 
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request for guidance from the secretariat on the format of the voluntary country 
reports. This had arisen from an identified need for harmony and streamlining to 
lessen the reporting burden placed upon countries.37 Two panel discussions were 
held on the economic aspects of forests and on regional processes and 
initiatives.38 
The second MSD was held during UNFF-3 on 27 May. Eight major groups 
participated, two new groups for the first time (women and youth).39 There were 
three dialogues on forest health and productivity (scientific community and 
women), the economic aspects of forests (indigenous people and forest owners), 
and maintaining forest cover (youth and environmental NGOs). An open dialogue 
between the Member States, intergovernmental agencies and the major groups 
followed these more formal presentations. Subsequently three case studies were 
presented on forest health, maintaining forest cover, and economic aspects of 
forests by the scientific community, the Women’s Caucus, and the Forest Owner 
Association of Kempten respectively.40 The Chairman’s Summary contains the 
comments made by the major groups, governments and agencies regarding the 
thematic issues of UNFF-3 and occupies a significant amount (approximately 
15%) of the Forum’s final report. Discussions regarding the structures and 
processes associated with forest policy making at all levels -- most notably 
concerning participation -- dominate the Summary. Only three of the 19 
paragraphs do not include matters of governance, and the word participation 
occurs twelve times in nine paragraphs.41 The Chairman himself noted that the 
discussions “had evolved from purely questions about involvement to questions of 
substance.” 42 Beyond the broad principle of participation, non-state participants 
within UNFF were concerned about a wide range of substantive issues relating to 
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the effectiveness of UNFF as a governance system.  These included structural 
matters regarding interest representation (inclusiveness and resources) and 
institutional arrangements for openness and transparency, as well as general 
procedural issues concerning decision making and implementation. On 13 June 
the Forum agreed to include a summary of the MSD in the main body of its report 
of the third session.43 
UNFF-4 was held 3-14 May 2004 in Geneva.44 Further policy resolutions were 
adopted regarding the implementation of the IPF/IFF PfA covering: a) forest-
related scientific knowledge; b) social and cultural aspects of forests c) 
monitoring, assessment and reporting via C&I for SFM.45 A fourth resolution was 
adopted on the IAF effectiveness review process for UNFF-5, recommending that 
preparations should be open, transparent and comprehensive in scope to allow for 
informed decisions at UNFF-5. Respondents to the annexed questionnaire, it was 
suggested, might wish to present materials based on their experiences: such 
selections would be used for a comparative analysis in the final report.46 The 
responses from countries, organisations and major groups were to be entirely 
voluntary in nature and it was agreed that a document would be synthesised from 
individual reports on the extent of implementation of the IPF/IFF PfA in advance 
of the fifth session.47 This would “provide a global overview of progress towards 
sustainable forest management…as a contribution to discussions” at that 
session.48  
One item identified in the MYPOW for consideration at the fourth session, 
which resulted in no agreement, was the item on traditional forest-related 
knowledge (TFRK).49 This item has been portrayed as foundering on 
North/South, as well as internal North/North conflict. The less developed, 
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southern, G77 countries wanted to retain national sovereignty over all commercial 
decisions relating to TFRK (both access to knowledge and to the benefits derived 
from such knowledge). They favoured the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) as the principle negotiating forum rather than UNFF as it was developing 
an agreement on who was to have access to and benefit from the sharing of TFRK 
already. The developed countries were split between the US and the EU 
(periodically joined by New Zealand and Canada). The US as a non-signatory to 
the CBD opposed the idea of an international regime on access and benefit 
sharing, and wanted to link funding to indigenous and community-led initiatives. 
The EU, hoping to gain commercially from TFRK, wanted to link the financial 
assistance developed countries might provide to further international obligations 
outside the CBD, such as the WTO rules on intellectual property rights. The 
conflicts could not be resolved, and the negotiations ended without any 
agreement.50  
Two of the ad hoc expert groups, transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies and finance, and mechanisms for monitoring, assessment and 
reporting, were scheduled to present their reports at UNFF-4. Negotiations inside 
the former resulted in disputes over funding via official development assistance 
(ODA), favoured by the South, versus private sector financing preferred by, and 
economically advantageous to, the North. The draft text of a resolution was 
consequently abandoned and discussions subsequently took place behind closed 
doors.51 A relatively weak decision (rather than a resolution) was passed 
encouraging members to take “concrete action” and deciding to give the matter 
“further consideration” through the MYPOW.52  
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The second group was more successful, with deliberations resulting in a 
resolution, although its contribution to concrete action could be considered 
limited, since it recommded that “monitoring, reporting and assessment, including 
the adoption or implementation of criteria and indicators, [should be] on a 
voluntary basis in accordance with national priorities and conditions.”53 In 
addition, the decision to exclude material relating to the upcoming IAF review 
prepared by NGOs and to include only information provided by the CPF and 
national governments left environmental NGOs in particular feeling that their 
views were not respected in UNFF.54 This led the writers of the Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin to conclude that the lack of input from civil society would 
exacerbate their feelings of alienation “and could eventually deprive the post-
UNFF arrangement of an important source of legitimacy.”55   
The third MSD was held on 6 May 2004, and the Chairman’s summarised 
précis, focussing largely on forest policy, was made available to the Forum on 14 
May. The dialogue was in two parts, with the first component consisting of 
general policy discussion arising from the Forum themes of TFRK and the social 
and cultural aspects of forests. The second component was more focussed on the 
implementation-related topics of capacity building and partnerships.56 The 
dialogue regarding TFRK reflected the events occurring within the Forum’s own 
negotiations and repeated some of the unresolved NGO frustrations of IFF/IPF.57 
The state and extent of non-state participation was once again a major element 
in the MSD, but with a greater emphasis on the mechanisms and institutions of 
forest governance to ensure effective participation. The social and cultural 
dialogue stressed the need for integration and decentralisation of the various 
interests involved in decision making.58 It also stressed the implementation of 
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forest policy as a joint responsibility and called for “extensive capacity-building 
to enable…effective participation.”59 The capacity-building and partnership 
discussions expanded on these themes. According to the summary, “capacity 
building provides an important role in strengthening the ability of stakeholders to 
effectively participate” and if done properly “ensures that each of the stakeholders 
can fulfil their role in ensuring sustainable forest management.”60 In an 
interesting, but probably unintentional allusion to ‘new’ governance 
arrangements, the section acknowledges the contribution of “associations and 
networks” to SFM.61 Further collaboration between the public sector and the 
major groups regarding networks and communication systems was highlighted by 
all present as important. Good dialogue, it was concluded, enhanced decision 
making processes, and governments were called upon to work jointly at all levels 
with stakeholders on matters of planning and implementation.62 
By the end of UNFF-4, the series of failed negotiations between governments 
resulted in a sense of frustration amongst non-state participants. The last 
statement delivered at the plenary by indigenous peoples organisations (IPOs) and 
NGOs highlighted their concerns regarding both the outcomes and processes of 
the session.63 The MSD itself was criticised by these groups as being “just an 
exercise in window dressing… the outcomes and concerns expressed during these 
discussions never found their way into the important decision making and text 
negotiations carried out by the governments.”64 This was reinforced by a delegate 
from the Global Caucus on Community-Based Forest Management: “What good 
is a multi-stakeholder dialogue unless the input of indigenous peoples, community 
representatives, and other members of civil society is incorporated within the 
actual resolutions of UNFF?”65 The Earth Negotiations Bulletin were equally 
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frank: “One point of clear consensus in Geneva was that UNFF has failed to 
deliver on its stated aims, and that continuing the arrangement in its current form 
is neither politically viable nor desirable.”66 
UNFF-5 was held in New York 14 May 2004 and 16-27 May 2005. Only one 
draft resolution was agreed, regarding the report of the fifth session and a 
provisional agenda for UNFF-6, referring the matters to ECOSOC. Two decisions 
were made, one regarding the accreditation of intergovernmental organisations, 
the other concerning the review process. With respect to the latter it was decided 
to complete the consideration of the review of the IAF at UNFF-6, which was to 
be guided by the Chairman’s bracketed draft text developed in the course of 
informal consultations during UNFF-5.67 UNFF-6 was also given the task of 
creating an agenda for UNFF-7, and the Forum’s life by implication was further 
extended.68 Two round table discussions were held during the course of the high 
level, ministerial, segment of the session, on restoring the world’s forests and 
forest law and governance. The second addressed the problem of illegal logging 
identified during IPF discussions, and noted that initiatives external to UNFF 
including certification and public procurement policies were valuable tools for 
providing market access for legal and sustainably managed forest products.69 
The fourth MSD was held on the 25 May. Representatives of the major groups 
simply read a series of prepared statements and there was no discussion.70 
Business and industry interests were equivocal regarding the IAF, neither 
supporting nor opposing any specific type of international arrangement, but 
asking for greater private sector and non-governmental participation. They 
recommended a set of basic principles and minimum requirements for greater 
coordination of forest policies and paying more recognition to the trade in 
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sustainably managed forest products.71 NGOs asserted that 10 years’ debate 
regarding whether there should be a global forest convention had prevented 
progress on a range of issues and that UNFF needed reform.72 Criticising major 
groups’ participation in the MSDs “as a way to segregate the input provided by 
those stakeholders” they argued that without “radical changes to ensure the 
effective consideration of proposals” there was no point in continuing with 
them.73 
Much of the Forum was occupied by discussions concerning the report 
prepared by the third (and extremely long-titled) “Ad hoc Expert Group on 
Consideration with a View to Recommending the Parameters of a Mandate for 
Developing a Legal Framework on All Types of Forests.”74 The title of the group, 
first agreed to at the IFF’s last meeting, it has been claimed, was deliberately 
equivocal, and reflected the ongoing debate over the type of forest instrument 
UNFF should adopt.75  The report presented two basic options, built around either 
a non-legally binding instrument (NLBI), or a legally binding instrument (LBI), 
both of which deeply affected the future shape and direction of the IAF. The 
report was hotly debated. Several countries argued that the IAF had neither 
matched up to expectations nor curbed deforestation and argued either for or 
against an LBI as a means of strengthening the instrument.76 Donor countries 
were once again split between the US (in favour of the NLBI route) and the EU 
(pro-LBI). The developing nations of the G77 were internally divided, but 
generally in favour on the NLBI.77  
The debate as to whether the IAF should be legally binding or not dated back 
to earlier disagreements.78 Neither UNCED nor IPF/IFF had ever fully resolved 
the debate regarding a forest convention, and discussions at the Forum 
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deteriorated into repeating old arguments (as with discussions surrounding TFRK) 
regarding money and sovereignty, which were replayed in the session’s various 
working groups.79 A second element of the conflict at UNFF-5 related to the goals 
and timetable for implementing the IAF.80 Determined to get a substantive 
outcome, the EU had initially pushed hard for quantifiable global targets, but 
dropped this in the hope of getting time-bound commitments from Brazil and the 
US instead. 81 Meanwhile the G77, whatever their internal positions on the LBI, 
continued to press the claim for funding to implement the IAF. 82 Text generated 
in discussions was so weak that countries agreed it should not be adopted as a 
ministerial declaration. Finally, four main points were agreed to in a draft 
resolution for ECOSOC as a basis for subsequent discussion at UNFF-6 on a non-
legally binding instrument.83  
Another major source of conflict, this time between countries and non-state 
interests, concerned the presence of the major groups in the high level ministerial 
discussions during the session. The Secretariat’s attempt to integrate the MSD 
into the high-level ministerial segment was opposed by Cuba. The matter almost 
went to a vote, but it was finally agreed that major groups would in future give 
their statements only after governmental delegations had presented, and not earlier 
in the sessions, as previously. This new format would provide the basis for major 
group participation at UNFF-6.84 Some states argued that this was necessary since 
stakeholder comments did not allow for sufficient time for country negotiations.85 
The impact on major groups was that they were essentially relegated to the role of 
passive observers. This was condemned by NGOs as a “retrograde position of 
governments in the UNFF [violating] the spirit of Agenda 21 under which it was 
agreed that Major Groups must be involved in all relevant UN processes.”86 The 
  479 
Forum ended with the chair, and a range of countries, expressing disappointment 
that UNFF had not risen to the challenge of the forest crisis, and was now in 
danger of becoming increasingly peripheral to the international dialogue.87 
UNFF-6 was held in New York 27 May 2005 and 13-24 February 2006. There 
were no resolutions and only one decision passed (relating to the accreditation of 
intergovernmental organisations).88 However, a draft resolution for adoption by 
ECOSOC was agreed to, representing some progress in deliberations between the 
Member States. Firstly, and as a consequence of the review of the effectiveness of 
the IAF, it was agreed that the IAF would contain three new principal functions in 
addition to those referred to in ECOSOC resolution 2000/35.89 Secondly, four 
new global objectives on forests were identified as means of implementing the 
IAF, summarised as follows: 1) reverse the loss of forest cover and increase 
efforts to prevent forest degradation; 2) enhance forest benefits and their 
contribution to international development goals; 3) increase the area of protected 
forests and areas of sustainably managed forests; and 4) reversing the decline in 
official development assistance for SFM.90 It was also agreed that following its 
seventh session UNFF would meet biennially on the basis of a more focussed 
MYPOW to be adopted by the Forum at its seventh session.91 Regional meetings 
would occur in between, concentrating on implementation.92 After a decade and a 
half of stalled negotiations on a legally binding instrument, all parties agreed to 
the conclusion and adoption of non-legally binding instrument at it seventh 
session. To this end it was agreed that an ad hoc working group, open to all 
Forum parties, would be convened prior to UNFF-7 to consider content for 
negotiation at the upcoming session.93 On that basis, the effectiveness of the IAF 
was to now be reviewed in 2015, and a full range of options, including a legally 
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binding instrument, was to be considered then.94 Six proposals for an instrument 
were appended to the report, the four most significant being from Brazil (a 
voluntary international instrument), Canada (an international convention) the EU 
(a subscription-based approach with an option for a future LBI), and the US (a 
voluntary SFM standard, or Codex Sylvanus).95 
Owing to the interventions of Cuba and other countries at UNFF-5, the status 
of the fifth MSD, as anticipated, was much reduced, producing the lowest level of 
non-state engagement since talks regarding the IAF began. Children and youth, on 
behalf of the major groups, expressed dismay in its opening statement that 
participation had been reduced, and called for indicators that incorporated their 
different interests in SFM.96 The lack of engagement by major groups led the 
writers of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin to conclude that NGOs were better off 
working through other agreements such as the CSD and alternative avenues such 
as the FSC.97 This plea for inclusion contradicted the rhetoric of the draft 
resolution to ECOSOC, which like many of its predecessors, contained several 
references to strengthening, promoting and encouraging stakeholder participation 
in SFM, policies and programmes.98 At the same time, the seventh session, it was 
decided, would strengthen interaction with major groups and forest stakeholders 
during the course of the Forum.99  
Interestingly -- and ironically, given the new arrangements for UNFF sessions  
-- major group interests participated actively in the subsequent meeting of the 
expert group on the non-legally binding instrument, held in New York, 11-15 
December 2006. Several of their interventions were included along with the rest 
of the bracketed text produced by country participants.100 This may reflect the 
changed circumstances arising from the decision to postpone discussions 
  481 
regarding a forest convention, and with previous divisions between hard and soft 
law becoming increasingly blurred, the NLBI discussions occurred somewhere in 
that continuum. A consensus vision document and the support NGOs received 
from various countries for their ongoing involvement may have strengthened their 
resolve to stay involved at some level.101 It has also been argued that the 
increasing proliferation of various soft law approaches to forest management 
regulation exemplified by the forest law, enforcement and governance (FLEG) 
processes (see below), further moved the debate beyond a forest convention, 
which was not supported by NGOs.102 
Governance Within UNFF 
System Participants 
UNFF re-committed itself to the inclusive language of IPF/IFF, but reformulated 
its structure, determining that owing to its status as a subsidiary of ECOSOC it 
should “be open to all States and operate in a transparent and participatory manner 
[and include] relevant international and regional organisations.”103 There are three 
broad constituencies in UNFF: Member States, intergovernmental agencies 
working on forests, and the so-called Major Groups referred to in Agenda 21.104 
Member state representation in the Forum itself differs from the previous IPF/IFF 
arrangements under CSD. Although both CSD and UNFF are subsidiary organs of 
ECOSOC, UNFF has a higher status in the sense that it consists of a universal 
membership (all UN Member States are members of UNFF) whilst CSD has 
limited membership.105 Governmental participation reflects this profile, with 
negotiations usually conducted by diplomats and high-level national 
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delegations.106 There are also ministerial segments conducted at important 
sessions.107  
Resolution 1/1 of UNFF-1 reiterated the importance of stakeholder 
participation and instituted the concept of a multi-stakeholder dialogue (MSD) at 
each session to engage representatives of five key (non-state) Major Group 
stakeholders. These stakeholders are identified as: forest-related NGOs (e.g. 
Greenpeace International); indigenous people (eg the Forest Peoples Programme); 
scientific and technological communities working in forest-related fields (e.g. 
IUFRO); business and industry related to forests (e.g. the World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development); and forest owners (e.g. the Confederation of 
European Forest Owners). 108 To this should be added women, children and youth, 
local authorities and farmers, which are identified in Agenda 21, and recognised 
in subsequent UNFF literature, making a total of nine identified Major Groups.109  
Institutional Arrangements 
International Level 
In 2000 the various action-related outcomes of the IPF and IFF were codified 
under a new international arrangement on forests (IAF), the primary objective of 
which was to “promote the management, conservation and sustainable 
development of all types of forests and to strengthen long-term political 
commitment to this end.”110 The principal functions of this new arrangement were 
to: a) facilitate the implementation of the IPF/IFF PfA; b) provide a forum for 
policy development; c) enhance cooperation and coordination amongst relevant 
agencies and d) enhance cooperation and coordination internationally, through 
cross-sectoral North/South public-private partnerships at the national, regional 
and global levels; e) monitor and assess national, regional and global progress on 
  483 
implementation; and finally f) strengthen political commitment (e.g. through 
ministerial engagement). These objectives were to be facilitated through an 
intergovernmental body -- UNFF (see Figure 7.1 below). The Forum was given, 
inter alia, two tasks: i) within five years, to “consider…the parameters of a 
mandate for developing a legal framework on all types of forests” and ii) “to 
devise approaches towards appropriate financial and technology transfer support 
to enable the implementation of sustainable forest management.”111 These 
objectives and tasks were to be programmatically implemented by means of the 
development of a multi-year programme of work (MYPOW).112  
In order to enhance coordination and collaboration between agencies working 
on forest-related activities, the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) was 
created in 2001. It is constituted from the various forest-related international 
organisations, secretariats of related conventions and institutions working on 
forests to support the work of UNFF. 113 UNFF can only guide, not direct the CPF, 
which has no formal status, operational or project management role, no 
independent budget and whose members are answerable to their own governing 
bodies rather than the UNFF.114 The CPF has been singled out by commentators 
for its inability to develop an “effective advisory relationship” with non-state 
interests associated with UNFF.115 
UNFF sessions also include panel discussions, led by experts who present 
information on specific topic areas and field questions from the audience. The 
panels are more of an academic seminar and do not appear to contribute directly 
to international diplomacy and policy-making.116 Between UNFF sessions there 
have also been ad hoc expert group meetings where experts “deliberate and 
provide advice on scientific and technical issues related to forests, as well as 
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advancing the objectives of UNFF.”117 Three groups were established at UNFF-1. 
The first and second groups dealt with monitoring, assessment and reporting, and 
finance and transfer of environmentally sound technologies respectively (both 
groups reported to UNFF-4). The third group was given responsibility for the 
generation of possible options for the international arrangement on forests on 
completion of the Forum’s first five sessions.118 The CPF is permitted to 
contribute scientific and technical expertise to such bodies, but while Major 
Groups can attend, UN rules do not permit active or substantive participation. 
Country- and CPF-led inter-sessional initiatives have also been encouraged by 
UNFF. These are for the purpose of  “catalysing enhanced cooperation and 
coordination where complex and politically sensitive issues are discussed and 
analysed and tabled at UNFF sessions for further deliberations and decisions.”119 
A Bureau from within the Forum was also created at UNFF’s inception and 
consists of one chairperson and four vice-chairpersons, one of whom acts as 
rapporteur, with reports being submitted to ECOSOC and through it to the UN 
General Assembly.120 A “compact secretariat” was established through the UN 
Secretary-General, consisting of  “highly qualified staff” strengthened through 
staff from the various other secretariats and agencies. The role of the Secretariat is 
to service the Forum and support the CPF and coordinate its activities with the 
secretariat of the CBD.121 The Secretariat contains no representatives from 
environmental NGOs or indigenous peoples organisations.122 The UNFF meets 
annually for two weeks in either New York (UNFF-1, 2, 5 and 6) or Geneva 
(UNFF-3 and 4).  
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Figure 7.1 Structure of UNFF 
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IPF/IFF PfA through NFPs.124 NFPs were first mooted as a means of improving 
forest management during discussions between donor countries and international 
organisations on the development of the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP). 
They foundered there, however, when support was withdrawn by international 
organisations following evaluations revealing that NFPs were failing to deliver 
expected on-the-ground impacts. Nevertheless, the idea re-emerged during 
UNCED negotiations, and proved to be a point upon which all negotiating parties 
were able to agree, and was extended to cover all forest types. NFPs were to 
survive throughout the IPF/IFF and subsequent UNFF negotiations.125 NFPs have 
been described as “policy planning instruments, striving to render politics more 
rational, more long-term oriented, and better coordinated by a series of basic 
principles and elements that replace the principles of traditional technocratic 
planning.”126 Participation, policy learning, coordination and decentralisation are 
identified as guiding principles for the formulation and implementation of 
NFPs.127 The development of NFPs are assisted at the international level by two 
agencies outside the UNFF: FAO’s NFP Facility in operation since 2002 and an 
offshoot of the TFAP; and the World Bank’s PROFOR programme, initially 
created by the UNDP in 1997 and moved to the World Bank in 2002.128 
Standards Development 
UNFF does not develop standards. Its most substantive output, carried over from 
the IPF/IFF processes are the PfA. UNFF’s contribution was to arrange the 270 
PfA arising from IPF/IFF into 16 thematic elements, which constituted specific 
agenda items at UNFF’s second, third and fourth sessions.129 The intention was 
for the PfA to be implemented by means of finance, transfer of environmentally 
sound technologies and capacity building. Some of the proposals, notably 
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thematic element (b) promoting public participation, were identified as common 
items for each session.130 
Institutional Typology 
Member countries within the UNFF are by far the most influential actors, 
reflecting their status in UN system as a whole. States negotiate text, pass 
resolutions and make decisions, and their power is absolute. UNFF can, however, 
be influenced by non-state interests through the Major Groups that participate in 
the MSD, by intergovernmental organisations via the CPF, and through the role 
played by special agencies (as well as state entities) in implementing SFM on the 
ground via NFPs and other mechanisms. Non-state interests also attend meetings 
as part of state delegations.131 These qualifications provide a moderating 
influence, and although UNFF clearly belongs on the state-centric end of the 
authority continuum, it is rated as being between high and medium. 
UNFF conforms largely to the aggregative model of democracy on account of 
its majority voting system, but conformity is not complete, since by tradition 
voting powers remain unexercised in favour of full consensus agreement (see 
below). Nevertheless, nation states themselves are aggregated around various veto 
coalitions and voting blocs that represent specific -- competing -- interest 
groupings akin to political parties (e.g. those supporting either an LBI or an 
NLBI). Although UNFF therefore sits on the aggregative end of the democracy 
continuum, formal voting is not practiced, and much of the interaction between 
enfranchised participants is discursive in nature, earning it a rating of low. 
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Figure 7.2 Institutional classification of UNFF 
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From its foundation UNFF decided to foster international cooperation through 
public private partnerships (PPPs).133 It is consequently associated with, but not 
directly responsible for, a range of ‘new’ governance arrangements at national and 
regional, as well as international, levels. These are noted as being instrumental in 
promoting SFM and for addressing issues regarding illegal logging and good 
governance.134 It is best placed somewhere in the middle of the governance 
continuum, but given its top-down structure, it is more directly associated with 
‘old’ governance arrangements than ‘new’, but with a rating of low. See Figure 
7.2 above. 
Critical Analysis  
Interest Representation 
Inclusiveness 
UNFF is the only subsidiary body of ECOSOC with universal country 
membership, which has given it a greatly enhanced profile within the UN 
system.135 Non-state participation is more restricted. Resolution 1/1 outlines the 
rules of procedure under which Major Groups can participate in UNFF sessions. 
These were based on the rules governing functional commissions of ECOSOC, 
and the supplementary arrangements established by ECOSOC for the CBD. The 
Forum was expected to extend the “participatory practices” established by the 
CBD, IPF and IFF.136 Under these procedures participating non-state interests are 
permitted to attend as observers, and may -- at their own expense and in the 
various official languages of the UN -- make written, unofficial, submissions. 
They may also, at the discretion of the chair, make oral interventions, with the 
consent of members, and may also be consulted or heard by any relevant 
committees, if properly accredited. Representation is to be equitable between 
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developing and developing country interests, and balanced regarding an 
environmental, or developmental focus.137   
The output of the involvement of the Major Groups in the multi-stakeholder 
dialogue is a chairman’s summary, included in the final report of each Forum. 
Any proposals arising from the segment are presented to the Forum and “taken 
into careful consideration” in any negotiated decision; this is considered an 
“efficient and effective way to involve Major Groups.”138 UNFF considers the 
Major Groups to be “actively involved in UNFF and its programmes.”139 This role 
was undermined by the changes to the MSD instituted as a result of Cuba’s 
intervention at UNFF-5, however. It has been argued that Cuba initially attempted 
to prevent the inclusion of the MSD at UNFF-6 all together. The final decision to 
allow Major Groups to speak only after government delegations represented a 
compromise, but which nevertheless turned the discussions of the MSD at UNFF-
6 it has been alleged, into “informal side events…rather than as part of the formal 
proceedings. Not surprisingly, the result of this decision was significantly lower 
major group involvement.”140 
The MSD and problems associated with its structural composition have been 
analysed in some detail by commentators. It is criticised for failing to live up to its 
promise and since it is poorly connected to other structures, its input into the 
broader policy dialogue of UNFF is restricted, creating a “participatory ghetto” 
for Major Groups.141 The practice of placing divergent interests under the single 
category of Major Groups, and expecting them to combine their views into a 
single consensus, is portrayed as offensive and counterproductive to every one’s 
needs, since it impedes their involvement. This has resulted in the waning of 
interest and participation of Major Groups, particularly in the wake of UNFF-5, 
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and the objection to Major Group involvement expressed by some 
governments.142 
Two UNFF reports have commented on the broader extent of external public 
participation in the programme’s PfA. They acknowledged that: “action has been 
taken to promote stakeholder participation at various levels [but] further efforts 
are now needed.” 143 Table 7.1 below gives the response of two social-
environmental NGOs to a survey of UNFF’s own participatory capacity, prepared 
as part of the IAF review process prior to UNFF-5. 
Table 7.1 NGO response on the extent to which participation in UNFF’s 
programmes and processes for implementing the PfA has been enhanced 
Organisation Structure None Limited Moderate High 
FERN/Forest 
Peoples 
Programme 
UNFF sessions X    
 UNFF 
decisions/resolutions 
X    
 Panel discussions at 
UNFF sessions 
 X   
 Country and 
organisation-led 
Initiatives 
 X   
 Reports of Ad hoc 
Experts Groups 
 X   
 CPF initiated 
activities 
  X  
 Contacts at UNFF 
sessions 
  X  
 Multi-Stakeholder 
dialogue 
X    
 Actions by the UNFF 
secretariat 
 X   
Source: http://www.fern.org (accessed 04/05/05) 
The attitudes of other sectors regarding UNFF’s participatory capacity varied. 
The Confederation of European Forest Owners, and workers and trade unions, 
both Major Group members, ranked the enhancement of their participation as 
high. Interestingly, given the apparent inclusiveness of UNFF, three member 
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countries indicated that the enhancement of their participation had been limited. 
Six Member States, as well as the EU, gave a rating of moderate. Only two 
countries provided a high rating.144 
Commentators have called for UNFF “to increase the opportunities for 
meaningful participation by multiple stakeholders.”145 They point to the need for 
greater inclusion of interests, particularly those, which both practice, and are 
affected by, forest management. For those who are already involved, particularly 
Major Group and civil society stakeholders, it is suggested that countries should 
include them as experts on their official delegations to enable them to more 
actively engage in discussions.146 This is already happening in an informal 
manner.147 The UNFF itself should adapt its procedures for such groups in order 
to make their participation more inclusive and substantive and in particular should 
experiment with new modes of participation and include Major Groups across the 
range of IAF activities.148 In short, it should “make a concerted effort to invite and 
enable more civil society stakeholders to attend and participate.”149 The UNFF is 
also criticised as being out of step with more inclusive policy processes, and the 
loss of NGO participation is attributed directly to this shortcoming.150 In contrast, 
such processes as the FLEG and the Asia Forest Partnership (AFP) have made 
efforts to include a broader range of actors and stakeholder perspectives.151 
However, with so many different interests competing within the system, other 
commentators see that UNFF’s agenda is over ambitious and is both unfocussed 
and bogged down as a consequence.152 On a more positive note, it is noted that 
UNFF-6 recognised the need to work with and receive input from regional and 
sub-regional stakeholders and made provisions for stakeholders from developing 
and transition countries to participate in UNFF.153  
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Interviews 
A wide range of comments was made concerning the inclusiveness of UNFF. The 
view was expressed across informants from group three that for the nation-states, 
the inclusive nature of UNFF was a good thing. One of the strengths of UNFF 
was that it had universal membership, which was not usual in the UN system, 
particularly as a subsidiary organ of the ECOSOC, which did not usually 
encourage such arrangements. It had been a very tough thing to negotiate within 
the UN diplomatic world in New York in 2000.154 The fact that it included the 
administrations responsible for deforestation around the table showed that it had 
been responsive to the criticism that at previous processes, decisions had been 
made about forests, without the forested nations being present. At UNFF those 
with the responsibility were present, even if they did not have the money or the 
power to address the issue.155 The presence of in excess of 180 countries meeting 
and engaging around discussions about illegal logging, enabling instruments, 
work programmes, and the goals and objectives of UNFF, was empowering. It 
would be easier if a lot of the countries did not attend. The fact that there were no 
major forest nations missing from the event was very powerful, even if it meant 
that the large number of participants made it difficult for people to achieve some 
of the things they wanted.156 
NGOs were generally negative. One commented that their involvement in 
UNFF could not be counted as participation because they could not make any 
changes to text. Participation did not even reach a level of being consulted, since 
they had been told directly by one delegation that NGOs were not wanted in the 
process, and no one had any intention of either explaining or changing their views 
as a result of listening them. They had initially put a lot of work into making 
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comments on the MYPOW, particularly regarding stakeholder participation, but 
questioned the current value of continuing to do so. After efforts to exclude NGOs 
from UNFF-6 the Major Groups’ day had been reduced, and their status as 
observers only in plenary sessions had been further tightened. They concluded 
that at best participation in UNFF could only be described as lobbying. The only 
value it had was that it provided opportunities to meet and discuss broader forest 
issues with colleagues.157 Another NGO commented on the consequences of the 
changes to the MSD. After UNFF-6 it had become even more difficult to 
convince NGOs to stay involved.158 According to the business informant UNFF 
was too inclusive and was too diverse in its make-up to be genuinely effective.159 
Interviewees from the third group of informants were mostly sympathetic 
towards the inclusion of non-state interests, although their views as to what role 
they should and did play varied. Those with a positive perspective argued that a 
lot of countries like Australia and the US had lobbied very hard throughout the 
UNFF processes to make sure that the Major Groups were well represented and 
got the opportunity to contribute their perspectives.160 But what needed to be 
understood was that the role of the NGOs was to bring issues to the UNFF, not 
advocate solutions, as these were not generally acceptable on account of their 
overly idealistic nature. It was the dialogue that NGOs had been able to initiate 
that was more significant. Raising the profile and attention paid to illegal logging 
was one such example.161 Nowadays at UNFF meetings Major Groups were a 
defined part of the system and the MSD was an attempt to ensure that that 
representation and input happened in a structured way. Governments needed other 
interests to assist them and it was therefore important to make sure that what was 
practical to implement reflected NGO input. Contrary to the views of NGOs, they 
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did not see the status of the Major Groups as a limiting factor any more -- so long 
as the constraints of the UN system were understood and accepted.162 
Other interviewees from this group had a more negative perspective on how 
non-state interests were included in UNFF and were particularly critical of the 
manner in which UNFF included non-governmental interests. UNFF was the only 
global political forum that addressed forests comprehensively, in all their aspects, 
economic, social and ecological. No other forum did that. The absence of NGO 
participation meant that a substantive part of the forest agenda was missing, which 
was a problem.  If environmental NGOs in particular had a stronger role greater 
pressure could be exerted on aberrant countries and this opportunity was currently 
being missed.163 This was to be contrasted with the Ministerial Council for the 
Protection of Forests in Europe (MCPFE) process, which UNFF would eventually 
follow in this regard. The MSD was far too restricted to be of any use. Most 
government delegates took it as an opportunity to go shopping. It would be better 
to include the Major Groups in formal sessions, and if necessary send them out 
during sensitive discussions, such as financing. They wanted to see more, not less, 
involvement of NGOs through the Major Group process.164 
This criticism of inadequate inclusion of non-state interests was not just 
confined to how stakeholders were managed within the MSD. One interviewee 
commented that despite being given special responsibilities for the effective 
functioning of the process, the ability even for their organisation to participate 
was limited. They could cite one case at UNFF-4, where they had been invited to 
present at a special side event. They were told just minutes beforehand that the 
event was cancelled because government ministers were using the room. Such 
behaviour made directing UNFF activities very difficult from a practical 
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perspective, and could be attributed to the fact that certain governments did not 
support the broader participation or involvement of any non-state interests in the 
deliberations of UNFF. This undoubtedly made the process weaker than it could 
be. A major participation gap in UNFF was the lack of any self-standing 
mechanisms through which scientists could offer independent assessments on the 
state of the world’s forests, as they did in climate change discussions.165  
Three interviewees provided some interesting concluding observations. For 
UNFF to be successful, it needed to move beyond just having meetings in New 
York and Geneva with high-level diplomats into a process that was better 
connected back to a broad range of stakeholders back in the regions and in the 
individual countries, and not just the governments. This had led to efforts in 
ensuring new arrangements included a regional component of UNFF. Although 
some non-UNFF fora were more open than others, many were better than the 
traditional UN processes.166 An effective regime needed to be participatory and it 
was hoped this would now be the case with the move to more regional 
meetings.167 Finally, and significantly, there appears to be an underlying tension 
between Member States in the UNFF system over the level of non-state inclusion. 
One interviewee attributed the push by some governments to exclude NGOs from 
participating in UNFF-6 to the inclusion of NGOs in some delegations, and some 
governments wanted to be able to negotiate in an environment that was free of 
their influence. This led to the observation that governments favourable to NGO 
inclusion were now effectively prevented from discussing their position with such 
interests during sessions.168 
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Evaluation 
For nation-state participants, UNFF is highly inclusive, since it is open to all UN 
Member States. In terms of non-state participants, there is also a relatively broad 
range of interests represented within the Major Groups, although some 
commentators call for a greater spread of stakeholders. Nation-state interests also 
participate actively within the UNFF system, all sub-components of the system 
are open to their input, including the MSD, ad hoc expert groups, working groups, 
panel discussions and the like. Non-state interests do not participate as actively 
since they generally only have observer status in most structures, and a restricted 
degree of involvement in others, with the notable exception of the ad hoc group 
for the NLBI at UNFF-6. Although state interests experience a high degree of 
inclusiveness, non-state interests do not. Some Member States have attempted to 
include non-state interests in their delegations, but this has met with resistance 
from others. Consequently, the high and low degrees of inclusiveness are 
counterbalanced, leaving the system as a whole somewhere in the middle between 
inclusive and exclusive, with a rating of medium. 
Equality 
Glück et al recognise that the different forms of new forest governance need to be 
reconciled with contemporary demands for participation and the protection of 
rights. They see the necessity of having a general frame and purpose for forest 
governance that can be identified as legitimate by all concerned. Such a frame 
should address what they consider to be the most important and demanding 
linkage between all levels of SFM: the problem of social justice.169 They envisage 
justice in terms of economic equality, whilst other observers relate justice and 
equity to how forest laws are framed and implemented, emphasising the linkages 
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between good governance, participation and sustainability.170 Meaningful 
participation is seen as being essential for SFM, and UNFF is accused of 
unnecessarily constraining and even denigrating civil society participation and 
there have been calls for it to embrace non-state interests as equal partners.171 
Other processes such as the ITTO and CBD have been identified by NGOs as 
providing much greater access. This may go some way to explaining the growing 
stridency in the criticisms made by some non-state interests over the course of 
UNFF.172 UNFF’s lack of equality has also been contrasted with other 
intergovernmental processes such as those covering fisheries, or water, where 
those involved engage in partnerships in which all stakeholders have joint 
ownership of the question concerned. In UNFF by comparison, even countries 
that have a tradition of supporting multi-stakeholder participation have not been 
particularly responsive to NGO concerns.173 UNFF’s structure and process are 
seen as limiting non-state interests to such an extent that their interest in 
remaining involved has “fluctuated, then dissipated and is now marginal.”174 This 
problem has been identified in some of the entities associated with UNFF. As 
early as UNFF-2 NGOs called for UNFF-related entities to ensure greater balance 
of interests in its activities at international, national and local levels, and singled 
out the CPF in this regard.175  
Interviews 
Perspectives on the nature, degree and expression of equality varied between 
NGO/business interests, and from those within the third group of informants, who 
were generally more involved. According to the latter group, UNFF was a 
government-led process under the framework of the United Nations, and this was 
why government delegates had a better position here than other interests. Other 
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interests had much greater difficulty in participating, which explained why so 
much of the activity actually took place in the corridors between meetings.176 The 
rules of procedure of the United Nations, which applied to the UNFF as a 
subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council did limit the participation of 
stakeholders to quite a considerable extent.177 This was on account of the fact that 
although UNFF had mechanisms for the participation and engagement of non-
country members, it was still a country dialogue. It was not the intent or the desire 
of UNFF to treat non-state interests as second-tier participants, but the reality was 
that the voice of countries had a priority over organisations, which did not reflect 
country perspectives. Non-state involvement was problematic because a number 
of countries in the process had very strong feelings either for or against the 
engagement and participation of the Major Groups. Some countries had 
threatened to walk out of discussions on account of what role Major Groups 
should or should not be allowed to play.178  
However, it was simplistic to argue that equality of participation would be 
improved merely by giving everyone an equal voice. This was not possible with 
usually well over 200 people in attendance at UNFF sessions. Equality was 
delivered by listening to what all interests said, and giving them an opportunity to 
participate and to develop processes, mechanisms and incentives to have as broad 
participation as possible.179 One problem identified was that UN processes were 
more structured and constrained than other events. Regional forest-related 
meetings, which fed into UNFF, allowed people to participate as relatively equal 
representatives.180 Nevertheless it was true that NGOs felt UNFF offered less 
opportunity for participation than other UN-level processes such as the CBD, 
which they regarded as “the place to be” and consequently gave it a higher 
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profile.181 However, the real extent to which NGOs could really influence the 
decisions in CBD was questionable; their impact on CBD decisions was probably 
no greater than in UNFF.182  
One NGO informant described the nature of their participation at UNFF in 
comparison to IPF/IFF, where the interviewee had actually been involved in 
drafting some of the original PfA, including those on traditional forest-related 
knowledge and the underlying causes of deforestation. At UNFF groups had the 
right to intervene in plenary sessions, but had observer status only in working 
group sessions and they could not participate in drafting at all. UNFF had proved 
to offer little more than an opportunity to lobby governments, such as those in the 
EU, usually resulting in little action, which was “very disappointing.”183  
One interviewee from the business sector was deeply critical of the lack of 
status accorded to the multi-stakeholder dialogue in particular. It was usually 
placed on day two when all the governmental delegates were negotiating 
elsewhere, and there was “virtually no one in the audience.” They felt that a 
number of governments, as well as the secretariat were not really interested in 
multi-stakeholder input.184 One interviewee from the third group of informants 
agreed with this observation. They portrayed the MSD as “completely ineffective” 
on account of the lack of interaction, as it was structured in such a way that 
interactive dialogue was not possible. In comparison, discussions with NGOs and 
the private sector in the MCPFE were much more “natural.” There, although non-
governmental participants still had to wait until after the government 
representatives spoke, they tended to stay throughout the talks as the chair always 
ensured their items were put on the agenda and discussed.185  
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Evaluation 
Nation states have extensive opportunity and the capacity to participate in 
UNFF’s structures of governance. They can vote, negotiate text, draft decisions 
and make agreements. Non-state interests cannot. These rights of access give 
nation-states a much greater capacity to participate in, and make use of, UNFF’s 
facilities than non-state interests, since their access is more restricted. Nation-
states have a high degree of influence within the UNFF system and over its 
outcomes, dependent on their geo-political power and strategic alliances. Non-
state interests are less able to influence the UNFF system since their involvement 
is relatively restricted under ECOSOC rules. Their power is based largely upon 
their ability to lobby effectively, and they cannot directly affect the outcomes of 
sessions. Nevertheless, the UNFF is characterised by a low degree of equality 
amongst its participants, with a rating of low. 
Resources 
Forest-related programmes can be both time and resource intensive, and the 
processes themselves require adequate resources for facilitation and management. 
Glück et al argue that effective policy networks ( which UNFF is an example) 
may require what they refer to as political-administrative capacity.186 UNFF’s 
effectiveness at this level has been challenged, since NGOs identified financial 
constraints in the MSD of UNFF-4 as the “main obstacle to creating and 
implementing capacity building programmes on both national and local levels.”187  
UNFF itself has recognised that capacity-building and technical and financial 
assistance, are “crucial preconditions for strengthening governance systems.”188 
Institutionally, it has also acknowledged the need to assist stakeholder groups that 
have limited capacity or opportunity to participate in the implementation of its 
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PfA.189 A draft resolution put forward at UNFF-2 regarding the provision of travel 
assistance and a daily subsistence allowance for member state participants from 
the least developed countries and countries with economies in transition was 
subsequently adopted at ECOSOC.190 At UNFF-3 it was agreed that the Forum 
should formally constitute a Trust Fund, which should be used for the assistance 
of developing country delegates to participate in future meetings.191 By UNFF-6, 
the Bureau identified an “overwhelming” need for travel support from 
participating developing countries, which exceeded the allocated budget of 
approximately $120,000 by some $350,000, and additional funds had to be 
sourced from donor countries.192  In accordance with General Assembly decision 
58/554 of 23 December 2003 the emphasis on provision of support is for 
participants from the least developed countries, and countries with economies in 
transition.193 Travel assistance is also provided to government-designated experts 
participating in expert groups and the like.194  
UNFF commentators have stressed the importance of effective, rather than 
wasteful resource management, but they are not sure of UNFF’s capacity to meet 
this need and consider it “ill-equipped” as an international forest governance 
system.195 This is largely a result of resource constraints. It has no budget for 
operational programmes, and this places limitations on its ability to take action 
directly.196 One critic argues the UNFF should facilitate the implementation of the 
PfA, but despite having a secretariat of 15-20 people in New York it has no funds 
or capacity to do so. This is left to the other organisations that collaborate in the 
CPF, such as FAO and ITTO, although establishment of CPF is considered the 
most valuable outcome of the IPF/IFF.197 Yet the CPF has no budget and staff 
either, but conversely, its lack of formal organisational status within UNFF may 
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have enhanced its ability to develop several useful products, even if half of its 
members do not participate actively.198  
Several areas have been identified where UNFF requires additional resources 
in order to increase its role in encouraging participation and collaboration around 
forest management.199 It is recommended that stakeholders, partners, multi-
stakeholder partnerships, and the Major Groups be provided with the financial and 
technical support to participate, consult and collaborate within new participatory 
modes and initiatives across the entire range of IAF meetings and events.200 
Regrettably, however, UNFF has been unable to obtain resources for SFM by 
reversing the decline in official development assistance (ODA) from donor 
nations.201 This trend is likely to continue: “unless it addresses the fundamental 
structural and procedural weakness that currently limit its effectiveness.”202 
Interviews 
The comments from interviewees regarding the resource-related aspects of 
participation and interest representation in UNFF are more thematic, rather than 
partisan, in nature. The cost of attendance is a cross-sectoral concern. Distance 
from New York, and the cost of accommodation was identified as a barrier to 
participation by several attendees.203 For countries closer to New York, 
attendance was less burdensome.204 Others noted that UNFF was costly in terms 
of the amount of time it took up, as well as being financially draining. Two weeks 
in New York hotels, the flights and being paid for the work time was really 
expensive in comparison to the generally unsatisfactory outcomes that were 
negotiated. They agreed with NGO criticisms that the money could be better 
spent.205 
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The provision of funds by UNFF itself, and by governments for national 
interests to attend was also discussed. UNFF received a regular budget from the 
UN and some money for travel support for developing countries only.206 
Developing country government delegates received a per diem for the whole two 
weeks; there was usually at least one from each developing country, about fifty all 
told. 207 Developed countries also provided some contributions to UNFF trust 
funds to facilitate participation of representatives from developing countries that 
were not well resourced.208  
 It was also acknowledged that NGO resources were limited, and that they 
needed to be present at all the international processes that worked on forest 
issues.209 Although money for NGO participation was not officially permitted, 
one NGO informant explained that they had received travel support as well as 3 
days’ worth of per diem expenses. Previously they had succeeded in convincing 
UNFF that it was important to provide support for at least one or two others to 
have more NGO representation.210 There had been no mechanism for the UNFF 
secretariat or the UN or the ECOSOC system to officially fund NGOs, although 
some funds were made available to non-governmental representatives from 2004 
onwards.211  
Generally, the UNFF secretariat preferred to encourage governments to include 
non-state interests in their delegations, and to find other organisations to support 
that, such as FAO. FAO could not directly fund participation either, but it was 
able to come up with some creative methods instead such as engaging people as 
“resource persons”, or keynote speakers, and pay them that way.212 One 
interviewee noted that their country contributed to the trust fund, and stressed that 
it did not get to exercise any choice over who was funded with their monies, 
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except that they were governmental representatives.213 One interviewee 
commented that their country had found that holding regional workshops, and 
bringing interested parties together to explain what was going on and help them 
find a way to contribute back into that process on an ongoing way was more 
efficient.214  
Another issue, and one that led to expressions of frustration amongst some 
interviewees, was that there was no real financing mechanism for the UNFF itself. 
UNFF was effectively a voluntary process as it had no formal legal status and was 
therefore not supported by the normal UN budget. Extra meetings between 
sessions needed to be financed to keep the process moving forward.215 As a 
reporting mechanism UNFF’s contribution should not be undervalued, because a 
lot of countries tied their aid budget to reporting. But if a country could not even 
report the basic fundamentals of certain activities, it was a major issue and needed 
to be addressed. The EU and a number of individual EU member countries had 
consequently invested considerable amounts of money on some of the 
fundamentals that were involved in reporting.216 A formal Trust Fund existed, but 
it was not well endowed and was really only there to support the participation of 
delegates from developing countries, and some participants in the multi-
stakeholder dialogue. There were no broader funding mechanisms for the 
implementation of the political commitments made by the governments at 
UNFF.217 UNFF itself did not require a giant budget, but the collaborative 
mechanisms that sat underneath it needed sufficient funds to make realistic 
progress, and that was not happening at all well. The biggest general criticism that 
could be levelled against UNFF was that the requirements did not match the 
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resources, and a way had not yet been found to increase the resources available to 
implement the agreed outcomes.218  
One interviewee commented that governments looked to the UNFF to deliver a 
proper financing system for forest-related agreements. Some of the largest donors 
were beginning to comment that their generosity would not last forever, 
particularly when taxpayers wanted to know what their money was being spent 
on. They provided an example of a country that had paid for four inter-sessional 
activities in the previous seven or eight years in order to see things move in the 
direction they wanted. This country was also financing the Secretariat, and was 
expecting progress on some kind of instrument, or it would stop funding the 
process.219 
The relationship between the provision of funds and the relative power of 
Member States within the UNFF process was discussed by a number of 
participants. The US was a very large donor to the Trust Fund, which gave it more 
influence and it used its monetary donations to exert pressure during the 
negotiations. When financial issues were raised the first thing the US delegation 
did was to point out that it paid all these millions of dollars, and who else was 
paying? The European Union for example would then be invited to pay as much 
as the United States if they wanted to move the process forward. The US did not 
want anything at an international level that directly influenced their own national 
forest policy so they used their money as leverage to prevent a formal and legally 
binding convention; they had used their money to create an “unholy alliance” 
between themselves and Brazil block it.220 At least half a dozen members of the 
EU were also major donors but they wanted a legally binding forest instrument. 
Despite the aid Brazil received from EU members, the economic forces backing 
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its rejection of any kind of global forestry instrument were stronger.221 Countries 
therefore participated on an unequal footing in terms of the resources they had to 
engage in such global forest-related processes as UNFF.222 
As a result of such crosscutting issues, the funding question was never far 
below the surface at UNFF. Several of the developed countries with the most 
funds did not have significant forestry activities, which influenced the nature of 
their input into discussions about funding.223 Their primary preoccupation was 
whether or not there should be a forest convention. For developing countries and 
economies in transition like Russia, obtaining money for environmental 
programmes had been a preoccupation since before Rio and as far back as 
Stockholm in 1972.  They were often quite willing to do deals to get it, but 
developed countries did not want to focus on money. This was a constant source 
of frustration for developing countries.224 
Competition for money also made relations between the various forest-related 
initiatives at the global level highly politicised. Within UNFF itself, governments 
did not fund CPF but rather the participating organisations within it. FAO for 
instance, it was alleged, had a largely agricultural mandate and tended to 
downplay natural forests, as a result spending most of its time promoting 
plantation establishment. The CBD was a much better convention than anything 
UNFF was likely produce, but its biggest problem was a lack of funds, and it was 
constantly under threat of losing funds to UNFF. The CBD was comprised mostly 
of environment ministers; forest ministers on the other hand attended UNFF. 
Conflicts between ministries over domestic funding played themselves out at the 
international level.225  
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Evaluation 
Although taking time to reach a formal agreement, UNFF, and particularly the 
Bureau, has put some effort into securing funds for developing country 
participation. The establishment of a facility within the Trust Fund for developing 
countries, as well as the provision of resources from donor nations to provide 
travel costs, and the availability of per diem expenses are valuable contributions. 
The situation for the Major Groups is less satisfactory. Although some funds are 
available for NGOs, these are only on a quasi-official level, and still insufficient 
in terms of providing for widespread representation. The high level of support for 
developing countries is consequently moderated by this state of affairs. On a 
broader level, however, the lack of funds to support the operational aspects of the 
system, such as the PfA, impacts not only on the participation of internal, but also 
external, interests in the system, such as those acting on a regional or national 
level. Secondly, although monies are provided for interest representation by donor 
countries, such funds can at times be highly politicised, and used to ‘buy’ favours 
(such as support for or against a NLBI). This also impacts on accountability. All 
these factors combine to produce a rating of low. 
Organisational Responsibility 
Accountability  
In 2004 the International Labour Organisation (ILO) World Commission on the 
Social Dimension of Globalization identified a number of significant problems 
associated with global governance, stemming largely from economic inequality, 
but compounded by the low degree of accountability and transparency of decision 
making procedures at the intergovernmental level. Particularly problematic was 
the fact that governments often adopted positions in such international arena, 
which were seldom the subject of parliamentary oversight at the national level.226 
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UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in a chapter on globalisation and governance 
contained in the Millennium Report also emphasised the connections between 
better governance, greater participation and accountability.227 The failings of the 
UN system in the environmental arena in this regard have also been highlighted 
through the UNEP International Environmental Governance (IEG) process.228 
Institutional reform has consequently been identified as a priority area within the 
UN system. Recognition of the linkage between accountability and transparency 
has also been reflected in calls for independent monitoring, assessment and 
reporting of all international institutions.229 Increasing the collective 
accountability of UN Member States has been identified as an important step.230 
Two mechanisms can be considered to hold countries accountable for their 
actions at UNFF. The first relates to the reporting on the status of Member States’ 
efforts in implementing the IPF/IFF PfA domestically. The second concerns the 
IAF, a country-by-country review of which was to be made available at UNFF-5, 
and which is to be periodically re-examined.231 In the broader UNFF system, 
NFPs, model forest networks and community-based forestry are the principle 
models of forest partnership on the national, global and local levels.232 
Governance scholars have noted the inherent problems of accountability in 
network governance and the democratic challenges public-private partnerships 
pose.233 During the MSD held at UNFF-4 NGOs stressed that effective 
partnerships between governments and non-state interests required clear 
agreements and jointly defined roles and responsibilities, reflecting the will of 
participating constituencies.234 Accountability in such relations was identified as 
being essential in ensuring the credibility of such approaches. 235 NGOs expressed 
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a note of deep concern that some types of partnership were “often established 
without the adequate participation of civil society.”236  
UNFF’s ad hoc expert groups consist of experts designated by governments 
but nominated in their personal capacities not as governmental delegates. The 
intention behind this is to avoid promotion of government positions. However, 
this arrangement has led one commentator to observe that “many governments 
appointed senior negotiators to the expert groups, with the unsurprising result that 
the views expressed by experts often bore a striking resemblance to government 
policy.”237  
Interviews 
All sectors commented on the degree to which government delegates could really 
be considered accountable to other participants in the UNFF system. According to 
one interviewee, one of the biggest problems with UNFF was that governments, 
who were also the largest forest owners, did all the negotiating. They would not 
stand for a process that criticised how they managed their forests in any way.238 
The problem of corruption was also a major problem. Money given to Russia, or 
many African countries, or Indonesia, never got to local communities, and either 
went to the banks in their capital cities, or was simply stolen and sent to 
Switzerland or Luxembourg.239 
Further comments were made from the same group of informants about the 
behind the scenes directing undertaken by the UNFF Secretariat prior to sessions. 
Some issues got put on the agenda that were more about giving the Secretariat a 
higher profile within the UN system than the meeting the needs of Member States. 
They were about enabling the Secretariat to demonstrate to the UN hierarchy that 
it was following broader UN programmes, such as sustainable development. This 
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informant felt that the Secretariat had forced certain issues onto the agenda of 
UNFF that were tangential to forest issues.240 Others attributed a less devious 
motive to the Secretariat’s actions. The Secretariat did a lot of its own thinking 
and preparation before meetings. When discussions proceeded in a direction, 
which deviated from their desires and expectations, they did at times attempt to 
steer the way things progressed. This informant felt such attempts to lobby or 
influence the process were done with good intentions and did not impact the 
course of discussions, but to stay abreast of developments. They added further 
that it was common for UNFF participants to lobby the Secretariat since it moved 
around various international fora, and knew what was going on.241 Another 
concern raised was the reporting around donor countries’ expenditure. It was 
crucial to them to have a framework that gave a greater degree of assurance that 
the money their country invested in projects had a sustainable impact on the 
ground, and not just to finance the project for two years. They needed to 
demonstrate to their parliament and taxpayers that their contributions had 
achieved something to reduce the 15 million hectares of global forest loss per year 
and wanted clear rules, clear obligations for countries, and verification 
mechanisms. 242  
Other informants felt country delegates were not really accountable to other 
stakeholders. During the MSD governments “dumped” their most junior people in 
the seats and went shopping. Yet they were the same governments that stated in 
the negotiated text how important participation was. There was no real intention 
to open the system to their involvement, in comparison to such institutions as 
FAO.243  
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Evaluation 
UNFF, like other intergovernmental processes, operates beyond the mandate of 
national-level parliaments, and its degree of ‘vertical’ accountability in terms of 
the direct responsibility of national governments to their domestic constituents is 
questionable. However, it should be noted that the existence of the linkage back to 
national level forest processes via National Forest Programmes partially mitigates 
this. Nevertheless, there is a compelling case to be made that there is little 
opportunity for Member States to be held accountable within the UNFF 
framework for their forest-related activities particularly since all the main 
intergovernmental instruments are voluntary. Within the Forum itself it could be 
argued that there is also little ‘horizontal’ accountability of Member States to 
other participating interests, such as NGOs, or the scientific community. Indeed, 
some countries have attempted to restrict even those aspects of UNFF, such as the 
MSD, or national level delegations, where non-state participation might challenge 
the actions of certain governments. Further accountability problems exist in 
relationship to the role played by government appointees in the various ad hoc 
committees and the subordination of scientific knowledge to matters of 
diplomacy, even if such issues are not unique to UNFF. There is also some 
ambiguity regarding the role played by the secretariat in furthering its own 
institutional ends, and its susceptibility to lobbying by national delegations. 
Accountability in the UNFF system is low. 
Transparency 
UNFF has acknowledged transparency as an “indispensable attribute of good 
governance.”244 Institutionally, it was also committed from its inception to build 
on the “transparent… practices” established by the CBD, IPF and IFF.245 
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Documentation also comments on the importance of “transparent and 
participatory practices, including multi-stakeholder participation at the national 
level” as part of the requirements for implementing SFM “in a cohesive and 
comprehensive manner.”246  
ECOSOC resolution 2000/35 requires governments to be the principle agent 
responsible for the monitoring, assessment and reporting on the implementation of 
the IPF/IFF PfA.247 Non-state interests may only sit in as observers on public 
meetings and only when matters in their competence are discussed.248 Concerns 
over transparency led NGOs at UNFF-4 to stress the need for UNFF and its 
associated entities to demonstrate transparency regarding information 
communication, publication and dissemination. The use of third party observers 
was recommended as a way of increasing accountability and transparency. Lack 
of access to information and communication networks were identified as 
hampering the ability of stakeholders to be involved equally and to maintain 
constant participation.249 
The reporting on implementation of the IAF is expected to operate in a 
transparent manner.250 In order to meet this commitment, it was agreed at UNFF-2 
that country reports, as part of the review process, would be made available at 
UNFF-3 and subsequently.251 In the period after UNFF-4 and prior to UNFF-5, 
participants were requested to report on their forest-related activities, for 
consideration at UNFF-5. The study was two parts: an analysis of the progress in 
implementing the IPF/IFF PfA, according to the 16 thematic elements, and a 
review of the effectiveness of the IAF according to six principal functions.252 
Regrettably however, it was determined that the reporting process should be 
voluntary.253 Responses to a preliminary questionnaire were received from just 14 
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Member States, five relevant organisations and forest-related processes, and a 
joint submission from the members of the CPF.254 An analytical study of the 
information collected, which was to provide the basis for a more formal report, 
noted that it had not been possible to give consideration to “information that 
might have been provided by countries that did not make reports or submit 
questionnaires.”255 A later revised version of the study was obliged to drop the 
separate analysis of the questionnaire responses, and instead included existing 
materials from the voluntary reports already presented by countries at UNFF-2, -3 
and -4. By the middle of March 2005, 56 voluntary reports and/or questionnaire 
responses had been received from Member States, relevant organisations and 
forest-related processes. The final report was published after UNFF-5 and 
contained 74 voluntary responses to the report and questionnaire.256 
Interviews 
Discussions relating to transparency within UNFF, and the degree of 
responsibility demonstrated by participating organisations was confined to 
comments about the institution itself and the role played by governments. One 
NGO informant criticised the failure of UNFF to insist on strong transparency 
mechanisms for national reporting. It had developed a weak process oriented 
around a questionnaire with few substantive reporting requirements, and which 
few countries had filled in. With such inadequate reporting it was impossible to 
tell what was really being done. Less than two per cent of participating countries 
reported on their activities for more than four years, and a large number had not 
reported on their activities even once.257  
Another interviewee from the third group of informants provided an alternative 
perspective. They explained that it was the PfA that should be understood as the 
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main transparency mechanism for UNFF, in so far as they provided a means 
whereby countries could report on their legislative frameworks and how they 
functioned in relation to forests. For some this was the first time they had been 
exposed to such a concept. It was true that the proposals contained no 
enforcement or monitoring provisions, but UNFF had nevertheless provided an 
environment, where countries could come together and discuss issues of mutual 
concern. Whether increased transparency flowed on to any concrete action on the 
ground would only become apparent over time.258 
Other informants from the same group were less complimentary in their 
analysis of government behaviour. The way in which governments met to 
negotiate text was not open. It was true that UNFF was an intergovernmental 
body, and that governments were its major clients, but in terms of transparency, 
the opportunities for either the members of the CPF, the Major Groups or any 
other NGO stakeholders to participate were “very limited.” There needed to be 
much greater transparency in the system to achieve this. At present non-state 
participation was accorded nothing more than lip service.259 Another contrasted 
UNFF’s lack of transparency to the MCPFE, where draft resolutions were still 
negotiated by the Member States, but all interests were present during these 
negotiations. In UNFF all major negotiations occurred behind “closed doors.” The 
interviewee wondered whether the outcomes and the generally constructive nature 
of discussions in the MCPFE were a consequence of the greater transparency of 
the process.260  
Evaluation 
There are at least four issues relating to an evaluation of the transparency of 
UNFF. The first relates to the inconsistency, or lack, of national level reporting. 
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Secondly, and relating to openness, is the manner in which Member States 
negotiate among themselves in sessions generally closed to non-state interests. 
Thirdly, concerning the availability of, and access to, information, UNFF’s 
performance is mixed. Its past, present and proposed future activities are freely 
available on the Internet, but the session reports are couched in largely neutral 
terms, and do not discuss the diplomatic nuances of any deliberations (this is left 
to the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, an external NGO publication). However, 
detailed financial reporting, such as income and expenditure, the allocation and 
amount of travel expenses and per diems, and donor country contributions to the 
Trust Fund is not available. Requests for more detailed financial information from 
UNFF were not forthcoming.261 Shortcomings in member state reporting, the 
closed nature of state deliberations, and lack of financial reporting undermine an 
otherwise medium performance in terms of access to information, resulting in a 
rating of low. 
Decision Making 
Democracy 
UNFF follows ECOSOC’s Rules of Procedure whereby each member state has 
one vote.262 Yet despite the existence of voting rights, by convention, these are 
not exercised. As a result, it has been argued, Member States have become 
clustered within a series of “veto coalitions” where particular actors whose 
cooperation is needed on a given issue create alliances between convergent 
interests to block change. Such coalitions are often clustered around issues such as 
financial assistance and state sovereignty and have historically hampered other 
consensus-based forest deliberations including the TFAP, the ITTO and the 
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UNCED process.263 Consensual decision making processes, the format UNFF 
follows by default, are particularly prone to such coalitions.264  
Regardless of the conventions, non-state interests do not have the right to vote. 
Any rights they are given depend on what type of organisation they constitute, 
although the categories are not entirely clear.265 Specialised agencies cannot vote, 
but may be represented at meetings and may participate in deliberations, which 
relate to items of concern to them, and may submit proposals regarding such 
items. Other intergovernmental organisations accorded permanent observer status 
by the General Assembly may participate in deliberations of relevance to their 
activities without the right to vote. Non-governmental organisations may be 
granted consultative status according to the determination of the Committee on 
Non-Governmental Organisations. 266 These rules were supplemented by 
arrangements, which permitted NGOs to make written representations and speak 
(with permission) but not have any negotiating role.267 These slight amendments, 
which granted NGOs the right to speak on the general business of UNFF, it was 
stressed, were not to be seen as setting a precedent.268 
Interviews 
The impression created by interview subjects was that the degree of democracy 
experienced at UNFF depended on the extent of participation in the system. 
According to one actively participating informant, because the UN was a body 
made up of Member States, government delegates always had a greater capacity 
to influence the outcomes than any others. It was an artefact of the UN process 
that the people negotiating the final text on any negotiated decision were 
government people. But there were ways to work with the non-government 
representatives to ensure that they achieved the outcomes they wanted -- at least 
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within the confines of the UNFF process.269 Another similarly active interviewee 
agreed, noting that although UNFF had mechanisms for the participation and 
engagement of non-country members, it was still a “country dialogue.”270 One 
interviewee from group three felt NFPs were intrinsically more democratic than 
the UNFF, since they actively encouraged a much broader range of interests to 
come on board. They were very critical of UNFF’s rules of procedure, but noted 
that this was probably a common problem for all fora sponsored by ECOSOC.271 
Other existing regional forestry-related fora had proved more useful in obtaining 
regional input into future UNFF deliberations, which could then be taken up at 
UNFF itself.272 
In terms of non-state input, it was acknowledged that the direct impact of the 
Major Groups on the negotiations was “very limited.” They could raise their 
issues by means of public statements, but they were seldom acted upon. 
Informally, the channels of communicating were there, but once the discussions 
went into pure negotiation mode after the generic statements of day one, the 
dialogue between the governments and NGOs and private sector stakeholders, or 
other international agencies was basically over. There was no further exchange of 
experience, and very little any stakeholder or any international agency could do 
from that point on.273  
One NGO informant commented on the impact of the democratic failings of 
UNFF. Representatives from the World Bank, or UNDP, for example, had exactly 
the same experiences to NGOs. They usually left after attending the high level 
segments deeply disappointed by the extent of discrimination against non-state 
interests. Consequently, they now tended to send only low-level staff, and there 
was no real collaboration with the process.274 Another described the negotiating 
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process as “really stupid”, because non-governmental participants never got to say 
anything, and had to resort to sneaking around to governmental delegates and 
whispering in their ears, in order to get them to ask questions on NGOs’ behalf. 
UNFF-5 had been particularly non-democratic and some governments had pushed 
to exclude NGOs from UNFF-6 entirely. This had led some NGOs to spend most 
of their time at UNFF-5 lobbying for the process to be abandoned all together.275 
Evaluation 
Democracy functions as a two-tier system in UNFF. Member States have the right 
to vote, and non-state interests do not. In the case of the latter group, participatory 
rights are further differentiated between specialised agencies and other 
intergovernmental agencies, and NGOs. This second-class status affects the extent 
to which some non-state interests have exercised the rights they have been given, 
potentially rendering the system less effective. However, in view of the fact that 
Member States do not exercise the right to vote, and that divergent interests spend 
much of ther time simply blocking one another’s interests through strategic use of 
their de facto veto powers, democracy in UNFF in low.    
Agreement  
Formal agreements in UNFF are referred to either as resolutions or decisions. The 
difference in status between a resolution and a decision in the UN system is 
important. A resolution has been described as “a statement of political 
commitment that has been agreed by a group of states, but which is not legally 
binding.”276 UNFF resolutions are to be understood as part of an increasing trend 
to create ‘soft law’ regarding forest issues and which constitute political, rather 
than legally binding commitments. Decisions on the other hand do not even 
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constitute soft law since they deal only with procedural and administrative 
matters.277 
Voting by Member States may be conducted by a show of hands, roll call or 
mechanical means, or by secret ballot. 278 Decisions are made by a majority of the 
members present. Where no member requests a vote on any proposal or motion, 
the proposal or motion may be adopted without a vote. Equally divided votes are 
resolved in favour of the negative.279 At UNFF, as with IPF and IFF, no matter 
has ever been taken to a vote.280 UNFF’s use of consensus led the writers of the 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin in their analysis of UNFF-6 to conclude that “pursuit 
of consensus on forest issues at the highest level has produced a document limited 
by the lowest common denominator.”281 UNFF’s ad hoc groups are formally 
obliged to make decisions by consensus.282  
Interviews 
A range of interviewees commented on the nature of decision making, particularly 
the use of consensus, within UNFF. Views from the third group of informants 
varied. Apologists explained that the UN system had its own rules and 
regulations, and was a very complex, defined process. This was a constraining 
factor, but it was very difficult to change the rules just for forests, because the 
same rules existed for every kind of interaction.283 If there was no consensus, 
there were no outcomes, as had been the case at UNFF-5 where no decisions had 
been made. 284 This meant that consensus the outcomes were not always the best, 
but if non-consensus meant nothing happened at all, it was better to live with the 
decisions that were made. At least there were opportunities for further input; by 
keeping people engaged over time, things could be changed.285 It was also 
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important to understand that there was a subtle difference between consensus and 
lack of objection. In UNFF, decisions were made on the basis of both methods.286 
Other informants from the same group were less positive. One subject 
commented that there was in fact a majority in UNFF who were prepared to take 
action but the sad thing was that because UNFF needed consensus to achieve 
anything, everyone had to wait for the very last of the minority of countries to say 
yes. Despite the existence of the appropriate procedures, there was no point 
exercising the powers of majority voting. Voting against powerful countries 
anywhere in the UN system led to impacts on the UN’s overall operational 
budget, so without consensus it was impossible to get anywhere.287 The situation 
was further exacerbated by the fact that UNFF hardly ever reached consensus 
because ambassador-level staff did not really have a mandate -- or, in fact, 
sufficient knowledge -- to discuss technical matters, so the negotiations could not 
really work.288 
On the subject of the negotiations themselves interviewees from both group 
three and the NGOs made a number of observations. NGOs were, not surprisingly 
given their minor role as outside observers, generally negative. One of the 
interviewees argued that had never been any “substantive discussion” in either the 
IPF/IFF or UNFF sessions. All the processes had been highly politicised since 
most countries sent diplomats, either from their embassies or from their ministries 
of foreign affairs and they knew nothing about forests or biodiversity. The only 
issue that mattered to them was whether they should oppose or support a legally 
binding convention.289 Another commented that negotiations were too long and by 
the end everyone was exhausted. People were always prepared to think creatively 
at the beginning of sessions when the text drafts were first exposed, but after days 
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of inserting square brackets and alternative wording people got to the stage where 
they did not care what went in. At UNFF-4 for example delegates had discussed 
indigenous peoples’ rights and had developed some good ideas, but negotiating 
the text had proved to be such a failure that everybody simply agreed to drop the 
whole idea.290  
Given the active role some of them played in negotiations, interviewees from 
the third group were more philosophical. One made the observation that outsiders 
(meaning NGOs and other interested parties) tended to look at the process naively 
or with unrealistic expectations. Parties to the negotiations by contrast recognised 
the degree of compromise that went into formulating any outcome and how little 
resemblance it bore to the original proposal, but that was part of the challenge.291 
They did comment however that regimented positions put forward before 
meetings could be very constraining. Countries that went along with a more open 
mandate and broad range of objectives rather than predetermined text allowed for 
negotiations to proceed much more smoothly. This resulted in more productive 
engagement leading to more mutually acceptable outcomes. UNFF-5 had been a 
wasted two weeks because of the decision amongst several countries to arrive 
with predetermined positions. At UNFF-6 a number of those countries came back 
with the understanding that such an approach would spell an end to the whole 
process and had negotiated with an entirely different mindset.292 
Another participant described negotiations as “really tough” since there were 
also coordination meetings amongst politically allied delegations to discuss what 
had happened during the day, and examine what strategies should be adopted.293 
This made for an intensive process of post- and pre-meeting meetings.294As a 
consequence there was inevitably a lot of “diplomatic tap-dancing” that went on 
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as a result of all these behind the scenes strategising, and agreements were 
progressed “very, very slowly.” 295 This led to the conclusion by one informant 
that when agreements were made, they were probably as good as they could get 
given the size and nature of UNFF.296  
Despite the philosophical stance taken by most interviewees from this group, 
there was a sense of frustration as well. One stated that their country’s interest did 
not lie in the UNFF only being a discussion forum. They wanted a venue capable 
of bringing forward concrete agreements, standards, and implementation 
systems.297 Another had reached the stage where they had given up on the type of 
instrument (legally binding or otherwise) and merely wanted a strong instrument 
to enable negotiators to go back to their own countries and increase the domestic 
political pressure for action.298 After years of negotiation the reality was that 
environmental matters had been discussed in such detail since Rio that negotiators 
had effectively exhausted their room to manoeuvre on anything.299  
Evaluation 
The process of coming to agreement in UNFF is subjected to a number of 
countervailing forces. On the one hand, the official procedures, which are clearly 
defined, and recognised by all parties, are never used. On the other, the actual 
method used, the “gentleman’s agreement”, is a source of almost universal 
frustration. Decisions, which might otherwise be approved by a majority of 
participants, do not get made. This results in difficult and complex negotiations 
based around compromise.  In such a context consensus is used not as the 
preferred tool, but one that generates the ‘least bad’ outcome: no one is offended, 
but no one is pleased. Whilst this may reflect the Realpolitik of the broader UN 
system, agreement in UNFF does not merit a rating of anything other than low. 
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Dispute Settlement  
Dispute settlement mechanisms across the UN system have been identified as 
inadequate.300 One problem identified in the literature on multilateral 
environmental agreements in particular is that dispute resolution mechanisms are 
often weak, and parties reluctant to use them.301 Commentators blame the conflict 
in UNFF on the focus given to text negotiation rather than collaborative dialogue. 
The emphasis on negotiating text as the primary method of deliberation, stems 
largely from arguments for or against a legally binging convention, and has 
resulted in a process- rather than output-oriented focus in UNFF.302 The current 
method of intergovernmental bargaining has resulted in a form of “disconnected 
politics” lacking in coherence.303 Substantive agreements in comparison increase 
with greater acknowledgement of diverse actors.304  
Interviews 
Informants did not comment in detail of the settlement of disputes in UNFF, 
although the comments made were generally negative. One NGO interviewee 
characterised most of the UNFF discussions as being one single dispute over 
national sovereignty, expressed through the conflict over what type of forest 
instrument to adopt.305 This was corroborated by a second, who portrayed UNFF-
5 as being a “fight” between the EU, which wanted a legally binding instrument, 
and Brazil and a number of other southern countries, who wanted no legal 
obligations but plenty of funding.306 One interviewee, from the third group of 
subjects, commented that because a minority of countries continually blocked 
developments, there was no real will to change anything at UNFF.307 This was 
because, in the opinion of another subject, voting blocs made things difficult for 
many participants.308  
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Criticisms were not confined to the oppositional role played by recalcitrant 
nation-states. One informant from group three also commented on the negative 
role played by “professional opponents” in the NGO sector. They functioned at 
such a high level that they were completely disconnected from the interests on the 
ground that they were supposed to represent. They were no different from 
governments, in that they were well paid and spent most of their time in New 
York or travelling the world. Discussions became more useful when there were 
presentations from private practitioners such as forest owner associations, who 
presented on how to approach real problems. The generalised theoretical and 
dogmatic demands made by internationally active NGOs were not really that 
helpful, even if some governments believed they should participate.309  
Another informant from the third group recalled that they did know of one 
formal complaint. It had been lodged by the UK with the Secretary General 
concerning the failings of the UNFF Bureau and Secretariat in relation to UNFF-
5, and their failure to obtain a formal ministerial declaration at that session.310 
Another interviewee from the same group commented that disputes were 
sometimes settled through the mediation of countries that were seen as not having 
a strong vested interest, and were not part of the big power blocs.311 
Evaluation 
Disputes are not settled in UNFF through any formal procedures, and are 
reinforced by informal, issue-oriented voting blocs, that impede collaborative 
discussion. With the exception of the entrepreneurial, or go-between, activities of 
some well-regarded Member States, text negotiation appears to be the only 
mechanism through which disputes are addressed. Dispute settlement in UNFF is 
low. 
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Implementation 
Behaviour Change   
According to Dimitrov, UNFF in particular, but reflecting the practice of other 
intergovernmental processes, is driven by a set of international norms, which are 
based upon “collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors.”312 He 
identifies an overarching phenomenon, the “norm of environmental 
multilateralism” (NEM) whereby governments are expected to address global 
environmental problems collectively, which helps explain the creation of UNFF. 
NEM has the undesirable result that when it comes into conflict with other factors 
(such as economic interest) it makes it prohibitive to actually disengage from such 
a prominent issue as deforestation. As a consequence “void” institutions arise, 
stripped of their policy-making capacity, and which do not facilitate policy 
coordination to halt deforestation because they are purely symbolic. However, no 
country can afford to declare outright opposition to combating deforestation. 
Consequently, UNFF as an institution of global environmental governance has 
become a way to avoid action whilst still appearing busy. He concludes that the 
relationship between norms, governance and institutions are not always 
coterminous, and the UNFF is one such international organisation, where the 
intention is not to provide governance.313 He goes so far as to argue that 
“sometimes states deliberately set up ‘decoy’ international institutions to pre-empt 
governance.”314  
UNFF is an entirely voluntary system. Humphreys argues that it “has made 
minimal progress on implementation [because] the question of compliance has 
never arisen, since the IPF/IFF proposals do not actually oblige the states to do 
anything.”315 Compliance is more closely related to ideas of regulatory 
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enforcement and the imposition of sanctions on entities that do not comply. The 
voluntary approach in comparison relies on mechanisms aimed at encouraging 
rather than enforcing adherence.  The problem with the voluntary approach is that 
it often fails to deal with intractable, or non-compliant, entities.316 At the same 
time, a relationship has been established between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ institutional 
approaches to changing the behaviour of relevant target groups.317 The ‘harder’ 
the institution the more likely is the chance of negotiation improving the quality 
of implementation and compliance. In softer institutions substantive targets may 
be watered down during the course of negotiations. In this case, “intrusive 
verification and review” is necessary to provide an option for successful 
implementation.318  
Interviews 
Attitudes regarding the behavioural change impact of UNFF were mixed. 
Generally speaking, those interviewees from the third group of subjects who 
actively participated in UNFF were more positive in their analysis. One informant 
believed that one of the political achievements of the UNFF was that it had 
succeeded in developing a common understanding of the concept of SFM at a 
global scale. This common understanding had been further strengthened by the 
identification of the thematic areas of SFM as part of the deliberations 
surrounding streamlining the PfA.319 Another felt that UNFF contributed to 
changing the political culture and recognition of forests domestically, particularly 
in terms of the impacts on NFPs, especially in federated nation-states in Europe 
such as Austria, Germany, Spain and Switzerland.320 Another commented that 
linking forest management to aid made UNFF much broader than in the past, 
enabling progress on a more united front possible.321 Another interviewee felt that 
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the CPF had played a role in mitigating inter-organisational rivalry, a common 
problem across the UN system. There were considerable advantages in having 
fourteen organisations regularly meeting to exchange information and coordinate 
their activities, and the CPF was a valuable exception.322  
However, praise from this sector was equivocal. Various informants 
commented on UNFF’s inability to change behaviour. Two points to remember 
were that UNFF did not have any implementation mandate, nor did it play any 
role in changing fundamental sovereignty issues within countries.323 Its role was 
merely to facilitate implementation by governments and NGOs. If it was 
perceived to be weak, this was really a criticism of the people that participated 
and how much they tried to implement agreements nationally. The problem at the 
moment was that there was not enough ownership of the whole process.324 A 
second interviewee, also from the third group of informants, made a connection to 
UNFF’s loss of political status and failure to achieve concrete outcomes. Because 
there had never been any agreement on a forest convention, politicians, political 
decision makers and donors had gradually shifted to those mechanisms, which 
were more legally binding, like the CBD and the Climate Convention. 
Consequently, the political momentum had shifted and did not carry the same 
weight as it did when it was established in 2000.325  
The perspective that the UNFF has had little impact on the behaviour of 
governments was explored in some detail by one interviewee from the third 
group. The real problem with UNFF was the lack of will by governments to 
accept the need for a change of policy settings. The main challenge for UNFF was 
to gain access to heads of state and cabinets and convince them that they needed 
to support cross-sectoral policies for change, which incorporated natural resource 
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management and development issues. No amount of increased participation of 
Major Groups or other interests would make any difference if governments did 
not change their forest policy perspective.326 
Those interviewees whose role in UNFF was more restricted were also more 
critical of the Forum’s impact, and there was a degree of agreement across the 
business and NGO sectors that UNFF was not sufficiently changing behaviour at 
the governmental level. One interviewee was dismissive of Member States across 
the board, and blamed what they referred to as the “tired, myopic national forestry 
regulators” for their failure to get any change at the national level.327 According to 
one NGO subject, some countries wanted to write their own rules, had no 
intention of reporting to UNFF annually and consequently had “no political will” 
to change the management of their forests.328 Another implied that changing 
forest management was not a primary interest amongst developing countries 
attending UNFF. Their only real motive was to extract money from the developed 
countries. Once the developing countries got the money, it did not go to action on 
the ground, and nothing got done.329  
Evaluation 
UNFF’s ability to change behaviour relating to forest management is affected by 
several factors. Analysts identify the subordination of environmental 
considerations to economic imperatives, resulting in an institution that creates the 
impression of tackling difficult issues such as deforestation, but does not in fact 
do anything. This is perhaps an unduly harsh criticism, but it is certainly true that 
the institution has no implementation mandate, and can do nothing to enforce 
compliance with any of its substantive outcomes, such as the PfA.  Here the 
fundamentally ‘soft’ nature of UNFF has a negative impact on behaviour change. 
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This leaves the change impact of UNFF to be largely determined at the national 
level. UNFF has undoubtedly contributed to the discourse of SFM at this level, 
but SFM itself is a highly contested concept, largely interpreted by defined actors 
and interests.330 Indeed, it has been argued that SFM in the UNFF-national 
context relates to a highly territorial, production-oriented definition, shaped 
largely by sovereign nation-states.331  Here, the political will -- or the lack of it -- 
to change behaviour on the ground is also particularly relevant. Inaction by some 
Member States has contributed to a loss of UNFF’s international institutional 
status, which has in turn further eroded its ability to influence and change 
behaviour. Behaviour change in UNFF is low. 
Problem Solving 
Bernstein argues there are inherent conflicts at play in intergovernmental 
processes that explain the failure of states to develop regulatory solutions to 
protect forests. He equates contemporary global environmental governance to a 
form of neo-liberal environmentalism, which is beset by ironies and 
contradictions: it has opened up opportunities for democratic participation, but 
also reinforces the role of the market. Such conflicting norms exist uneasily 
together in practice and result in conflicts that prevent action to protect the 
environment, most notably the exercise of the precautionary principle.332 
Humphreys also recognises the constraints of both neo-liberalism and government 
behaviour on the effectiveness of UNFF.333 
On a more specific level, commentators argue that part of the problem of 
translating SFM into effective action on a global level, is partly due to a lack of 
“political consensus” on who ought to be involved. Within UNFF itself, in 
contrast to the broader forest policy arena of which it is a part, there has been an 
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erosion of involvement and interest by important forest stakeholders, most notably 
NGOs and IPOs. This has been attributed to the inability of the IAF to link the 
international forest policy dialogue to forests on the ground, and consequently the 
actors most needed to solve forest problems have moved away from UNFF to 
more innovative and successful initiatives in regions and countries.334 
Consequently, recent years have witnessed an increasing number of multi-
stakeholder collaborations outside the UNFF that have developed working 
relations that have proved more effective in solving problems, such as those 
relating to forest law, enforcement and governance.335 These initiatives have been 
described as “part of a new system of governance to address illegal logging” that 
has arisen because UNFF has proved to be “too slow to deal with the complex 
issues involved.”336  
UNFF has itself taken some note of these criticisms. Secretariat Director Pekka 
Patosaari made a number of observations on the Forum’s past, present and future 
effectiveness in 2005. Noting concerns about the ability of UNFF to deal 
effectively with multiple interests and complex problems, he defended UNFF as 
the best intergovernmental body to address forest policy issues. Nevertheless, 
change was needed to avoid UNFF becoming “a typical policy talk-shop.”337 
Others are less diplomatic, and accuse UNFF of being comprised of a series of 
“distant global dialogues” in need of transformation “from repetitive, text-
negotiating talk-shops trapped in New York and Geneva into rich, interactive, 
multi-stakeholder collaborations that decisively address problems, share solutions, 
and clearly connect policy to forests and people.”338 
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Interviews 
Views on the problem solving capacity of UNFF were not sector-specific and 
were positive, equivocal and negative. Positive views were largely confined to 
participating delegates, but not exclusively. Looking at UNFF with ten years’ 
hindsight, the positive view argued that the world’s forests were better off than 
without it. A number of advances had been made, particularly in the relationship 
to the partnerships that had been formed between developing and developed 
countries. Although not a lot of concrete decisions had been made, the process 
had nevertheless generated more specific content than the Statement of Forest 
Principles, and had helped people understand what they needed to implement if 
they wanted to make progress.339 The UNFF’s role as a reporting mechanism had 
helped to identify gaps in national forest policies, and recognise what needed to 
be changed, although it was only one of many catalysts.340 The UNFF process was 
more about consensus building around global priorities and issues.341 The fact that 
it had built on so many discussions and was attempting harmonisation of 
international reporting was an achievement.342 UNFF’s strength lay in the fact that 
it was a global holistic process, not constrained to one particular aspect of forest 
management, such as production, or carbon issues, or biodiversity.343 Despite 
voicing negative opinions elsewhere in their interview, one informant agreed that 
UNFF along with IPF and IFF had made a useful contribution to the ongoing 
development of the C&I processes for SFM.344 
Another interviewee sought to explain that not all blame could be attributed to 
UNFF, and that the nature of the forest problematic made a solution inherently 
difficult. As a single global mechanism UNFF had to accommodate all these 
different interests and values, which made discussions much more difficult than 
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even those associated with climate change. The major problems facing forests 
worldwide needed to be understood in cross-sectoral terms. The true economic 
value of forests continued to be underestimated across the forest policy 
community. 345 
Less apologetic, and more equivocal, views on UNFF’s ability to tackle the 
forest problematic were also expressed. Some governments were questioning 
whether it was achieving anything useful. NGOs who had also interacted with the 
process over the years, had also stopped attending as frequently as they had, 
because they thought it was not achieving anything.346 Theoretically it was well 
positioned to address the forest problematic, but since the biggest problems only 
occurred in one or two countries it would probably be better to concentrate on 
striking a deal with them to solve their specific problems.347 The problem of 
global deforestation could never be solved without Brazil, and since it was not 
worth attending sessions without any resolution it was probably pragmatic to 
accept the inevitability of a non-legally binding agreement that might eventually 
become legally binding.348 
Other comments were more negative. Although UNFF had a high problem 
solving potential because it included a wide range of foreign ministers and 
agricultural and environmental interests, this potential had not been realised.349 
There had now been more than “ten years of wasteful discussion” and given that 
the legally binding instrument was not going ahead the negotiated outcomes were 
in fact little different from the original Statement of Forest Principles that had 
been adopted at Rio in 1992. During all these years and despite the money spent 
the world’s forests had continued to be destroyed. 350 It consisted of nothing more 
than endless discussions with “no impact on the ground.”351 One cause of this lack 
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of impact was that it had not addressed the right issues. UNFF was supposed to 
bring negotiators together and it had not done so. Instead, individual countries had 
become locked into their positions.352 Also, the language that was negotiated was 
often so complex that outside the immediate context of the UNFF session, it 
tended to lose its meaning. This made it very difficult to translate -- and 
implement -- in a domestic context.353 It would have been a much more valuable 
forum if it had focussed on real action, particularly implementation, but it had 
not.354 
Comparisons were inevitably drawn with other intergovernmental forest-
related processes. A number of interviewees from across the sectors pointed to a 
number of these, which they considered to have been more effective. These 
included FLEG, UNFCC, ITTO and CBD. 355 However, one business sector 
perspective was that most of the interesting discussions were happening outside 
governmental processes. The Forest Dialogue, for example was an “an active, 
ongoing multi-stakeholder process” and had brought NGOs and industry together 
on an ongoing basis to discuss a number of difficult issues including certification, 
intensive forest management, and the role of commercial forests in biodiversity 
conservation. 356 Two interviewees from the third group of informants stressed 
that UNFF’s problem solving ability should not be compared with such 
achievements, particularly forest certification, which operated at the other end of 
the spectrum.357  
One major problem that was identified across all sectors was the lack of strong 
coordination between all intergovernmental forest programmes, as they tended to 
tackle the problem solely from their own perspective.358 Consequently, UNFF was 
failing to utilise scientific expertise. It would have a better information base to 
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work from and would be more efficient in tackling forest issues if this expertise 
could be better fed into the process.359 The CPF should be seen as a positive 
initiative, but this could not be claimed by UNFF, since it was the member groups 
that made it effective.360 Some said that the UNFF had promoted greater 
coherence around national forest programmes, but it had not. The level of 
discussion at UNFF made no real contribution to national action.361 Things 
basically happened within countries at the technical level where a lot of the 
agencies and other organisations were filling the gap that UNFF had been unable 
to provide. What mattered more was ensuring that peoples’ participation could be 
sustained, and it was the agencies on the ground that provided for this.362 One 
business viewpoint was that UNFF could not be described as a governing system 
for forest management. It would be more appropriate to describe it as “a debacle”, 
representing nothing more than “a failed intergovernmental process.”363 
Finally, one NGO interviewee cited the lack of progress on tackling 
deforestation and the constant disagreements amongst governments as the main 
reasons why most NGOs were, along with business interests, deserting the 
process. It had become increasingly difficult to convince colleagues to attend 
when they felt they could be more effective elsewhere. Rather than influencing 
countries to change their behaviour it was more a question of forming alliances 
with “democratic” countries to block bad positions. Participation in UNFF had 
effectively degenerated into “a kind of damage control.”364  
Evaluation 
UNFF is the latest in a series of post-Rio processes, which have attempted to 
grapple with the global forest problematic. There is a strong case that UNFF has 
provided an enhanced, more universal, intergovernmental forum for dialogue 
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about forest issues, but has not made any substantive new inroads in combating 
deforestation. Indeed, there are strong arguments to be made that other processes 
have been more successful in this regard, particularly in terms of addressing the 
problem of illegal logging. UNFF’s problem solving ability is rated as low. 
Durability 
At UNFF-6 it was proposed that the Forum would meet every two years, 
commencing after UNFF-7 (April 2007) and the Forum’s mandate was renewed 
for another nine years until 2015.365 The Forum however has had difficulties in 
developing creative solutions to entrenched policy positions. At UNFF-5 for 
example, disagreements over whether the IAF should be legally binding led to 
public accusations from the EU of inflexibility in the negotiating position of those 
in favour of the non-legally binding route. This response itself proved unhelpful, 
and caused negotiations to grind to a halt.366 On a national level non-state interests 
expressed a concern during the course of the MSD at UNFF-3 that government 
structures needed to be more flexible if they were to recognise and take account of 
the needs and values of forest dependent people at the national forest policy 
level.367 
Interviews 
Comments on the durability of UNFF were confined to the third group of 
informants. The fact that it had been going for as long as it had was an 
achievement in its own right.368 In terms of UNFF’s adaptability, one interviewee 
commented that the Forum did not really generate any ideas of its own, but picked 
up ideas as they evolved around the world, and simply brought them to the 
attention of the international community. It did not generate the instruments itself 
but it certainly gave them a profile; the C&I processes, which were already in 
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existence before UNFF, were one such example. UNFF had recognised that these 
were good ideas, and had decided that they should be encouraged around the 
world’s forest regions. The originality lay in determining that these processes 
could be organised around the thematic elements developed within UNFF itself. 
This approach could be interpreted as either the strength, or the weakness, of the 
system.369  
One informant accused the Forum of procedural inflexibility. The MCPFE 
process was much more flexible. It allowed everybody to speak on equal terms, 
whether they were government representatives, business and industry, forest 
owners or environmental NGOs. Everybody had a voice and a stake.370 In an 
environment that had so many equally important members, and where each 
country had an individual vote regardless of forest cover or any other criterion, it 
was important to have a degree of negotiating flexibility. It was hard for UNFF to 
reach any form of conclusion when countries were inflexible in their positions.371 
NGOs had far greater opportunities.372 
Evaluation 
UNFF has certainly proved to be a relatively long-lived institution, and its 
extension until 2015 confirms this. In terms of adaptability, it has also shown that 
it can take on the ideas of other bodies, and adapt its own substantive outcomes 
such as the PfA, to reflect changing policy conditions. The institution has shown 
itself to be procedurally inflexible however; it is a victim of intractable 
negotiations. This mitigates an otherwise high performance, resulting in a rating 
of medium.  
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Governance Quality of UNFF 
Commentary 
Table 7.2 Evaluative matrix of UNFF governance quality 
Principle 1. Meaningful Participation 
Criterion 1. Interest representation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
Actual score: 4 
2. Organisational responsibility 
Highest possible score: 6 
Lowest possible score: 2 
Actual score: 2 
Sub-
total 
(out of 
15): 
 
            
6 
Indicator  Inclusiveness Equality Resources Accountability Transparency  
High       
Medium 2      
Low  1 1 1 1  
Principle 2. Productive deliberation 
Criterion 3. Decision making 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
Actual score: 3 
4. Implementation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3  
Actual score: 4 
Sub-
total 
(out of 
18): 
 
            
7 
Indicator  Democracy Agreement Dispute 
settlement 
Behavioural 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Durability  
High        
Medium      2  
Low 1 1 1 1 1   
Total 
(out of 
33) 
      Final 
Score: 
            
13 
UNFF received thirteen points out of a maximum total of thirty-three. Nine 
indicators achieved low ratings (equality, resources, accountability, transparency, 
democracy, agreement, dispute settlement, behavioural change and problem 
solving), and two medium ratings (inclusiveness and durability). The conventional 
pass/fail target value of 50% was not met by any criterion, the results being 44% 
(interest representation and implementation) and 33% (organisational 
responsibility and decision making). At the principle level, in terms of meaningful 
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participation the aggregate result was 40% and for productive deliberation, 39% 
(see Table 7.2 above). 
Postscript 
UNFF-7 and Beyond 
UNFF-7 was held on 24 February 2006 and 16-27 April 2007 in New York.373 
One resolution, concerning the multi-year programme of work (MYPOW) for the 
period 2007-2015 was passed, and one draft resolution, concerning the non-
legally binding instrument (NLBI) for all types of forests was referred to 
ECOSOC for adoption. Three draft decisions were also referred to the Council 
relating to the UNFF Bureau’s term of office, the dates and venue for UNFF-8, 
the report of UNFF-7 and agenda for UNFF-8.374 MYPOW discussions centred 
upon operationalising UNFF’s activities for UNFF-8, -9, -10 and -11. It was 
agreed these activities would be based around the four global objectives identified 
at UNFF-6, the implementation of the NLBI, and examining the IAF (to occur at 
UNFF-11).375 Various delegates expressed views that the MYPOW represented 
the “true value-added” agreement on UNFF-7, managing to avoid difficult 
questions regarding funding and the NLBI, and producing a “more ambitious” 
programme than that originally agreed to at UNFF-1.376  The success of these 
discussions led the writers of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin to conclude that the 
agreement “could be the start of a transition of UNFF’s function from being a 
forum burdened with an intricate negotiating task into an institution that generates 
useful information and facilitates cooperation.”377 
However, whilst progress on the MYPOW was positive, other delegates felt 
that the NLBI was by contrast “a distracting side-show.”378 Afraid that UNFF 
would collapse without agreement on the NLBI, its production in the last hours of 
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the meeting was an achievement in itself, even if there were deep concerns that 
the language in the final text weakened much of what had already been agreed to 
in previous documents. A number of key elements, discussed at length during the 
meeting, including a process to facilitate NLBI implementation, the use of time-
bound and measurable targets, combating illegal logging, and a definition of SFM 
were all dropped. The language relating to funding of the NLBI was also vague, 
and left for future negotiations. The resulting somewhat “meatless” NLBI also 
served to reinforce the views of some countries that they should press ahead with 
a series of international controls outside the Forum, and an exclusive meeting took 
place in private to discuss just such an option.379 
Two MSDs were held 18 and 23 April. Three themes were covered concerning 
Indigenous peoples and local communities, engaging the private sector, and 
strengthening Major Groups’ involvement.380 Although women and other Major 
Group interests were relatively active in their participation, and were able to 
provide input to the plenary and working groups, the general rate  of NGO 
participation was “very low” and many previously active environmental NGOs 
were entirely absent.381 Nevertheless, a number of governments expressed their 
support for Major Group involvement in UNFF, and called for “greater 
coordination, collaboration and consultation between all stakeholders through 
capacity building.”382 A proposal for a Major Group-led initiative to be hosted by 
a member state of the Forum, suggested by womens’ interests, was hailed as “a 
good sign that stakeholder participation was evolving from dialogue to concrete 
action on the ground.”383  
In the final analysis, according to one participant, UNFF-7 should be seen as 
successful. Although the NLBI was not very ambitious, it was an achievement 
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given the polarised views of countries, particularly as Brazil and the US played a 
predictably dominant role, with Brazil behaving as inflexibly as ever. In the end, 
the NLBI as it emerged was a hybrid of the EU, Brazilian and US models 
proposed at UNFF-6. The value of the Forum was that it had, in their opinion “re-
established the significance of forests and forestry in the global political 
agenda.”384 
Conclusions 
Commentators portray the international deliberations of UNFF as taking place 
within a governance framework that operates on a range of levels and includes a 
range of participants. In the broader forest policy context, these diverse interests 
are now seen as being equally important to government agencies in contributing 
to the challenges of SFM. There is an increased role for civil society, but with this 
new range of actors and ideas, interactions have become increasingly complex, 
particularly since many forest policy issues are trans-boundary and take place in a 
rapidly changing context.385  
Given these observations, it is perhaps not surprising that a feature of UNFF is 
the high level of attention paid to participation, both within the institution itself, 
and regarding forest management on the national and local levels. Indeed, the 
constant recognition paid to participation has an almost mantra-like quality in 
institutional documentation. It is frequently placed after the word stakeholder -- 
almost in the same way as ‘sustainable’ is before forest management. As with 
UNFF’s predecessors, the term clearly represents an accepted norm of global 
environmental and forest-related governance. And yet despite this repetition, 
participation is a highly contested concept within UNFF. Interest representation 
within UNFF is very mixed. There is certainly extensive state representation, but 
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while these interests are actively involved and engaged within the structures of 
UNFF, this is less so for the specialised agencies active in such entities as the 
CPF. Major Group interests are involved, but the degree of inclusion is uneven 
and on a structural level, non-state interests do not formally participate at all. 
They may make interventions in plenary meetings, yet they are excluded from text 
negotiation. They are only accorded the status of observers under ECOSOC rules, 
and when they do participate, it is on a consultative basis, even if they may speak. 
The status of the MSD is largely tokenistic, since it is extremely limited in terms 
of its political influence, especially since UNFF-5. In terms of resources, only 
developing countries are provided travel costs, and non-state interests must 
generally fund themselves, with some exceptions being made for environmental 
NGOs. The institutional arrangements regarding the accountability and 
transparency of participation within UNFF are also problematic since much of the 
institution’s activities take place behind closed doors. This may reflect the 
intergovernmental nature of the Forum, but there are other examples where non-
state interests can listen in on other processes, such as MCPFE. 
A second striking feature of the UNFF is that despite the years of extensive 
deliberation there have been seemingly few substantive outcomes in comparison. 
UNFF is also marked by few agreements and frequent disputes. This is 
attributable to the institutional tradition of avoiding voting, leading to a kind of 
‘forced consensus’ where the lowest common denominator predominates in the 
presence of any opposition. In this case, the effort to secure a legally binding 
instrument for example was caught between competing interests, and in the 
absence of a vote, fell victim to consensus decision making. Conversely, and 
surprisingly, given the wide-ranging and divergent interests clustered together, the 
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ability of the Major Groups to organise themselves around common points of 
agreement stands in some contrast.386 The apparent lack of any formal dispute 
settlement processes, other than those generated by looming deadlines and the 
fear of failure seem to be a feature of state negotiations in UNFF.387  
In terms of implementation, UNFF was created for the express purpose of 
putting into practice the PfA first identified in the IPF/IFF processes, a purpose 
that it has not been particularly successful in fulfilling. On a broad level, this 
might be attributed to the fact that all aspects of reporting, as well as monitoring 
and assessing individual countries’ performance are voluntary, and there are no 
means of sanctioning non-performance. This lack of compliance most probably 
relates to the absence of enforcement mechanisms, which states have avoided in 
favour of voluntarism, and are likely to do so into the foreseeable future now that 
a LBI is off the table. Here too, the voluntary nature of reporting may prove 
counter-productive to behaviour change. 
UNFF has not been particularly successful in combating deforestation, which 
challenges the system’s overall impact on changing behaviour. It could be argued 
that greater behavioural change has occurred outside UNFF, in the FLEG 
processes for example, where several bilateral agreements have been negotiated in 
an attempt to control illegal logging. Despite its procedural inflexibilities and 
entrenched power blocs, UNFF has nevertheless proved itself to be a relatively 
durable institution, and having extended its mandate until 2015, it is likely to 
remain on the international forest scene for a while yet. UNFF-7 succeeded in 
keeping the institution alive, and there were some slightly more encouraging signs 
in terms of state and non-state relations at this event than at other sessions. How 
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effective the NLBI will prove itself to be, given its rather weak nature, remains to 
be seen. 
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Comparative Analysis 
Introduction 
Each of the institutions of forest governance selected for this study have now been 
analysed and the quality of their governance arrangements subjected to a detailed 
critical evaluation, using the qualitative indicators presented in Chapter Three. 
These individual case studies provide the basis for a comparative analysis of 
governance quality in this chapter. The chapter begins with a discussion of the 
performance of all four case studies at the principle and criterion levels. The 
criteria form the basis for determining compliance at the principle level, where a 
conventional pass/fail threshold of 50% has been used to determine overall 
performance. This is followed by a more detailed investigation at the criterion and 
indicator level, with the cumulative values of the relevant indicators 
demonstrating the performance of each criterion. Here the threshold value is also 
50%. The normative threshold value at the level of the individual indicator is two, 
or a ‘medium’ rating.1 Commentary relating to individual institutional 
performance is also included at this point. The chapter continues with an 
exploration of some of the possible reasons underlying the differences and 
similarities between the performances of each institution, and provides some 
concluding observations regarding each criterion. Following a final comparative 
analysis, the last section discusses the relationship between the performance of 
each case study and its institutional type.  
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General Performance at the Principle and Criterion 
Levels 
Discussion 
Table 8.1 below sets out the performance of each of the forest governance 
systems analysed.  
Table 8.1 Comparative matrix of governance quality 
Principle 1. Meaningful Participation 
Criterion 1. Interest representation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
2. Organisational responsibility 
Highest possible score: 6 
Lowest possible score: 2 
Sub-
total 
(out of 
15) 
Indicator  Inclusive-
ness 
Equality Resources Total Accountability Transparency Total  
FSC 3 2 2 7 2 2 4      11 
ISO 2 1 2 5 2 1 3        8 
PEFC 1 1 1 3 1 1 2        5 
UNFF 2 1 1 4 1 1 2        6 
Principle 2. Productive deliberation 
Criterion 3. Decision making 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
4. Implementation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3  
Sub-
total 
(out of 
18) 
Indicator  Democracy Agree- 
ment 
Dispute 
settlement 
Total Behavioural 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Durability Total  
FSC 2 3 1 6 2 2 3 7       13 
ISO 2 2 1 5 2 1 3 6       11 
PEFC 1 2 1 4 2 1 2 5        9 
UNFF 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 4        7 
       Grand 
Total 
(out of 
33) 
FSC             24 
ISO             19 
PEFC             14 
UNFF             13 
As can be observed, FSC is the highest achiever of the four systems investigated, 
scoring highest in each of the principles and criteria. At the indicator level, it 
consistently ranks the highest, or joint highest, of the other systems. With a score 
of 11 out of 15 at the principle level for meaningful participation, FSC achieves 
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about 73%, exceeding the threshold value of 50%, and for productive deliberation 
13 out of 18, or about 73%. With a cumulative score of 24 out of a total of 33, or 
about 73%, FSC’s overall performance could be seen as very creditable. 
ISO is the second strongest performer at both the principle and criterion levels. 
And at the indicator level, it consistently ranks the second highest, or equal 
second of the systems. With a score of eight out of 15, or about 54% it just 
exceeds the threshold required for meaningful participation at the principle level, 
and scores 11 out of 18 or about 61% for productive deliberation, also placing it 
second after FSC. With a total score of 19, or about 57%, ISO’s performance 
could be described as generally satisfactory.  
The performance of both PEFC and UNFF is less strong, making them the 
weakest performers overall. PEFC achieves 14 points overall and UNFF 13, 
meaning that both systems fail the threshold value of 50%. Neither PEFC nor 
UNFF meet the threshold for meaningful participation, with PEFC achieving five 
out of 15, or 33%, and UNFF scoring six out of 15, or 40%. For productive 
deliberation, PEFC meets the threshold value, scoring nine out of 18, or 50%. 
UNFF scores seven, failing to meet the threshold, with approximately 39%. Given 
such low scores, the quality of their governance is questionable, challenging the 
legitimacy of both these systems. Here the point should be reiterated that this 
study has argued that legitimacy is determined by the quality of the interactions 
between actors within the structures and processes of a given system, and the 
outputs and longer-term outcomes these interactions generate. In the case of both 
UNFF and PEFC, low scores reflect an overall deficit in the interactions between 
participants and therefore the extent of their collaboration, which in turn affects 
the impact their outputs have on achieving longer-term outcomes.2  
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Thematic Investigation at the Criterion and Indicator 
Levels 
Interest Representation 
Of the four case studies, both FSC and ISO exceed the threshold for interest 
representation with seven out of nine and five out of nine, or 77% and 56% 
respectively. PEFC scores lower than UNFF with three out of nine compared to 
four out of nine, or 33% and 44% respectively, but the differences here are less 
important than the fact that both of the systems clearly fail the criterion (see Table 
8.2 below).  
Table 8.2 Interest representation 
Criterion 1. Interest representation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
Indicator  Inclusiveness Equality Resources Total 
FSC 3 2 2 7 
ISO 2 1 2 5 
PEFC 1 1 1 3 
UNFF 2 1 1 4 
Inclusiveness 
FSC rated highly under the inclusiveness indicator, and both ISO and UNFF also 
exceeded the threshold, achieving a rating of medium. PEFC rated low. The three 
non-state systems use a UN-style general assembly model as their highest organ 
of interest representation. The FSC’s chamber-based structure is the most 
sophisticated method of including different interests (economic, environmental 
and social) and although it does not include nation-states on a ‘one country one 
vote’ basis it does make specific provisions for including interests on a developed 
and developing country basis, via the northern and southern sub-chambers. 
Governmental interests are also included in the economic chamber. Non-members 
are also well catered for in standards setting at the international and national 
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levels, if less so at the level of certification assessment. ISO and PEFC do not use 
the chamber system and include state and non-state interests on a national basis 
only. ISO appears to have recognised the problem of including interests in this 
manner, and is beginning to explore new ways of including international NGOs. 
These two schemes also fall short in the extent to which local interests are 
included in certification assessment. UNFF, bound as it is by the UN’s rules of 
procedure, is limited in the extent to which it can include non-governmental 
interests, although it has made some effort to do so. Nevertheless, despite these 
shortcomings ISO and UNFF, like FSC, are inclusive systems. PEFC on the other 
hand is structured for the express purpose of restricting which national-level 
interests can participate, and excluding others such as international social and 
environmental NGOs.  
Equality 
Only FSC meets the threshold for equality. FSC does not score highly, and is 
perhaps the victim of its own ambitions: it has set itself some lofty targets for 
gender, social and geo-political equality in its participatory structures at all levels, 
which it has not always met. It has also been historically dogged by accusations of 
undue NGO influence, there is some ongoing resentment amongst business 
interests, esepcoally those more supportive of PEFC. Mitigating factors are the 
level of equality enjoyed by non-members in standards setting, and the 
recognition given to equality by the institution, and its efforts -- admittedly not 
always successful -- to achieve it. ISO, PEFC and UNFF are hamstrung by their 
own governance structures: since each system accords the various categories of 
interests that participate within them such different status, achieving equality is 
currently practically impossible. In UNFF national governments share a high 
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degree of structural equality, but this is offset by the inequality amongst other 
non-state interests. Here inequality is a structural aspect of interest representation, 
since nation-states have the only procedural authority to participate meaningfully 
within the system. Even the CPF, despite its delegated powers and collaborative 
role with other UN instruments, does not enjoy equal status with the nation-states. 
In both ISO and PEFC structural inequalities are chronic. In the case of ISO, this 
is partly a historical legacy, since it was established in an earlier era to develop 
industry oriented technical standards, which were largely only of concern to 
business.  However, in view of the shift towards more social-environmental 
standards, the dominant role that economic interests continue to play in standards 
setting and executive structures is problematic. The redesign of some of the 
institution’s governance is an acknowledgement of this problem, but is at present 
anecdotal and too recent to lead to any firm conclusions. To achieve any degree of 
equality it will be necessary to revisit the whole issue of O-, P- and L-members. In 
the case of PEFC inequality is also structural. At the Board level, economic 
interests overwhelm social-environmental interests. In the General Assembly 
there are no arrangements, as with FSC, to counter northern country domination.  
Resources 
Both FSC and ISO meet the threshold for resources; PEFC and UNFF are rated 
low. There are some similarities between FSC and ISO in that both institutions 
have specific arrangements for providing funds for participation at an 
international level. In the case of FSC, this is a constitutional requirement and 
covers any member; for ISO, provisions exist under its DEVCO programme, but 
only for developing country members, and not NGOs. Both have rather haphazard 
arrangements for supporting participation at the national level, depending on the 
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country and the level of resources available to the national body. Neither system 
provides financial resources for those participating in certification-related 
consultations. UNFF’s funding arrangements are altogether problematic, since a 
number of its related organs, such as the Secretariat and CPF do not have funds in 
their own right, and although there are monies made available for developing 
countries, and some NGOs to attend, these are provided largely by Member States 
on a discretionary basis. In PEFC there is no funding available for international-
level participation, and as with FSC and ISO provision of funds for under-
resourced interests to participate at the national level is anecdotal. 
Concluding Observations: Interest Representation 
Inclusiveness is an important indicator as to whether interests are being 
represented within a given system. Excluding certain interests affects the quality 
of participation, since there is an insufficient diversity of stakeholders.3 This is 
clearly the case with PEFC, which is selective in its inclusion of interests, and 
fails in this regard. However, having a wide diversity of stakeholders is not an end 
in itself if there is a disparity in status between those within the system. 
Consequently, inclusiveness needs to be complemented by equality in interest 
representation. Earlier in this study, a link was made between the availability of 
resources and the capacity for various interests to participate within a given 
governance system. There is ample evidence in all the case studies provided that 
participation in environmental governance is an expensive and time-consuming 
business. Where there are no resources, or limited resources within a governance 
system to support participation, those with their own technical or economic 
capacities clearly have an advantage when it comes to representing their interests. 
The non-provision, or inadequate provision of resources by a governance system 
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can impact on both inclusiveness and equality. Those who do not have the 
capacity to represent their interests are effectively excluded. Those with 
comparatively fewer resources than others have less capacity to wield influence 
over the system than others. The interdependence of these three aspects of interest 
representation need to be understood, since if there are shortcomings in any one 
aspect, there are likely to be impacts on the criterion as a whole. Distorted 
representation has the potential to lead to distorted outcomes.4 
Organisational Responsibility 
FSC, ISO and UNFF meet the threshold for organisational responsibility, with the 
FSC scoring four out of six, or almost 67% and ISO and UNFF three out of six, or 
50%. PEFC scores two out of six, or 33% (see Table 8.3 below).  
Table 8.3 Organisational responsibility 
Criterion 2. Organisational responsibility 
Highest possible score: 6 
Lowest possible score: 2 
Indicator  Accountability Transparency Total 
FSC 2 2 4 
ISO 2 1 3 
PEFC 1 1 2 
UNFF 1 1 2 
Accountability 
Both FSC and ISO meet the threshold for accountability with a medium score, 
whilst PEFC and UNFF both fail at this indicator level. A common, and alarming 
theme in the three non-state certification schemes, given the importance of their 
role, is the accountability problem identified by both commentators and interview 
subjects regarding the role of certifiers. In all three systems, the relationships 
between the certifiers, their clients and the bodies whose standards they are 
implementing have been questioned in view of the potential for conflicts of 
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interest. Part of this disquiet may stem from the structural tension inherent in the 
role of the certification bodies. By being deliberately set apart and independent of 
the system to which they are accredited there is at best a weak link in horizontal 
accountability, raising questions as to whether certification bodies are really 
answerable to the public. In the case of FSC and ISO this is partly resolved -- but 
also, somewhat ironically, made all the more problematic -- by the right for 
certification bodies to be members of the system. This raises the second problem 
of vertical, i.e. internal, accountability. In the case of FSC its own accreditation 
body has previously sat inside the system, and some ambiguities remain even in 
the current (and proposed) arrangements. ISO certifiers may even play a role in, 
or chair, committees relating to standards they may subsequently implement. 
PEFC accredited certification bodies are answerable to an accreditation 
programme (IAF) that exists entirely external to the system, but it is almost 
exclusively accountable to business interests, and certainly not to the public. 
Accusations have also been raised regarding the undue closeness of some PEFC 
certifiers to national governing bodies, which they are in turn expected to audit for 
their eligibility for membership to the scheme.  
UNFF does not face the accountability conundrum of how to deal with 
certification bodies, but as a system, like the other case studies investigated, it has 
systemic problems. Firstly, its nation-state members are only held horizontally 
accountable for their actions through periodic, and largely unrelated, national 
elections. It should also be added than in some national instances such elections 
are neither free nor fair. Vertically speaking, there are also internal accountability 
deficits, since Member States do not have to answer to other non-member, 
participating interests, such as NGO participants, or to other aspects of the system 
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(such as the CPF). The other, certification-related systems could be argued to be 
horizontally accountable to the wider public through a linkage back to national 
regulations, and compliance frameworks. Here though, there are problems with 
the level of stringency in such requirements, and whether the standards under 
which the various schemes comply are process-, rather than systems-based. Here, 
ISO and PEFC could be argued to be less accountable than FSC, which either 
meets, or exceeds national-level requirements, and is performance-based. In terms 
of vertical accountability, each scheme investigated has a particular set of 
members who sit closer to the institution itself, and consequently have the 
possibly to wield more influence than others. In the case of PEFC and ISO, 
business interests are closer to the institution than others, and through the lesser 
constitutional status of O- and L-members, less answerable to minority interests. 
In the case of FSC, its NGO origins have given certain groups a greater ‘insider’ 
status than others. 
Transparency  
FSC earned a medium rating, while ISO, PEFC and UNFF failed this indicator 
with low ratings. In the case of the FSC, the institution’s activities were highly 
transparent in terms of publicly available documentation. ISO is hampered by the 
restricted release of documentation, and only at certain stages, during standards 
setting. The public also faces considerable difficulties simply trying to locate 
relevant information on a plethora of websites, (such as committee minutes), and 
the fact that certain information (such as standards, or rules of procedure) must be 
purchased. In PEFC the ‘hollowed out’ nature of the institution at a global level 
means that much information is only available from national bodies, and critical 
international documents, such as General Assembly minutes are only available as 
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extracts upon specific request. In UNFF, considerable amounts of discussions 
between Member States occur behind closed doors, and non-state participants as 
well as the general public are effectively locked out. Publicly available reports are 
also worded in neutral diplomatic language to ensure the interests of all actors are 
reflected impartially.5 This makes it difficult to identify competing points of view, 
and general observers must therefore rely on external sources, such as the Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin to interpret events. In these three institutions, transparency 
in terms of quality and availability of information is problematic. Financial 
information was not forcoming from ISO, PEFC or UNFF, which is a problem 
since running such institutions is expensive, and funds must come from 
somewhere such as government, business, or civil society interests, all of whom 
have the potential to influence institutions behind the scenes if their contributions 
are not made explicit. 
Preliminary Conclusions: Organisational Responsibility 
Accountability, often directly equated with responsibility in the literature, is 
particularly important given the network arrangements and long distance 
constituencies associated with global governance.6 The more distant processes of 
governance are from their points of accountability the more important it is that 
information is freely available; this is particularly the case where there are no such 
nation-state mechanisms for transparency such as freedom of information 
legislation.7 In view of the well-established understanding of the relationship 
between accountability and transparency to ‘good’ governance in both theory and 
practice, the scores here leave no room for complacency in any of the systems 
investigated; this is especially the case for PEFC and UNFF.  
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Decision Making 
Two of the institutions exceed the threshold for decision making, FSC with a 
score of six out of nine, or almost 67%, and ISO with a score of five our of nine, 
or about 56%. PEFC and UNFF both fail, PEFC scoring four out of nine, or 44%, 
and UNFF with a score of three out of nine or 33% (see Table 8.4 below). 
Table 8.4 Decision making 
Criterion 3. Decision making 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3 
Indicator  Democracy Agreement Dispute 
settlement 
Total 
FSC 2 3 1 6 
ISO 2 2 1 5 
PEFC 1 2 1 4 
UNFF 1 1 1 3 
 
Democracy 
Both FSC and ISO meet the threshold score of two, or medium rating, whilst 
PEFC and UNFF both score one point each, or low, thus failing to achieve the 
required level. Although FSC and ISO have similar results, the reasons are quite 
different. In the case of FSC, it is fair to say that the institution is highly 
democratic, and shows a sophisticated blend of consensus and voting. The 
problem FSC encounters is that it has not been able to fully capture social 
interests and small forests within its broader decision making structures. In the 
case of ISO and TC207 there are differences in the manner in which democracy is 
exercised across the different subcommittees, and at times within each 
subcommittee, effectively franchising or disenfranchising certain participants 
depending on the democratic mode adopted. In UNFF although decision making 
powers amongst nation-states reside with the least, as much as with the most 
powerful members, other interests have no franchise at all. In PEFC power is also 
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not distributed evenly amongst voting member bodies; the more production forest 
in a given country, the more votes. There may be good reasons for this, such as 
avoiding the decisional gridlock that characterises UNFF, but in both PEFC and 
UNFF there is a clear democratic deficit.  
Agreement 
FSC scores the highest rating of three, while ISO and PEFC meet the threshold of 
medium. UNFF only scores one point, and fails to meet the threshold required to 
pass this indicator. FSC scores the highest rating possible because of the fact that 
the system as a whole is characterised by a very high level of agreement between 
participants over the decisions made. The key to this success is not that the FSC 
uses ‘consensus’ on all occasions, but that the stages leading to the making of a 
decision make agreement increasingly likely. In the General Assembly for 
example, a motion does not make it to the floor unless there is majority in favour 
of the motion in all chambers, or until it has been amended in such a way as to be 
acceptable to all chambers, whereupon it is put to the vote. At this point the 
qulaified majority (66.6%) voting system often results in agreement by 
overwhelming majority. ISO has some of the same outward appearance of using 
consensus as FSC, but without the same clear procedures as FSC the reaching of 
agreements can be a confused process. Decision making switches between 
different modes of agreement (consensus or qualified majority, or majority) in a 
relatively arbitrary fashion, and consensus suffers from a lack of clarity over what 
“sustained opposition” means in practice. PEFC rates similarly to ISO, but is 
clearer as to how it reaches agreements on the international level where the 
standard practice is essentially majority decision making. Its problems are at the 
national level: there are inconsistencies between countries over the methods for 
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reaching agreement, and like ISO, it also suffers from a lack of clarity over what 
is meant by consensus within standards setting processes. UNFF on the other 
hand, whilst universally employing consensus (despite being procedurally bound 
by majority rule), has a generally low level of reaching agreement. Here 
enfranchised participants are pitted against each other according to which veto 
coalition they belong.  
Dispute Settlement 
It is of some concern that all of the systems investigated failed the threshold for 
dispute settlement. In both FSC and ISO there appears to be an institutional 
preference for settling disputes informally. In the case of FSC this is because 
formal mechanisms are complex, legalistic and burdensome on all parties 
involved. In ISO the right to engage in dispute settlement procedures is limited to 
Participant members, and unsettled matters simply pass up the chain of command 
until they reach the Council, which has the final say. ISO is therefore hampered 
by a lack of formal avenues for appeal in some specific aspects of the system 
(such as membership accreditation and conformity assessment). In both cases 
neither formal nor informal measures have assisted in settling protracted disputes. 
In PEFC there are no measures for dispute settlement at the international level; 
nationally the emphasis is more on the existence of dispute settlement 
mechanisms than whether they actually settle disputes, since concerns expressed 
by interested parties only require consideration. In the case of UNFF, as with 
other multilateral environmental agreements between states, there is a marked 
reluctance to engage in any formal dispute settlement mechanisms. Here there is a 
preference for voluntary approaches, but these are particularly ineffective in 
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addressing complaints relating to the compliance of individual states with the 
agreements made. 
Preliminary Conclusions: Decision Making 
An important aspect of the democratic processes associated with decision making 
in each of the case studies is the issue of consistency. This is not to say that 
specific democratic modes must be used uniformly across a governance system, 
but rather that at each stage of a given decision making process the manner in 
which decisions are reached is clearly defined and consistently implemented.  In 
the case of standards development, which affects three of four case studies, 
inconsistency has the potential to impact on the quality decisions made, and the 
content of the standards themselves.8  
In all four case studies, the observation that any consensus-seeking process 
requires that participants enjoy the right to be heard, and have their concerns 
taken into account, is particularly valid.9 FSC achieves both requirements. In ISO 
participants have the right to be heard, but the concerns of different groups are not 
always taken into account; this may be through a determination to resort to 
majority voting (whereby some members are disenfranchised), or on account of 
unclear rules of consensus. In PEFC not all interested parties have the right to be 
heard, particularly at the international level, and while the system is obliged to 
take the concerns of stakeholders into consideration at the local level, it is not 
obliged to act upon them. UNFF provides for all participating Member States to 
be heard, but is undermined by its various veto coalitions, which appear incapable 
of accommodating divergent concerns, other than through lowest common 
denominator decisions. The failed deliberations over a legally binding instrument 
serve as a case in point.  
  583 
There are two recognised aspects of dispute settlement missing in each of the 
mechanisms employed by the systems investigated, and their absence may be 
significant factors in their weak performance. Importantly, given the interactive 
nature of modern governance, collaborative problem solving mechanisms 
between the parties in dispute are missing.10 In PEFC for example, where dispute 
settlement mechanisms do exist on the national level, the interaction is 
unidirectional (from the complainant to the national mechanism, which is not 
obliged to act upon the complaint). In UNFF disputes are not subjected to any 
formal procedural mechanism and tend to be manifested instead in the inflexible 
positions adopted by the various nation-state factions within the system. The 
second missing element in all four case studies is the presence of a third party 
intervenor or mediator, who is not party to the dispute.11 In FSC and ISO, for 
example, the institution itself (the Board and Council respectively) is the final 
arbiter in disputes (although there are proposals to alter this). The inability of any 
of the systems under investigation to productively settle disputes is a matter that 
undermines the overall quality of deliberation in every case study.  
Implementation 
Table 8.5 Implementation 
Criterion 4. Implementation 
Highest possible score: 9 
Lowest possible score: 3  
Indicator  Behavioural 
change 
Problem 
solving 
Durability Total 
FSC 2 2 3 7 
ISO 2 1 3 6 
PEFC 2 1 2 5 
UNFF 1 1 2 4 
Three of the institutions investigated met the threshold for this criterion: FSC 
achieved seven out of nine or almost 78%; ISO six out of nine or about 67%; and 
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PEFC five out of nine or about 56%. With a score of four, or 44%, only UNFF 
failed to meet the threshold (see Table 8.5 above). 
Behaviour Change 
It is interesting to note that all three of the private governance systems meet the 
threshold for behavioural change, whereas UNFF does not. Business subscribers 
to each of the three programmes are required to modify their behaviour, if they 
have not already done so, to meet the systems’ requirements, and maintain it, if 
they wish to retain their certification status. This is not to say that there are not 
substantive differences between the systems investigated -- not least of which is 
the discrepancy between performance- and process standards -- but all three 
internalise certain expected norms of behaviour, such as continuous improvement, 
for example (even if there is variability as to whether improvement is monitored). 
The extent to which participants in each of these systems have also changed 
behaviour as a result of mutual learning is present in each programme, although 
the extent and type varies. In FSC for example there has been a high degree of 
inter-organisational learning resulting from its multi-stakeholder structures and 
this is present to a more limited extent in ISO also. In both instances, although to 
different degrees, interaction and communication has engendered social learning. 
PEFC participants have opted for a narrow, technical response to changes in the 
forest policy environment: the system has a relatively low capacity for social 
learning on account of its exclusive structures; and having filtered out dissenting 
viewpoints, has restricted its scope for policy learning.12 With its strong scientific 
orientation and intergovernmental policy focus UNFF’s capacity for social 
learning is also restricted: governments act as gatekeepers of the policy agenda 
and largely serve their own political and economic agendas, whilst other interests 
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play a largely subordinate role.13 Non-state agents may be the biggest potential 
agents for change, but UNFF’s procedures limit their role, and the institution’s 
ability to change behaviour is limited. It has neither compliance nor sanction 
mechanisms and relies on a system of voluntary implementation and reporting. 
Here the argument that a lack of strong norms and seriousness concerning 
implementation may be decisive factors in a regime’s effectiveness may be 
particularly relevant for UNFF.14  
Problem Solving 
FSC achieved the highest rating of medium, meeting the threshold for this 
indicator, but the other three systems only achieved one point, thus failing to meet 
the threshold. Such weak performance in all of the systems should be a cause for 
concern.  
It is perhaps worthwhile remembering at this point that all four systems arose 
in the context of UNCED where sustainable development was identified as major 
objective of Agenda 21. In terms of forest issues, Agenda 21 was clearly aimed at 
combating deforestation, but the means of achieving this objective came to be 
increasingly couched, particularly through the IPF/IFF processes, in terms of 
SFM. It has been pointed out however that this concept varies according to which 
groups of actors and interests define it.15 FSC opted to avoid the idea of SFM all 
together as a normative concept in all of its documentation, and expresses its role 
as being “to promote the responsible management of the world’s forests.”16 PEFC 
specifically refers to its role as being “to promote sustainable forest 
management.”17 UNFF’s role is “to promote the management, conservation and 
sustainable development of all types of forest and strengthen long-term political 
commitment to this end.”18 The initial impetus of the ISO 14000 Series, arising 
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out of Rio, was to address clean production and tackle hazardous waste. This 
objective was ultimately transformed into a vision and a philosophy that 
environmental management standards “provide an effective means to improve the 
environmental performance of organizations and their products, facilitate world 
trade and ultimately contribute to sustainable development.”19 
FSC, PEFC and ISO have opted to address the ‘problem’ of deforestation 
through the ‘solution’ of sustainable development in different ways, and with 
divergent strategic objectives. In the case of FSC, the original aim of addressing 
deforestation by tackling the unsustainable harvesting of tropical timber has been 
partially obscured by a greater level of uptake in the arguably already well-
managed forests of Europe, and the developed world generally. For PEFC, two 
underlying motives were the desire to create a market alternative to FSC in 
Europe (and subsequently the world), and provide a place for forest owners not 
initially welcome in the FSC system. It could be argued that SFM was a 
secondary, more public, market objective. Being non-state initiatives, both PEFC 
and FSC also have their own sets of external constraints, the most notable being 
their market-based orientation, and their inability to impose compliance on forest 
actors in the same way as nation-states might do. But despite being composed of 
nation-states with potentially more regulatory power than such non-state 
initiatives, UNFF’s goal to promote sustainable management has also been 
restricted, in its case by political and diplomatic considerations. This has resulted 
in a voluntary and non-legally-binding system, which has been effectively 
stripped of any enforcement capacity. Whether this will assist or hinder action on 
combating deforestation is not yet clear. 
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Durability 
All four systems passed the threshold, FSC and ISO both rating highly, and UNFF 
and PEFC achieving a medium rating.  In the case of FSC and ISO this score is in 
some part due to their relatively long existence as far as non-state market driven 
governance systems go (approximately a decade and a half). The FSC has built in 
the ability for its regional standards to be sufficiently flexible to fit into local 
conditions, whilst at the same time meeting international accreditation 
requirements. It has also demonstrated its ability to adapt to changing market 
conditions (most notably the arrival of competitor programmes) and more recently 
in ensuring that the contents of its standards are mutually consistent. Some 
criticisms have been levelled against the institution: it has been slow to adapt to 
the needs of its business constituents and its standards vary in their stringency 
both on a country-by-country level, and in terms of generic versus national 
standards. ISO reflects a similar ability to adapt to changing market conditions on 
an even broader level, moving in a more historical context from product- to 
process-based standardisation, including an increasing range of social-
environmental standards beyond environmental management systems (social 
responsibility and greenhouse gas emissions, for example). Although there has 
been some institutional resistance, the development of these new standards has 
also demonstrated a degree of flexibility in responding to the arrival of new 
interests, and their needs. It too has been criticised over consistency: in the case of 
the 14000 Series, for the large discrepancies in environmental performance 
between different companies, depending on the stringency of their (internally 
generated) objectives. 
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Both UNFF and PEFC are relatively recent institutions of forest governance, 
and as such cannot be compared with ISO and FSC in terms of longevity. UNFF 
does however have a degree of institutional continuity from previous 
intergovernmental forest arrangements of the IPF and IFF, and a large proportion 
of its multi-year programme of works is built on the previous efforts of these 
bodies. Its lifetime has also been extended at least until 2015. It has shown a 
degree of adaptability by clustering the 270 PfA of its predecessors into thematic 
areas and specific reporting criteria. It has also demonstrated a degree of 
flexibility in reinterpreting its mandate: the decision, after much fruitless debate, 
to abandon a legally binding instrument is one such example. PEFC has 
demonstrated an ability to adapt to changing market conditions, but it is difficult 
to determine whether this is as a result of a genuine desire to respond to criticism 
or as a matter of pragmatic expediency. The institution has a tendency towards 
excessive flexibility in terms of its national standards, which can be either 
performance- or systems-based, and either nationally or regionally implemented. 
This raises questions over the consistency of its standards. 
Preliminary Conclusions: Implementation 
It is interesting to note that it is the three non-state systems that perform better in 
terms of implementation than UNFF, although, in the case of PEFC, only 
marginally. This may be related to the fact that these systems use third party 
compliance verification against a set of standards, a model of private rulemaking, 
which, it has been argued, exceeds the regulatory requirements of state-based 
approaches.20 An observation might therefore be made that even within voluntary 
systems, a degree of compulsion is necessary to change behaviour. 
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In terms of their problem solving capacity, it is interesting to note that with the 
exception of the FSC, the low rating for ISO and PEFC would seem to imply that 
non-state systems are not automatically more likely to tackle problems more 
effectively than state-centric approaches. Firstly, it is possible that market-based 
instruments are the wrong tools to tackle deforestation, since it has been argued 
that deforestation is a consequence of current market ideology. Public goods 
(forests) have been converted to private assets in a global neo-liberal economy 
that promotes voluntary regulation, which is a policy approach that renders action 
ineffective.21 This critique is certainly relevant to the ISO 14000 Series where 
economic interests confined the programme to facilitating world trade by means 
of process- rather than performance-based environmental management standards 
for sustainable development, a decision that was to have a normative influence on 
subsequent management systems, including PEFC. Secondly, an argument has 
been advanced that certification is simply too narrowly focussed for tackling such 
a comprehensive problem as deforestation.22 FSC’s decision to expand its policy 
parameters beyond economic considerations, and adopt performance-based 
standards in contrast to the other certification systems investigated may mitigate 
these criticisms, and provide an explanation for its more positive impact on the 
ground.  
Nevertheless, fundamental question arises from these case studies as to 
whether a system that fails to tackle a given problem can be considered to have 
succeeded either in terms of implementation, or more broadly, as a governance 
system. A preliminary conclusion offered here is that this depends on the extent to 
which a system has passed or failed in other areas of governance; i.e. whether it 
has the other necessary structural and procedural components in place to improve 
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its performance. These components are important since, given the complexity of 
the issues surrounding deforestation, it should be recognised that combating such 
a problem is likely to take time, and the longer-term efficacy of an institution may 
depend on the quality of its governance arrangements overall. It should also be 
remembered that all non-state systems passed the implementation threshold, while 
UNFF did not. This may be a peculiarity of UNFF, since it has no effective 
implementation capacity by design. Given its massive mandate, and broad based 
membership, if UNFF had made strong agreements backed by powerful sanctions 
it might have had a more significant on the ground impact. Given that non-state 
regulatory mechanisms now seem an accepted complement to tackling problems 
when the state proves insufficient indicates there is a strong likelihood that non-
state measures will continue into the future.23 However, other intergovernmental 
processes are legally binding such as the EU’s Forest law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade Action Plan. This has arisen in the wake of UNFF as an 
alternative mechanism with a focus on illegal logging, and demonstrates the value 
of an ongoing role for governments in combating deforestation.  
Comparative Institutional Performance 
Summary 
Looking at the strongest performer first, FSC most clearly fulfils the requirements 
for meaningful participation and productive deliberation at a principle level, and 
the interaction between structure and process appears to have been the most 
collaborative of all four systems in terms of outcomes, as it is the only system to 
meet the normative threshold for problem solving, and rating most highly overall 
in terms of implementation. In terms of interest representation, FSC is almost the 
complete reverse of PEFC: with a high degree of inclusiveness, and a satisfactory 
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performance in the other indicators of participation, it is well placed structurally 
to handle the necessary deliberations associated with multi-stakeholder decision 
making. Here the relationship between structure and process is the most 
favourably expressed, since the system also demonstrates a satisfactory level of 
democracy, and a high degree of agreement. The only area of concern is the 
FSC’s problems associated with settling disputes; this has caused problems in the 
past, and unless adequately addressed in the systems new proposed changes, may 
do so in the future. 
In the case of ISO, the low degree of equality and access to resources amongst 
participants cuts across its satisfactory level of inclusiveness, impacting on the 
representation of interests overall, although the institution does exceed the 
threshold value. A weak performance in terms of transparency also impacts on its 
level of institutional responsibility as a whole, although the threshold is met, but 
not exceeded. On a procedural level ISO’s weak dispute settlement mechanisms 
have been the subject of ongoing and unresolved conflict between the more and 
less powerful interests within the system. If ISO were to be judged solely by its 
outputs these governance shortcomings might be overlooked in view of the 
existence of useable standards. However, in terms of its implementation, ISO’s 
problem solving capacity is low. This is partly attributable to a lack of 
performance targets, raising the possibility that according a more equal status to 
those groups that advocated improving this aspect of the standard, and addressing 
their concerns, might lead to an overall improvement in problem solving capacity. 
In this instance it may be possible to see a correlation between structural and 
procedural shortcomings and the deficit in the problem solving aspect of 
implementation. Given the institution’s willingness to re-evaluate the manner in 
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which certain sectors participate in some of its more recent standards, its current 
participatory shortcomings are not insurmountable, although there remains a level 
of hostility from national standards bodies that play a role in ISO not dissimilar to 
the Member States of UNFF. If these shortcomings and the failings of its current 
dispute settlement mechanisms are addressed, as recent reports have 
recommended, it is not impossible that ISO’s problem solving capacity will 
increase over the medium term. 
Looking at PEFC, the point has already been made that structurally the 
institution is not capable of delivering meaningful participation for anything other 
than a restricted set of interests. Since the system is oriented largely towards these 
insiders, a lack of transparency is only really an issue for outsiders, whose 
participation is neither encouraged nor resourced anyway. For those interests that 
are included in the system it is worth noting that the absence of equality, 
democracy, or even effective dispute mechanisms has not prevented those within 
the system from reaching agreements. Indeed, with such a high level of 
‘consensus’ amongst those involved over the parameters of the system’s various 
certification programmes, it might be argued that higher levels of such 
governance attributes are not necessary. This argument is reinforced by the fact 
that the system’s implementation capacity is passable, in comparison to UNFF. 
On this view, increasing inclusiveness, and other such governance shortcomings, 
might even prove counter-productive for current participants. In effect, PEFC, 
despite the recommendations of the recent review, may continue in its present 
state in order to maintain itself. But if no change is instituted, opponents to the 
current paradigm will remain unable to participate meaningfully or make 
substantive contributions to policy and procedural decisions. Implementation will 
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probably continue to be relatively effective, but because it has arisen in such a 
constrained social-political environment, the system’s problem solving capacity is 
likely to remain low. PEFC does not at present have the necessary governance 
attributes to improve its performance -- which it may yet obtain, if it fulfils the 
recommendations of its own governance review. 
UNFF, although performing at a level similar to that of PEFC, has a slightly 
different set of structural and procedural problems. In reality it has an exclusive 
membership, since only states can join and participate as recognised actors. In 
addition there are shortcomings in equality, resources and transparency between 
those within in the system, and its procedures disenfranchise a number of 
participating interests. Unlike PEFC however, UNFF is characterised by a lower 
level of agreement. In this instance, its more universal inclusion of Member States 
may work against it: as a UN body with a universal country membership, it cannot 
simply exclude conflicting interests. Also unlike PEFC it does not exercise its 
permitted option of majority voting; parties are condemned to a lowest common 
denominator form of consensus, resulting in deliberations that are not particularly 
productive -- especially given the lack of dispute settlement mechanisms. Another 
critical difference between it and PEFC, despite similarly poor scores is its lack of 
implementation capacity. PEFC by contrast, although a voluntary system, does 
impose some obligations on subscribers. If UNFF does not improve its level of 
performance under its new non-legally binding format, its perception as a hollow 
and ‘decoy’ institution will be reinforced.  
Typological Comparison and Preliminary Conclusions 
In Chapter One, the introduction questioned the adequacy of existing global 
governance institutions to the task of managing forests in the current era. FSC’s 
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success in particular, it was argued, did not arise from the institution itself, but 
rather, that the particular expression of democratic participation, which 
underpinned its system of governance, made the institution more suited to the 
current era of globalisation than the other institutions selected. Such a claim 
required some justification, and an examination of the theory and practice of 
governance noted firstly a shift away from ‘top-down’, to more participatory 
approaches, and a preference for deliberative, rather than aggregative, democratic 
modes. However, given the many different types of modern governance, it was 
necessary to explore contemporary governance in more detail. Three factors, or 
parameters, were identified as influencing the various types of contemporary 
global governance: authority (state versus non-state), democracy (aggregative 
versus deliberative) and innovation (new versus old). In their respective case 
study chapters, each institution was classified on the basis of these parameters, 
and the quality of its governance evaluated.  
It has so far been left unsaid as to which of the institutions, in view of their 
performance, can be considered legitimate. As a result of the investigations 
undertaken in the case studies, it transpires that two institutions, the FSC and ISO, 
have exceeded the 50% pass/fail threshold overall. ISO, like FSC, also exceeds 
the thresholds at the principle and criterion levels for both meaningful 
participation and productive deliberation. To this degree, it might be said that on 
the basis of the quality of their governance systems, both FSC and ISO could be 
considered legitimate institutions, and, by implication, PEFC and UNFF 
illegitimate.  
However, even if both ISO and FSC can be considered legitimate institutions, 
there is a relatively large gap in overall performance between the two. With FSC 
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scoring 24 points out of 33, and ISO 19, there is a difference of five points, or 
about 15%, of the total score achievable. Between FSC and PEFC, the difference 
is ten points, or 30%, and between FSC and UNFF 11 points, or 33%. The 
intention here is therefore to look at the performance of each of the institutions in 
relation to the three parameters discussed above, and see if there is a relationship 
between institutional performance and the types of governance of which the four 
case studies are exemplars.  
Figure 8.1 below locates each of the case studies in the model institutional 
classification first presented in Chapter Three. The first point to note is that both 
UNFF and PEFC, the weakest performers of the four case studies, occupy the 
portion of space that is more oriented to the state-centric end of the authority (x) 
axis, a situation repeated on the aggregative end of the democracy (z) axis. The 
closeness of their overall performance in relation to innovation notwithstanding, it 
is interesting that they fall on opposite sides of the zero-point for the innovation 
(y) axis. The similarity of their overall performance makes it difficult to draw any 
definite conclusions. It is however interesting to speculate as to whether PEFC’s 
more innovative governance style has contributed to its marginal lead over UNFF. 
More significant however is the possibility that the two institutions’ poor overall 
performance is linked to their state-centric, aggregative democratic orientation 
raises potentially profound questions regarding the exercise of authority and 
democratic practice. 
The second point of interest is that both FSC and ISO, the higher performers, 
provide a mirror opposite to UNFF and PEFC, occupying the non-state end of the 
authority continuum. In terms of innovation, ISO sits slightly along the ‘old’ end 
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of the y-axis, while FSC is much further along the ‘new’ end of the axis. A similar 
situation exists on the democracy axis.  
Figure 8.1 Institutional classification of governance type: UNFF, PEFC, FSC, ISO 
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both institutions regarding their location on the axes for innovation and 
democracy. Here it may be possible to infer some relationship between 
democracy, innovation and overall performance.  There may also be a link to their 
generally higher performance and the non-state nature of their authority. 
Looking at FSC, the most highly rating governance system of the four case 
studies, it is clear that it sits closest to the non-state, deliberative, and ‘new’ ends 
of the authority, democracy and innovation axes of any of the case studies. It 
should also be noted that the FSC is the only institution clearly placed on the 
deliberative end of the democracy axis. This may lend some credence to the 
linkage made in the introduction between the ‘fit’ between deliberative modes of 
democracy and contemporary global governance, in contrast to the inherent 
conflict between economic, environmental, and social interests participating in 
governance systems that adopt a more traditional, aggregative-democratic 
approach. 
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Conclusions  
This study has looked in detail at the construction of global governance, making 
use of the environmental policy domain as a thematic area to understand its 
contemporary expression in finer detail. Generally, it has argued the case that 
participation and deliberation are integral to the structures and processes of 
effective and legitimate governance in contemporary global institutions. 
Specifically, using a detailed framework of governance-related principles, criteria 
and indicators for evaluating governance quality, it has investigated a range of 
systems, and has assessed their performance. This framework has gone beyond 
the relatively random selection and application of criteria used to determine 
governance quality elsewhere. Having applied the framework to the 
environmental policy area of forests and forest management, clear and specific 
differences between governance systems have been revealed. The ways in which 
these systems differ means that the institutions that have been investigated are not 
to be understood as similar entities: once an analysis of governance is applied 
consistently, as it has been done here, it is possible to see how these differences 
impact on the legitimacy of the institutions in question. If the institutions 
investigated are interested in ‘best practice governance’, and wish to address their 
legitimacy deficits, they need to take a closer look at the indicators in which they 
fall short. It is hoped that the study that has been undertake here, will encourage 
institutional leaders, and general readers, to ask their own questions as to how 
democracy is being, and can be, practised to meet the needs of the third 
millennium. 
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Each of the case studies has also been further delineated as representing a 
specific type, and the case has been made that there is a relationship between this 
classification and overall performance. Beyond the specific variations noted in the 
systems investigated in this study, contemporary governance is expressed in a 
number of divergent, and at times, competing, models. A process aimed at 
developing national governmental responses may place an entirely different 
emphasis on certain governance attributes than private or civic initiatives. Whilst 
all will share similar components, and at times provide complementary 
approaches, they may vary markedly in their policy objectives. Indeed, these 
observations apply even within apparently similar regulatory models such as 
certification, and are reinforced, for example, by the rivalry between market 
competitors. Such rivalries point to a tension within the market-driven emphasis 
in contemporary governance, and especially within the discourse of sustainable 
development. This discourse has been adopted, and indeed, it has been argued, 
aggressively pursued, through a particularly dominant ideology of the 
contemporary era, neo-liberalism.1 But as the introduction noted, the cornucopian 
model of limitless economic growth in a finite world has itself contributed to 
unsustainable development.  
And so it is that the global environmental policy arena is built upon the 
conflicting values of economic rationalism on the one hand, and the need for 
environmental protection on the other. How to collaborate in such potentially 
fraught contexts is one of the most important challenges to this rapidly evolving 
domain of global policy making. The increasing role played by the private sector, 
NGOs and other non-state actors at all levels has necessitated the development of 
alternatives to the traditional methods utilised by nation-states. Environmental 
  602 
governance therefore typifies a contemporary trend for interaction between 
decentralised networks made up of multiple actors.2 The institutions in which 
these interactions occur are manifold, and even within a single policy domain 
there are multiple approaches to addressing common problems. Although 
‘governance without government’ remains someway off, there is nevertheless a 
wide array of mechanisms of social-political decision-making, ranging from the 
centralised and hierarchical, to the decentralised and self-regulatory.3 
Forest governance has provided an ideal laboratory in which to scrutinise “the 
increasing tendency for collaboration in many sectors where political and 
economic trade-offs also exist.”4 Where a particular policy arena is built around 
conflicting values, the role played by institutions established to address the 
particular issue becomes a critical one. So too does the type of governance system 
utilised to negotiate, make and implement decisions addressing the policy issue. 
Where there are value conflicts inherent in the policy area, a deliberative approach 
encompassing multiple sets of interested parties, as demonstrated in this study, is 
more effective than one that seeks to serve only single or dual interests, since this 
only entrenches conflict.  
In the case studies investigated, it is possible to draw two significant 
conclusions regarding deliberation and conflict. Firstly, the four institutions place 
different emphases on certain sets of interests. In the case of UNFF, governments 
are to be identified as the single interest grouping, with the most exclusive access 
to decision making. PEFC clearly favours forest owners and the forest industry. 
These two institutions impede the participation of a range of interested parties in 
substantive discussions, and can be interpreted as being either single- or dual 
interest focussed. ISO has a largely business/technocratic emphasis, although this 
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is now being challenged by non-state interests. The FSC has a legacy of close 
relations to environmental NGOs and has had some problems with the 
representation of social interests, but as a system, it has a broad-based 
constituency. It is the one system in which genuinely ‘multi-stakeholder’ 
deliberation is central to decision making processes.  Secondly, given the 
variation in the performance of the institutions investigated, it appears that the 
practice of democracy is not yet an optimal level to adequately account for the 
multiple actors involved in global forest governance. The lack of consistency 
across the case studies should be a source of concern as it indicates that in terms 
of their broader structures and processes, some of the institutions investigated are 
less democratic than others. This has implications for their legitimacy, and 
therefore, the value to some interests of participating within them at all. 
How the implications of this study will be taken up by the institutions 
investigated are for them to decide; it is possible that they may wish to make 
improvements in their governance as a result. For them, and other institutions that 
may be interested in evaluating their own performance, determining if a 
‘minimalist’ or ‘elaborate’ programme of improvement is necessary to achieve 
gains in performance would be a highly practical area for further research. A 
minimalist approach would look at making improvements at the indicator level, 
whilst a more elaborate programme would entail changes at the criterion and 
principle -- i.e. structural and procedural -- levels. For the FSC the changes 
required would appear to be at the indicator level. In the case of ISO, the changes 
required would appear to be slightly more significant, but also relate largely to the 
indicator level. For PEFC, which this study has presented as being relatively state-
dependent despite its non-state orientation, it might be a question of increasing its 
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autonomy from the state, shifting its governance away from a ‘state democratic’ 
model, and making other changes to its structures and procedures.5 In the case of 
the intergovernmental programme UNFF the degree of change necessary will 
mean according non-state interests a much greater role, and moving beyond the 
rules and procedures of the UN system as they stand. This may require a degree of 
change at the principle and criteria levels that these latter two institutions neither 
can, nor will, implement. However, given the problems identified in this study 
with their governance models, some changes are essential -- at the indicator level 
at the very least. 
Beyond these specific recommendations, it is difficult to draw any definitive 
conclusions from only four institutions about the practice of democracy in an era 
of globalisation, particularly if the findings from the studies are used to determine 
if the causal relationships between deliberation and effectiveness are to be applied 
elsewhere. Any future analytical studies into the quality of global environmental 
governance would require a greater number of case studies across a wider range 
of other institutional types to determine if the trends identified here are correct. 
Consequently, this study should be seen as developing some insights into, and 
contributing to a revision of, some of the theories of contemporary governance, 
but it is not definitive in its own right.  
There are other problems associated with the methodology developed in this 
study. Although the analytical approach adopted has been consistent across 
institutions, the means by which their performance has been assessed is less so. 
Whilst it is true that the governance problems associated with each of the systems 
investigated are often unique, it may still have been useful if the hierarchical 
framework of assessment had been extended to a finer level of detail to include 
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specific verifiers for each indicator.6 This might have provided a uniform set of 
information by which each indicator could be evaluated.7 This would make data 
collection easier, and more reliant on specific information; for example, in the 
case of transparency, one verifier might be the public availability of certain types 
of information (for example board minutes). Another similar shortcoming is the 
selective nature of the personal interviews used. These might have been more 
useful if they had been larger in number, and quantitatively, rather than 
qualitatively, analysed. 
Finally, there are also some possible problems with the calibration of the 
evaluative matrix. Firstly, with a simple ‘low-medium-high’ evaluation of 
governance performance, some of the ratings are almost too close to call. This 
might be resolved by increasing the sophistication of calibration. Secondly, at 
present each indicator is equally weighted within the relevant criterion. In the case 
of interest representation, for example, this places the same degree of significance 
on the provision of resources for participation as the inclusiveness of 
participation. In the field of forest certification, from which the use of PC&I 
presented here has been adpated, it has been noted the scoring and weighting of 
indicators and determining their relative importance is a subjective exercise.8 
Investigating the application of PC&I in a range of other fields may be helpful in 
this regard. 
Nevertheless, this study has made some useful contributions to understanding 
contemporary governance. One of the most potentially valuable of these has been 
the development of an analytical framework by which the different aspects of a 
governance system have been attached to either structure or process. This has 
provided a new means of examining a range of different governance types against 
  606 
a common set of PC&I. It also provides an opportunity for the development of a 
programmatic method to evaluate performance in a relatively simple manner, and 
identify areas in need of improvement. Each of the case studies investigated 
functions on both the micro, meso and macro levels, from the local to the global. 
It would therefore be helpful to determine if assessment can be scaled down to 
encompass those aspects of global governance that occur at the national and sub-
national levels. The methodology adopted in this study implies that consistently 
formulated hierarchies of PC&I have the potential to be applied at all spatial 
levels.9  
The value of the PC&I approach to evaluation is that it also allows for the 
creation of standards that can serve as a reference for monitoring, assessment and 
reporting.10 It would be entirely possible to develop a standard out of the 
framework used in this study that could be applied to the practice of governance 
at the global, national and local levels. In view of the inconsistency of the 
governance arrangements utilised in each of the case studies investigated, the 
disagreements in the literature over the various attributes of governance, and the 
‘self-certification’ currently in place, such a standard is in fact essential. As the 
world comes to grips with a range of global problems, and social political 
interactions increasingly shift to non-state democratic contexts, governance 
standards will become the main means by which legitimacy can be guaranteed. 
Such standards will make it easier for potential participants to determine whether 
they should engage in a given process or not. It will avoid the uncertainty that 
currently exists over the legitimacy of a given system, and whether to lend it 
credibility by participating. 
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ISO is now looking at social responsibility and standards setting in other 
similar social-political contexts, which would make it an ideal body to develop 
such standards. Whether national standards bodies and the business/technocratic 
community will initiate such a process remains to be seen. The initiative may 
need to come from elsewhere. Given this current gap, and the very fluid nature of 
authority on the global level, any body that takes up the challenge to manage the 
process of negotiating the development and deployment of such standards could 
make a significant contribution to the practice of global governance.11  
An obvious area for further research is whether the analytical framework 
developed here can be applied elsewhere. A comparative study including other 
forest governance programmes, such as the various intergovernmental Forest Law 
Enforcement and Governance processes, as well as other PEFC-affiliates such as 
SFI and CSA, and FSC partner LEI would be enlightening. A study of PEFC 
members for example would provide useful information regarding the 
Programme’s quality and legitimacy at the national level.  
A discrete, but related avenue for further research which would also be useful 
would be a comparative analysis as to whether market-based governance systems 
are more, or less, effective than other models, and which specific market models  
-- focussing on illegal logging versus sustainability certification for example -- 
constitute the better problem solving approaches. Here, the insights gained into 
market-driven systems might have wider relevance beyond forests. A closely 
related area, such as social responsibility, already demonstrating a range of 
certification systems and intergovernmental approaches not dissimilar from those 
associated with forest management, is a likely candidate for evaluation against 
such models and standards.12 Fairtrade and other commodity labelling 
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programmes, as well as organic certification more generally, spring to mind. 
Research into the framework’s applicability to other environmental policy 
domains, one of the most topical being climate change, would also be interesting. 
In this case, an exploration of the relationship between meaningful participation, 
productive deliberation and performance would be very useful. So too would an 
evaluation of the quality of the governance of the rapidly expanding market-based 
systems for emissions trading. In this area, the need for standards of governance 
quality is critical.13 
In addition to deliberation, the research in this study has also implied that there 
is a higher level of performance if an institution is non-state-centric, and adopts an 
innovative governance model. This hypothesis might be tested in more detail by 
treating each these factors as dependent variables in a study of the performance of 
a range of non-state-centric models. One institution that could be included in such 
a study is the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC): it contains a number of 
features similar to the FSC, but is sufficiently different in terms of structure and 
process to provide some valuable insights into which variables make the greatest 
contribution to effectiveness.14 
Given that forest governance has been identified as being indicative of broader 
political and economic trends, and of social-political interaction more generally, it 
is also possible that the analytical framework presented here may be applicable 
beyond the environmental arena. A question that would be worthy of investigation 
is whether it can be applied to economic institutions such as the World Bank, the 
World Trade Organisation and the International Monetary Fund. In view of the 
current economic crisis, an institutional analysis focussing on governance 
performance across the global financial sector would assist greatly in the current 
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efforts for regulatory reform. Whether there are casual links between market 
failure and governance failure, and whether a deliberative approach contributes to 
a more effective institution than one dominated by single or dual interests, would 
be extremely valuable hypotheses to test.15  
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with FSC as a non-state model? How might the concept of NSMD governance be refined to take 
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7 Lammerts van Beuren and Blom, Hierarchical Framework p. 25. 
8 Lammerts van Beuren and Blom, Hierarchical Framework p. 29. 
9 Lammerts van Beuren and Blom, Hierarchical Framework, p. 7. It is noted however that: 
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10 Lammerts van Beuren and Blom, Hierarchical Framework, p. 34. 
11 An alternative, and equally suited body might be the One World Trust 
http://www.oneworldtrust.org, whose global accountability framework formed the basis of the 
PEFC governance review. 
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Organizations’ certification standards, and the UN’s Global Compact would provide a similar mix 
of state and non-state governance systems as those investigated in this study.  
13 In 2000, the author conducted a study of forestry companies in the state of Tasmania, Australia 
that were clearing old growth forests and rainforests for the establishment of plantations that were 
being promoted for their carbon sequestration (fset) value (Tim Cadman, The Clearcut Case: How 
the Kyoto protocol Could Become a Driver for Deforestation (Amsterdam: Greenpeace 
International, undated).  
14 The MSC has a structure somewhere between FSC and ISO: founded exclusively by WWF in 
partnership with Unilever, the Main Board of Trustees of fifteen is the supreme authority, under 
which sits a Technical Advisory Board, which in turn is guided by a Stakeholder Council of 50 
members (Nancy Vallejo and Pierre Hauselmann, Governance and Multi-stakeholder Processes 
(Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2004), p. 11). Characterised as 
being similarly inclusive to the FSC in its consultation processes, it sits closer to governments than 
FSC with its P&C based on a Code of Conduct developed by FAO, but governments – perhaps in 
response to non-state encroachment (and mirroring some of the certification wars between FSC 
and PEFC) – have responded by developing their own guidelines for fish and fisheries eco-
labelling (Lars H. Gulbrandsen, “Mark of Sustainability? Challenges for Fishery and Forestry Eco-
labeling”, Environment 47 (5) (2005), p. 13).  A note of caution has been raised that “the selection 
of cases for study on the basis of the outcomes on the dependent variable biases conclusions” 
(Barabara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in 
Comparative Politics” Political Analysis 2 (1990) 131-150). 
15 This is hinted at in some of the literature examined for this study. Kjaer makes a link between 
economic governance and effective cooperation (Anne Mette Kjaer, Governance (Cambridge and 
Malden MA: Polity Press, 2004), p. 132). She equates effectiveness to “strategies relying on upon 
dialogue, consensus seeking and inclusion, rather than coercion, raw power and exclusion” 
(Governance, p. 147). Gamble recognises that diverse actors now shape how the global economy 
is governed and that there are multiple forms of economic governance consisting of “different 
combinations of markets, hierarchies, networks and communities” (Andrew Gamble, “Economic 
Governance” in Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy ed. Jon Pierre 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 110-137 at p. 134). In the same volume, Jon Pierre 
views some of the causes and consequences of governance failure and economic performance as 
stemming from poor institutional frameworks (Jon Pierre, “Conclusions: Governance Beyond 
State Strength”, in Debating Governance pp. 241-246 at p. 245, following D. C. North, 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University press, 1990)). 
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